THE TIGRAY WAR®IONAL IMPLICATIONS (VOLUME 1)

1. Forward

By Habte Hagos, Chair of Eritrea Focus

The tragic, brutal and entirely predictable war in Tigray has brought immense suffering to the Tigrayan people, exacerbated the long suffering of the Eritrean people and caused misery to families across the Horn of Africa. This report is an attempt to capture the complexities of the war and the events that led up to it. It includes detailed explanations of everything from the origins of the conflict and the looted treasures of the region to the atrocities committed against the Tigrayan people in general and women in particular. The authors have attempted to provide a dispassionate analysis of these dramatic events, from a variety of perspectives. Eritrea Focus encourages this diversity of opinions, without endorsing all the views contained in the report.

Although the atrocities we have chronicled are despicable and horrific, they should not come as a surprise. Almost every single atrocity inflicted on innocent Tigrayan civilians have been, and are being, committed against the people of Eritrean. Their heroic fight for independence, and against Ethiopian oppression, culminated in the liberation of Asmara in 1991 and our de-jure independence in 1993. Yet our hard-won freedom has been illusory: Eritrea has become a prison-state for its people. President Isaias Afwerki’s regime is not constrained by a functioning constitution, a parliament or an effective judicial system. It is an absolute dictatorship by a leader who has never faced an election.

The 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices issued in March 2021 by the US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor on Eritrea graphically described the atrocities committed by the Eritrean regime against its people¹:

“Significant human rights issues included: unlawful and arbitrary killings, forced
disappearance; torture; and arbitrary detention, all committed by the government;
harsh and life-threatening prison and detention center conditions; political prisoners;
serious problems with judicial independence; arbitrary or unlawful interference with
privacy; the worst forms of restrictions on free expression and the press, including
censorship and the existence of criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the
rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; severe restrictions on
religious freedom; widespread restrictions on freedom of movement; inability of
citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections;
restrictions on political participation; trafficking in persons; criminalization of
consensual same-sex sexual conduct; and the worst forms of child labor”.

These atrocities, and others, have been chronicled annually since 2014 by the UN Human Rights Commission.² However, the international community has failed to use the information in these reports to take action against the Eritrean government; instead preferring to look the other way. This has left Eritrea’s people to suffer in perpetuity, behind closed doors. These horrific abuses, first inflicted on the Eritrean people, are now being exported to Tigray. The inaction of the international community has made this possible.

This report was conceived on the day of the outbreak of the Tigray war in November 2020 and has been brought together over many months. It is being published as events are unfolding in the most dramatic fashion. The re-capture of Mekelle on Monday 28 June by Tigrayan forces, in what can only be described as a stunning victory for the Tigray Defence Forces, has transformed the situation. However, it has not been possible to capture all aspects of these transformative events in this version of the report. We aim to provide a fuller, updated version at a later date. At this critical moment Eritrea Focus – as an Eritrean human rights organisation – calls for the following.

First: The immediate, unconditional and verifiable withdrawal of all Eritrean forces from Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia. Unless the Eritrean troops withdraw immediately, the unilateral ceasefire proclaimed by the Ethiopian government on 28 June will leave large areas of Tigray under occupation. This cannot be the basis for peace and will prolong the war in which thousands of Eritrean youth continue to perish.

Second: In the light of the famine now gripping Tigray, with 900,000 identified as close to starvation, it is vital that all bottlenecks and roadblocks on Ethiopian roads, preventing humanitarian assistance reaching the needy, are removed. The ports of Eritrea and Djibouti must also be open to shipping so that aid from the international community can flow through them. The aid route through Sudan (used during the 1984-85 famine) also needs to be re-opened. These measures are both vital and urgent.

Third: Those responsible for the atrocities committed during the war – especially those who systematically abused women and sent underage Eritrean children to war – must be held to account. This requires an internationally recognised, independent investigation and reference to international courts, if local courts prove incapable of prosecuting those involved. No-one – including the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea – should be granted immunity.

Fourth: All works of art and means of production, as well as personal belonging, looted by the occupying powers, must be returned. An international commission should be established to take stock of what has been stolen, and assist with the restoration of damaged works. A precedent for this exists in the commission established at the end of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war of 1998 – 2000 to assess the
responsibility for goods looted and homes and factories damaged on both sides of the border.

Fifth: It is vital that the good personal relations between Tigrayan and Eritrean communities, so terribly damaged by the current war, should be mended. This will take careful work by community and religious leaders. It is important to remember that both Eritreans and Tigrayans have suffered ruthless repression at the hands of President Isaias who wants to create hatred and division between our two peoples. We must not fall into this deceitful trap. There is immense goodwill between the Eritrean and Tigrayan diaspora. We should all work hard to build on this goodwill, and not allow events at home to divide or embitter us.

Sixth: As Eritreans we hold President Isaias Afwerki personally responsible for this war. His alliance with, and manipulation of, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed brought this unnecessary war upon our peoples and the region. President Isaias runs one of the world’s most dictatorial regimes and he, and the tiny circle around him, must not escape from this tragedy unscathed. They must be brought to justice and we call on the international community to ensure that this takes place.

And finally, a message to Eritrean diaspora. Every conflict has a silver lining and the tragic Tigray war has shown the coming together of the Eritreans abroad in a way that has never been seen before. There are ongoing concerted discussions about forming an Eritrean Government in Exile to replace the unelected regime in Asmara. Others are working proactively to establish a representative group that can advocate for the rights of the Eritrean people and to engage with the international community. This is the time and there is the momentum for us all to rise to the challenge. It is an opportunity we must grasp.

Dictators have a limited shelf life and President Isaias is no different. It is essential that we prepare in unison for a smooth transition to a peaceful and democratic Eritrea.

By Prof. Kjetil Tronvoll, Director, Oslo Analytica

The war on Tigray is a political, social, economic and humanitarian disaster, instigated by unaccountable political leaders in Ethiopia and Eritrea. This report outlines the key elements of the crisis and its impact on the people of Tigray in particular, and Ethiopia and Eritrea in general. The report will serve as a useful tool for the international community to increase their understanding of the complexities of the war, its political background, and future implications.

Oslo Analytical has been engaged in policy research on the political developments in the Horn of Africa in general and in Ethiopia and Eritrea in particular for several years. Our key efforts have been concentrating on providing policy advice to

international actors on the radical political changes occurring in Ethiopia, especially since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018. While praising the early reforms and diplomatic initiative towards Eritrea, we cautioned about the shift of policy directions in late 2018 and how it would impact stability and political trajectory of the country and undermine a genuine people-to-people peace process between the two countries. We have in particular addressed the so-called Ethiopian-Eritrean “peace process” and its political motivations and objectives, expressing a scepticism the genuine interest and the pursuit of peace by President Isaias Afwerki. Based on research in the Tigrayan-Eritrean borders, we unveiled a more sinister motive, which fed into our analysis of the new political dynamics.

Since the abolition of EPRDF and subsequent establishment of the Prosperity Party in December 2019, it became clear that political developments in Ethiopia would lead to an armed confrontation between the Federal government and the Tigray regional government unless conflict preventive measures were put in place. Oslo Analytica tried to mobilise the international community to undertake active conflict prevention diplomacy from early 2019, alas in vain.

Since the outbreak of war, we have been focusing on disseminating empirical based analysis on the war and its political and social impact in Tigray, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, with a three-fold objective: a) to support conflict prevention and mitigation; b) to alleviate the plight of the citizens of the Horn of Africa; and c) to end human rights violations and war crimes committed with impunity. We believe this report will greatly help in this endeavour.

2. Introduction: war, offensives and atrocities

By Martin Plaut³

2.1 Overview

The war in Tigray is now in its ninth month. This conflict, began as what the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed described as no more than a local “law enforcement operation” in November 2020. It soon escalated into a regional conflict involving Eritrean and Somali troops and Amhara special forces. The Tigrayans were rapidly driven from their capital, Mekelle and most of the region was soon in Ethiopian or Eritrean hands. Yet the Tigrayans fought on and in June 2021 transformed what had been a guerrilla war into a conventional conflict when they launched what they called “Operation Alula Aba Nega,” or simply “Operation Alula.”⁴ In just ten days, from 18 June to 28 June 2021 the Tigrayans succeeded in sweeping all before them, until they marched back into their regional capital, Mekelle. They found that the banks had been looted by the Ethiopian military just before they arrived and so had the UN offices. The ‘interim government’ appointed by the Ethiopians had packed up and fled. These events were followed by an Ethiopian offer of a unilateral ceasefire, but the offer was not well received by the Tigrayans, who pointed out that Ethiopian, Eritrean and Amhara troops remained on their soil.⁵ The United States responded by declaring that they would act if there were further atrocities, while re-iterating their call for Eritrean forces to leave and aid to be allowed to reach the needy without being held up at Ethiopian roadblocks.⁶ The shallowness of the Ethiopian ceasefire offer was soon revealed when the Ethiopian military declared that it could re-enter Mekelle within weeks, if necessary.⁷

Until these dramatic events unfolded the conflict was characterised by the following:

• Eritrean troops (despite initial denials by both governments) having direct involvement in the fighting since the start of the war in November 2020. The Ethiopian government then repeatedly stated that the Eritrean forces were about to leave⁸ (in response to calls for such a withdrawal from the international community) but this had, to date, not taken place. Rather, their troops were forced to leave large sections of Tigray by the Tigray Defence Forces.
• Somali troops were initially involved, as were regional Ethiopian militia, including the Amhara.
• As the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres pointed out, the conflict left Tigray “on the brink of famine” and that it will only get worse unless “funding is increased and humanitarian access is improved.”⁹ Mark Lowcock, the senior humanitarian emergency official at the UN, went further. He told a webinar on 10 June 2021 that 350,000 were already in a famine situation and that this figure was “higher than anywhere in the world.”¹⁰ Towards the end of June 2021 the head of USAID, Samantha Powers, put the figure at 900,000.¹¹ But getting aid to those in need is being held up by the Ethiopian and Eritrean military. As Samantha Powers said: “critical aid is being blocked and prevented from saving lives.”12
• The war has been characterised by extreme brutality against civilians. Thousands of women and girls have been sexually violated and raped, atrocities which appear to have been officially sanctioned. Civilians have been massacred and infrastructure, including historic and religious sites have been looted and destroyed. Religious leaders have been killed. Many thousands have been forced to flee to Sudan, while even larger numbers have been internally displaced in Tigray, or have sought sanctuary in other parts of Ethiopia.
• Eritrean refugee camps in Tigray, under the protection of UNHCR and the Ethiopian government, were attacked. Refugees were abused and killed with some forcibly returned to Eritrea from where they had fled.
• The fighting has spilled across Ethiopia’s frontiers, with clashes between Sudanese troops and Ethiopian, Eritrean and Amhara forces in a disputed border region – al-Fashaga.
• There are further regional tensions. The UAE was reported to have deployed drones against Tigrayan forces to support the Ethiopian and Eritrean war effort. The Ethiopian dam on the Blue Nile has caused deep concern for both Egypt and Sudan, which have threatened to prevent it being filled. Ethiopian peacekeepers in Sudan and Somalia were withdrawn to fight in Tigray.
• While this conflict has taken place inside Tigray there has been unrest in the rest of Ethiopia. Protests and fighting have taken place in a number of regions. The Prime Minister is facing extensive resistance from a number of ethnic groups, including the Amhara, Oromo, Gumuz, Qemant and Somali.

The aim of this report is to bring together information about the Tigray war from different perspectives, drawing on the expertise of a number of scholars. They take a variety of views on events. This is inevitable, since the conflict is still ongoing and it is far too early to provide a definitive account of what has taken place. This report is an honest attempt to provide a balanced narrative, with references where these can be provided. Since some of the information is provided by writers who have been directly involved in the region, some of the authors have asked not to be identified.

We trust the reader with understand the parameters within which the report is written.

The international community has been involved with the crisis from the start. The African Union and the United Nations, together with the European Union and individual states, have attempted to halt the Tigray war, without success. The best the international interventions have achieved is a statement from Prime Minister Abiy that Eritrean troops will leave Tigray, at an unspecified date, and an agreement to hold an investigation into human rights abuses. As the prime minister said in a Tweet: “In our March 26, 2021 discussions with President Isaias Afwerki during my visit to Asmara, the government of Eritrea has agreed to withdraw its forces out of the Ethiopian border.”¹³ Three months later this had yet to take place. There has been an increased access to some areas of Tigray for humanitarian agencies, but this is still limited.¹⁴ The EU has withdrawn some foreign aid and the United States has begun to impose sanctions against the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments, but the full panoply of measures have yet to be deployed by the West to persuade Ethiopia to open negotiations with the Tigrayans.

The Tigrayans were driven from the towns and moved their forces into the hills and mountains soon after the war commenced. The fighting continued, destabilising Ethiopia and the wider region.¹⁵ Eritrean men, women and even children, have been forcibly conscripted and thrown into the conflict, where many are paying with their lives. The war is a cruel drain on the resources and population of Ethiopia and its neighbours. It is also – in the view of Jeffrey Feltman – a potential threat to the entire region. Feltman, a seasoned former senior U.S. and United Nations diplomat (who was subsequently appointed President Biden’s special envoy to the Horn), told Foreign Policy in April 2021 that the conflict had the potential to spiral into a full-fledged regional crisis, citing a comparison to the war in Syria.¹⁶

“Look at what the collapse of Syria and the chaos of civil war has meant,” said Feltman, citing the refugee crisis and its impact on Europe, as well as the rise of terrorist groups in the power vacuum from the collapse of a country that had a pre-war population of around 22 million people. “Ethiopia has 110 million people,” he said. “If the tensions in Ethiopia would result in a widespread civil conflict that goes beyond Tigray, Syria will look like child’s play by comparison.”

2.2 Early attempts to halt the fighting

The outbreak of fighting in Tigray on the night of the 3/4 November 2020 followed months, if not years, of escalating tension. The Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders, Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki had planned some form of offensive against the Tigrayans, in association with the Somali leader, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known as ‘Farmaajo’, since 2018.¹⁷ The Tigrayan leadership responded by blocking the removal of heavy weapons from their border with Eritrea and refusing to accept the replacement of Ethiopian commanders in their region.¹⁸ The conflict that erupted on 3/4 November brought a flurry of international statements of concern. The UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, “expressed his alarm over the reported armed clashes in the Tigray region” and “called for immediate measures to de-escalate tensions and ensure a peaceful resolution to the dispute.”¹⁹ The very next day an influential group of American senior diplomats issued a warning about the regional implications of the conflict.²⁰ Signed by two former Assistant Secretaries of State for African Affairs (Chester Crocker and Jonnie Carson, plus former US ambassadors, it carried real weight and is worth quoting in some detail.

They warned that war could lead to a:

“fragmentation of Ethiopia” which in itself “would be the largest state collapse in modern history. Ethiopia is five times the size of pre-war Syria by population, and its breakdown would lead to mass interethnic and interreligious conflict; a dangerous vulnerability to exploitation by extremists; an acceleration of illicit trafficking, including of arms; and a humanitarian and security crisis at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East on a scale that would overshadow any existing conflict in the region, including Yemen. As Ethiopia is currently the leading Troop Contributing Country to the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, its collapse would also significantly impact the efforts by both to mitigate and resolve others conflicts in the Horn of Africa.”

The potential threat to stability of the Horn was underlined by the UN Secretary General who stressed in a further statement that: “The stability of Ethiopia is important for the entire Horn of Africa region.”²¹ The European Union’s most senior Foreign Affairs official, Joseph Borrell, made similar remarks when he expressed concern at the risk to the integrity of Ethiopia and called for a de-escalation of the crisis.²² None of the statements appear to have had any impact on the conflict itself, which continued to escalate.

Rather, Mr Borrell’s views, coming on top of the comments by the UN, apparently infuriated Prime Minister Abiy. In an official Tweet on 9 November 2020, he declared that: “Concerns that Ethiopia will descend into chaos are unfounded & a result of not understanding our context deeply. Our rule of law enforcement operation, as a sovereign state with the capacity to manage its own internal affairs, will wrap up soon by ending the prevailing impunity.”²³ The suggestion that the conflict would “wrapped up soon” proved wildly inaccurate. By April 2021, Abiy had to admit that far from the war being over, his forces were bogged down in ‘difficult and tiresome’ fighting on eight fronts.²⁴

As the war erupted the African Union attempted to intervene to end the conflict which was – after all – erupting just north of its headquarters in Addis Ababa. The chairman of the African Union Commission issued a statement appealing for “the immediate cessation of hostilities and calls on parties to respect human rights and ensure the protection of civilians,” while also urging talks.²⁵ Towards the end of November the African Union chairman, South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa, held talks with the Ethiopian President, Sahle-Work Zewde.²⁶ Together they hammered out a mediation plan. This involved the appointment of what were termed three African “distinguished Statespersons”: Joaquim Chissano, former President of the Republic of Mozambique; Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, former President of the Republic of Liberia; and Kgalema Motlanthe, former President of the Republic of South Africa. They were asked to act as Special Envoys of the African Union to help to mediate between “the parties to conflict” in Ethiopia.²⁷

Teferi Melesse Desta, the Ethiopian ambassador to Britain, told the BBC’s World Tonight on 20 November that his country had accepted the appointment of the three envoys to mediate in the crisis.²⁸ “The government of Ethiopia has accepted the initiative of the African Union chairperson, the President of South Africa, to appoint three special envoys to find a solution to the current situation in Ethiopia” Ambassador Teferi said. The international community moved swiftly to try to support the initiative. The UN Secretary General welcomed the appointment of the African Union envoys. A UN spokesman said that Mr Guterres “commends the Chairperson of the African Union, President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, for this initiative and extends the full support of the United Nations. He also expresses his appreciation to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia for facilitating this initiative for peace.”²⁹

Unfortunately, this went against the stated policy of Prime Minister Abiy who had tweeted on 11 November that there would be no dialogue “until our efforts to ascertain [sic] the rule of law are achieved”.³⁰ Clearly furious, the Prime Minister said he would meet the former African presidents, but had no interest in allowing them to mediate in the conflict, or travel to Tigray.³¹ “We don’t negotiate with criminals. We bring them to justice, not to the negotiating table,” the Prime Minister declared.³² Although Prime Minister Abiy met the three former presidents for stiff, but entirely pointless discussions on 27th November, the African Union mediation mission failed.³³ The last, best, chance for peace had been ended by Ethiopian government intransigence.

2.3 The war escalates

Air attacks began within days of the first clashes. Prime Minister Abiy announced that air strikes had taken place against what he described as military targets on 7th November.³⁴ At the same time the internet and telecommunications were cut. The army high command was re-structured to purge it of Tigrayan officers and anyone thought to be “unsound.”³⁵ Over the following weeks Tigrayans civilians were also ethnically targeted and forced out of their jobs, from airline staff with Ethiopian Airlines to taxi drivers in Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian parliament voted to replace Tigray’s elected government with an administration it would select.³⁶ The Ethiopian government subsequently officially declared the Tigray People’s Liberation Front a ‘terrorist organisation.’³⁷

The Eritrean government joined the offensive against Tigray. This had apparently been in preparation for some time, in collaboration with Ethiopia. It was reported that Ethiopian troops had, over weeks, been flown into Asmara in the dead of night and then transported up to the front lines. Prime Minister Abiy told the Ethiopian parliament that Ethiopian troops who refused to join the Tigrayans after 4 October, had fled into Eritrea, where they were fed, clothed and re-armed.³⁸ These Ethiopian soldiers then participated in Eritrea’s offensive against Tigray. On 10 November Reuters reported that the Tigray leader, Debretsion Gebremichael, accused Eritrea of crossing the border. “Since yesterday, the army of (Eritrean leader) Isaias (Afwerki) have crossed the country’s boundary and invaded,” he said. “They were attacking via Humera using heavy arms.”³⁹ At the time the statement was greeted with some scepticism; it soon proved to be true.

Two other forces were involved in the attack on Tigray: Amhara Regional Special Forces and associated militia, as well as Somali troops. This will be explored below.

Much of the initial fighting was concentrated along Ethiopia’s western border with Sudan, at the point where Eritrea and Ethiopia meet.⁴⁰ This was around the town of Humera which came under bombardment from Eritrean artillery from just over the border.⁴¹ The aim was clear: to attack Tigrayan forces from both North and South and to drive a wedge between them and the Sudanese border. Sudan was a conduit for supplies for the Tigrayans during the 1984-85 famine and throughout their long war that ended with their seizure of power in Addis Ababa in 1991. Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias, well aware of this fact, were determined to create a corridor along the Sudanese border, depriving the Tigrayans of potential support from Sudan, and efficiently cutting it off from the rest of the world.

The Prime minister made explicit his determination to prevent supplies entering Tigray from Sudan in an interview he gave on Fana television on 23 June 2021.⁴² Prime Minister Abiy explained that – in his view – the Tigrayans were using the present famine for their own ends, just as they had in the past.

“Until 1984, TPLF didn’t have a single town and a single zone which it could claim as their stronghold. They had never conducted a decisive battle. However, when the famine struck in 1984/85 and there were calls for aid corridors through to Sudan to be opened. The organisations that wanted to see the fall of the Derge (the Ethiopian military government) entered the areas held by the TPLF. They brought with them strategic advice, ideas, finance, training and armaments. The same organisations are now putting forward the same ideas. Today they want to use the same tactics which they used 30 or 40 years ago. We will never allow this to happen.”

The Eritrean and Ethiopian forces attacking Humera were joined by Amhara militia, who were keen to regain lands they believed to have been taken from them by the Tigrayans under the 1995 Constitution. By March 2021 the Amhara had seized large areas of Tigray.⁴³ Tigrayans were driven out of the areas that had been captured, fleeing eastwards, leaving a large swathe of territory between most of the population in the centre of the region and Sudan.

Despite the prime minister’s repeated assurances in early and mid-November that the war would soon be over there were few signs of this taking place. Rather, there was a swift advance on multiple fronts by Ethiopian forces and their allies. The towns of Axum and Sire fell.⁴⁴ The government declared it was in the “final phase” of an offensive in northern Tigray, with the capture of the town of Wukro, predicting that they would “control Mekelle in a few days”.⁴⁵ On 28th November the attack on the Tigray capital, Mekelle, began with a heavy bombardment.⁴⁶ Within hours of the assault the Ethiopian army chief of staff, General Berhanu Jula, said the army had captured the city. “Our hero army is fully in control of Mekelle,” the general declared.⁴⁷ While the city had fallen, the Tigrayan administration had ordered their forces to withdraw before the attack. An eyewitness explained what took place.⁴⁸

“After the bombing came the troops. The city was surrounded. The first we knew was that elders and priests called local meetings
in district halls. They told the people that the TPLF had left confidential messages with them. The leadership explained that they were pulling out of Mekelle to prevent it from being destroyed in fighting. They left for the mountains to continue the struggle. I understand why they did this, but it was a terrible moment. I felt helpless. Vulnerable. Alone. Some people panicked and left the city.”

With the regional capital and most major cities in the hands of Prime Minister Abiy’s forces, he felt able to claim victory: federal troops controlled Mekelle, a major development in a three-week-old war which was – in his view – effectively over.⁴⁹ He claimed that Mekelle had fallen and that “not a single civilian was killed” during the operation.⁵⁰ “I am pleased to share that we have completed and ceased the military operations in the Tigray region,” the prime minister said in a Tweet.⁵¹

This version of events was challenged by the Tigrayan leader, Debretsion Gebremichael. On 26 November Reuters reported receiving a message from Debretsion in which he said that his forces were continuing to fight, with clashes taking place near Mekelle.⁵² Perhaps to underline this message, the Tigrayans unleashed rocket attacks against the Eritrean capital, Asmara. As ever, this was not reported by official Eritrean government sources, but the US embassy put out an alert to its citizens in the country.⁵³ “At about 10:13pm on November 28 there were six explosions in Asmara. The Embassy again advises all U.S. Citizens in Eritrea to continue to exercise caution, remain in their homes (when not at work), conduct only essential travel, and to remain situationally aware of the ongoing conflict in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia. US Citizens not in country should avoid travel to Eritrea.” This was not the first time the Tigrayans had used rocket attacks. The cities of Bahir Dar and Gondar in the Amhara region were attacked on 13 November.⁵⁴ The rocket attacks did not continue. Perhaps the Tigrayans ran out of long-range missiles; perhaps their rocket launchers were destroyed from the air by jets or drones. Whatever the reason, they do not appear to have played a central role in the war.

The Tigrayans had adopted the tactics they had used throughout their long war against the Ethiopia government that ended with the TPLF seizing Addis Ababa in 1991: they retreated into the hills and mountains. Ethiopia was – once more – beset by a guerrilla war, of an intensity previously witnessed when the authorities last fought the Tigrayans.

3. Ethiopia at war

By Antony Shaw55

3.5 The Federal Government v Tigray Regional State

Introduction

On November 4, 2020, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ordered federal armed forces, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), into action to carry out a “law enforcement operation” in Tigray.⁵⁶ His statement followed a number of overnight attacks by Tigray Regional Special Forces and militia on ENDF bases and offices, in Mekelle, the capital of the region and headquarters of the Northern Command of the ENDF. There were similar confrontations in other parts of Tigray, some close to the border with Eritrea where the ENDF had major concentrations of troops and equipment. ⁵⁷ Surprisingly, the ENDF was taken unawares, Prime Minister Abiy said later. He said units were forced to flee into Eritrea without clothes or equipment, while others were surrounded with soldiers killed, some while sleeping.⁵⁸ There are two very different explanations of the actual outbreak of war that appear equally unlikely. The first is the story that was offered by the Tigrayan authorities.

The Tigray Regional Government originally claimed that the government started the conflict, though even then there was more than one version of what actually happened. One account claimed there had been an unsuccessful Federal government commando raid on Mekelle in the early hours of November 4 to try and seize the Tigrayan political leadership believed to be meeting at the Planet Hotel.⁵⁹ The commandos found the hotel empty and then retreated. An alternative account suggested the commandos had arrived in the guise of security forces guarding a transfer of banknotes, airlifted to Mekelle in two helicopters and an Antonov from Bahir Dar, again without finding their target. In these versions, it appears there was no fighting in Mekelle, but TPLF forces subsequently took over the ENDF base near Mekelle airport through which the commandos had come, where there was some fighting.

In fact, given the situation at the time, neither version seems plausible. It would be highly improbable that a commando unit would be able to land at Mekelle airport, drive into the city, take over a hotel and withdraw without conflict.

A different version of events suggests the Tigrayan government did not really expect conflict to break out until October, despite a long series of threatening moves by Abiy over several months, and they had made few preparations. When confrontation appeared inevitable, the Tigrayan leaders held talks with the Northern Command headquarters in Mekelle, to ask for assistance or at the least for weapons and logistical support, including artillery and rockets. They claimed Abiy had mobilized ENDF units and the Amhara militia and come to an agreement with Eritrea to attack Tigray. Agreement was reached allowing the Tigrayans to remove weapons but most of troops at the base refused to fight for Tigray. They then retired to Mekelle University campus to be guarded, housed and fed. Later an agreement was reached with the International Committee of the Red Cross, under which 1,300 were sent to Gondar and Addis Ababa.

In this version, when the Tigrayans arrived at the base to collect the promised weapons, some of the troops resisted and as a result fighting broke out. In the meantime, Tigrayan units had approached other ENDF bases throughout the region. The ENDF units were offered the alternatives of surrender or joining to fight for Tigray. Several thousand, including many of the Tigrayan troops in the Northern Command, took the latter option; but at least as many appear to have surrendered to be held prisoners.⁶⁰ In a number of cases, fighting broke out, for example, at Adigrat, Dansha and Serto, and some troops were forced to retreat into Eritrea.

This account appeared to be broadly confirmed a couple of weeks later when a TPLF official, Sekou Toure Getachew, admitted that the TPLF had taken what he described as a pre-emptive action, attacking units of the Northern Command in advance of a Federal Government assault on the region planned for the next day. ⁶¹ The timing of this, the day after the controversial 2020 US election, suggests the Federal government itself may indeed have been planning an attack to coincide with this distraction for the international community. Certainly, it had already moved some ENDF units into a position to launch an immediate response on November 4, as well as already mobilizing Amhara regional Special Forces at the border with Tigray. ⁶²

If the narrative provided by the Tigrayans is implausible, then so is that offered by the Ethiopian authorities. This portrays the Ethiopian government as having been taken completely by surprise by the attack on the Northern Command on November The evidence points in the other direction. There are solid indications that Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias spent many months working on plans to resolve their problems with the TPLF, or at least to reduce its influence inside Ethiopia and along the border with Eritrea. After Prime Minister Abiy went on his historic visit to Asmara on 8 July 2018 President Isaias and Prime Minister Abiy made no fewer than nine visits to each other’s capitals, or visited foreign capitals together prior to the outbreak of war in Tigray.⁶³ This cementing of relations was enhanced by further mutual visits by Ethiopian and Eritrean ministers and senior officials. A summit meeting was held in Asmara on 27 January 2020, at which the Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders were joined by the Somali President, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo.⁶⁴ A statement was issued after the meeting in which the three leaders pledged to face common security threats together.⁶⁵ When the war in Tigray erupted, troops from all three countries would be involved. The final piece of the puzzle is offered by the visits made just prior to the Tigray war by President Isaias and Prime Minister Abiy. The Ethiopian leader becomes the first foreign head of state to visit Eritrea’s main training base at Sawa on 18 July 2020 and was photographed inspecting troops and military equipment.⁶⁶ This was followed by President Isaias’ visit to the Ethiopian air force base at Bishoftu on 12 October.⁶⁷ This pattern of inspection of military facilities just prior to the Tigray war, together with the summit with Somalia, strongly suggests that the leaders were making preparations to confront and – if necessary – eliminate the threat they perceived to emanate from Tigray.

If this interpretation is accurate then the official versions of events provided by both the Tigrayan and the Ethiopian and Eritrean sides of the conflict need to be treated with scepticism.

On 28 November, just over three weeks after the outbreak of war, Federal troops advanced to seize the regional capital, Mekelle. Rather than fight street by street the TPLF leadership and its forces chose to withdraw, taking to the countryside to continue the conflict. Prime Minister Abiy felt he could declare his ‘law enforcement operation’ had been a success. He wrote on his Twitter account: “I am pleased to share that we have completed and ceased the military operations in the Tigray region. Our focus now will be on rebuilding the region and providing humanitarian assistance while Federal Police apprehend the TPLF clique.”⁶⁸

His belief that military operations in Tigray had been “completed and ceased”, rapidly looked hollow. With most of the TPLF leadership remaining at large, and the launch of guerrilla war, there were a steadily increasing number of claims of continued fighting, of massacres and attacks on civilians, and of looting as well as attacks on churches and mosques being carried out by both Federal Government and Eritrean troops. The war has continued with a series of confrontation that ranged from skirmishes to full scale battles.

The government has complained about the reports of continuous fighting claiming that these have exaggerated the humanitarian situation in the region, the human rights abuses committed against the local population in Tigray. The presence of Eritrea troops in Tigray was repeatedly denied as fake news. As the BBC reported on 27 January 2021: “Both the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments deny that Eritrean forces are in Tigray, which borders Eritrea.”⁶⁹ It was only on 23 March 2021 that Abiy only very reluctantly and belatedly admitted in a speech to Parliament that there were indeed Eritrean troops in Tigray. He said that he had spoken to Eritrean officials about the allegations of atrocities, following a growing number of accusations of abuse.⁷⁰ He told MPs: “After the Eritrean army crossed the border and was operating in Ethiopia, any damage it did to our people was unacceptable”, adding, “Regardless of the TPLF propaganda of exaggeration, any soldier responsible for raping our women and looting communities in the region will be held accountable as their mission is to protect.” ⁷¹

Whatever the original intention of Abiy and the Federal government may have been, the operation in Tigray region rapidly assumed a much larger dimension than mere ‘law enforcement’. With the involvement of Eritrea, and to a lesser extent Somalia, it became an international conflict. The international aspect has been reinforced by the associated tension and clashes along the Sudan-Ethiopian border. Bloomberg reported on 24 March 2021 the UN as saying that Eritrean forces were participating in the clash between Ethiopian and Sudanese forces.⁷² ‘“The conflict along the border between Sudan and Ethiopia remains active, with Sudanese Armed Forces and Ethiopian — including Amhara militias — and Eritrean forces deployed around Barkhat settlement in Greater Fashaga and clashes reported since early March,’ the UN said in its latest situation report on Ethiopia.” It is also a major humanitarian disaster, threatening the very survival of the region’s population and giving rise to accusations that Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias have decided to destroy both the TPLF and even Tigray itself.⁷³

From the outset of the fighting, the ‘law enforcement operation’, involved substantial numbers of Federal Government troops, Amhara Special Forces and militia and the support of much of the Eritrean army, apparently aiming for the destruction of the TPLF and apparently careless of any loss of life that might occur. They confronted tens of thousands of Tigrayan Special forces and militia and some ENDF soldiers and officers from Tigray, who had gone over to the Tigrayan side. Thousands were forced to flee as refugees into Sudan, and hundreds of thousands more have been internally displaced. Accusations and counter-accusations of human rights abuse and of violations of the rules of war, have filled social media platforms, and the usual difficulty of evaluating claims in war situations was increased by the Federal Government’s blanket refusal to allow outsiders any access to the region and the cutting of all Internet and other communication links in Tigray. This, of course, had the effect of increasing international concern about the activities of both sides and more particularly of the Amhara and Tigray Special Forces and militia as well as of the Federal forces and even more of the Eritrean troops.

The Federal government’s ban on external and independent access to Tigray, both journalistic and humanitarian, was partially lifted in late February as a result of the increasing evidence of abuse, as Tigrayan leaders managed to provide reports to the outside world.⁷⁴ The ban had been doing the Federal government no favours and the effect on the reputation of Prime Minister Abiy will be long lasting. It also had the result of producing two, diametrically opposed, narratives, contrasting ‘truths’, very different accounts of why, and how, conflict erupted at the beginning of November, and of what has been happening since. These narratives not only cover the war, they also amount to two very different interpretations of events since Prime Minister Abiy came to power in April 2018 and of the years of TPLF hegemonic control of Ethiopia’s ruling coalition, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Federal Government prior to 2018, and even more of where blame lies for the descent into the catastrophic situation in Tigray. Neither can be accepted as totally plausible or accurate.

The absence of so much external and independent information, the refusal of the Federal government to allow independent access into Tigray, and the destruction of so much in Tigray, a point of concern in itself, means much of the story depends upon balance of probabilities not certainties. Surviving TPLF leaders have seldom been able to give their version of events since early November; the Eritrean government apparently continues to believe it can outlast any reports of killing, looting and destruction, and has remained silent as usual; the Ethiopian government has offered minimal details of its ‘law enforcement operation’. These have, however, included Prime Minister Abiy’s somewhat premature announcement of a successful conclusion to the operation on November 28, along with his knowingly inaccurate assertion that no single civilian had died in the capture of Tigray’s towns and cities. A growing number of detailed reports of human rights abuse, killings of the local population and the destruction caused by Ethiopia and Eritrean troops have been filtering out of the region since the end of November, despite all the efforts of Federal Government. Similarly, claims of continued TPLF military action have continued to appear, as has the evidence of maltreatment of civilians by refugees reaching Sudan, and the refoulement of Eritrean refugees from Tigray to Eritrea. The Federal government, in turn, has been steadily reinforcing its own narrative with reports of investigations claiming additional evidence of TPLF criminal and treasonable activities both before and after the outbreak of hostilities.

The contradictions in the competing narratives extend to the whole period since the TPLF lost power in early 2018, and indeed cover its activities since 1991 when it ousted the military regime of the Derg. A central element in Abiy’s account of how and why he became Prime Minister has been his increasing enthusiasm to blame the TPLF exclusively for all the problems of the EPRDF, for which, of course, he himself worked for so long, as a soldier, in security, as a minister and then as an Oromo politician. In fact, however, behind all the arguments and claims lies a long history of conflict and disagreements over power and authority in Ethiopia as well as over the policies and legacy of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).⁷⁵

Perhaps we should at this point, underline that what we hope to do here is to provide a third, realistic, narrative, producing as accurate an account as possible of events, steering a course between the Scylla of government claims and propaganda and the Charybdis of TPLF allegations and counter-claims, and avoiding the exaggerations, distortions and lies of social media, fake news, mis-information and hate speech produced by both sides and their supporters.

Background

The onset of the conflict in November 2020 was hardly a surprise. Indeed, expectations of open conflict had grown steadily ever since Prime Minister Abiy formally took office on 2 April 2018, and relations between the TPLF leadership and the Federal government in Addis Ababa began to deteriorate. The choice of Abiy as leader of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) saw Abiy sworn in as Prime Minister after the resignation of his predecessor, Hailemariam Dessalegn in February 2018. More significantly, it indicated an end to the TPLF domination of the EPRDF and of the control it had exercised over the Federal, and state, governments, for 27 years. Indeed, there were signs that the writing was on the wall since the outbreak of widespread demonstrations in 2015.⁷⁶ Ethiopians were increasingly fed up with deep seated corruption and failures of governance. It became clear that the public was prepared to resist the senior, and largely Tigrayan, levels of the EPRDF government, which had become infected by their immunity in power.

The TPLF leadership was proud of its revolution, of the effort and of the sacrifices it had made to overthrow the military regime of the Derg in 1991. They had built strong support in Tigray during, and after, the struggle. They had also produced a solution for the distribution of power in the rest of Ethiopia. Starting as an ethno-nationalist organization, long before the collapse of the Derg, the TPLF had realized the need to find another way of dealing with Ethiopia’s multiple ethnic problems. Its answer was a federation, and rather more controversially, an ethnic federation. The logic of this seemed reasonable in 1991– there were a number of ethnically based guerrilla groups operating across Ethiopia, and the country was awash with arms as the Derg’s 500,000 strong army collapsed. The TPLF may have been the leading element in ousting the Derg in Ethiopia but it owed much to the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s successes in Eritrea and for the help the EPLF provided in capturing Addis Ababa.⁷⁷ The Tigrayans were also supported by the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) later the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), ⁷⁸ and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) ⁷⁹ in Ethiopia. Other armed ethnic opposition movements were also found at various times among the Afar, in Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Sidama and the Somali regions. Indeed, much of the opposition to the Derg (and to the previous imperial regime) came from minority nationalities which believed correctly that they had been marginalized and largely ignored in terms of power, development, culture and language within the centralized imperial and military structures of governance.

On achieving power in Addis Ababa, the TPLF, well aware of the minority status of Tigrayans (only 7% of the population)⁸⁰, used the EPRDF as the vehicle for control. It added the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (later the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM) in 1992 to incorporate 56 ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ from the southern part of the country. In theory, the Front provided an equality of authority between its four elements; in practice, the TPLF remained very much in charge. Its long-time chair Meles Zenawi (President 1991-1995; Prime Minister 1995-2012) developed a steadily increasing autocratic streak, particularly after he defeated an attempt to oust him in 2001.

Meles’ own personal authoritarianism was reflected in the way in which the TPLF controlled the EPRDF, producing an elite to dominate governance and administration, business and finance, and, in particular, military and security concerns.⁸¹ Never quite so pervasive as its critics claimed, and gradually losing some of its control in all these spheres after 2012, significant elements of the TPLF nevertheless became involved in mis-governance. This included tax evasion, embezzlement, money laundering and all the other usual aspects of rent-seeking activities available in a developmental state suffering from corruption. Identified later by Prime Minister Abiy as essentially a Tigrayan fault, this was hardly the case.⁸² During the 2000s, suspicion of corruption, both of power and of money, spread across all levels of the EPRDF and indeed of the associate regional ruling parties, in the Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harar and Somali regional states. Indeed, it could be said to transcend ethnicity and involve all regional governments as well as the Federal administration. When rumour became impossible to ignore, a minister might find himself (gender was hardly a concern prior to 2018) posted abroad as an ambassador despite protests from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Another alternative was to retire gracefully into a business advisory role. Any faults, real or imaginary, remained hidden behind the government’s traditional walls of secrecy.

Meles and some TPLF leaders railed against such perversion of the revolution, but demonstrated all-too-common undemocratic answers to criticism: jailing opposition party leaders, journalists and others, and responding violently to any demonstrations of opposition as in the aftermath of the controversial, and genuinely contested, 2005 elections.⁸³ There was some awareness of the need for change. In June 2009, at Meles’ insistence, the Front adopted Metekakat, his plan to provide for a new generation of leaders in three phases.⁸⁴ Meles himself was due to leave in the third and final stage by 2015. The first phase involved the resignation of a third of the EPRDF’s Executive Committee drawn from all four organizations. The reality of the changes was questioned because those resigning largely moved from executive to advisory roles with Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin, for example, being appointed Ambassador to China. Nevertheless, Meles, at least, intended the process to be real, if only as an excuse to remove of a number of people from the party. ⁸⁵ The second stage of this transition was due in 2012, but the process abruptly came to a halt when Meles unexpectedly died in August 2012.⁸⁶

The commitment of the TPLF, and therefore of the EPRDF, to an ethnic-driven federalism was in part driven by the circumstances of the struggle against the Derg, but it also reflected the TPLF’s own interest and aims for establishing Tigray’s future role in Ethiopia, and its ideological view of the place of the Amhara in Ethiopian history. This included awareness of the historic competition between the Amhara and Tigrayans for control of the core Abyssinian highland empire. For all its Marxist credentials its commitment to ethnic nationalism meant that the TPLF also looked back to the reign of the Tigrean Emperor Yohannes IV in the late 19th century, the last time Tigray had been dominant. Early on in its own existence, in 1976, the TPLF produced a position paper exploring the possibilities of an independent, even a greater Tigray, including the Tigrayan-speaking areas of what later became Eritrea.⁸⁷ It was considered seriously, but almost immediately rejected for practical, political and ideological reasons. Although it has been frequently used as a slur since 2018, it is only now that it appears to be gaining traction again in response to the treatment of Tigray and Tigrayans by Abiy.

Whether the TPLF ever intended to create genuine federal structures, ethnic, linguistic or otherwise, may be an open question, ⁸⁸ but certainly, despite having been instrumental in instituting a federal structure, the TPLF failed to implement the necessary structures for its growth. Ethnic, or rather linguistic federalism, however, had consequences, as might have been expected, most notably a substantial increase in ethno-nationalism with the potential to disrupt the unity of the state despite the emphasis laid on ‘unity in diversity’. Problems were exacerbated by the creation of the ‘developmental state’ which required a vanguard party, in this case a coalition controlled by the TPLF. Almost inevitably, this led to a widespread belief that the TPLF favoured state aid and investment for their home region over the rest of the country.⁸⁹ Intended to moderate and control ethno-nationalism, the EPRDF, in fact, encouraged it despite Meles’ own desire to turn the Front into a single national party. ⁹⁰ The EPRDF Central Committee set up a sub-committee to study this back in 2008 but the four parties failed to agree on possible modalities. Significantly, they also refused to consider incorporating the ruling parties of the smaller regional states. These were also, in effect, creations of the TPLF but the EPRDF consistently refused to accept they had reached a sufficient stage of political maturity to join the EPRDF as equal partners.

This underlined the major failure of the TPLF and its creation, the EPRDF: it proved unable to resolve the “question of nationalities in Ethiopia” ⁹¹ Its attempt, ethnic, or more accurately linguistic, federalism, was never seriously applied with the TPLF operating a centralised authoritarianism in which repression became a major issue. This failure outweighed the quite genuine achievements of the government. Indeed, despite the Federal Government’s virulent propaganda after April 2018, the record of the EPRDF prior to 2018 was far from poor. Its ‘developmental state’ oversaw some 15 years of double–digit economic growth, an impressive and substantial fall in poverty, and significant development in infrastructure, health and education across the country. Life expectancy between 1991 and 2018 rose from 40 to 65. By 2019 the World Bank assessed that this had risen to 67 – a remarkable achievement.⁹² Donors found the EPRDF used aid effectively and welcomed its state-led developments in infrastructure and social services. It provided stability, if at a price, and supported international and regional peace-keeping. Nevertheless, despite the EPRDF’s insistence that it was aiming for a ‘democratic developmental state’, its repressive and authoritarian approach to criticism, coupled with increasing perceptions of Tigrayan dominance and escalating failures of governance and corruption, provided for a steady build-up of opposition.

Overall, the operation of the federal state as implemented under the 1995 Constitution by the TPLF reinforced its authoritarianism, negating any efforts at real change or (re)-negotiation of power or even any improved relationship between the Federal government and the state administrations. At the same time, it offered no alternatives to the growing ethnic mobilization that the constitution inevitably encouraged in the states or to its increasingly vocal intellectual support. Coupled with the merging of party and state functions and administration within the centralized ethnic federal state, this became a major cause of increased ethnic-based violence, largely driven by land and territorial issues, particularly after 2015.

Any changes in personnel at the head of the EPRDF, or of the TPLF in 2010 and 2012, did nothing to moderate the growth of the TPLF into a propertied urban elite distant from its own roots among the Tigrayan peasantry. Nor did it make much effort to deal with the growth of popular unrest after 2015, largely in Oromia and Amhara regions, other than responding by violence, first instituting a State of Emergency in October 2016. This provided for an extensive list of measures, including bans on social media, on accessing the external ESAT and Oromia Media Network outlets, on participating in or organizing unauthorized protests, and on opposition groups issuing statements to the press. Diplomatic travel outside Addis Ababa was limited and security forces given considerably greater powers to search or use forces. Meles’ successor as Prime Minister, Hailemariam Dessalegn, from the Southern region, did also make a number of suggestions for economic and social reforms, but he was unable to make any real progress in the face of TPLF intransigence, not least because he was seen by the other parties, not altogether accurately, as a TPLF mouthpiece.

By 2018 TPLF leaders were certainly well aware of the need for reform. The first State of Emergency in 2016, was a reaction to widespread disturbances instigated by the Oromo youth protest movement, Qeerroo, later followed by the appearance of similar groups (Fana) in Amhara areas. Qeerroo activity originated due to concerns over the arbitrary expansion of Addis Ababa’s city boundaries, taking over land farmed by Oromo farmers. The protests rapidly escalated into widespread demonstrations against government abuse, corruption and maladministration.

4.  

The rise of Abiy Ahmed

Both the EPRDF, and in particular the TPLF, also responded by launching programs of self-criticism and considering further reform.⁹³ However, for the EPRDF, this was overtaken by discussions preceding Hailemariam’s resignation in mid-February 2018 and agreement on the appointment of Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister at the end of March. The TPLF continued its discussions on internal reform, holding a six-week long Central Committee gim gima (evaluation) also in part a reaction to criticisms within the Tigray region, from new Tigrayan ethno-nationalist parties, Baitona, Third Weyene, and the Tigray Independence Party as well as from its longer established opponents, Arena and the Tigrayan Democratic Party which rejected ethnic federalism. This too was largely overtaken by events.

The growing pressure of continued unrest, and the Federal government failure to deal with it, brought together the Oromo and Amhara parties in the EPRDF, providing them with the opportunity to put together a firm enough alliance strong enough to encourage Hailemariam to resign. He did so on February 15, making it clear he believed it was necessary for an Oromo to succeed him. The most obvious possibilities were Lemma Megersa, President of the Oromia region and chair of the Oromo party, and Abiy Ahmed, his deputy and head of the Oromo party secretariat. The person most prominent in 2017 in organizing Oromo and Amhara pressure on the TPLF was Lemma, much the more popular and more respected. Political discussion prior to 2018 constantly emphasized the work that “Team Lemma” had done in dealing with problems in Oromia and Lemma’s own increasing status within the EPRDF. Indeed, Lemma was widely spoken of as a possible premier for several months before Hailemariam resigned.

For Abiy to become the Oromo candidate for the chair of EPRDF and for Prime Minister required some careful political manoeuvrings. Lemma might be the most obvious Oromo candidate but he was not a member of parliament, a requirement for becoming chair of the EPRDF and thus prime minister. The alternatives were to arrange a by-election or to replace Lemma as party chairman. This was the option Abiy persuaded the party to adopt, to take the tactical decision to replace Lemma by Abiy, allowing the party to continue with its leading role in the anti-TPLF alliance, making Abiy its candidate for the leadership of the EPRDF at the meeting of the 180-strong executive committee meeting which began on March 1. In effect, after February 2018, Abiy out-manoeuvred Lemma, who accepted the situation in order to ensure the choice of an Oromo as Prime Minister and ensure the defeat of the TPLF.

Discussions in the EPRDF Council were protracted, and rancorous, before Abiy was elected EPRDF chair on March 29. There were four candidates, the heads of the four member parties. Out of the 168 votes cast, Abiy received 108 votes. These included all the Oromo votes, and after Demeke Mekonnen, the Amhara candidate, withdrew in effect assuring Abiy’s success, virtually all the Amhara votes. ⁹⁴ Abiy also received a dozen or so Southern votes and even a little Tigrayan support. The other two candidates were the Southern leader, Shiferaw Shigute, who took 58 votes, a majority of the southern party and most of the Tigrayan votes, while Debretsion Gebremichael, chair of the TPLF, received only 2. Most of the TPLF voted for a southern option as the least dangerous option for the TPLF. On April 2, Abiy was elected Prime Minister by the House of Representatives.

In the best traditions of democratic centralism, the TPLF accepted the vote, if with little enthusiasm. TPLF members were not impressed by Abiy. TPLF chair, Debretsion was heard to remark that he thought Abiy, aged 41, was too young for the job, and the NISS head, Getachew Assefa did not think Abiy had sufficient capacity to cope with the problems. Of most concern, however, were the proposed changes that Abiy was looking to make and which he spelt out in his first address to parliament. And these appeared to largely aimed at limiting what he saw as the TPLF’s underlying control of governance, the economy and security, in its influence and command of the ‘deep state’. Abiy’s ideas also appeared to threaten the ‘developmental state’ as established by the TPLF/EPRDF, and even threaten the operation of the federal constitution. An additional concern for the TPLF was Abiy’s insistence on resolving relations with Eritrea. Nobody, in theory, objected to ending the state of ‘no war, no peace’ with Eritrea, a situation that had continued since the end of the war with Eritrea in 2000, and which benefitted neither country. However, President Isaias was a sworn enemy of the TPLF which he regarded as responsible for the UN sanctions against Eritrea and his own near isolation for nearly twenty years, and had frequently made it clear he wanted its removal politically, and indeed its destruction. For the TPLF, any deal with Eritrea needed its involvement. The TPLF’s concerns were intensified by Abiy’s obvious suspicion of the TPLF and his assumption it was intending to try and take action to restore its previous status.

Certainly, it was clear from the outset that Abiy saw a need to consider changes in
the federal structure though his approach changed significantly between 2018 and 2020. In April 2018, the choice of Abiy as Prime Minister within the framework of ethnic federalism was seen as elevating the Oromo to control of administration and policy. As the chair of the EPRDF’s Oromo party, Abiy was expected to follow the example of the TPLF and increase the number of his own ethnicity, the Oromo, in Federal government at the expense of Tigrayans. He did indeed do so to a considerable expense and underlined this by the launch of investigations into the alleged corruption of the previous regime. Oromo activists saw Abiy’s appointment and his early decisions as the start of a new dispensation. Jawar Mohammed, owner of the Oromo Media Network (OMN), who claimed a million and a half Facebook followers, and who had persistently argued for a greater Oromo role in Federal Government and realistic Oromo regional self-determination, welcomed Abiy’s appointment. The Qeerroo groups were quick to see his appointment as an opportunity to demand an ‘Oromo First’ policy, calling for genuine self-rule in the Oromia regional state and for Oromos to predominate in federal government.

One side effect of the events of 2017-18, and increasing divisions within the EPRDF, was the virtual collapse of party control at local level, and as party and administration officials were in effect indistinguishable, a near collapse of local authority. Within weeks of Abiy’s accession to the premiership, dozens of local conflicts broke out across Ethiopia. Most had a long genesis in the stresses and strains of two decades of ethnic federalism, and a number involved deliberate efforts by the Oromia and Amhara regional state governments to expand their territory. There were border conflicts between Oromos and Somalis, Amhara and Gedeo; between Wolayita and Sidama; Gurage and Kebena; Somalis and Afars; Berta and Gumuz and Amhara; and the Amhara region made threatening noises over western and southern Tigray.

Another effect of the security problems of 2015 and the continued rise in violence, was a considerable increase in regional militarization, and the creation of regional Special Forces, an additional paramilitary force intended to deal with more serious problems. Under the constitution, regional states have the right to organize their own police forces, and provide these with regular police training and any weapons necessary to enforce the law at local level. Local militia forces also operate as an adjunct to the local police. The idea of military training and heavier arms for ‘Special Forces’ at the regional level was first introduced in 2007 in the Somali region to control large-scale Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) insurgency. The activities of this force, the Liyu [special] regional police, though successful, acquired a highly unsavoury reputation under the Somali regional president, Abdi Iley, who was removed at an early stage of Prime Minister Abiy’s reforms in 2018. The reputation of the Liyu police, however, did nothing to prevent other regions raising their own Special Forces after 2015, notably both the Oromo and Amhara regions. Amhara Special Forces were heavily involved in the November fighting in Tigray. The Tigray region also substantially enlarged both its militia and it Special Forces in 2018-2019.

The effective collapse of local government and traditional patterns of authority, and the rise of largely unstructured local youth groups, the Qeerroo and the Fana, also encouraged outbreaks of violence in a dozen cities and numerous smaller towns, many in the Oromo region. Most of these related to land and corruption issues and were driven by expectations of the implementation of reform. The problems were compounded by the return of externally based opposition groups, several from Eritrea where they were being trained and armed.⁹⁵ This certainly played a role in the upsurge of ethnically based violence in the later part of 2018 and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

Subsequently, the Prime Minister, as part of his demonization of the TPLF and Tigrayans, ascribed this upsurge of conflict to the machinations of the TPLF, arguing that this was all part of a policy aimed at inciting violence to discredit his government and derail his reforms, and ultimately restoration of TPLF control. The government has produced little evidence of this, though Abiy himself told Parliament in November 2020 that there were 113 outbreaks of ethno-nationalist violence that could be ascribed to the TPLF activity since he became prime minister. He also referred to the TPLF plans to seize control of the Northern Command weapons as the first stage in more extensive plans: “The aim was to attack the Northern Command first and to control Gondar and Woldiya in the morning. After they controlled Gondar and Woldiya, they would cause explosions in Addis Ababa, Adama, and Hawassa through their agents and then the country would enter into chaos so that they could do what they wished after that. Some people from here were also preparing themselves with such thinking that they would become a government when the regime is changed.” ⁹⁶ Apart from the TPLF attack on Northern Command bases in early November, nothing has been produced in support of such accusations and they seem highly implausible.

While one immediate element in the problems that arose between the TPLF and the Prime Minister in 2018 might have revolved around issues of power and control, the wider underlying question remained the relationship between the central government and the regional states. The relationship between federalism and ethnicity in effect provided for an ideological dispute over the type and extent of the implementation of federalism in Ethiopia under the Constitution of 1995. While it dominated the government, the TPLF had been committed to a centralized ethnic/linguistic federalism, offering a carefully controlled amount of self-determination to those peoples who had been traditionally marginalized by a perceived and previous Amhara-centric imperial regime. As its own dominance began to fragment after 2015, while accepting the need for reform, the TPLF certainly tried to manipulate the system. And in response to the growth of ‘Ethiopiawinet’ (Ethiopianess), pan-Ethiopian unity rather than a federal construct, the TPLF began to emphasize the importance of ethnic federalism in 2019-2020 as a rallying point among the country’s minority nationalities. Most of the smaller nationalities claim to have been marginalized under previous regimes, as in fact do the Oromo. Regional autonomy, though never effectively applied by the TPLF, nevertheless remains seen as a protection against any of the over-centralizing authorities which historically marginalized the minorities.

This gained some traction, especially among Oromo ethno-nationalists, suspicious of Amhara ambitions, but there was real reluctance to offer support to the TPLF because of the perception that it had for quarter of a century operated a repressive, and latterly highly corrupt, regime with its own members taking the leading role in military and security services and in government and administration. Prime Minister Abiy also pre-empted the possibility of any substantial open Oromo support for the TPLF by disbanding the ERPDF and creating the Prosperity Party (PP) in December 2019, bringing together the EPRDF parties and its five associated parties. The only party that refused to join was the TPLF. A few months later he also took the opportunity to arrest leading Oromo opposition figures, in June 2020. It should be emphasized, however, that Abiy’s success in preventing other nationalities supporting the TPLF does not, however, indicate any lessening of their concern over the steady shift of Abiy’s policies towards ‘Ethiopiawinet’, a concern which is being intensified by events in Tigray.

Federalism and the Constitution of 1994-95 can perhaps be described as an experiment in multilateralism; Abiy’s attempt to redraw it, an approach paralleled by the changes he has introduced in foreign policy, is largely a response to populist demand, significantly modified by his own interests and aims. What he is offering with the creation of a single party, the PP, is a modified and reduced form of selfdetermination without providing a more democratic reality than had previously existed. His own autocratic, religiously-flavoured, version of democracy and politics apparently provides for compulsory unanimity without participation or rather without equality. For his critics, in other words, it threatens a return to an imperial past of traditional autocratic politics, perhaps without an emperor in name, but once again marginalizing and side-lining the non-Amhara nations and nationalities, sweeping away the gains these groups have acquired since 1991 under ethnic federalism, even when only partially and poorly implemented.

Abiy originally had the support of the Oromo, the Amhara and most of the southern nations, nationalities and peoples. Removing the TPLF’s excess presence in government and administration and replacing its [over-] centralized federal system was widely welcome. But it wasn’t long before his actions raised suspicions that his reforms and other changes were aimed less at a creating an effective ethnic federal structure and more at a centralized government replicating the ‘Ethiopiawinet’ of the past. His friendship with the region’s most authoritarian leader, President Isaias, and his more publicity-focused actions, have added to the concern with which many now regard him. The honeymoon lasted less than a year.

3.6 Prime Minister Abiy’s short-lived whirlwind of reform

Once in place, Prime Minister Abiy launched a whole series of reforms, positioning himself as a young (41), charismatic, energetic, reforming leader, and catching the attention of Ethiopians and of the world. In a well-received inaugural address to the House of People’s Representatives, he apologized for past abuses and called on exiled opposition groups (several of whom were being armed, trained and supported by President Isaias in Eritrea) to return. He appealed for unity, pledged to respect all human and democratic rights, especially freedom of expression, assembly and organization. He promised to introduce economic reforms and to tackle corruption, emphasizing the needs of youth and women. He also said he was ready to resolve differences with Eritrea and called on Eritrea to do the same. ⁹⁷

Over the next months, he announced a series of reforms and appointments, freeing thousands of political prisoners, promised free and fair elections, gender equality, economic changes including extensive privatization, the opening up of the media and revision of controversial anti-terrorist and CSO laws. It was all buttressed by the publication of his own personal philosophy of Medemer, which emphasized reconciliation on the basis of synergy, unity, dialogue, for both Ethiopia and the region, underlining the importance of keeping the best of the past while moving to the future.⁹⁸

The most striking step was the achievement of a Peace Accord with Eritrea, which gained Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize for 2019. The citation included some of the accomplishments of his first 100 days: lifting the State of Emergency, releasing political prisoners, removing media censorship and legalizing opposition groups, as well as engaging in other peace and reconciliation processes in East and Northeast Africa. Displaying considerable prescience, the citation also noted that “some people will think this year’s prize is being awarded too early” but added the Nobel Committee believed that Abiy Ahmed’s efforts deserve recognition and needed encouragement. ⁹⁹

It all seemed to be too good to be true, and it was. Abiy faced significant political difficulties in the implementation of his programs, and his responses rapidly seemed to hark back to his own past as a member of the repressive EPRDF/TPLF regime that he had tried to distance himself from as he became prime minister and which he subsequently excoriated so strongly. He had been in office less than a year when he was warning ‘spoilers’ that his patience was not inexhaustible. His own certainties, coupled with impatience and refusal to listen to criticism or even questions have too often negated any possibility of dialogue over his proposed policies, despite the supposed centrality of dialogue and unity to his philosophy of Medemer. His alliance with President Isaias of Eritrea led him into new and problematic areas of policy including the horrific levels of violence displayed in his ‘law enforcement operation’ in Tigray which, since November 2020, seems to have displayed all of the more traditional and repressive activities and human rights abuses so prevalent in the past in Ethiopia and so dominant in Eritrea under President Isaias.

One policy that achieved particular resonance for the international community, despite the widespread failure to implement anything similar elsewhere, was Abiy’s announcement, in October, of a cabinet offering gender parity. Half of the ministers in the cabinet were women, including the important posts of Minister of Defence and the new Ministry of Peace, with a portfolio overseeing the rival intelligence/security agencies, the National Intelligence and Security Service and the Information Network Security Agency, the Federal police, the National Disaster Management Commission, the Main department for Immigration and Nationality Affairs and several other related agencies. Women were also appointed as President of Ethiopia (Sahle-work Zewde), and as Chief Justice (Meaza Ashena), with a mandate to reform the judiciary, and as chair of the National Electoral Board (Birtukan Mideksa). Critics, however, were quick to notice that the gender balance did not continue lower down the administrative hierarchy. Women only held 25% of the appointments at state ministerial level, and far fewer at lower levels. When 20 new ambassadors were appointed in early in 2021, only two were women. In his February 2019 interview with the Financial Times, Abiy noted he had freed all journalists and opened up the media.¹⁰⁰ The Committee to Protect Journalists in its 2018 annual Prison Census report on journalists imprisoned for their work included no Ethiopians for the first time in 14 years.¹⁰¹ A Media Law Working Group (MLWG) was established and there was a significant increase in the number of private print and electronic media outlets. By mid-2020, there were 13 public and 26 commercial television stations, 10 public and 15 commercial radio stations, 54 community radio and television stations, and nearly 50 print media products.

However, it was only a matter of months after April 2018 that the federal government was again closing off the Internet, and reports surfaced of Oromo journalists being arrested, with signs of an increasingly hostile environment for commentators on events in Ethiopia. Amnesty International was demanding the release of five journalists arrested a month earlier in October 2019.¹⁰² This steadily intensified with the increasing amount of ethnic conflict, the threat of conflict with Tigray and the outbreak of war, producing an increasing amount of self-censorship. In early November, 2020, a senior editor for Addis Standard, was arrested and accused of “attempts to dismantle the Constitution through violence” and “outrage against the Constitution”. Released shortly afterwards, he was rearrested and held for a month. The authorities deported the Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst on Ethiopia, William Davison, allegedly for irregularities over his work permit on November 21, 2020.¹⁰³ The same day, they also issued warning letters to Reuters, the BBC and Deutsche Welle.¹⁰⁴

In January this year, a journalist working for Tigray TV was shot and killed by federal security forces a week after he had been briefly detained. Armed men raided the home of a freelance reporter in Addis Ababa and threatened to kill her if she continued investigating stories about the conflict in Tigray. Ethiopia’s Ambassador to Washington issued a sharp warning to journalists to “abide by the most stringent ethical standards”, claiming the major print media was telling falsehoods against the Ethiopian government about complicity in “massacres, torture, rapes, abductions, and the looting” in Tigray.

The government’s claim that both local and international journalists had been provided with access as early as November to cover the active phase of the rule of law operations and had filed reports, and it was therefore wrong to claim no media access, were not shared by the media. It was not until mid-February 2021, that the government announced that seven media agencies could have limited access to Tigray – AFP, Al Jazeera, New York Times, France 24, Reuters, BBC and Financial Times.¹⁰⁵ Over the next few days, however, several journalists working in Mekelle as translators or fixers with these agencies were arrested or beaten in a specific effort to intimidate them in advance of international media arrival. The ENDF arrested two journalists in Mekelle who were, it said, broadcasting ‘false propaganda’. ¹⁰⁶

The Committee to Protect Journalists 2020 Prison Census, published in December, once again had to include Ethiopian journalists, seven of them, the third highest number in sub-Saharan African countries, after Eritrea and Cameroon, though six were subsequently released.¹⁰⁷ That same month, the Council of Ministers approved a new Media Proclamation outlining the media’s legal responsibilities, and penalties for flouting these.¹⁰⁸ The Prime Minister said this would bolster freedom of expression and press freedom; human rights groups argued it had created the legal means to muzzle critics. ¹⁰⁹

Relations with journalists look set to continue. In March, the Ethiopian Broadcast Authority announced it would take ‘corrective measures’ against media outlets that challenged Ethiopia’s sovereignty, or endangered the unity of its people and the country’s peace. Its Deputy Director-general said a media monitoring assessment of the ‘law enforcement campaign’ in Tigray had showed that some foreign media outlets reports were “full of bias, unbalanced, and inaccurate” and this raised questions about journalism and professional ethics. Journalists who entered the region after the government’s approval were producing unbalanced, biased, inaccurate, and distorted reports, completely denying the Ethiopian government’s efforts to rebuild the region. Seven international agencies were authorised and were in the region; no journalist needs permission to operate there. The government remained committed to its promise to protect media freedom and had not yet prosecuted media professionals who violated the media laws. It had only revoked licenses or expelled them. The government, he stressed, would continue to support the media sector “as long as it does not challenge the sovereignty, unity of the people and the country’s peace.”¹¹⁰

The steps towards reform of the judiciary, and for reconciliation, another strong focus of Abiy, have also made less progress than might have been expected. A reform plan for the federal courts was adopted in mid-2019, but the five-year strategic plan with a focus on judicial independence and the provision of prompt and good quality judicial activity, was only due to start in 2021. Some widely criticised laws, the Charities and Societies Proclamation, the Anti-Terrorist Proclamation and the Media law have also been revised, though the latter, in particular, remains controversial. The Federal Attorney General has drafted a five-year National Human Rights Action Plan, ostensibly giving priority to civil and political rights, and rights of women, children, persons with disabilities, refugees and other vulnerable groups, as well as calling for human rights education at national level. Significantly, it doesn’t include the signing of some international conventions allowing scrutiny of government activities. Equally, the military operations and the steadily increasing and horrifying evidence of the reality of atrocities in Tigray, as well as of other ethnic killings of Amhara and other nationalities elsewhere, effectively render it irrelevant. Since November 4 and the Federal government’s ‘law enforcement operation’ and even more since Prime Minister Abiy declared operation a success and finished, human rights abuses and humanitarian problems have intensified in Tigray. There is now a major humanitarian crisis in the region “characterized by food shortages, widespread looting, rape, and sexual violence.” Tigrayans also claim they are suffering from ethnic profiling in Addis Ababa and elsewhere.

The violence against Tigrayans has been far in excess of any other conflict, but both Oromo and Amhara ethno-nationalists also now see themselves as being the targets of each other, as well as of Abiy and the critics of federalism and supporters of pan-Ethiopian unity. The Federal government’s response to assassinations in Bahir Dar and in Addis Ababa (June 22, 2019) included a wave of arrests, but to many in the Amhara region, the person responsible for what was identified as an attempted coup, Brigadier General Asaminew, was a hero, and after his death, a martyr. His efforts to increase the size of the Amhara Special Forces over the previous months were to be welcomed not criticised. Widespread demonstrations in April 2021 by Amhara underlined the continuing perception, even if encouraged for political reasons by ethno-nationalist parties, that the Amhara had become the target of Oromo violence. Oromo nationalists have seen themselves as the target of Abiy and pro-unity Amhara elements since 2019, an assessment reinforced by the arrests of the leaders of the main Oromo opposition parties in mid-2020.

Abiy told the Financial Times in January 2019 that he had released 60,000 political prisoners, significantly expanding the policy begun by his predecessor, Hailemariam, who had released 6,000 in January 2018.¹¹¹ It was only a year later, however, before protestors were being rounded up again in considerable numbers. Tens of thousands have been detained in the last two years following demonstrations in the Oromo region and ethnic clashes elsewhere. Most recently in 2020-21, thousands of Tigrayans in the security forces have been detained, and Tigrayans in other areas of government employment have lost their jobs.112 Despite federal government denials, since November 2020, and even before, Tigrayans have been targeted in what looks increasingly like a policy of ethnic profiling.¹¹³

In fact, Abiy’s policies, whether by accident or design, have seriously expanded the underlying problem of ethnicity, and the related issues of regional difference, land and resource conflict, and democracy. Politics, and here Abiy is certainly responsible, have become increasingly ethnicised, driven by his attack on Tigray and Tigrayans.

Home-grown Economic reform

Abiy’s overall approach to policy is clearly visible in his economic strategy:
substantial promises, and rather less achievement. The ‘Home-grown Economic Reform’, the basis for the 10-year Development Plan announced a year later, was announced in mid-2019, aiming for sustainable economic growth and major job creation, with macroeconomic reforms to improve the efficiency of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as well as privatise some government organizations. It includes partial privatization planned for key state-owned enterprises, Ethiopian Airlines, Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, and EthioTelecom, with others, including sugar plantations and industrial parks, to be fully privatised. It provides for implementation of a comprehensive and controlled remittance strategy; the control inflation; to modernize banks, and while keeping control of the financial sector, allows Islamic banking; and improved financial access. It also identified four sectors, agriculture, manufacturing, mining and tourism as areas on which to concentrate. Abiy, stressing Ethiopia is “now fully open for business” called the agenda “the bridge to prosperity”.¹¹⁴

Welcomed by international agencies because of the emphasis on development of the private sector, the privatisation of major public enterprises and the opening up of the economy to foreign investors, marks a significant departure from the EPRDF’s developmental state. In a clear shift towards neo-liberal global policy, the government has demonstrated significantly greater responsiveness to external partners, including the World Bank and the IMF as well as to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The Home-grown Economic Reform ran into criticism at the outset for its lack of public involvement. Adopted in September 2019, the policy, drafted and adopted by Abiy before any public debate, ignored the interests of many stakeholders and local policy-makers. A subsequent ‘discussion process’ was widely dismissed as no more than a gesture to try to pacify critics. It was also in effect overtaken by the onset of COVID-19 and the impact this have had on the strategies to mitigate unemployment, inflation, foreign exchange and debt. At the structural level, this has meant longer delays over implementation of the privatisation process and any efforts to address bottlenecks, and improve tax policies and regulations. It also seems to have delayed any real effort to increase transparency, if indeed this was ever the intention. Other major lacuna in the process include the lack of reference to the importance of regional development either in the objectives or in the details of the reform program, despite the acknowledged disparities in regional development, including “universities, airports, network infrastructure and industrial parks”. ¹¹⁵ Questions have been raised over the government figures used in the presentation of the Reform.¹¹⁶

Abiy himself remained upbeat about the progress of reform when he introduced the 2020-21 budget in the House of `Representatives in July last year. He said the reform agenda had produced real results in the macroeconomic and productivity sectors and relaxed debt stress and improved the budget gap.¹¹⁷ External debt had fallen from 31% to 25% of GDP, following his efforts to extend or reschedule debts. It had enhanced private sector capacity and increased agricultural productivity, making finance available for small holder farmers – he mentioned the amount spent on water pumps, imported duty-free, and increased allocations for irrigation. Nominal GDP, he said, had increased from 2.2 trillion birr (USD 85 billion) in 2018 to 3.4 trillion birr, (USD 100 billion) in 2020. The Prime Minister also noted the economic impact of COVID-19 on the economy but surprisingly said exports had increased by 15% over the previous year despite the pandemic. The projections for the current year, however, must have been seriously affected by the increased spread of the pandemic, and continuing and indeed increasing inter-ethnic, the continuation of the war in Tigray, and if reports are accurate, by the promised subventions to Eritrea for the use of the Eritrean army. The government’s current claim that GDP growth this year will still reach 8.5% is clearly highly optimistic. The latest projection of the IMF, which has approved a nearly USD 3 billion support program, is a rather more plausible 2.0%.

The lack of direction in the ruling EPRDF, increasingly apparent after 2015, and intensified by the efforts to marginalize and then remove three decades of TPLF influence and control after April 2018, allowed regional ethno-nationalist interests to operate almost unchecked. There was a sharp upsurge in inter-ethnic violence with millions displaced, extensive destruction of property and numerous killings, across almost every region of the country. The one exception, prior to November 2020, was the Tigray Regional State and this appears to have been one reason why Prime Minister Abiy later blamed all of these problems on the TPLF. He told Parliament on November 30 that there had been at least 113 major conflicts that had occurred in every region except Tigray, ¹¹⁸ with the ‘junta’ (TPLF) creating antagonism and enmity between different ethnic groups, adjacent regions and even neighbouring countries. He cited 37 major conflicts in Oromia, 23 in Amhara region, 15 in Benishangul-Gumuz, 14 in Addis Ababa, and others in Gambella, the South, Dire Dawa, and Harar, and between the Somali and Afar regions. All, Abiy asserted, were the work of the TPLF, which had worked “to sow great mistrust and suspicion between the peoples of Ethiopia”. He added that it had also tried to persuade the Sudan government to take over disputed lands along the border. The Prime Minister said Sudan had rejected the proposal and had informed him about the suggestion. This presumably referred to the area of al-Fashaq which Ethiopia said was taken over by Sudanese a few days after the Prime Minister’s speech.

The Prime Minister’s catalogue of inter-ethnic violence underlined the fact that since he came to power, there had been an enormous displacement of people. In 2018 alone, according to international NGO reports, nearly three million people were forced to leave their homes, mainly because of violence; government figures were significantly smaller. There was conflict in a number of woredas in or along the borders between Amhara and Tigray, Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz. ¹¹⁹ Another major area of violence was all along the 1400 km. interface between the Oromo and Somali regions. The creation of the Oromo and Somali regions in 1994-5 had enforced a boundary that cut through many communities with close intra-ethnic and intra-clan links, and left a legacy of disputes all along the border. The National Election Board in 2004 organized a referendum in 422 kebeles for people to choose which side of the border they wished to live. 323 (80%) chose Oromia; 93 the Somali region. It did not, however, settle disputes over land, grazing and water. Nor did it do away with interest in acquiring extra resources, or ethno-nationalistic demands for the recovery of previously administered territories that had been adjusted when the Constitution was drawn up. ¹²⁰ In 2016/17 a series of clashes led to over a million people being displaced on both sides of the border. This was one of the factors used by Oromo politicians, including Abiy, to generate support across Oromia for changes in the EPRDF. ¹²¹ Another major confrontation along Oromia borders in 2018 was between the Gedeo people of the SNNPR and the Guji Oromo, again with an estimate of another million or so displaced.¹²²

These and similar clashes were also encouraged by the increased mobilization of Oromo and Amhara nationalist interests, driven in part by the choice of Abiy, a prime minister originally identified with Oromo interests. A related factor was the government call for opposition organisations in exile to return. Among these were the Oromo Liberation Front and Patriotic Ginbot 7, both of which had been based in Eritrea where they had been armed and trained. ¹²³ Although Ginbot 7 disarmed on arrival, the OLF did not, and one faction, OLF-Shene, or the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), has continued to be militarily active in the western areas of Oromo, in Wollega, as well as in the south near the Kenyan border. After its return, Ginbot 7 merged with several other opposition parties to form the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA) which is opposed to ethnic federalism and supports a more centralised, unified, structure of government, and revision of the constitution. Ginbot 7, although a multi-ethnic organisation, gains its main support comes from the Amhara and from urban elites.

The continuing ethnic violence provided the Prime Minister with additional reasons in support of his own intention to unpick the ethnic elements of the EPRDF and replace this with a new single national party. The mechanics for this provided a major step in the breakdown in relations between the Federal Government and the TPLF as did Abiy’s remarks to the FT, in January 2019, that he would like to move to a directly elected presidential system, rather than continue the indirect process conducted through parliament to choose the prime minister. ¹²⁴ He also spoke of the “unity of the nation and national pride”, though he accepted this could be a concern for supporters of more regional autonomy. The EPRDF parties had discussed the possibility of merging their four elements into a single party before, and had even set up a committee to look into the practicalities in 2008. It concluded there were both practical and ideological difficulties, the latter connected with the relationship between the Federal government and the regional state authorities which has become the central issue in the current war in Tigray, as well as in the process of holding the national elections which, after two postponements, are due in June 2021.

Creating the Prosperity Party

The failure of the EPRDF to resolve its own problems in 2017-18 or to produce a consensus for reform, certainly underlined the need for change. The idea of turning the Front into a single party had been considered several times before, being first raised formally at the EPRDF’s 5th Congress in 2004. It set up a committee to consider the possibilities in 2008, but that failed to resolve the central problem of whether this should take the form of a merger of the four parties or of the creation of a new party.

A team was set up to make another study of merger possibilities in 2017. The study was expected to be presented at the EPRDF’s 11th Congress held in Hawassa in October 2018 and then endorsed. In his opening speech, Abiy, who was re-elected chairman of the Front with 176/177 votes, stressed federalism was the way to go for Ethiopia, but warned it should not be mixed and confused with ethnic identity: “If we are able to form regional administrations without confusing it with ethnic identities, then there is no question that federalism is the best option for Ethiopia’s situation,” adding a plea for treating all people equally and “not attack one another motivated by and based on our ethnic and religious differences.” However, the study was not presented to the Congress as neither the Executive Committee nor the EPRDF Council had been able to discuss the proposals in advance. The TPLF participated in the Congress, but in a statement shortly afterwards warned that rushed moves to dissolve EPRDF and create a single unified party posed a serious danger to the nation. It said it was necessary first to identify a vision or practices that could be unified, adding without identifying the dangers, “it is impossible to think about creating a single unified party.” The statement, which said there was “no unity of command and trust between and among the sister parties of the Front”, also referred to “the campaign to subdue the people of Tigray and TPLF from different directions”. ¹²⁵

Abiy’s own version was that the TPLF had originally decided to resign from the EPRDF and not attend the Congress, but it had then changed its mind and decided to attend to cause trouble. He claimed later the ‘junta’ (an example of the unfortunate use of abusive language by the Prime Minister concerning his opponents) had developed a three-pronged strategy to undermine and thwart his work. One was insults delivered before the meeting; then it organized groups to create chaos in the assembly and encourage dissension and recrimination, and finally, bring in others who pretended to be mediators. It was all intended, he claimed, to cause confusion and chaos. ¹²⁶

As Abiy indicated to the Congress, his growing support and emphasis on “Ethiopiawinet” posed an alternative to the TPLF’s version of the EPRDF, the developmental state and the federal structure. Abiy countered the TPLF insistence that this threatened the very concept of a federal state by accepting, if under pressure and reluctantly, the Sidama demand for their own state, allowing a referendum which voted overwhelmingly for it, in November 2019. It had the unwelcome result of encouraging a number of other groups in the southern region to consider making their own claims for statehood which Abiy had tended to ignore.

Despite the failure of the EPRDF to consider a merger in 2018, Abiy pressed ahead with his plans both for bring the four EPRDF parties into one and to add the ruling parties of the remaining regional states, the five associate parties, previously identified by the EPRDF as failing to reach the right level of development for incorporation in the Front, a status all five resented. ¹²⁷ In November 2019, a meeting of the EPRDF Council, boycotted by the TPLF but attended by the other three EPRDF parties, Oromo, Amhara and Southern, agreed to disband the EPRDF and merge in a new Prosperity Party. ¹²⁸ After the three parties agreed to the change, the five EPRDF-associated ruling regional state parties also agreed to join the Prosperity Party (PP), which automatically controlled the Federal House of People’s Representatives and all the regional states with the exception of Tigray. Each of the eight parties, became branches of the PP, contributing members to its central committee, and to an Executive Committee of 52. The NEBE quickly gave the party a certificate of registration, though its structure and by-laws were still unclear.

Abiy argued that what he proposed to call the Prosperity Party (PP) would strengthen national unity and minimize ethnicity. ¹²⁹ It also offered the best prospect of ensuring his own position in the face of growing discontent among his former Oromo base. He was careful to continue to claim to support the concept of federalism, if not the ethnic variety, but the PP clearly endorsed the concept of Ethiopiawinet (unity) which had in effect been side-lined by the ERPDF in the constitution of 1995. With membership drawn directly from the former EPRDF parties, minus the TPLF, and from the former associated parties, the new party automatically acquired a membership base of several million members, quite sufficient to win any election.

The TPLF opposed the creation of the PP, and refused to join, arguing that it was a clear rejection of the federal principle. It also questioned, with some justice, the technical legality of the move.¹³⁰ Under EPRDF concept of “democratic centralism” full agreement from the four parties within EPRDF was necessary for such changes. The TPLF was not alone in its concerns, and leading figures in other parties also abstained from supporting the move, including one of Abiy’s key allies, Lemma Megersa, the then Minister of Defence and former president of Oromia, and Muferiat Kamil, chair of the Southern party and Minister of Peace. Lemma has since lost his job though Muferiat remains in office. Both the Oromo and Southern parties of the EPRDF were in fact divided on the timing of the changes though not on the need for replacing the EPRDF. Others argued that Abiy should have acquired a new mandate via an election before creating a new ruling party out of the “three of the four components of a delegitimized and decaying EPRDF”.

The PP claims to a national party designed to abandon the ethnic element, and as a national non-ethnic-based party, to be inclusive, representing all communities; it uses Amharic, Afan Oromo, Tigrigna, Somali and Afar as working languages. Equally, Abiy told the PP assembly last year: “Our party believes the federal system is viable, beneficial and conducive for Ethiopia …Our commitment is to build a true, strong, and democratic federal system; rather than dissolving a system, we are building it better and implementing [it].” Indeed, since the members of the former all-ethnic parties provide most/all members of the PP chapters in their region, ethnicity by default remains a central feature, with party branches in each region being largely drawn from the region.

It is, in fact, difficult to see how far the different Prosperity Party branches will be able to reach consensus on ethnic issues, and the problems have already been apparent. They include Amhara expectation of retaining control of western Tigray, despite demands from the interim Tigray administration now being set up in Mekelle for the return of some areas now under Amhara administration. The respective Oromo and Amhara party branches are at odds over the future of Addis Ababa as a separate entity as the Amhara Prosperity Party insists, or whether it should in effect become Finfine, the capital of the Oromo region. Failing any change in Addis Ababa’s status, both have an interest in controlling the city.

Both of these branches of the PP have already expressed concern over the security of their respective populations in each other’s region, and as one observer puts it: “The differences in historical narratives that the elites from the two parties display in public to rile up their base is poisoning the politics”.¹³¹ In March 2021, the Amhara and Oromia regional state chapters disagreed sharply over who might be responsible for an outbreak of violence in the Oromo Special Zone and North Shewa Zone of the Amhara regional state. The Amhara PP chapter accused the OLF-Shene, and the TPLF, as being behind the clashes, and repeated its assertions after the Oromo-PP released a statement blaming the members of the Amhara Special Forces.¹³²

In October 2020, effectively the first anniversary of the Prosperity Party, Abiy told party members that the party was making a real effort to provide a genuine response to the demand for nations and nationalities to administer themselves as well as allow people to exercise democracy. Previous parties, he said, suffered from the disease of conspiracy, power struggles and personal benefit. The PP was different. It supported the ideas he himself had laid out in his inaugural speech as Prime Minister: unity in diversity, need to restore justice, diaspora to cooperate, peace with Eritrea, youth participation, the genuine equality of women, press freedom, and democracy. The government, he said, had taken fast and bold decisions to deal with these and other issues including the poor state of the economy, falling exports, problems with GERD. One tangible action was the creation of the Prosperity Party to implement the ideas of his philosophy of Medemer, “designed to find a national solution to national problems.” ¹³³

In his acceptance speech for the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, Abiy offered a definition of Medemer: “Medemer, an Amharic word, signifies synergy, convergence, and teamwork for a common destiny. It is a home-grown idea that is reflected in our political, social, and economic life. I’d like to think of ‘Medemer’ as a social compact for Ethiopians to build a just, egalitarian, democratic, and humane society by pulling together our resources for our collective survival and prosperity…At its core, Medemer is a covenant of peace that seeks unity in our common humanity”. Synergy in this context also meant “cooperation and collaboration to achieve an enhanced effect, [allowing] us to act synergistically to ensure a prosperous Ethiopia that provides for all its citizens.” ¹³⁴

Abiy told the party members that the PP accepts the superiority of ideas over force, a positive-sum game, not a zero-sum game. It claims its approach can be summed up by several characteristics: a unique vision of prosperity, political, economic and social prosperity, to lift Ethiopia out of its present poverty, dealing with the problems of class, nations and democracy through application of Medemer, that is: “home grown thought and knowledge, the only way possible to solve existing problems”. Ethnic identity, language, culture were all necessary and should not be any threat to national identity; they work together building a country while maintaining their own identities. The party recognizes both those who supported individual rights and those who support group rights. There should be a balance between the private sector and government intervention; centrist politics offer a unique place in the political history of the country. The Prosperity Party also offers continuity of generation which neither the TPLF nor the OLF were able to do. It has embraced youth and the concept that new generations mean new ideas. Its system is adaptive, not robust, nor violent.

Elections and the Electoral Process

From the outset, Abiy has repeatedly promised to hold free and fair elections for both the Federal House of People’s Representatives and for regional state councils, a promise repeated by the now ruling Prosperity Party on several occasions since its foundation in December 2019. One of Abiy’s major reforms was reorganizing and restructuring the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) as an independent body reporting to the House of People’s Representatives, in June 2019. On the recommendation of the Prime Minister, a former opponent of the TPLF, Birkutan Medikssa, recalled from exile, was appointed to head the restructured Board.

The elections were originally due to be held in May 2020 but the timescale became impossible after the Prosperity Party was founded in December 2019. On security grounds, the NEBE postponed the date to August 2020. This was reluctantly accepted by opposition parties as the date still fell within the theoretical five-year mandate of the parliament and of the Prime Ministerial term of office which was due to run out in October 2020. Another postponement to October 5, 2021, however, moved it outside the constitutional time-frame. This time the reason given was the problems posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, but it was widely believed to relate to the need for a longer period needed to organise the Prosperity Party,

The decision was authorised by parliament, which thereby extended its own term, but the TPLF was quick to claim this was not authorised by the constitution. The added delay also gave the TPLF an opportunity to hold its own state elections before the deadline and claim a legitimacy that it argued the Prime Minister and the Prosperity Party no longer could have after October 2020. Although the National Election Board declared any separate Tigray election would be illegal, the TPLF went ahead with its own regional state council election in Tigray in September, winning 98% of the vote. The House of Federation, the Upper House of Parliament, and the guardian of constitutional issues, also declared the TPLF elections unconstitutional. The National Election Board promptly declared this meant the TPLF would be unable to participate in the June election. That decision was underlined by the war in November and the subsequent security issues. No realistic Tigrean involvement in any government organised election is possible, though the NEBE has registered some Tigrayan parties opposed to the TPLF, and the Prosperity Party itself claims to have a Tigrayan branch.

Despite its short life, the Prosperity Party has all possible advantages in the elections. With its membership including the former ruling parties in every regional state, with the exception of Tigray, it should easily win all the regional state councils as well as the Federal election. It is the only party capable of putting up candidates in all constituencies. No other party is putting up candidates in all constituencies. The nearest is Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA) which has announced plans to field candidates in 435/547 constituencies. Control of government allows its officials to use public investment to boost their campaign, placing schools, hospitals, roads, irrigation facilities and any public works projects where they can most benefit the party. These financial benefits are underlined by the Prime Minister hosting 5-and 10-million-birr dinners for business leaders. How funds are raised and who provides them could in theory be an issue, but it is not one that appears to trouble the party leader. Abiy told Parliament last October that MPs should not and could not call him to account over donations made to him personally and that they had no right to question him over where he obtained funds or how he spent them. The current security situation with substantial areas of the country under Command Post, military, control also benefits the PP as the arm of government, making it difficult if not impossible for opposition candidates to open party offices, recruit candidates, or run election campaigns. It has the freedom to use public media at will, and can and does deny their use to opposition parties, despite the various agreements over the use of the media. It also has the support of notionally independent media like the Fana Broadcasting Corporation and Walta. Given the government and Abiy’s increasingly negative attitude towards critical reporting as shown in Tigray, private media has been more and more careful to self-censor material.

Oromo nationalists, who originally supported Abiy in 2018 with great expectations that he would, as an Oromo, respond positively to their demands, were already becoming concerned about the direction of policy by early 2019. He made a substantial number of Oromo appointments after taking office but little effort to respond to more serious demands, such as giving Afaan Oromo the same status as Amharic, more autonomy to the Oromo region or reconsidering the status of Addis Ababa or giving the Oromo region more autonomy. His moves towards postponing the election and creating a single national party were seen as threatening to Oromo opposition parties which remain supportive of the concept of an Oromo region. The Oromo Federal Congress (OFC), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and activists like Jawar Mohammed consider an active federation with ethnic regional parties a necessity to protect and expand Oromo rights. Jawar, the founder of the Oromo Media Network, and originally a supporter of Abiy, finally joined the OFC after the creation of the Prosperity Party in 2019.

The breaking point between Abiy and the Oromo ethno-nationalists, who had originally supported him in ousting the TPLF, came in mid-2020 after the killing of a popular Oromo singer, Hachalu Hundessa, on June 29.¹³⁵ His death led to a wave of violence in a number of towns as well as an inappropriate dispute over where the body should be buried. Abiy blamed domestic and foreign enemies, and a Prosperity Party Oromia branch spokesperson said the TPLF funded and worked with Jawar and the OLF to plan Hachalu’s killing and destruction in towns in order to spark religious and ethnic violence which would lead to a security collapse. The Oromo regional government claimed 167 people were killed and more than 10,000 displaced in the subsequent demonstrations. A report, issued on January 1, 2021, by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), however, concluded that 123 people had been killed, more than half (76) by government security forces, 35 by individuals and groups, and 12 as a result of explosions or similar incidents. Its 59-page report, drafted after visits to forty towns, concluded: “The findings show that the attacks meet the elements of a crime against humanity with large numbers of people, organized in groups, having selected their victims on the basis of their ethnicity or religion when conducting a widespread and systematic attack in several different areas over the three days.”¹³⁶

Abiy took the opportunity of Hachalu’s death and the violence to arrest a swathe of opposition leaders, including Jawar Mohammed, and leading members of both the OFC and OLF, accusing them of inciting, orchestrating or organising the violence. Charges against Jawar also included the surprising allegation that he had been training terrorists in Egypt in order to assassinate Orthodox Christian priests, potentially increasing religious tensions. The government closed down Jawar’s Oromo Media Network, shut down the Internet for three weeks and over the following month detained more than 9,000 people in Oromia. It announced more than 4,000 people would be prosecuted for the violence, including 1,200 regional officials for allegedly failing to discharge their responsibilities and 500 government employees for participation. A month later, a meeting of the Prosperity Party Oromo branch, suspended several leading figures including ex-Oromia president Lemma Mergessa, a former ally of Abiy, and the ex-mayor of Shashemene Teyba Hassen, accusing them of failure to discharge their duties. ¹³⁷ It was hardly a surprise when, in March, the OFC and OLF decided not to participate in the election in June. Arrests have not been confined to Oromo politicians, they have also included Amhara ethno-nationalists and other politicians among them the founder and former president of the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), Lidetu Ayalew, who was also arrested in July 2020, accused of coordinating and financially supporting disturbances in Bishoftu. Eskinder Nega, founder of the Balderas for True Democracy Party, was also arrested a day or two after Hachalu’s death along with six other members of his party, charged with trying to incite ethnic and religious violence, including the training of a terror group to assassinate the former acting Addis Ababa mayor and take power in the capital. Balderas supports a self-governing, multi-ethnic Addis Ababa. Eskinder was also accused of telling people that with the election postponed Abiy’s government would no longer be a legitimate government. ¹³⁸

There are numerous other issues that will affect the electoral processes besides security, the arrests of opposition leaders or the withdrawal of the two major Oromo opposition parties. Among the problems apparent at local level in the elections of 2010 and 2015 was the lack of distinction between ruling party and administrative officials at kebele (local) or woreda (district) level, with obvious effect on registration of voters, campaigning or of polling stations very few of which had observers. In 2010, for example,170 observers visited 815 out of the 43,500 polling stations to observe voting and counting. In previous elections, state resources have commonly been used for ruling party campaigning; and opposition candidates routinely prevented from campaigning, subjected to arbitrary arrest, and other forms of harassment. The Prosperity Party includes the former members of the EPRDF or of its affiliated parties whose previous electoral behaviour was marked by intimidation and obstruction if not outright fraud. How far, as rebranded members of the Prosperity Party, they have changed their attitude is unclear, but almost all parties certainly suffer from poor organisation.

The lack of security, currently widespread, also benefits the PP as the arm of government. The creation of Command Posts, equivalent to imposing a state of emergency, which now cover around a third of the country, coupled with the arrest of leading political figures, closure of opposition branch offices and bans on meetings, makes it clear there will be no provision of a level playing field. This has been particularly apparent in the Oromo region, and Tigray, of course, is now effectively outside the whole process.

The final step in ensuring a victory for the PP has been extensive detention of political leaders from major opposition parties, notably the Oromo Federalist Congress, the Oromo Liberation Front and Baldaras for Genuine Democracy, and in a practical sense preventing them from any realistic participation. In March, 2021, the OLF, which earlier complained its own branch offices had been closed and its headquarters put under surveillance, announced it now felt unable to take part in the elections. The Oromo Federal Congress made a similar decision. The PP will face little or no opposition throughout the Oromia regional state.

The continuing political and security operations in Tigray and elsewhere and the jailing of opposition political leaders may guarantee a total victory for the ruling Prosperity Party in an election in June. It will not provide any realistic vote, any confidence in his version of democracy or of his Medemer philosophy, nor will it offer the legitimacy or the mandate that Abiy and his PP government need to have.
Military and Intelligence changes

From the start of his premiership, one of the areas of governance that most concerned Prime Minister Abiy was the possibility of Tigrean control of the ‘deep state’, and specifically of the military and security aspects. He himself had, of course, been a member of the army, reaching the rank of colonel, and involved in the setting up of the Information Network Security Agency (INSA), of which he was acting director for two years. He was very aware of the ramifications of security links across all levels of government and administration.¹³⁹

Restructuring the ‘deep state’ was a priority from Abiy’s point of view, and he launched the process on 7 June 2018 when General Samora Yunis, a Tigrayan who rose to be the Army Chief of Staff, and another Tigrayan, Getachew Assefa, Director of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), were both abruptly removed from office. General Samora, who had tried to resign a year or two earlier, accepted the decision and was retired with honour. Getachew a member of the TPLF Executive committee, as well as the long-time director of the NISS, ¹⁴⁰ was “unhappy” and according to the Prime Minister immediately retired to Tigray, taking with him quantities of surveillance and military equipment. Getachew, later complained he had heard about his dismissal on the media. It had, however, been widely expected. Two weeks later, there was an apparent assassination attempt during a mass rally in Addis Ababa (June 23) when a grenade exploded and several people were killed just after Abiy had left the podium. Abiy blamed the security services, and Getachew was accused of being responsible. When a warrant was later issued for his arrest, the authorities in Tigray declined to send him back to Addis Ababa.

The government launched an investigation into the incident and the first results became public in November. Attorney-General Berhanu Tsegaye said on November 12 that 36 people had been arrested from the NISS and the Prison Service, for human rights’ violations, including an ex-deputy head of the NISS and former Federal Police Commissioner, Yared Zerihun. ¹⁴¹ In addition to the arrests, Abiy took the opportunity to make widespread changes in the senior ranks of the NISS, and INSA and in the Federal police, financial intelligence and defence institutions. He said all, had fallen under control of “individuals and families”, by implication all Tigrayans. The Attorney-General’s investigation had also covered the issue of corruption in the military-industrial complex, METEC. ¹⁴² And in November, he also announced another 27 arrests for corruption. Those detained included the former head of METEC, Major-General Kinfe Dagnew who had resigned some months earlier.

A government produced documentary on METEC’s embezzlement and mismanagement, assuming General Kinfe’s guilt, was put out on TV the day after the general’s arrest. The documentary raised allegations over the trading of arms between Iran and Somalia a few years earlier, irregular procurement procedures with inflated prices, including the acquisition of five aircraft, four of which were subsequently scrapped. Commentators were concerned that the way the arrests were handled and the Attorney General’s statements amounted to a trial by media, rendering a fair trial impossible: “The documentary regarding embezzlement and mismanagement by METEC that was aired by the state broadcaster the day after the arrest of its former boss puts in jeopardy the constitutional right to the presumption of innocence.” ¹⁴³

The TPLF, however reluctantly, had accepted the actuality of proceedings against human rights abuse and corruption, but it was less than happy over the way these were being carried out. A day after the Attorney General’s announcement, it issued a statement emphasizing that the rule of law should be respected. However, it also thought it necessary to underline that those responsible for corrupt practices came from the EPRDF in general, not just the TPLF, and from government as a whole. It was deeply concerned by the way General Kinfe’s arrest was shown on television with attendant government media comments assuming his guilt.

The TPLF saw the apparent concentration on Tigrayans as a warning. There had been earlier efforts to move against corrupt officials and business associates under Abiy’s predecessor, Hailemariam Dessalegn, with no apparent emphasis on Tigrayans, but most of those detained then had been released in the wide-ranging amnesty after Abiy took office. This time, there was no doubt that Tigrayans were in the frame, ¹⁴⁴ and the arrests were seen as politicizing the issue of corruption. They may have reinforced Abiy’s reform credentials, but they increased concerns in Mekelle over the aims of the Prime Minister. Former Communications Minister, Getachew Reda, said the it looked as if only Tigrayan leaders were responsible for past abuses under the ruling coalition. He thought Tigrayans were being turned into scapegoats. The President of Tigray, Debretsion Gebremichael declared the investigations and arrests, particularly that of General Kinfe, were politically motivated, and Tigrayans were being disproportionally targeted. In fact, the political nature of the charges was reinforced in February this year, when the government dropped charges against METEC officials and others accused of corruption or charged with human rights abuse – in order to “broaden national understanding.” A central focus of Abiy’s changes in the military was to alter the balance of perceived ethnic authority and control in the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF). Critics of the TPLF had long maintained the senior ranks of the armed forces were almost exclusively Tigrayan, even claiming they made up over 90% of senior officers. While this might have been true in 1991, it was a considerable exaggeration by 2018 when only 50% or so of those holding the rank of Brigadier-General or above were from Tigray; the figure for majors and colonels was under 60%, and the numbers were falling steadily, though certainly still disproportionate. According to Abiy, percentages for other areas of command were significantly higher, including 80% of the senior posts within the Ministry of Defence, and most of the training and logistical institutions as well as all six sector commanders and deputy commanders. ¹⁴⁵ The Prime Minister claimed army training had been tied to identifying the army as the vanguard of the EPRDF and defending the party’s revolutionary democracy rather than Ethiopia, though this, at least in theory, represented a substantial change from earlier practice. General Tsadkan Gebretensae, a former army Chief of Staff (1994-2001) and all members of the armed forces were required by the Constitution in 1995 to resign from any political party or to leave the military, and did so.

Changes in 2018 included an extensive series of retirements and promotions aiming to balance senior positions between Amhara, Oromo, Tigrayans and Southerners, the areas represented by the four parties of the EPRDF, and to limit the Tigrayan element within the mechanized forces to 50%. Other measures reorganised the management structures to limit the number of representatives of any ethnicity at every level of command. Training was reorganised to ensure the army should think of itself as an Ethiopiawinet army, entirely separate from political divisions or and political parties.

In addition to the changes in senior personnel and a reduction of the numbers of Tigrayan elements in various units, following the assassination attempt on June 23, Abiy also created his own Republican Guard. This was a substantially expanded version of the ‘Agazi’ brigade created by Meles which acted both as a guard unit for government offices and senior officials, and as a security strike force. It was reputed to be a wholly Tigrayan unit though its last commander was in fact an Oromo. The government also made what the Prime Minister later described as a “huge effort” to expand the army, launching a major recruiting drive in early 2019. A commission headed by Deputy Prime Minister, Demeke Mekonnen (Amhara), and his then security adviser, Abadula Gemeda, (Oromo) was set up to oversee the military and security reforms. Lt-General Mola Hailemariam, (Tigrayan) took control of the Federal Special Forces, overseeing the replacement of the Agazi brigade by the new Revolutionary Guard.

As part of the reconstruction, Abiy disbanded two of the six regional commands, those based at Enda Selassie in northern western Tigray and at Semere in the Afar regional state. These along with the Northern Command in Mekelle were part of the government’s anti-Eritrean strategy which became outdated with the Peace Accord with Eritrea signed in July 2018. The four remaining commands were the Northern Command still based at Mekelle; the Central /South Command, previously based at Hawassa, moved to Addis Ababa; Western Command, previously at Bahir in Amhara region, moved to Lekemte in western Oromia; and the Eastern Command at Harar/Jijiga. The number of commands was again increased to six again just prior to the outbreak of conflict in Tigray as part of the government’s preparations for its attack

Other changes were made in the air force, which the Prime Minister said needed to be revived. He also acquired a number of drones, later explaining that this was done in secret, and the necessary training as well as the number and deployment was kept from the TPLF. Drones played an important role in the conflict in November, their use apparently taking the Tigrayan forces by surprise. There was speculation that the drones used in Tigray were supplied by the UAE from its base at Assab in Eritrea. Given the alliance with Eritrea, this is highly plausible. ¹⁴⁶

Although he was prepared to use Tigrayan officers, such as General Seare, Chief of Staff 2018-2019) or General Molla, whose loyalty Abiy felt was reliable, all these changes in the military hierarchy, the restructuring of units, expanded recruitment and acquisition of drones as well as of new equipment, certainly suggest the Prime Minister saw a need to neutralise the Tigrayan element in the army as a matter of urgent necessity, suggesting anticipation of conflict with the TPLF.

3.3 An inexorable drive towards conflict 2018-2020

Both the Prime Minister and the TPLF blame the other for the steady advance towards war in November 2020, and, as noted, they have produced very different narratives to assign culpability. It’s symptomatic of their dysfunctional relationship that that both sides have claimed they made every effort to avoid conflict and encourage reconciliation. Neither claim is realistic.

Prime Minister Abiy, of course, came to power as the result of an Oromo-Amhara alliance within the EPRDF to oust the TPLF from control of the Front and of the Federal government. This was never more than a tactical alliance between two parties with very different political aims and an equal desire for power, and its fundamental instability seemingly left Abiy vulnerable to TPLF efforts to restore their position within the EPRDF. This at least seems to have been one of his major concerns from the beginning of his premiership.

Certainly, it might be expected that the TPLF would be concerned, though hardly surprised, by the loss of control of the EPRDF and loss of positions in federal government. The Front was in disarray and the TPLF itself was divided. The proposed changes in social or economic affairs offered in Abiy’s reform agenda little that was unexpected as almost all the proposed reforms had already been suggested, or considered by the EPRDF or Abiy’s predecessor Hailemariam during his time in office. More worrying was the stress on total TPLF responsibility for all the problems of the past and for the excesses of an autocratic and repressive EPRDF government, and the apparent intent to make it the scapegoat for past abuses. This indeed encouraged many TPLF leaders to withdraw to Mekelle, the capital of the region, and keep out of harm’s way. Additional concern developed over Abiy’s avowed aim to replace the EPRDF by a single party and by his moves towards a more centrist, less federal approach, to government. The methodology employed by Abiy allowed the TPLF to complain that he was bypassing the EPRDF and even Parliament, but its failure to understand how far its years in government had exasperated other parties, meant it was unable to gather the necessary support to oppose him effectively. The TPLF also seriously under-estimated how far Abiy was prepared to go to ensure it could no longer pose any threat.

This, indeed, only became apparent when the Eritrean army began to pour into Tigray in mid-November 2020, though the TPLF worries stemmed from the Peace Accord with Eritrea that Abiy signed in July 2018. EPRDF policies towards Eritrea were of the most direct relevance to Tigray regional state as it has a thousandkilometre-long border with Eritrea. It was the region most affected by the 1998-2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia war and by the ‘no war, no peace’ scenario that followed Ethiopia’s victory and the decisions of the Border Commission in 2002 which Ethiopia failed to accept. This led to a series of cross-border incursions, with both sides claiming to be responding to provocation by the other, numerous kidnapping raids from Eritrea, and an endless flow of refugees fleeing from national conscription in Eritrea. The closure of the border affected the economic status of the communities on both sides. On the wider level, the TPLF-dominated Ethiopian government in the mid-2000s had made a determined, and largely successful, if much resented, effort to contain and isolate President Isaias and Eritrea.¹⁴⁷ Indeed, as has become clear more recently, this seems to have contributed to Isaias’s determination to destroy the TPLF and indeed Tigray region itself, although enmity between the TPLF and Isaias’s party can be traced back to the 1970’s. It would appear likely to have provided a significant element in his long-standing determination that the future of Eritrea required either a collapsed Ethiopia or an Ethiopia in which he could play the major role. In these circumstances, the TPLF believed changing policy over Eritrea certainly demanded some TPLF input, and consideration of what other changes in foreign policy might result. For Abiy, the TPLF were always going to be a potential threat to his ambitions, both personal and governmental, once these became clear. Even after the TPLF members of the EPRDF Council had all voted for him as Chair of the Front (and therefore as Prime Minister) and the effort of the TPLF Chair, Debretsion, to become deputy leader had been a comprehensive failure, Abiy remained highly suspicious of any Tigrayan presence in government and in the upper ranks of the military and security services. This suspicion continued even after many of the TPLF leaders retired to Mekelle. They, in fact, appeared to be concerned that they might be caught up in Abiy’s anti-corruption investigations into the previous government. Abiy said later that after he became prime minister, the TPLF-headed NISS had posted snipers on buildings to demonstrate its ability to remove him if necessary. ¹⁴⁸ Indeed, he appeared to believe that conflict was inevitable from the time he became prime minister.

One major area of disagreement revolved around the future of the EPRDF and the way Abiy carried out its replacement by his Prosperity Party. This ignored EPRDF party protocols and regulations, through his habitual practice of taking apparently ad hoc decisions without consultation and certainly without thinking through the possible consequences. The determination to delay elections past the original date of his mandate as prime minister may, however, have been calculated. It led the TPLF into holding its own regional election and set off a series of activities that provided Abiy with an excuse for taking action over what he would claim were treasonable activities that could be portrayed as a betrayal of the TPLF’s relationship with the ENDF.

The postponement of the elections was a decision that had an immediate effect on relations between the Federal government and the TPLF. In June 2019, the NEBE had warned that insecurity which had displaced 2.4 million people (UN figures) could delay the May 2020 election. A national census had already been postponed twice. Political figures reacted negatively to the idea. OFC Chair, Merara Gudina said any postponement would anger the public; Debretsion Gebremichael, TPLF chair warned postponement could have “grave consequences” as not holding the election on time was unconstitutional, adding “It means the Ethiopia government after 2020 [would be] illegitimate.” The House of Representatives, however, approved postponement until August 2020 despite opposition protests. And Abiy issued stern warnings against anyone planning to be involved in “Illegal political activities and acts threatening to violate the constitution and constitutional order in Ethiopia.” The government, he said, would do anything necessary to protect the safety of the country.

A few months later, in March 2020, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) said it would be unable to run the election in August because of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, and this also precluded setting another date. In June, the House of Federation considered the issue and formally extended the term of office of the federal and regional governments, and therefore of parliament also, up to nine to twelve months after the Ministry of Health considered the pandemic sufficiently under control. A date of June 2021 was fixed subsequently. The TPLF claimed the postponement of the election was no more than a government effort to prolong its term of office to strengthen the Prosperity Party’s position before any election. It denounced the decision as unconstitutional for extended the government and parliament beyond their five-year mandates, due to end on October 5, 2020. Provocatively, it then announced that to avoid any violation of the time-frame and keep within the constitution, it would carry out its own regional election at the beginning of September which it did despite warnings by the House of Federation and the NEBE that this would be illegal. As expected, it won an overwhelming 98% of the vote, not least because by then it was able to call on a rising surge of Tigrayan nationalism in the face of Federal government actions.

Following the Tigrayan regional vote, the two sides then indulged in a series of titfor-tat declarations, steadily ratcheting up the tension. The House of Federation declared the Tigray vote illegal; and the TPLF, in turn, declared the government in Addis Ababa illegitimate after October 5 and said it would not implement any new federal laws and regulations. The House of Federation asked the Ministry of Finance not to transfer the regular budgetary allocation to the Tigray regional government but send funds directly to local administrative bodies, bypassing the regional administration. Tigray officials declared this unconstitutional, adding that it amounted to a “declaration of war. Claiming the Federal finance ministry had retained 285 million birr provided by donors for social welfare programs in Tigray, they also announced the withholding of tax receipts collected for the Federal government.

As part of the policy of refusing to implement any federal decisions, the Tigray authorities refused to accept the appointment of a new commander and deputy commanders for the ENDF Northern Command based in Mekelle, and said it would only recognise the previous commander, General Diriba Mekonnen. The TPLF responded by claiming that as federal government had “no legal responsibility or power to make decisions regarding the reorganization and/or operations of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, any decisions made thus far are not acceptable and will not be implemented.” It said: “any decisions related to Tigray, such as operational decisions, leadership changes and command reorganizations and the movement of troops or armaments, are absolutely unacceptable and will never be implemented,” One of the new deputy commanders, Brigadier-General Jamal Mohammed was immediately sent back to Addis when he arrived at Mekelle Airport. Brigadier-General Belay Seyoum, appointed as the new Commander of the Northern Command, his other deputy, Brigadier-General Seid Tekuye, and Lt. General Molla Hailemariam, responsible for the handover, were told in advance they would not be allowed into Mekelle. They made no effort to do so. The Ministry of Defense criticized the regional government for restricting the army from “performing its duties”, and pointed out the deployment and mission of the army was not under the interest of any group and was bound by the constitution. The TPLF also refused to allow some troops movements, relocating units of the Northern Command to western Oromia and to the Southern region. This wasn’t the first time Tigray had prevented Northern Command reorganisation. In 2018, after the signing of the Peace Accord with Eritrea, the authorities mobilised the local population to prevent the removal of troops and equipment from the Eritrean border. They repeated this in January 2019 when the Federal government made another effort to get the Northern Command’s heavy weapons, rockets and artillery out of Tigray.

While the government was building up its forces in preparation for war, so was the TPLF. Faced by what they saw as the threats posed by Amhara claims to Western Tigray and to Raya in southern Tigray, officials spoke creating a “security fortress” and build up the region’s militia and the region’s Special Forces.¹⁴⁹ There were suggestions that it managed to mobilise as many as 250,000 fighters in advance of the outbreak of hostilities. The Federal Attorney-general claimed at a press conference in January (30.1.2021) that the TPLF had trained 170,00 militia in addition to 80,000 regional Special Forces during 2018-2020. 150

The Attorney-general claimed the TPLF had created its own Central Military Command in July, organising these forces into 23 regiments, recruiting both current and retired ENDF military officers. The accounts of the fighting in November suggest these figures were significantly exaggerated, as indeed were the casualty figures claimed, by both sides, during November and subsequently. It was alleged that the Tigrayan Central Command had planned to collect technical and logistic supplies for a three-month conflict in preparation for a campaign against the Amhara region and then an advance to Addis Ababa. The investigation, the Attorney-general said, had found this was to be preceded by the attack on the ENDF bases of the Northern Command which actually took place on the night of November 3. The rest of these plans were pre-empted by the Prime Minister’s immediate response on November 4 and the actions of the ENDF and Amhara Special forces in defeating the advance towards Gondar on November 4. Reports of the fighting do indicate that the TPLF did take control of the ENDF base at Dansha on November 4, there were no other indications that the TPLF had planned any advance into Amhara region.

Another major factor in the deterioration of relations was the growth of Amhara ethno-nationalism after 2018 and the Federal government’s support for the anti-Tigrayan component in this. In part, this was a response to conflicts that had broken out at various points around the borders of the Amhara regional state, and of the treatment of Amhara in other areas, as well as emulation of the appearance of Oromo ethno-nationalism. It also thrived on the apparent opportunity, provided by the collapse of Tigrayan power (and of federal authority), to take back areas that had been assigned to Tigray regional state under the 1995 constitution. These included most of what had been designated Western Tigray and the Raya on the eastern side of Tigray.

Protests in the Amhara region, and the appearance of an Amhara youth movement, Fana, paralleled those in Oromia. Calling for the implementation of Amhara claims to Western Tigray, this encouraged Amhara ethno-nationalism and increased support for the National Movement of Amhara (NaMA), set up in June 2018. Since then, this has been posing an increasing threat to the Prosperity Party’s Amhara branch, being vocal in its criticism of the Federal government for failing to react to the killings of ethnic Amhara in Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia and the Southern Regional state.

The first open Amhara moves against Tigray came in mid-2018, when the Amhara administration started closing off roads from Amhara into Tigray. By the end of the year, it was almost impossible for Tigrayans to get to Addis Ababa through the Amhara region. They were being forced to take a long detour through the Afar regional state into Oromia and then to Addis Ababa. Federal police refused to take action when Tigrayan merchants buying grain in the Amhara region were robbed by local youth. Over 130,000 Tigrayans felt obliged to withdraw from other regions and move back to Tigray, though some of this was a response to attacks in the Oromo region going back to 2015/6.

In June 2019, the Amhara regional head of security, Brigadier-General Asaminew Tsige, attacked Amhara regional government offices in Bahir Dar, killing the regional president and two other senior officials. This coincided with the killing in Addis Ababa of the army Chief of Staff, General Seare Mekonnen, a Tigrayan loyal to Abiy, giving rise to claims that this was part of an attempted coup against the Federal government. In fact, Brigadier Asaminew’s actions appear to have been limited to an attempt to take over power in the Amhara region. One of the accusations against was that he had been illegally increasing the Special Force units in preparation for his own coup attempt. Whether or not that was the case, the extra units he had recruited were not, in fact, disbanded after his own death.¹⁵¹

As the TPLF tried to link up with other supporters of ethnic federalism in 2019, and nationalist elements in Oromia became concerned over Abiy’s failure to push Oromo demands, Abiy looked to Amhara support. Given the long-term issues between the Amhara and Tigrean regions, this was easy to obtain. Abiy was quite prepared to pay the price, support for and acceptance of the Amhara ‘recovery’ of Welkait and indeed all of western Tigray and of Raya, not least as it would help ensure a weakened Tigray in the future. He ignored the likelihood that any such military action might set off an unending chain of attack and counter-attacks. Equally, the Amhara region, and the Amhara elite in Addis Ababa, have always been largely supportive of a more centralised system of governance than of any federation, ethnic or otherwise. This is an attitude that resonated with Abiy’s views as expressed to the Financial Times in January 2019, and with his interpretation of Medemer, a word that might imply unity and dialogue, but which critics note, actually involves rather more instruction from on high than any realistic pretence at listening to others.

By the middle of 2020, Amhara militia and Special Forces had been mobilised and well before the fighting broke out they were deploying along the border with the Tigray region. It seems they were also well aware of the plans for an attack on Tigray and had been in discussion with the ENDF. Part of the final preparations for the attack also involved the creation of a new ENDF North-west Command, announced on October 20, 2020, to be head-quartered in the Amhara regional capital of Bahir Dar.¹⁵²

The Chief Commissioner of the Amhara Regional State Police, Abere Adamu, indeed later admitted that the Amhara regional state had “already done [its] homework,” before war broke out and “deployment of forces had taken place in our borders from east to west. The war started that night after we had already completed our preparations.”¹⁵³ He also acknowledged that the Amhara Special Forces and ENDF mechanized units based near Humera (presumably at the ENDF base at Dansha) had discussed joint operations. There was heavy fighting at Dansha on November 4 with the ENDF forces being forced to retreat towards Humera. Then, the Commissioner said, Amhara forces arrived to provide support to the ENDF mechanised units: “this was how the war started, this was the day,” he said. ¹⁵⁴ Commissioner Abere lost his job in April. He died suddenly in May.

The importance of the Amhara role in the war in Tigray was underlined on November 7, only three days after the launch of the “law enforcement operation”. In response to concern in the army over the outbreak of war and even more over his agreement to involve Eritrea troops, Abiy found it necessary to make changes at the top of the army, the security services, the police and the foreign ministry. These clearly indicated both the level of concern and his dependence on the Amhara element in the Prosperity Party and government. Lt. General Berhanu Jula, previously deputy chief of staff, an Oromo and close ally of Abiy, was promoted to Chief of Staff of the ENDF, with Lt. General Ababaw Tadesse., called back from retirement, as his deputy. Temesgen Tiruneh, previously president of the Amhara regional state, and Abiy’s National Security Advisor before that, was appointed Director of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). He had been made President of Amhara regional state after the assassination of the then regional state president, Ambachew Mekonnen and other senior officials on June 22, 2019. There were also changes at the head of the National Intelligence and Security Service and the Federal Police Commission, and Abiy finally acceded to the repeated demands of Deputy Prime Minister, Demeke Mekonnen, to add the position of Foreign Minister to his portfolio, with outgoing foreign minister, Gedu Andargachew, being appointed as National Security Advisor. Both were leading members of the Amhara political elite.

More generally, there had been numerous other points at which neither side made any real effort to avoid opportunities to irritate, alarm or even anger the other, particularly in the second half of 2020, by which time it appears Abiy and Isaias had decided on a date for war.

Among the issues that raised problems between the TPLF and the Federal government were the Administrative Boundaries and Identity Issues Commission, a commission reporting to the Prime Minister with a mandate to resolve border and ethnic conflicts. ¹⁵⁵ Tigrayan MPs objected strongly, arguing it was unconstitutional, and unnecessary, because the upper house, the House of Federation already the proper body to deal with such issues. It was seen as threatening by Tigray as it seemed to offer a way for the Prime Minister to assist the Amhara region to resolve Amhara claims on Western Tigray.

A complaint, frequently repeated by Federal officials, was that the growth of demands from southern nationalities for their own killil (regional states) was due to TPLF encouragement. One group, the Sidama, despite government delays, successfully achieved this with a referendum in November 2019 providing an overwhelming vote in favour. This success inspired nearly a dozen other groups to demand a similar change of status. Abiy himself argued that it was the TPLF itself which was accountable for 27 years of corruption and repression, and that it was largely responsible for encouraging, indeed, organizing inter-ethnic conflict across the country to try to destabilize his regime.

The major failure of the TPLF, in fact, was that it never managed to resolve the “question of nationalities in Ethiopia.”¹⁵⁶ Its solution, ethnic federalism, proved unacceptable because of the way the TPLF implemented it, keeping the regional states subservient to a centralized authoritarianism. The failure to encourage realistic federal governance and the continued efforts to keep control of the regional states also counted against the TPLF’ subsequent appeals to federalism. The TPLF believed that any concern about its methods of government would be outweighed, as to some extent they had been in the past, by the positives: over a decade of double-digit growth, a revived and developed economy, substantial infrastructural development, and major progress in reducing poverty and in health and education development. They miscalculated, and it was only after Abiy began to make clear his interest in a more centralised and essentially Amhara agenda in the build-up to the war against Tigray that many of Abiy’s Oromo supporters had second thoughts. Abiy lost Oromo support because he failed to support demands for a greater Oromo role. There were also indications in early 2021 that he was beginning to lose Amhara support when he failed to respond sufficiently to the more extreme elements of Amhara nationalism.

Faced by Abiy’s anti-Tigrayan attitude, and policies, the TPLF in effect concentrated on Tigray though it also worked to build up an alternative coalition with groups and parties on the basis of the existing constitution and support for ethnic federalism for the elections. It believed such a coalition could win any election in 2020 especially after Abiy arrested leaders of the OLF and OFC and lost much Oromo support. This was one of the factors that [made] the House of Representatives illegal after October 5 It was the TPLF’s efforts to build an opposition coalition that appears to underlie Abiy’s allegations that the TPLF had been responsible for all the ethnic clashes across the country over the previous two years.¹⁵⁷

By early 2019 Abiy was prepared to tell the Financial Times that there were serious tensions between the Federal government and the Tigrayan regional state, but he wasn’t too worried by them: “Yesterday they were on the streets of Mekelle insulting me, but I love that. That is democracy,” adding that he wanted to secure peace by persuasion, not through arms. “Negative peace’, he said, “is possible as long as you have a strong army. We are heading to positive peace.” ¹⁵⁸

Despite this, the provocations continued. In a statement from the Office of the Prime Minister in mid-November, he said the TPLF had, over several months, sponsored, trained, and equipped ‘anyone’ prepared to carry out actions to derail the democratic transition, instigating ethnic and religious clashes, and referred to ‘horrendous crimes’ in Western Gondar, the destruction of the town of Shashemene, and the massacres of innocent civilians in the areas of Arsi, Bale, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gura Ferda and most recently in Western Wollega. In addition, it had, orchestrated an illegal election in Tigray and openly refused to accept any federal government directives after October 5, and had recalled the Tigray representatives from the Federal House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House of Federation, which was a direct denial of Federal government authority. ¹⁵⁹

In the two months after the Tigray election, the TPLF claimed the government had carried out an increasing series of petty actions against the Tigray region: blocking the transfer of a chemical spraying drone, bought and sent by Tigrayan and Eritrean nationals residing in Israel, to help the region fight locusts; stopping the arrival of two water experts from the Chinese company China Gezhouba Group Company (CGGC), who were transiting through Addis Ababa en route to Mekelle; prohibited the supply of masks for students in the Tigray region; told national and regional sport federations to cut ties with Tigray; and barred federal institutions from exchanging letters, information, providing support, or allowing participation in any Federal forum.

More serious was the House of Federation order to the government to cut off the federal budget subsidy for Tigray Regional State Council, though other officials said disbursement to woreda, kebele or city administrations would continue. In October, there was also some confusion about the disbursement of the next tranche of a 285 million birr fund under the donor-funded Safety Net program for the coming three months, though the Federal Ministry of Finance insisted it would be sent to woredas and kebeles as before. ¹⁶⁰

The rhetoric magnified. A Tigray regional government statement referred to the “illegal, unitarist and personalistic dictatorship currently in charge of political power at the federal level” which was conspiring with external actors to bring the people of Tigray to their knees, and “committing the treasonous act of abandoning the country’s policy of independence and sovereignty.” It also said cutting or suspending the federal budget subsidy was tantamount to a declaration of war. Three days later, former Foreign Minister, Seyoum Mesfin, speaking on the local Dimtsi Weyane television station in Mekelle on October 29, called Abiy the ‘former prime minister’, accused him of being a traitor, of selling GERD to Egypt and of colluding with President Isaias to undermine the sovereignty of the country and its constitution, and of allowing Isaias to ‘rape Ethiopia under the guise of cooperation’. He said Abiy had made “a one-day secret trip to Asmara”, conspiring with Isaias to wage war on Tigray. Eritrean military and security officers, he said, were in Bahir Dar advising on training and organizing the new ENDF North-west Command. Asmara had also recruited and trained new forces with the aim of “finishing off the TPLF”.

On November 2, Regional President Debretsion Gebremichael speaking on regional television said that the regional government had “prepared its military Special Forces” not because it wanted war but because it needed to be prepared for the worst. He said the situation was advancing towards war and everyone should be ready. It was, he said, a war that would be waged by the Federal government of Ethiopia and a foreign power (Eritrea). He said repeatedly the Tigrayan people wanted peace but if war was waged against them, they were prepared to fight and to win. ¹⁶¹

The way both sides responded to the efforts of the Ethiopian Reconciliation Commission to mediate, blocking any progress by setting what amounted to politically impossible pre-conditions, was symptomatic of the relationship. The House of Representatives had voted for the creation of an Ethiopian Reconciliation Commission in December 2018, and the 41-member body was established six weeks later. Headed by Cardinal Berhaneyesus Demerew, head of the Roman Catholic church in Ethiopia, its members included many of the ‘great and good’: politicians, among them former Prime Minister Hailemariam, and opposition party leaders, academics and intellectuals, sporting heroes, philanthropists and religious figures. The Commission was given the aim of looking at conflicts, considering opposite points of view and working for reconciliation. In theory, at least it has the power to subpoena documents, summon individuals to give testimony, and demand police support.

At a press conference on October 24, 2020, Cardinal Berhaneyesus revealed that the Commission’s attempts to mediate the current impasse between the Federal government and Tigray Regional State had been hampered by the pre-conditions set by both parties before they were prepared to sit down together around a table. The Cardinal said both sides had expressed their willingness to address the gaps between them but, he said, the politicians had persisted in underlining their own respective pre-conditions for conducting a dialogue. He refused to give any details of these but noted the Commission had received “a very constructive and good gesture from the Tigray administration” when they met Debretsion Gebremichael and his cabinet in Mekelle.¹⁶²

At different times, Abiy did suggest the TPLF should merge with the PP or join as an affiliated party, or for Tigrayan President, Debretsion, to become Deputy Prime Minister and for a number of senior TPLF members to return to Addis Ababa to work with him. The TPLF offered to negotiate on security and other national issues and the holding of peaceful elections; but refused to cancel its own electoral process or to join the PP. It said, it would support an all-inclusive national dialogue, but that must involve the release of all political leaders, and a transitional national government to oversee elections with the earlier Tigray election accepted as valid. Security should be in the hands of regions, and President Isaias be excluded from any participation in affairs. The government and Prosperity Party firmly rejected any consideration of a transitional government or a national dialogue, insisting the Tigray election must be declared null and void and the previous administration reinstated. Once the conflict started Abiy repeatedly refused to consider any possibility of mediation with what he called a ‘criminal clique’, and demanded their complete surrender.

Given the prescriptions of his philosophy of medemer, it might have been expected that Abiy might also have tried to reconcile the TPLF with Isaias. The nearest he came to doing so was when he asked Isaias to talk to Tigrayan President Debretsion at the Ethiopian New Year in 2018. It was hardly a success. Isaias described his two meetings with Debretsion in the interview/speech he gave in February this year: “We met Debretsion in Zelambessa on 11 September 2018. I was not in a mood to talk to him. This was followed by another meeting in Om Hajer. I only agreed to do so late the previous night having said I would not meet him up to that point. I had only one message/question and repeatedly asked myself if I should say it or not. In the end, I thought it better to say it. I asked Debretsion, why are you preparing for war? Why? He replied, “it won’t happen”.163

3.4 President Isaias and Prime Minister Abiy – who is in the driving seat?

Central to Abiy’s policies towards the TPLF and Tigray, and more generally in terms of internal political developments as well as regional and foreign policy, has been his relationship with Eritrea, or more accurately, with President Isaias.

Abiy’s promise to accept the Boundary Commission report of 2002 in full, subsequently endorsed by the EPRDF’s full Council including TPLF members on June 5, 2018, was seen as one of the most important points in his inaugural speech.¹⁶⁴ In the context of Abiy’s relations with the TPLF, it should be noted that the TPLF’s own Executive Committee described the decision as essentially in line with the peace principles of the government’s approach for the last 18 years and said it was appropriate and timely. It did add that it should be implemented carefully “in the light of geopolitical realities,” and complained the decision had been made public before being accepted by the EPRDF’s Council, a requirement of the EPRDF’s constitution. It warned of the need for careful consideration of implementation. Overall, the TPLF statement described the decisions as having fundamental flaws as it hadn’t followed proper party procedures, and had failed to take into account the “fundamental leadership deficit and the damage visible within the EPRDF”. Nor had it valuated the progress of the “deep reform” agenda that the EPRDF was currently undertaking in order to solve the challenges it faced. ¹⁶⁵

The significance of Abiy’s decision was underlined by the related changes in Ethiopia’s foreign policy, with the Peace Accord bringing the Horn of Africa’s most isolated dictator back into regional circulation and, even more, giving him a leading, even controlling, role in Ethiopian affairs, and above all in events in Tigray regional state. Of course, an end to the 20 years of “no peace, no war”, largely driven by Isaias’ continuous efforts to destabilise Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia after his defeat in 2000 and Ethiopia’s refusal to hand over Badme and its constant exertions to isolate Eritrea, was widely welcomed, not least by the people of both countries.

How far the Peace Accord was the result of Abiy’s own thinking and how far the result of external prompting has been the subject of much speculation. Some of the first moves came quietly from religious groups. In September 2017, the World Council of Churches sent a team to see what common ground there was on both sides.¹⁶⁶ It has been suggested, plausibly, that some of the groundwork for the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea was done by the United States. Ambassador Donald Yamamoto, the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa visited Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia in late April 2018, and explored “the possibilities of an Ethiopian-Eritrean understanding, including the possible use of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to help underwrite the costs”.¹⁶⁷ Ambassador Yamamoto was a long-time proponent of bringing Eritrea back ‘into the fold of a relationship with the US and the international community; and with a career that uniquely qualified him to try to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, he made a number of efforts to do just that during the 18 years of “no peace, no war”. ¹⁶⁸ Diplomatic sources suggest that Yamamoto hosted talks in Washington at which both sides were represented. The Eritrean minister of foreign affairs, Osman Saleh, is said to have been present, accompanied by Yemane Gebreab, President Isaias’s longstanding adviser.¹⁶⁹

Certainly, the US, and the US Ambassador in Addis Ababa, Michael Raynor, welcomed the Peace Accord. It didn’t need the US to explain its value to both Abiy and Isaias, (though the US may well have added an additional benefit to the agreement by persuading Saudi Arabia and the UAE to finance it) not least because Abiy and Isaias believed they had a common enemy, the TPLF. There was no indication of this in the Peace Accord signed on 8 July 2018 in Asmara, but Isaias had already made his position known several weeks earlier. After Abiy’s original call to “resolve differences through dialogue” and the EPRDF’s approval in June, he publicly identified this as “Game over” for the TPLF.¹⁷⁰ He said he would send a delegation to discuss Ethiopian troop withdrawals from the disputed areas along the Ethiopian/Eritrean border that runs along Tigray, but he also needed to get some assurance that Abiy really had the political support necessary to deal with the TPLF. Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh and Presidential Adviser, Yemane Gebreab, arrived in Addis Ababa just after the attempted assassination of Abiy during a rally in Meskal Square. They were impressed by Abiy’s response to the attack and by the authority he had already shown in removing General Samora and Getachew Assefa. They reported favourably to Isaias. Two weeks later, on July 8, Abiy, at his own suggestion, arrived in Asmara – to an enormous welcome. President Isaias received an equally impressive reception when he visited Addis Ababa a week later. There was no doubt of the popular support in both countries for an end to 18 years of ‘no war, no peace’ and the opportunity for families to renew links across the Eritrea-Tigrayan border. Both leaders, particularly Abiy, basked in world-wide adulation.
The Peace Accord signed in July consisted of five general points, covering an end to the state of war, cooperation on political, economic, social, cultural and security issues, and opening embassies, links in trade, communication and transport, implementation of the border decision, and working jointly towards regional peace and security. It offered no specifics, and no indication of how the two sides would move the situation on. It was a clear example of what has become Abiy’s trademark approach: a personal action, often unexpected, to garner the headlines, without thinking through the consequences, or worrying about details, which are left to be discussed, or ignored, later. It also reinforced Abiy’s own view of his capacity to charm anyone and his skill in dialogue. For Isaias, it offered the prospect of lifting sanctions which would allow him to resume what he regarded as his proper role as an elder statesman in the Horn and start on the process of replacing the regional block, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In the second place, however, it offered the opportunity for the overthrow of the TPLF. Even more, it allowed for the actual destruction of the organisation, and the possibility of making sure no Tigrayan organisation (or even the region) could ever function effectively again, by destroying its administration, infrastructure, culture, and even its population. Isaias’ determination to crush the TPLF even allowed him to ally with Amhara ethno-nationalist elements against whom he had spent over 30 years fighting for Eritrean independence. Abiy was equally determined to shore up his own power base, despite his commitments to medemer, to dialogue, synergy, and unity, allowed himself to be carried along.

It seems unlikely that plans for the destruction of the TPLF and Tigray were worked out at Abiy and Isaias’ first meeting. However, their statements seemed to suggest that they rapidly saw the opportunities for something more than a mere alliance. On his first visit to Addis Ababa in July 2018, Isaias said: “I have given [to Abiy] all responsibility of leadership and power; from now on, anyone who says Eritrea and Ethiopia are two people is out of reality.”¹⁷¹ Abiy made similar remarks at Davos in January 2019, adding that he saw no need for Ethiopia, Eritrea or [more surprisingly] Djibouti to have separate armies or embassies.¹⁷² A few weeks later, Abiy, apparently referring to Eritrea said “it is only a matter of time that those who have left will return”, a statement that alarmed Eritreans who saw this as the potential negation of thirty years of their independence struggle and that “Eritrea has been offered to Ethiopia on a silver platter”. This. Inevitably, gave rise to rumours that they were considering some sort of closer links, even confederation. While these have not gone away, it is far from clear whether any such suggestion can be considered practical politics. What does seem clear, is that by the end of 2018, the two leaders had come to the conclusion that their alliance would, of necessity, encompass a military solution.

For Abiy, the TPLF was a dangerous political rival — a party that had once led Ethiopia and, once he became prime minister, repeatedly flouted his authority. For Abiy, like Isaias this was unacceptable. Both believed they needed the political annihilation of the TPLF. An additional factor, in the longer term, was a requirement for the devastation of Tigray’s economy in order to allow the Eritrean economy to benefit from the reopening of the border. This was underlined by the brief but very substantial impact of the openings of the border in July which benefitted Mekelle merchants and businesses, not Eritrea, and underlined the poverty and lack of capacity of the Eritrean economy

For Isaias, though, it was also much more, a deeply personal feud. Grievances, bad blood and ideological disputes stretched back to the time of the struggle against the Derg and for Eritrean independence. And as Isaias has frequently shown, he never forgets an injury, real or imagined, however small. Abiy offered Isaias what he most desired: a way to destroy the TPLF which had humiliated him in the 2000 border war, and which had subsequently prevented him from achieving the role and status he believed should be his: recognition as an elder statesman of the region. His dislike long preceded the war that ended in 2000. In the mid-1980s, when the TPLF had criticised his ideological arguments and refused to accept his guidance and his suggestions, Isaias closed off a major TPLF supply route from Sudan running through EPLF held areas during the 1983-84 famine.¹⁷³ Tens of thousands of Tigrayans died before the TPLF was able to build their own road through to Sudan. In the last years of the Derg’s rule the two accepted the need for a tactical alliance and after their respective takeovers in Eritrea and Ethiopia, relations improved. But even before the disagreements that led to the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia, Isaias had become convinced that Meles had tried to kill him by causing problems to an aircraft on which he was returning to Asmara. Meles Zenawi once told Alex de Waal: “Isaias … cannot forgive the Weyane for defeating his unconquerable army and so he is looking to punish them. One way he would like to do this is to dismantle Ethiopia, which is proving a lot more difficult than he thought. The other strategy is to hang on until he can find enough Ethiopians who can also demonize the Weyane.” ¹⁷⁴

For the second stage of their rapprochement, Isaias and Abiy signed an Agreement of Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation in the presence of the UN Secretary General and the King of Saudi Arabia in Jeddah on September 16.¹⁷⁵ This added little to the previous accord with its seven general articles. The state of war was ended and the two countries would promote cooperation in the political, security, defence, economic, trade, investment, cultural and social fields on the basis of complementarity and synergy, develop joint investment projects, including Joint Special Economic Zones, promote regional and global peace, security and cooperation, and combat terrorism and people, arms and drug trafficking. The two slightly more specific articles covering implementation of the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission decisions and the establishment of a High-Level Joint Committee, and relevant sub-committees to oversee the implementation of the agreement.

Internationally, both Isaias and Abiy gained. For Abiy, of course, it meant the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, and a significant increase in his international status, with the UN Secretary–General talking of peace breaking out in the Horn of Africa. Subsequent events, of course, have seriously damaged his image and raised questions about the applicability of the prize. For Isaias, it relieved some of the international pressure over internal Eritrean policies, though that has never really worried him. He was irritated not to be given the Nobel Peace Prize jointly with Abiy, but his interest has always to be seen as a respected regional elder statesman. The rapprochement was irrelevant to Eritrea’s internal development, and was never intended to have any impact in terms of encouragement of democracy or open government, it only relate to his own position and authority, and his own desire for revenge against Tigray. He has used the Accord to bring his position in the region and in the lower Red Sea back to where he thinks it ought to be, joining the Saudi sponsored Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden set up in 2020, and bringing Ethiopia and Somalia into an organisation which he can dominate. Isaias has not bothered to resolve his border problems with Djibouti but he has encouraged Abiy to make major changes in Ethiopia’s foreign policy, both towards Somalia and Somaliland and the Somali Federal states, in pursuit of his own long-standing aim of replacing IGAD with an organisation in which he can play a leading role. This, and the war in Tigray, has, of course, also affected Ethiopia’s relationship with Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan and IGAD, and weakened Ethiopia’s regional standing and its ability to control the discussions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Isaias insisted that lifting the UN sanctions on Eritrea must be part of the overall deal, in part perhaps because of the need to acquire more arms. There have been reports that as soon as the sanctions were lifted, he was in the market for weapons, using the funds given by Saudi Arabia and the UAE for signing the agreements. Some of the weaponry displayed by Eritrean troops in Tigray appears to have been recently obtained. The UN sanctions had been imposed over Eritrea’s dealings with Djibouti and its support for extremists in Somalia. Relations with Djibouti, at least on the surface, were dealt with the day after the Eritrea-Ethiopia Peace Agreement, when, at the request of King Salmon, President Guelleh of Djibouti arrived to meet Isaias in Jeddah. They shook hands and agreed to restore relations, though Isaias subsequently made no further effort to improve Eritrean-Djibouti relations. ¹⁷⁶

Earlier, Isaias himself had also mended relations with Somalia. He invited Mohamed Abdullahi Mohammed ‘Farmaajo’, President of Somalia to Asmara on 28 July 2018 the first such visit by a Somali president.¹⁷⁷ They signed a Joint Declaration on Brotherly Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation, which covered acknowledgement of “each other’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.” This was followed by a summit of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia in Asmara on 5 September 2018, resulting in another Joint Declaration of Comprehensive Cooperation with agreement to build close political, economic, social, cultural and security ties, and coordinate policies to promote regional peace and security.¹⁷⁸ The three leaders also agreed to set up a Joint High-Level Committee to coordinate efforts. A second summit was held in Bahir Dar, the capital of the Amhara regional state, in November 2018 at which the parties reaffirmed their “commitment to inclusive regional peace and cooperation”.¹⁷⁹

It was all enough for the UN Security Council to agree to the lifting of sanctions against Eritrea in November, achieving one of Isaias’ main aims.

The summit in Bahir Dar, however, was seen in a very different light by the TPLF, as it placed President Isaias in the Amhara regional state. The leaders discussed the possibility of making a joint attack on Tigray on two fronts: from Amhara region in the south and Eritrea in the north. The danger was certainly clear to the TPLF and was exactly what happened in November 2020. There is no doubt that the decision to hold the summit in Bahir Dar, whether suggested by Isaias, as at least one senior Ethiopia diplomat believed ¹⁸⁰ or not, was designed to send a message to the TPLF.

Although no announcement was made at the time, it subsequently became clear that the three leaders had signed a formal agreement to set up a Horn of Africa Council at the Asmara summit. This appeared to be the first stage in a plan to try to replace IGAD, an organisation which Isaias, who walked out in 2007 when it refused to accept his advice over Somalia, had no time for. One result of the creation of the Council was a request by President ‘Farmaajo’ for Eritrea to provide troops for Somalia after the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) leaves which it is due to do later this year. Whether Isaias agreed is unclear, though there have been unconfirmed reports of some Eritrean troops in Mogadishu. He did, however, offer to train Somali troops, and the first group went to Eritrea in 2019 and 600 returned in mid-2020 after ten months training and more were sent. Somalis have claimed a total of 3,000 were involved. President ‘Farmaajo’ visited Eritrea in October 2020 and there has been speculation that he then agreed to allow the trainees to take part in action in Tigray.¹⁸¹ Uncertainty about the Somali election and its date will, however, affect any decisions that Isaias and Abiy want to take over Somalia.

It is clear the final details for the planned offensive against Tigray were worked out after the Tigrayan authorities announced at the beginning of May 2020 that they would go ahead with their own regional state election in September, after the further postponement of the national elections in Ethiopia.¹⁸² The timing of the offensive was chosen to coincide with the controversial US election day, November 3, when the world’s attention would be on the United States. It had the added advantage of coinciding with the beginning of the harvest in Tigray, making it difficult for the TPLF to deploy its substantial militia.

The final steps in the joint planning, paralleling Abiy’s internal steps in preparation for war, came in the second half of 2020. Abiy visited the main Eritrean military training base for national service conscripts at Sawa on July 18, to watch the graduation of the 33rd national service course, many of whom found themselves fighting in Tigray a few months later. President Farmaajo was in Asmara at the beginning of October, and President Isaias made his sixth visit to Ethiopia on 12 – 15 October 2020. This time he visited Ethiopia’s main air force base at Bishoftu, as well as the Ethio-Engineering Group facilities there. The EE Group took over production of military vehicles for the ENDF from the disbanded METEC conglomerate. ¹⁸³ During Isaias’ visit, the intelligence heads of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia held an unannounced meeting in Addis Ababa. There were also reports of troops and equipment being moved towards Tigray region. Isaias ramped up his pre-war rhetoric. The outbreak of fighting was preceded by series of inflammatory statements almost designed in effect to provoke a military action. One Eritrean government statement at the end of October accused the TPLF of obstructing regional peace and stability, with its “poisonous ethnic based politics”. It said the TPLF, which was quivering on its “death bed”, was still holding Tigray back, despite having being told by President Isaias that it was “Game over” for the TPLF two and a half years earlier. ¹⁸⁴

There were reports of the movement of military hardware towards the Tigray region from other parts of Ethiopia during and after Isaias’s visit. And it is clear there were similar activities going on in Eritrea. Eritrean opposition sources later provided details of some Ethiopian units being airlifted to Eritrea in October in preparation for the start of the offensive. In December 2020, former Eritrean Chief of Staff, General Mesfin Hagos, quoting his own Ministry of Defence sources, was able to give some details of just how extensive Eritrean involvement was – and it would all have had to be planned and mobilised in advance of the conflict. He said Eritrea first provided intelligence, logistical back-up and artillery support at Humera, and other areas close to the border. Once ENDF and Amhara special forces ran into problems, which they very quickly did, very substantial numbers of Eritrean troops crossed the border – on November 10 according to Tigray president Debretsion – in four areas. They participated in the attacks in Shire and at Axum and Adua, with two mechanized divisions, (46th and 48th) and three infantry divisions (26th, 28th, and 53rd); at Zalembessa, with two mechanized divisions (42nd and 49th) and four infantry divisions (11th, 17th, 19th, and 27th); and another five divisions moved from the Bada oasis, where they had been mobilized, into eastern Tigray, south of Adigrat. ¹⁸⁵

Who fired the first shots?

Whoever fired the first shots on the night of 3 – 4 November 2020 is almost irrelevant, as both sides had taken up positions in which conflict was inevitable and no other option possible. Prime Minister Abiy firmly claimed the TPLF was responsible and the attack on Northern Command bases in Tigray “in the early hours of November 4, 2020” by Tigrayan forces sparked off the war. This appeared to be confirmed when TPLF official Sekou Toure Getachew, said the TPLF had launched a pre-emptive attack on the Northern Command, being forced to act by the build-up of Amhara, Eritrean and ENDF forces poised to invade Tigray.¹⁸⁶ As noted above, this was later denied.

The Northern Command was the strongest of Ethiopia’s six regional commands with more than half of the ENDF mechanised units and much of its heavy weaponry. As many of the units had been based in Tigray since the end of the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea, and still included a significant percentage of Tigrayan officers, despite Abiy’s changes in the military hierarchy, the TPLF believed it would be able to count on its reluctance to support federal intervention. Indeed, the TPLF thought they might be able to get active support from many of the units if conflict broke out. It had laid plans for such an eventuality though in the event these were not as successful as expected. Certainly, as the probability of conflict increased in October, and earlier, the TPLF held talks with senior officers of the Northern Command, in an effort to secure their neutrality if not their active support in case of war. It appeared to have persuaded at least half of the Northern Command to remain neutral, at least at the beginning of the war.

Original reports claimed that the fighting started in response to an attempted attack by government troops very early on the morning of 4 November, after an aircraft carrying a special commando unit from Bahir Dar attempted to eliminate the Tigray leadership. The force was airlifted into Mekelle by two helicopters and an Antonov to try and seize the TPLF leadership at the Planet hotel. The commandos landed without a problem, drove into Mekelle, seized control of the hotel, but found no Tigrayan leaders present. They then withdrew without fighting, but after the raid TPLF forces forcibly took over the Ethiopian National Defence Force camp located near the airport, the airport itself and the Northern Command HQ in Mekelle. The commando raid allegedly preceded Prime Minister Abiy’s claim of a TPLF attack on the Northern Command barracks, but there had already been some fighting in Western Tigray by then between Amhara Special Forces and Tigray troops. Another version was that the reported aircraft had been sent to Mekelle to “deliver new banknotes”, with a commando guard. and that it was subsequently seized by the TPLF.

The government and the Prime Minister have also put out several versions of what happened on 3 – 4 November. The original statement from the Prime Minister’s office on 4 November said the TPLF had attacked and taken over an army base. It said the TPLF had attacked the ENDF base in Tigray in the early hours of 4 November, and attempting to rob the Northern Command of artillery and military equipment. The statement said that over the previous few weeks the TPLF had been arming and organising irregular militia outside the constitutionally mandated structure. It accused the Tigrayans of continually provoking and inciting violence over the past months, while the Federal government had maintained a policy of extreme patience and caution. This attack, however, was the last red line and the Federal government had therefore been forced into a military confrontation. The ENDF, under the direction of a Command Post, was therefore ordered into action “to save the country and the region from spiralling into instability.”¹⁸⁷ Later in a TV address, Abiy added that the TPLF had launched an attack which had resulted in “many martyrs, injuries and property damage” and had tried to loot military assets during attack, forcing the federal government into a military confrontation.¹⁸⁸ And two days after he had ordered the ENDF into Tigray, Prime Minister Abiy said his ‘law enforcement operation’ had “clear, limited and achievable objectives”. He identified these as disarming the TPLF, bringing its leaders to justice, appointing a new administration for the region, and enhancing law and order.

In a statement ten days later, the Prime Minister’s Office said the TPLF had committed high treason with its attack on the Northern Command of the ENDF, as well as planned, trained, financed and executed ethnic and sectarian conflicts in Ethiopia, endangered the constitutional order and that its three decades of rule had been characterized by egregious violations of human rights, corruption and self-enrichment. Therefore, the government was now going to disarm the TPLF ‘junta’, restore legitimate administration to Tigray, enforce law and order and bring fugitives to justice. ¹⁸⁹

Government accounts of what happened overnight on November have become steadily more outspoken and luridly detailed. At the end of November, Abiy told Parliament the ‘junta’ had cut communications, surrounded the ENDF units across the region, controlled most but killed some. He said: “Our soldiers who were killed were naked and both their legs and hands remained tied until our soldiers controlled the area and buried their bodies”. He gave no figures but said the ‘junta’ had driven members of the defence force into Eritrea naked: “But the people of Eritrea gave them clothes to wear, water, food and armed it as well, and they came back and fought in Eritrean clothes. That is why they said, ‘Eritrea is fighting us’. He said he himself had flown up to Eritrea along with three generals to reorganize these troops.¹⁹⁰

A few weeks later, he added further details:

“On the night of 3 November 2020, the TPLF leadership launched, under cover of darkness, what they later described, on public television, as a ‘lightening pre-emptive attack’ against the Northern Command of the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), which had been stationed in the Region since the outbreak of war with Eritrea over two decades ago. Using traitors recruited from within the army along ethnic lines, not only did the TPLF leadership cause the massacre of unarmed soldiers in their pyjamas in the dead of night. They also took possession, illegally, of the entire military arsenal of the Northern Command… After they surprised and overpowered several regiments of the ENDF forces, the TPLF identified and separated hundreds of unarmed Ethiopian soldiers of non-Tigrayan origin, tied their hands and feet together, massacred them in cold blood, and left their bodies lying in open air. Never would I have imagined it humanly possible for any person to kill their fellow soldiers while asleep and record themselves singing and dancing on the bodies of their victims.”¹⁹¹

A preliminary report by the Federal Attorney-General’s Office in January said that on the night of 3 November, about a hundred military and police posts were attacked by regional Special Forces and militia which has surrounded the camps. The actions were led by Tigrigna-speaking brigade commanders and some defence forces defended themselves. The report gave no overall casualty figures though it referred to “17 hostages” killed in a vehicle collision, and to looting and to some killed in the camps, and to beheadings by “the TPLF group”. The report said that telecommunication and power facilities had been attacked and the Ethiopian Petroleum Supply Company depot and the National Disaster Risk and Preparedness Agency stockpile of wheat in Mekelle taken over. Arms, including rockets and missiles were taken from military units. The TPLF had been planning this for the previous three months, and a TPLF Executive Committee meeting ten days earlier had expected fighting to start at any time. The report’s conclusions were that The TPLF had prepared its own army; sponsored conflicts for more than two years; collected weapons for war; attempting to overthrow the unity of the country, the unity of the federation and the state of Tigray; declared a state of emergency; established its own defence council; sold bonds and allowed the withdrawal of excess money in defiance of National Bank Directives; and committed terrorist acts.

Abiy’s gave his own account of the reasons for the outbreak of fighting later: “No government can tolerate its soldiers and innocent civilians being ambushed and killed in their dozens, as happened at the hands of the TPLF last autumn. My primary duty as prime minister and commander in chief of the national armed forces, after all, is to protect Ethiopia and its people from internal and external enemies.” Unfortunately, “the suffering and deaths that occurred despite our best efforts have caused much distress for me personally as well as for all peace-loving people here and abroad. Ending the suffering in Tigray and around the country is now my highest priority.” He said, “Our operations in Tigray were designed to restore peace and order quickly”. He noted that the removal of the TPLF had fuelled “unease in the international community and that concerns about ethnic profiling in Tigray and obstacles to humanitarian relief abound”, but, he insisted, his government “was determined to address and dispel such concerns.” Government actions, he said, were designed to restore peace and order quickly, underlining that with “the removal – for good – of the corrupt and dictatorial TPLF, Ethiopians can now imagine a future based not on ethnic chauvinism, but on unity, equality, freedom, and democracy. Moreover, the source of ethnic division that had poisoned inter-state relations across the Horn of Africa has now been overcome.” He made no mention of the presence or the activities of Eritrean troops in Tigray.¹⁹²

One of the points in the Prime Minister’s original 4 November statement was that the TPLF had also been “manufacturing Eritrean uniforms at the Almeda plc factory just outside Adua, and this was intended to implicate the Eritrean government in false claims of aggression.” Given the realities of subsequent Eritrean military involvement in the war, and the repeated denials by the Ethiopian government, it is clear that this statement was intended to try and pre-empt and nullify any subsequent claims of Eritrean involvement. At times, indeed, the apparent attempts to conceal the involvement of Eritrean troops reached farcical proportions. The government claimed:

1. The TPLF had manufactured Eritrean uniforms to dress up TPLF fighters as Eritrean soldiers and commit atrocities;
2. Ethiopian troops who fled to Eritrea early in November were given Eritrean uniforms to return to fight the TPLF; and
3. TPLF released prisoners (numbers ranged from 13,000 to 60,000) and dressed them in Eritrean army uniforms encouraging them to commit abuses that could be blamed on Eritrean forces.
4. The TPLF claimed Eritrean troops were putting on Ethiopian uniforms to conceal their presence; and
5. That both Eritrean and Ethiopian troops were wearing each other’s uniforms and operating under each other’s command.

The multiplicity of reports of the presence and indeed of the horrifying abuses committed by Eritrean troops, finally forced the Ethiopian government to admit their presence in March, over three and a half months after the first crossed the border.¹⁹³ It was nearly a month before any Eritrean official was prepared to make such an admission, though it was not until April 15 that any Eritrean official did so. ¹⁹⁴ Until then, Eritrea while not admitting its troops were present in Ethiopia, had on occasions carefully avoided actually denying their presence, and indeed virtually implied that they were there. In Geneva, for example, in February, the Eritrean delegate described an OHCHR oral report of the crimes committed by Eritrea’s armed forces as “utterly baseless. These are alien and an affront to the history and culture of Eritrea and its military establishments”.¹⁹⁵

It is true that during the independence struggle, the EPLF did treat most of its prisoners relatively well, though not all. Eritreans who fought for Ethiopia, notably the Kunama for example, got short shrift, and it is far from clear that all those who surrendered (on either side) in the 1998-2000 war survived the experience. Certainly, the Eritrean troops who advanced into Irob in May 1998 to take Alitiena and outflank Ethiopian defences on the road to Adigrat, cut a swath of destruction across the region. An Irob submission to the Boundary Commission in April 2002, detailed “Killings of civilians, imprisonment, harassment, rape of women, desecration of and looting of churches, eviction of residents from their houses, destruction of houses, health centres and schools were daily activities of the Eritrean troops”. 15 months later, the Catholic Bishop of Adigrat, whose diocese included Irob, noted that in his jurisdiction over 300,000 people had been displaced, their homes destroyed, schools, clinics and churches looted, either severely damaged or totally destroyed. The town of Zalembesa, he said, had been systematically bulldozed and the Catholic Church there had lost eight institutions.¹⁹⁶

There can be little doubt that Prime Minister Abiy was firmly confident that his ‘law enforcement operation’ would be quick and easy. Even though he found it necessary to make changes at the top in both the military and security establishments on 7 November, he was quite sure his preparations for dealing with the TPLF and Tigray would be sufficient as his continuous references to a three-week action demonstrated. He had, after all, the Ethiopian army and air force (largely purged a year or two earlier of their Tigrayan elements), President Isaias and the Eritrean army, the Amhara region special forces and militia, and, he believed, God, on his side. Despite breaking with his former Oromo supporters and other advocates of a realistic functional federalism, he had managed to prevent any conjunction of pro-federal forces emerging to support the TPLF. Indeed, entirely confident in his military superiority, he set himself firmly against any possibility of mediation or of dialogue, deliberately rejecting the parameters of a Nobel Peace Prize and his own medemer philosophy to accept the views of his autocratic and authoritarian ally who was determined on the destruction of an elected leadership he hated.

The TPLF was also confident it would be able to provide an effective resistance. They had sizeable and well-trained special force units and substantial militia forces. There was the prospect, however obtained, of acquiring the use of most of the heavy weapons of the best armed units of the Ethiopian army, and the possibility of being joined by a significant element from the Northern Command. The TPLF had a belief in their own strength, buttressed by the history of their long and successful war to overthrow the Derg’s military regime in 1991. Refusing to accept that its 27 years in power and its methods of governance had left a legacy of distrust and dislike, even enmity, it had also expected to be able to call on supporters of federalism from across the country. It under-estimated the sheer size of Abiy’s “law enforcement”, nor did it expect President Isaias to commit such a large proportion of the Eritrean army. It was shocked by the amount of new weaponry Isaias had acquired since the lifting of UN sanctions in November 2018, much of it no doubt from the UAE, and even more by the use of drones, which played a decisive role in the fighting in November. ¹⁹⁷

However, the fighting in November, essentially between regular forces, was no more than a prelude of what seems likely to be the start of a long guerrilla war. Abiy has ignored the fact that the TPLF successfully resisted the Derg for 17 years in Tigray. He overlooked the possibility that military action, however described, would generate resistance, and disregarded the probability that an invasion of Tigray, whether by the Federal army, or Amhara or Eritrean forces, would cause the population, not just the TPLF, to take to the hills. In the months since Abiy first declared victory at the end of November, his policies, including the deliberate and horrifyingly destructive operations of the Amhara and Eritrean forces and the Federal army, and his obstinate refusal to consider any dialogue, have made it clear the survival of both Tigray and the Tigrayan people are at risk.

The conflict seems set to continue, with the real possibility of spreading, within Ethiopia and into the wider region.

4. Progress of the war

By Ermias Teka

Introduction

There is a fierce controversy about the events that led to the war. There are two antagonistic and mutually contradictory views: one from the Ethiopian government and the other promoted by the Tigrayan regional government. They revolve around which side started the war and also the incident that led to the conflict. The Tigrayan authorities claimed that sometime late in the evening of 3 November, 2020, the federal government airlifted commandos to Mekelle in an attempt to eliminate the Tigrayan leadership.¹⁹⁸ The ‘surgical operation’ led to an intense fighting that lasted about half an hour but apparently failed to achieve its objective. The Ethiopian government rejects the accusation, while conceding that it sent planes that evening as part of a scheduled arrangement to replace old currency.¹⁹⁹

Immediately following this incident, the Tigray Special Forces (TSF) are reported to have carried out a “highly organized” offensive against many camps of the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) Northern Command, at various sites in Tigray. The swift and highly coordinated TSF’s attacks on the Northern Command suggested that they were pre-planned and meticulously organised, well before the event. The Prime Minister later admitted that over 200 camp sites were simultaneously hit by the Tigrayan forces.²⁰⁰

The following day a statement claimed to have been released by the Northern Command was shown on Tigray TV, controlled by the Tigrayan regional government, which claimed that the Northern Command had transferred its allegiance to the Tigray government. It said this had happened because the Federal Government was beyond its term of office and was therefore unconstitutional.²⁰¹ The broadcast also called on other ENDF commands to follow their example. The question of how much of the Northern Command actually joined the Tigrayan forces remains ambiguous and controversial. What is certain is that, while a significant contingent of the Northern Command (primarily those in which Tigrayan soldiers were in the majority) did break ranks and joined the Tigrayan forces, many other units remained either hostile or uncooperative. The TSF was accused of ruthlessly attacking or besieging units that did not join it, including the command headquarters in Mekelle.²⁰²²⁰³ At the same time sizable contingents near Tigray’s northern border fled into Eritrea, while camps in western Tigray were able to fend off the TSF attacks and retain their mechanised divisions.

4.1 ENDF offensives along the southwestern front

The federal authorities complained repeatedly that their troops had been ‘stabbed in the back.’²⁰⁴ But credible evidences from different sources make it clear that the Ethiopian army was not sitting idly by when the attack occurred. An on the record admission by ENDF official revealed that the high command was making preparations of its own.²⁰⁵ Moreover, Mesfin Hagos, former minister of defense of Eritrea, relying on sources inside the Eritrean military as well as Eritrean opposition intelligence sources, reported that “large number of Ethiopian elite units had slowly trickled into Eritrea” which were to coordinate with the North command for a swift multi-frontal attack on Tigray. ²⁰⁶ Similar reports from various sources show that the ENDF had mobilised sizable contingents in the areas bordering on South and South Western Tigray several days ahead of the attack on Northern Command.²⁰⁷

But it appears that before the Ethio-Eritrean coordinated attack was executed, the Tigray Special Forces outmaneuvered them by carrying out the surprise attack on the North command momentarily causing vulnerability for the Ethiopians. However, the “anticipatory” attack of the TSF only succeeded in inflicting a temporary setback to Abiy’s and Isayas’ plans. Their prolonged and extensive preparations enabled them to quickly improvise for a counterattack whose magnitude was beyond anything their antagonists expected.

On 4 November, claiming ‘provocations’ in Soroka and Kirakir (border villages between the Amhara and Tigray states) the combined forces of the ENDF, Amhara Special Forces and Amhara militia attacked on the southwestern front, particularly in the area of Dansha.²⁰⁸ Moreover and apparently by prior agreement, the Sudanese sealed off the border areas thus preventing essential supplies from getting through to Tigray.²⁰⁹

The Tigrayans were clearly unprepared for the magnitude and intensity of the ENDF counterattack. In May 2021, an unnamed senior official in the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) gave a brief statement regarding the condition of the army and the course of the war.²¹⁰

“We entered the war before we had time to strengthen our forces, train the youth and equip ourselves sufficiently with weaponry. However, the (TDF) army encountered these challenges by using ambush and mobility tactic and faced the enemy by taking into account its strategies”.

He claimed the TDF had grown in strength over time and attributed the revival of Tigrayan forces to the fact that they are fighting a just war.

“The leadership has reformed itself anew and the youth also flooded in once again. The novices, as well as those who had acquired experience in warfare have gathered together. (TDF), using ambush, semi-ambush and mobile fighting, is scoring victory over the enemy. The power balance is shifting. After some time, once we are completed all the necessary preparations, we will start dominating the situation and will make the transition to full blown offensives. It can be said that right now the (TDF) army is in good shape.”

Officials of the Tigray government repeatedly accused the Ethiopian army of using the human wave tactic in Dansha and subsequent ferocious battles. This is plausible. The Tigrayans were forced to give up well fortified positions, including trenches, despite having trained forces, boosted by battle-hardened veterans and ex ENDF soldiers in their ranks. Local and international observers, who had expected prolonged and entrenched warfare to last for months before any significant territorial gains were made, were taken by surprise.²¹¹ The ENDF and their allies were able to advance rapidly, capturing several towns in South-Western Tigray. By 7 November, merely 4 days after the start of the war, ENDF had taken Mai Deliye, Dansha and Humera Airport. Moreover, Lugdi, a strategic town along the Ethio-Sudanese border linking western Tigray to Sudan, fell to the federal forces, thereby severing what would otherwise have been a key supply route into Tigray.²¹²

Aware that ENDF’s South-Western offensive was aimed at driving a wedge between Tigray and Sudan, Tigray Defence Forces mounted a fierce resistance near Baeker, on the hills just a few kilometres from Humera Airport.²¹³ As long as they were able to keep hold of Baeker and Rawyan, Sudan was still within the Tigrayan’s reach. ENDF officers who took part in the battle of Baeker attested to the fierceness of the fighting²¹⁴. It was at this moment that the Ethiopian military reportedly decided to involve their Eritrean counterpart. Debretsion Gebremichael, president of Tigray regional state, later claimed that, in the heat of the battle, the Eritrean army carried out a blanket bombardment of Humera town from their side of the border. This forced the TSF to divert resources from the Baeker defensive line.²¹⁵ Humera residents who fled to Sudan confirmed that the town was indeed shelled with heavy artillery from across the Mereb river.²¹⁶ It appears the Ethiopian side, when confronted with the stubborn resistance which was likely to keep their offensive in check for days, invited Eritrean mechanised units to intervene. This was the first instance in which the Eritrean army was overtly involved in the conflict.

With the fall of Baeker, the ENDF quickly moved to seize control of the north western towns of Rawyan, Humera and Mai Cadra, probably without stiff resistance.²¹⁷ Tigrayan sources indicated that the Eritrean army, which crossed the Ethiopian border the very next day, involved its ground forces during the capture of these towns. With the capture of Humera and Rawyan the first mission of the ENDF – sealing off Tigray from the West and Sudan – was complete. It was completed in only one week.

The TSF’s direction of retreat from the western front appears to have been along the Tekezze river towards Waldibba and Mai Tsemri. They were rapidly pursued by ENDF and Amhara forces. However, before the main body of TSF’s western corps, including its leadership, was able to cross the Tekezze river and head towards the better fortified town of Shire, an Eritrean contingent (possibly assisted by ENDF units of the Northern Command that had crossed to Eritrea during the initial Tigrayan attack) quickly moved South from Badme, capturing Shiraro, Asgede Tsimbla, Alogen and finally the Tekezze bridge. At about the same time a joint ENDF-Amhara contingent moved up and captured Waldibba and Mai Tsemre, thereby almost completely encircling the retreating Tigrayan forces. General Migbe, one of the leaders of TSF military corps described just how dire the situation was in a speech to Tigrayan forces, which was leaked:

“The enemy came in the direction of Waldibba; it also came through Tselemti – Mai Tsebri. About two divisions of Sha’abiya (Eritrean Defence Force – EDF) came through Tekezze from up top. They took control of Debre Abay and Aloguen; Tekezze too. It occupied the bridge you crossed and approached nearer. We had wounded among us. Leadership was with us …”²¹⁸

Despite this, before the encirclement was complete, the Tigrayan forces managed to find an opening and evade capture to be reunited with TSF regiments in Zana. After the capture of Welqait and Humera, ENDF divisions which came all the way from South-Western Tigray joined Eritrean forces that arrived southwards from Shiraro in time for a combined assault on Shire.²¹⁹

Tigrayan forces attempted to delay ENDF/EDF advance by destroying bridges, including on the Tekezze, and digging holes at several spots along the B-30 highway.²²⁰ But that doesn’t seem to have slowed down the momentum of the advance to an appreciable extent.

4.2 The northern fronts

On 13 November, the Eritrean army began powerful offensives on four fronts along the northern border. Tigrayan media claimed that 16 divisions of EDF, in conjunction with ENDF Northern Command detachments, attacked simultaneously at Rama, Tsorena, Gerhu Sernay and Zalambessa.^{221 222} Mesfin Hagos provides extensive details of the Eritrean divisions deployed through one of these fronts:

Through Zalambessa alone, the Eritrean president sent in the 42nd and 49th mechanized divisions and the 11th, 17th, 19th and 27th infantry divisions. On reaching Edaga-Hamus, south of Adigrat and north of Mekelle, these divisions were reinforced with addition five Eritrean divisions, including the 2nd brigade of the 525th commando division. He also unleashed the 26th, 28th, and 53rd infantry and 46th and 48th mechanized divisions on the Adwa front along with only one division of the Ethiopian federal army.²²³

The Eritreans used blanket bombardments of the towns, with Zalambessa shelled for 13 consecutive hours.²²⁴ The Tigrayan forces responded by rapidly withdrawing from the towns in an attempt to minimise damage to the urban areas, but fierce fighting continued nearby. Wave after wave of relentless Eritrean offensives, at several points along the border, coupled with indiscriminate bombardment of towns with heavy artillery and air raids, overwhelmed the Tigrayan defensive line, which was spread thin in face of the multi-frontal attacks.

The Tigrayan strategy appeared to be to deal with the Northern Command (more than half of the entire ENDF army) by capturing or neutralising those members who opposed their cause and co-opting those that would support the Tigrayan resistance. With its newly acquired mechanised divisions, the TSF hoped to force their opponents to the negotiating table. Initially the strategy appeared to be having some success. But the Tigrayan side counted on the much-needed heavy artillery, which they had were seized from the Northern Command, to counter the enemy’s firepower. However, much to the dismay of the Tigrayan forces, the large weaponry they had amassed were neutralized before they could be used to influence the course of the war to any appreciable extent.²²⁵

The Ethiopian government claimed its air force was able to destroy the tanks and heavy artillery, while capturing those that remained, in just days after the start of the conflict. The Tigray regional government, on the other hand, reassured the Tigrayan public, during the first phases of the war that it was still in possession of the weapons, but claimed that it needed time to regroup and remobilise its newly formed mechanized division to support its ground forces. By 15 November, however, the Tigrayan side began accusing the UAE of using its base in the Eritrean port of Assab to launch drone strikes in the unfolding war.²²⁶ Since the Ethiopian air force lacked precision guided missile technology to single out specific targets, its claim of effectively neutralizing the entire arsenal of the Northern Command by air force attacks was hard to credit.^{227 228} Though the UAE’s Assab base did indeed contain drones, only limited evidence has been provided of their use in Tigray.²²⁹ Independent investigations of the drone allegations by Bellingcat came to the following conclusion:²³⁰

“In sum, the claims made by the Tigray forces are not impossible, but so far they
seem improbable. Satellite imagery confirms the presence of Chinese-produced drones at the UAE’s military base in Assab, but that is all it confirms. There is currently no further evidence that these same drones have been involved in operations in support of the Ethiopian air force, though there have been confirmed sightings of Ethiopian jet fighters in the conflict zone.”

Despite this, one fact remains incontestable. Regardless of how it happened, most of the artillery of the Northern Command (which constituted more than half of the entire Ethiopian military arsenal) was destroyed before it could be put to use by Tigrayan Special Forces. Of course, the TSF was still in possession of significant missiles and rockets till mid-November, which it used to strike airports of Gondar, Bahr Dar and Asmara. The apparent aim was to disable EDF/ENDF aerial attacks. However, these systems were incapable of halting the enemy advance.^{231 232}

4.3 The Southern Front

In contrast to the swift advances of ENDF and EDF from the West and North respectively, the southern front remained relatively stagnant with no significant territorial gains. The forces deployed to break through TSF defensive lines included (in addition to the ENDF and the EDF²³³²³⁴) Amhara Special Forces,²³⁵ and Amhara militia, as well as Somali troops.²³⁶ Alamata, a border town in South Tigray, was captured by ENDF and Amhara forces on 16 November, two weeks after the war broke out. Even then, advancing further North against the Tigrayans proved costly and difficult. Battles around Mekoni and Chercher, which were the two pivots of attack from the south, proved indecisive. There was intense fighting that lasted several days without any meaningful territorial advance.²³⁷ Tigrayan sources claimed that the TSF was able to repulse Ethiopian offensives with its much smaller defensive units repeatedly inflicting huge losses on the advancing forces.²³⁸

4.4 The ENDF’s strategy

Addis Ababa’s approach to what it labelled ‘law enforcement operation’ was simple. It had set a daringly tight schedule and was therefore prepared to use all means, and pay any price, to take control of Mekelle in less than a month. The stories that emanated from eyewitnesses about the capture of scores of Tigrayan towns, including Dansha Shire, Zalambessa, Adigrat and Wukro, all followed similar patterns. First the towns were indiscriminately shelled with heavy artillery, resulting in huge civilian casualties and property damage.²³⁹ Similarly, air raids were carried out by the Ethiopian air force, allegedly targeting the towns rather than the entrenched TSF defensive lines.²⁴⁰

The aim seems to have been to cause a sudden, all-consuming terror and confusion among both the Tigrayan civilians and the defending forces. This was designed to cause momentary indecision and bewilderment in the Tigrayan chain of command. It was also claimed to have been used to intimidate and subsequently force the withdrawal of the local forces who were keen to keep the towns intact.²⁴¹ This was followed by, and at times coupled with, the alleged use of ‘human wave’ tactics. Hundreds of soldiers were made to rush straight onto entrenched TSF lines, forcing the defending troops to retreat and give up their strongholds. This is what appears to have taken place at May Kadra, with the Amhara militia taking many casualties. It was followed by attacks on civilians when the Amhara and Ethiopian forces finally took the town.²⁴²

These tactics enabled the advancing force to speedily capture several areas, albeit at the cost of heavy casualties and material losses. The Tigrayans also accused their opponents of deploying thousands of barely trained and ill-disciplined local militia and regional Special Forces on the frontlines as cannon fodder, to minimize the casualties of the better trained and disciplined national armies of the EDF/ENDF.²⁴³ This apparently enabled the advancing force to conserve its core strength, while simultaneously forcing their opponents to prematurely use up their firepower. In just five weeks the war in Tigray fought scores of battles, with some of the bloodiest and most brutal confrontations.

By 25 November, the combined forces of the Ethiopian and Eritrean coalition were able to make major territorial advances on all the three critical fronts. They captured Shire, Axum and Adwa from the West; Adigrat and Idaga Hamus from the North and Chercher, Mekoni and Hiwane from the South. The combined forces then proceeded to approach Mekelle from three directions, i.e., via Nebelet-Hawzien – Abraha we Atsbaha; Frewoyni –Negash and Hiwane.²⁴⁴ The forces that followed the first two lines of advance probably came together at Wukro, while Hiwane served as a point of convergence for the contingents which mobilized from Korem and Chercher. On 27 November, Prime Minister Abiy announced he was launching of the final phase of the ‘law enforcement operation’ which was to culminate with the capture of Mekelle.²⁴⁵ Despite the ENDF advances on all fronts, the Tigrayan leadership remained defiant. News of victories on several battle fronts, of Tigrayan forces repulsing wave after wave of enemy attack, was broadcast repeatedly on Tigrayan controlled stations: Demtsi Weyane and Tigray TV. They concentrated on the huge human and material losses TSF was able to inflict on their adversaries. Territorial concessions were presented as strategic withdrawals. At one-point Getachew Reda, a senior leader and spokesperson for the Tigray regional government, insisted: “Our aim is not to prevent them from taking cities, but to make it impossible for them to keep them”.²⁴⁶

Behind this façade of defiance, the leadership in Mekelle seems to have realised soon after the fighting started that they would lose a conventional war. As the Ethiopian forces inched closer to the regional capital, the TPLF leadership rapidly adjusted their military strategy and started to prepare for an inevitable withdrawal to the hills to pursue guerrilla warfare. The TSF strategy in many of the battles fought after surrendering western Tigray can be interpreted in this light. Tigrayan units sought to hold out as long as they could, inflict as much damage on the advancing army and then withdraw before incurring significant losses. Roads and bridges were destroyed to slow down enemy advances, to give enough time for the leadership in Mekelle to make preparations for the inevitable future life in the hills. News of victories started to incorporate slogans like “our struggle is bitter but short; yet our victory is inevitable.” These were versions of slogans last used during the 17 years guerrilla war that ended in 1991. On 27 November, the Tigray regional government came out with the statement that the Tigrayan forces were to pursue a ‘unique struggle’ befitting the circumstances thus cryptically admitting the transition of Tigrayan resistance to guerrilla warfare.²⁴⁷

4.5 Retreat and consolidation

On 28 November, the Ethiopian led forces began their direct assault on Mekelle.²⁴⁸ The capital was indiscriminately bombarded for several hours. As a result, 27 civilians were killed and 100 wounded.²⁴⁹ A few hours later the Ethiopian government announced that it had taken control of the city.²⁵⁰ Debretsion Gebremichael, president of Tigray regional state, later confirmed²⁵¹ that Tigrayan forces had indeed withdrawn from the city, apparently after discussing with the city’s respected elders and businessmen.²⁵² He claimed the decision to leave Mekelle was not because of a military defeat, but to save the city from destruction by the enemy, whom he accused of looking for an excuse to reduce it to rubble.

In reality the Tigrayan leadership was far from being in control of the situation. On the contrary, it seemed momentarily to have been in disarray. Accusations were reportedly thrown around, accusing the leaders of not making adequate preparations for the war, though the signs were evident from early on. Many, even within the leadership, lamented not taking heed of the warnings and advise from those who had seen the danger early on.

There was also indecision over how to react to the mass exodus of civilians who followed the retreating Tigrayan force as they withdrew from Mekelle. Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, former TPLF central committee member, described the frantic nature of the withdrawal:

“So many people moved out of the cities of Tigray towards the rural areas
following the army, including some of their families. So, we were caught in between…. Are we going to defend these people who flocked out of the cities with their families? Or are we going to fight? I mean, the army was caught in between.”²⁵³

Nevertheless, fighting continued in the outskirts of Mekelle as the retreating Tigrayan army was determined to slow down its withdrawal into the highlands of central Tigray. Meanwhile its leadership sought to cut their losses and instead focus on securing safe areas, somewhere deep in central Tigray, where political leaders, who had little contribution to make in the armed conflict, could evade repeated manhunts by the Ethiopian forces.

After the capture of Mekelle, the vicious Tigray war appeared to be culminating in a defeat for the regional government and the overwhelming majority of Tigrayans who supported them. The leadership was on the run; unimaginable atrocities were being committed on civilians on a daily basis.²⁵⁴ The public struggled to deal with the unexpected defeat of Tigrayan forces and this led many to descend into despair.²⁵⁵ In addition, faced with the absence of communication equipment, the TPLF leadership remained disconnected from Tigrayan militia who had lost touch with the main forces in various areas across Tigray.²⁵⁶ Confused and isolated, some chose to surrender.²⁵⁷ At the same time many Tigrayan troops remained defiant and continued mounting isolated resistance in small units throughout the occupied territories. Hence local militia of Wejerat, Atsbi, Ahsea, Bora Selewa, Neksege, Mai Maedo, Tselemti kept carrying out small scale ambushes against EDF, ENDF and Amhara forces.²⁵⁸

At the same time the main corps of the Tigray Special Forces appears to have remained intact. The assault and retreat strategy that it followed more or less guaranteed that it was able to avoid incurring significant casualties. But rushed withdrawal meant it faced severe shortages of arms and military equipment.²⁵⁹ Moreover, numerous manhunt operations carried out throughout December, by Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, forced the troops to constantly shift their positions. Tigray forces prioritized mobility over size and were rumoured to have temporarily halted military recruitment.²⁶⁰ Getachew Reda later recalled that, in these times, TDF units were repeatedly at risk of being encircled by EDF and ENDF contingents. He claimed they were able to successfully break out, preventing Tigrayan forces from being trapped an annihilated.

Even during the tumultuous times of December and January, fierce fighting continued along the outer peripheries of TDF strongholds. These consisted more or less of the districts of south-central Tigray – Medebay Zana, Naeder Adet, Abergelle, Kola Tembien as well as parts of Asgede Tisimbla, Abergelle and Degua Tembien.

As ENDF and EDF forces attempted to move away from the main highways, which they had secured, and penetrated into rural areas of south-central Tigray, Workamba, Zana, Adet, May Kinetal, Nebelet, Migulat Edaga Arbi and Hawzien, they came under repeated attack. The Tigrayans used sudden ambushes as well as swift attacks from the enemy’s rear, using small, agile units. The attacks from the rear, known among Tigrayans as ‘Qoretsa’ – a military strategy the TPLF military leaders devised during their guerrilla years – was claimed to have proved decisive in frustrating ENDF/EDF offensives. These areas became sites of small scale, but fierce fighting, accompanied by massacres of civilians. With the exception of the battle of Workamba, where a well-built TDF entrenchment was claimed to have been captured by ENDF forces, other battles remained bloody but inconclusive. Meanwhile TDF units, deployed along the B-30 and A-2 highway, carried out repeated ambushes aimed at disrupting EDF and ENDF supply lines. These had a significant impact on the logistical capability of the occupying forces and also negatively affected army morale.

By the end of December, the TDF leadership had recovered sufficiently to reestablish a more reliable command structure. It was not a coincidence that it was at this time that the exiled government of Tigray issued its first statement since its retreat into the hills. Call to arms resonated throughout the statement, largely directed at Tigrayan youth. These calls were repeated on 9 and 15 of January, signifying that Tigray Defence Forces was ready to expand its military capacity.

4.6 Tigray Defence Force expansion and the start of semi-conventional warfare

The unexpected resurgence of Tigray Defence Forces, from near extinction to one boasting tens of thousands of fighters, was probably the result of several interrelated factors. The capture and the public ridiculing of veteran TPLF leaders and the apparently deliberate assassination of some (including the former minister of foreign affairs, Seyoum Mesfin²⁶¹) caused delight and celebration in Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar. The Tigrayan public, however, were disgusted. Moreover, there was widespread indignation at the atrocities, rape, looting, persecution and mass murders routinely carried out by ENDF and EDF soldiers. These events, coupled with the apathy and subtle support from Ethiopianists, crystallised in Tigrayans a sense of betrayal and indignation that they had harboured for the previous 3 years. This was exacerbated by attacks on the territorial integrity of Tigray. This included open declarations by the Amhara regional State authorities regarding the extrajudicial annexation of parts of western and southern Tigray,²⁶² as well as the occupation of a corridor along the northern border of Tigray by the Eritrean army. These developments were accompanied by programs of ethnic cleansing against Tigrayans. These entrenched the animosities of many Tigrayans and invoked a strong desire for creating an independent Tigray nation among ordinary people.

The opening of pro-TDF radio stations, disseminating reports of battlefield victories of Tigrayan forces, also served to connect the leadership with people in rural areas, urban residents and the diaspora. The re-appearance of the popular leaders like Debretsion Gebremichael and Getachew Reda (who had been repeatedly declared dead by pro-government media) alongside opposition leaders like Mehari Yohannes of Tigrayan Independence Party (who joined the resistance despite political differences) broadened the appeal for the TDF cause among Tigrayans, even if they were not affiliated to the TPLF. As a consequence, support of the public for the struggling military leadership soared and encouraged many recruits to flood into TDF military training sites.

Throughout January and February 2021, TDF operations were confined to small scale skirmishes often involving brigade level encounters. By the beginning of March, however, Tigrayan sources indicated that as the capacity of TDF rose, their forces were able to increase the magnitude and number of combat engagements throughout central and southern Tigray. Getachew Reda identified the battles of Maekel Segli, in central Tigray and Werkedino, in Wag zone of neighbouring Amhara region, as the first instances in which several battalions of TDF were involved in semi-conventional engagement with large contingents of the EDF and ENDF. This heralded that the tide had turned. According to insiders this was the first time Tigrayan forces engaged directly with the Eritrean army since the capture of Mekelle. Additional battles in Tselego and Dengolat were also perceived to have shown the newly enhanced military capability of the TDF.

The beginning of April saw mounting international pressure which caused concern for the Ethiopian authorities that Eritrean forces might be forced to withdraw from Tigray. According to Tigrayan sources this led to renewed efforts to crush the TDF once and for all, before the Eritrean withdrawal took effect. This resulted in the EDF and ENDF carrying out large scale offensives in southern and central Tigray; areas which had remained TDF strongholds. This coincided with PM Abiy’s claim of ENDF fighting on 8 fronts²⁶³ and lent credibility to suggestions that large scale battles were indeed being fought inside Tigray. In the aftermath of the battles, Tigrayan forces claimed major victories, including inflicting huge losses on Eritrean contingents. ENDF also claimed victory. The assertions of both sides remained elusive and difficult to verify. However, the fact that the B-30 highway linking Adwa to Adigrat was closed for several days, allegedly blocked by Tigrayan forces, may show the enhanced the ability of TDF to fight in areas beyond its stronghold, as well as a corresponding decline in the ENDF and EDF’s grip on Tigray.

4.7 Overall War Progress: November 2020 to May 2021

After the capture of Mekelle, allied Ethiopian and Eritrean forces sought to continue the momentum and quickly advanced on Ala’isa and Gereb Segen.²⁶⁴ The pattern of ENDF/EDF offensives remained consistent. Towns were shelled indiscriminately²⁶⁵ a few days prior the arrival of the ground troops and where the army encountered stiff resistance, massacres of civilians followed.²⁶⁶ The towns of Ala’isa, Hagere Selam, Agbe and Abi Addi were captured in quick succession.

Then, on 4 December, the ENDF mounted an offensive on Werqamba town, 17 km north of Abiy Addi, where they faced fierce resistance from Tigrayan forces.²⁶⁷ It was rumoured that the TPLF leadership was hiding in the town.²⁶⁸ After intense fighting (during which Tigrayan forces claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on their opponents) the ENDF eventually took control of the town. Yet, the TPLF leaders remained elusive. With the capture of Werqamba the road connecting Mekelle to Adwa, and through to Abiy Addi, fell into the hands of the Ethiopian forces.

On the southern front, the ENDF contingent advanced towards Gereb Segen, reaching Samre town towards the end of December, which was captured after brief but intense fighting. Simultaneously, Gijet town, a few kilometres away, was subjected to a blanket bombardment in preparation for a subsequent attack.²⁶⁹

On the northern front, Ethio-Eritrean forces attempted to move beyond the B-30 highway and deeper into south-central Tigray. However, their attempt to capture Medebay Zana and Naeder appears to have proved unsuccessful, as the Tigrayans were reportedly able to repulse ENDF offensive around Adi Achelai.²⁷⁰ These areas remained TDF stronghold from which they were able to mount subsequent attacks. Fighting was also reported around Asgede Tsimbla, Edaga Hamus, Sasei Tsadaimba and Dengelat, with apparently inconclusive outcomes.²⁷¹

The beginning of January saw new fronts and deeper penetration of EDF and ENDF forces into previously unconquered areas of central and Northern Tigray. To the north west of Mekelle, the allied forces carried out offensives against the towns of Tsigereda, administrative centre of the mountainous district of Geralta, with the direction of attack likely originating from Ala’isa.²⁷² To the south, forces mobilizing from Maichew attacked Amba Alaje and went as far as Bora town.²⁷³ Meanwhile, Eritrean troops had already set up secure administrative areas along the border with Tigray, including Zalambessa, Irob, Gerhu Sirnay, Rama and Shiraro.²⁷⁴ However, rural areas and towns between this buffer zone and the B-30 highway southwards remained under the control of the TDF and hostile Tigrayan militia. The Tigrayans targeted crucial supply routes along Rama-Adwa and Zalambessa-Adigrat roads. Intending to nullify these intermittent attacks, EDF offensives were launched from Kerseber town, between Adigrat and Zalambessa, to areas as far as Assimba Mountains. Similar offensives were carried out against Debre Damo and Bizet.²⁷⁵

Ethio-Eritrean forces soon discovered that holding towns far from the highway was far more difficult than capturing them. The Tigrayans kept targeting supply routes and mounting unexpected attacks against the towns themselves, only to withdraw before supporting units arrived from nearby garrisons. Consistent with this pattern, the TDF launched a series of attacks on several towns of northern and central Tigray. As such, mid-January offensives by the TDF on Daero Hafash, Edaga Arbi, Mai Kinetal, Nebelet and Hawzen appear to have been successful and the Tigrayans were even able to occupy several of them, even if they were only held temporarily. Among these offensives, Daero Hafash, near Axum, stands out as one involving the most intense and lengthy fighting. Tigrayan sources claimed to have inflicted upwards of 4,000 casualties on EDF/ENDF forces.²⁷⁶

Fighting intensified throughout February. Ethio-Eritrean forces continued to mount attacks on the mountainous areas of central Tigray. Conversely, TDF kept targeting the enemy’s supply routes and carrying out ambushes, choosing spots where the advancing force would be vulnerable. On the central front, rural areas around Nebelet remained a focal point of repeated clashes between the TDF and EDF, with the former persistently mounting surprise attacks, involving ‘Qoretsa’ maneuvers, to make sustained occupation untenable.

With the approach of the annual “Lekatit 11” celebration (18 February 2021), commemorating the start of Tigrayan armed struggle, the TDF leadership planned a series of high-profile attacks in an attempt to score victories that would reinvigorate popular support for the resistance. Consequently, on February 8th, Tigrayan forces carried out an operation named after the late Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin around Juamare, Kola Tembien. After a series of battles in the surrounding area, the TDF claimed to have defeated a battalion sized contingent of Ethio-Eritrean forces which had been drafted into the area.²⁷⁷

By mid-February, even more significant battles were fought in Mai Kinetal, Gijet and Samre, lasting several days. In the aftermath of the fighting, Tigrayan forces temporarily recaptured the towns and allegedly inflicted heavy losses on EDF/ENDF before withdrawing to the mountains.²⁷⁸ In Mai Kinetal alone, Tigrayan forces claimed to have killed or captured more than 2,000 EDF soldiers. This was the first time since November when Tigrayan forces had faced such sizable enemy contingent. It appears to have served as a reversal of fortune for the EDF/ENDF while emboldening the Tigrayan side. In the aftermath of the battle, a TDF statement said: “the defeat showed that the Eritrean army is not as formidable as is being claimed to be.”²⁷⁹ To friend and foe alike, it was presented as evidence that the TDF was capable of moving beyond mounting guerrilla attacks and could openly engage the Eritrean army and come out on top.

On 20 February, the government of Tigray issued a statement listing its terms for peace negotiation. These included the unconditional withdrawal of Eritrean and Amhara forces from Tigray; an independent investigation of alleged atrocities committed in Tigray and a vehement denunciation of the Tigray interim administration, appointed by the government in Addis Ababa.²⁸⁰ More than anything, the statement revealed the Tigrayans belief in the ability of their military to maintain a sustained resistance that would be sufficient to force negotiation on their own terms. That, at least, was what the Tigrayan authorities wished the world to believe. The fact that the ENDF was by this time reportedly digging trenches around Mekelle, moving into a defensive posture, appeared to affirm a gradual shift in the military strength among the antagonists.²⁸¹

March saw evidence of the enhanced of military capability of TDF. Multiple semi-conventional battles took place involving several brigades from both sides, with correspondingly high human casualties. During the first week of March, major offensives were carried out around Samre, Bora and Ofla, by the combined armies of Ethiopia and Eritrea, and supported by Amhara regional forces, in an attempt to overwhelm southern Tigray and weaken TDF presence there.²⁸² The fighting provided evidence of the involvement of Eritrean forces in southern Tigray. This coincided with reports of Ethiopian forces being redeployed to central and southern Ethiopia, to head off an increased threat from the Oromo Liberation Front. The ENDF was gradually yielding Tigray to Eritrea while moving its forces in Oromia. After several days of fighting, it appears that TDF units were able to carry out successive ambushes as well as entrenched engagements in the area. As a result, they wore down enemy attacks, neutralising thousands of EDF/ENDF soldiers in the process. This meant an increased presence of TDF in southern Tigray, which led to their subsequent infiltration attacks into neighbouring Amhara territory.

Towards the middle of March two major infiltration-type offensives were carried out by the TDF deep into Amhara territory. On March 18th Tsata town, an administrative center in the Wag Himra Zone of the Amhara region, was attacked by TDF infiltration units.²⁸³ Besides aiming to acquire much needed military equipment and supplies, while simultaneously weakening Amhara forces in the area, the TDF leadership also appears to have intended to make a statement that it was now a force to be reckoned with.

By the beginning of April, Ethio-Eritrean forces carried out huge operations described as ‘once and for all’ attacks.²⁸⁴ Several divisions of EDF/ENDF were mobilised in almost all fronts of central and southern Tigray. The Tigrayan media house, Demtsi Weyane, reported extended fighting around Endabaguna, Seleh Leha, Zana, Hawzien, Maikinetal, Edaga Arbi and Wojerat.²⁸⁵ The multi-frontal Ethio-Eritrean offensive, which involved mechanised divisions and aerial support, continued in full force until the middle of April. Both sides claimed to have achieved major victories, which is difficult to verify. However, it is evident that the Ethio-Eritrean forces terminated the operation before achieving their main objective – the complete eradication of the TDF. Contrary to ENDF claims, several videos of large contingents of TDF units celebrating victory, as well as mobilizing for another operation, were released on social media.²⁸⁶ This was followed, on April 26th, by another Tigrayan offensive against Nirak, located inside the Amhara region near Abergelle, with TDF infiltration units reportedly destroying a contingent of Amhara Special Forces that had camped in the area.²⁸⁷

During the first week of May, TDF infiltration units are reported to have carried out a limited offensive against Eritrean positions near Gerhu Sirnay town, bordering on Eritrea.²⁸⁸ The offensive was similar to the ones undertaken inside the Amhara region. TDF activities in April and May suggests that, beyond attacks on supply highways, the Tigrayan resistance is likely to continue such limited scale offensives targeting weak spots of its opponents. At the same time, it appears unlikely that Tigrayan forces will seek to confront EDF/ENDF units head-on and try to make territorial advances any time soon.

4.8 Conclusion

It has now been more than six months since the start of the Tigray war and all the available evidence shows it’s unlikely to end soon. At the start of the war, faced with relentless attacks by the numerically superior allied forces of Eritrea and Ethiopia, Tigrayan Special Forces were forced to withdraw from major towns and retreat to the mountains, to conduct a guerrilla war. Subsequent campaigns, in December and January, by the EDF/ENDF into TDF strongholds of central and southern Tigray failed to crush Tigrayan resistance.

After barely scraping through its worst period, however, the Tigrayan resistance grew in strength.²⁸⁹ Numerous horrifying atrocities committed by armies of the EDF, ENDF and Amhara forces, as well as the annexation of Tigrayan territory, and the deliberate destruction and looting of public property, enraged the Tigrayan public against the federally appointed interim administration. This period has also seen the emergence of the TDF as a truly national resistance movement, not tied to any particular political party. Its status has been enhanced by the fact that TPLF veterans²⁹⁰ and opposition leaders joined its ranks,²⁹¹ as did large number of Tigrayan youth.²⁹² They were supported by the emergence of a pan-Tigrayan, and highly vocal diaspora²⁹³ which was able to consolidate and mobilise the Tigrayan public. These factors served to transform the resistance into an all-inclusive people’s war.

Meanwhile, the Ethiopian army was facing a significant decline in its operational capability. With the Northern Command – its most potent segment – neutralized, the Ethiopian national army was at a disadvantage from the beginning.²⁹⁴ In addition, thousands of Tigrayan members of the ENDF, were swiftly side-lined or imprisoned by the Ethiopian government because of their ethnicity, without sufficient preparations for their replacement. Considering the fact that the Tigrayans were the most experienced members of the military, it is obvious that this would take a significant toll on the ENDF’s military capacity. Moreover, the brutal November campaign, where the Ethiopian command pursued a strategy that prioritized the swift capture of Mekelle over operational efficiency, had resulted in heavy casualties and the loss of essential equipment.²⁹⁵ Subsequent ambitious, but ill-conceived, campaigns into central Tigray, which attempted to completely eliminate the TPLF led resistance, coupled with TDF’s adept utilization of guerrilla warfare, resulted in the ENDF losing some of its most experienced troops.²⁹⁶ With most of its divisions tied up in Tigray, the rise of insurgency movements, like the Oromo Liberation Army²⁹⁷ and Gumuz Liberation Front²⁹⁸ in the rest of Ethiopia, as well as a border conflict with Sudan, compelled the Ethiopian government to be increasingly reliant on Eritrean forces in its Tigray campaign.

Eritrean forces were heavily involved in the Tigray war right from the start. Tigrayan sources had claimed that as early as the beginning of November, more than half of the EDF’s infantry divisions were already deployed on Tigrayan soil. After the fall of Mekelle, the Eritrean army annexed a part of northern Tigray instituting military administrations around Zalambessa, Rama, Irob, Gerhu Sirnay and Shiraro. Moreover, several divisions of EDF, including the infamous 525 commando division, were deployed alongside ENDF units, in ongoing campaigns into central Tigray.²⁹⁹ Numerous reports from residents illustrate that few, if any, areas of central and northern Tigray had not been visited by EDF contingents. As early as December, a permanent Eritrean presence was reported in several Tigrayan towns including, among others, Wukro, Adigrat, Adwa, Shire and Nebellet.³⁰⁰

By the beginning of February, TDF affiliated sources were repeatedly insisting that two thirds of the Ethiopian national army had been ‘neutralized’ and that most of the fighting in northern and central Tigray was against EDF units.³⁰¹ It was also claimed that, if the Eritreans were to withdraw, the ENDF alone would be unable to contain the Tigrayan Defense Forces.³⁰² With mounting international pressure for the Eritrean army to withdraw from Tigray, reports started to emerge that the Eritrean army had started to wear ENDF uniform, with the aim of eventually merging with the Ethiopian army.³⁰³

Meanwhile, public opinion in the rest of Ethiopia, beyond the current war, remained finely divided over the legitimacy and course of the conflict. The sharp and seemingly irreconcilable difference of opinion among advocates of the two sides appears to align with their respective attitude towards, and identification with, the previous history of Ethiopia, as well as their views of the best model of governance for the country to follow. Many of the most vocal advocates of the multinational federation denounced Abiy’s attempt to crush Tigray and his alliance with President Isaias. This explains the firm support by hard core federalists among the Oromo for Tigrayan resistance, despite the TPLF’s previous antagonism towards the OLF. This has resulted in a strategic, if unlikely Oromo alliance, with Tigrayans.³⁰⁴

However, many federalists had been embittered by the behavior of the EPRDF, and TPLF’s role within it. As a result, many have remained perceivably apathetic about Tigray’s suffering and have not involved themselves in the conflict. Somali nationalists, as well as those of Afar and Southern nationalities, fall into this category. While the Special Forces of almost all the regional states participated in the war on the side of the federal government, it would be wrong to confuse their role with the position the elites of their respective nationalities towards the Tigray war. All in all, because of the previous experience that ethnic nationalists had of the TPLF, some, who might otherwise have supported Tigrayan resistance, have remained divided on the issue. Ethiopianists, however, apart from a small minority, have remained strong supporters of the government’s crusade against Tigray.

On the other hand, the people’s support for the federal government, hadn’t translated well when it came to providing recruits for the national army, or at least not as much as the federal government had wanted it. While it could be argued that there was good response to government’s calls for volunteer recruits during the first few months, as the war dragged on, and as gossip of the national army’s high casualty rates or the difficulty of fighting against Tigrayan insurgency begun to spread among the population, the number of volunteers started to dwindle while the governments call of arms began to appear desperate and frequent. Abiy Ahmed repeatedly criticized the youth for preferring to ‘fight on Facebook’ while the country was in desperate need of new conscripts.³⁰⁵

With the failure of the April offensives to decisively defeat the Tigrayan resistance,³⁰⁶ it has become clear that the Tigray war is poised to become a protracted conflict, threatening to sink the Horn into instability.³⁰⁷ It is apparent that over the past couple of months, the operational capability of TDF has grown significantly and has now reached a point where it is deploying several brigades in its contacts with EDF/ENDF units. It appears capable of successfully defending its strongholds in the mountainous central and southern Tigray.³⁰⁸ Moreover, its ambushes targeting the A-2, B-20 and B-30 highways have severely constrained the supply routes of EDF/ENDF armies, making it increasingly difficult for its opponents to sustain a prolonged occupation of the region.

By May 2021 the rural areas of central and southern Tigray below A-2 and B-30 highway, as well as smaller towns found farther from the main roads, appeared to be firmly under TDF control. The Eritrean forces, on the other hand, have maintained a firm grip over the larger towns in central Tigray found along the B-30 and A-2 highways. Towns like Maikinetal, Werqamba, Abiy Addi and Nebelet, which are further south of the highway, were also under EDF control.³⁰⁹ However, as these towns are exposed to repeated TDF attacks, it will be difficult for the Eritreans to sustain control over them in the coming months, especially during the rainy season, which beings in July. ENDF units seem content with administering the bigger towns south of Mekelle found along the A-2 highway. Western Tigray, beyond Tekezze river, will probably remain under the control of Amhara forces³¹⁰ and TDF attacks in these areas, especially aimed at sustained territorial advances, appear unlikely in the near future.

[Note: This chapter was written prior to the launching of Operation Alula³¹¹ which transformed the war in just ten days, from 18 June to 28 June 2021, with the Tigrayans re-capturing Mekelle and a string of other towns and villages.]

5 The Ethiopian national context

Author’s name withheld

Other chapters in this collection discuss detailed aspects of the war in Tigray: its outbreak, conduct and devastating impact within the regional state. This chapter broadens the focus to look at other political and conflict dynamics in Ethiopia and their articulation with the war in Tigray. It focuses primarily on politics in the Oromo and Amhara arenas. There has been a strong tendency before and after the outbreak of fighting in November 2020 to treat the political divergence – and now war – between the federal and Tigray governments as somehow “separate” and separable from other dynamics of the political evolution of Ethiopia. There are political and analytical consequences to this approach.

5.1 Contextualising the war in Tigray

The government narrative from Addis Ababa since the current Prime Minister came to power in April 2018 sought to separate the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) from other political actors. It attributed responsibility for the ills of “27 years of darkness”³¹² to the TPLF, not to the wider ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) of which it was a member. It cast TPLF leaders (and not their EPRDF colleagues still in government) as criminals and accused them of destabilising the “transition.” The narrative has proved clear, effective and popular, tirelessly reiterated on all of the media sources easily available to Ethiopia’s public.³¹³ Since November 2020 the government and its supporters refer to the war as a local policing or “law and order” operation against a small group of “treasonous” lawbreakers. Even in the context of the rout of its military forces in late June, the government persisted in its “law and order” operation claims.³¹⁴ The approach has been designed to counteract an understanding of the war as driven by politics, or tractable only to a political – not to a policing or military – solution, as most observers believe. The formal proscription by Ethiopian lawmakers on 6 May 2021 of the TPLF (together with what the government refers to as “OLF Shanee”³¹⁵) as a terrorist organisation serves to reinforce this ringfencing strategy. It remained in force at the end of June 2021.

Many analysts have fallen in with this approach, treating the “Tigray conflict” not as civil war but as independent of a wider crisis of the Ethiopian state. Ethiopia is large, diverse and complicated and one way to try to unpick and convey this complexity has been to distinguish its different conflicts for separate analysis. But something important is lost in this way. An understanding of the interlinkages with wider disputes and developments is important to capture a sense of the complex and shifting motivations of the protagonists in the war, and of their myriad supporting cast members, many of whom operate across the broader political canvases of Ethiopia, the Horn and beyond. The war itself, and the polarisation and propaganda associated with it, now have an influence on Ethiopian political developments including the June election: rhetoric from late May 2021 about “foreign interference”, for instance, provided politically useful grist to the Ethiopian sovereignty mill,³¹⁶ activating powerful historical echoes.³¹⁷ It was supremely well-timed to galvanise support a month before national polls. Examination of the wider Ethiopian context, then, helps illuminate the scope and intricacy of the challenges that confront a sustainable resolution of the bloody conflict in Tigray. It also illuminates the scale of what may be at stake, far beyond the borders of Tigray itself.

5.2 A threat to Ethiopia’s integrity?

As “the war continues, destabilising Ethiopia and the wider region” so the perception has grown that it “is a cruel drain on the resources and population of Ethiopia and its neighbours [and] a potential threat to the entire region.”³¹⁸ As Martin Plaut has noted in the introduction to this collection, a group of senior US diplomats warned in late October 2020 that “fragmentation of Ethiopia […] would be the largest state collapse in modern history.”³¹⁹ As the war ground on beyond six months Ethiopia began to draw new and invidious international comparisons. US Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman, told Foreign Policy in May 2021 that the conflict has the potential to spiral into a full-fledged regional crisis: “If the tensions in Ethiopia would result in a widespread civil conflict that goes beyond Tigray, Syria will look like child’s play by comparison.”³²⁰ Also in May 2021, Theodore Murphy the Africa Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations said “if the Ethiopian government can’t find a way out of this war, and we also understand that the war can’t be won militarily, it is akin to a sort of Afghanistan for the Ethiopian government. But it’s one that they can’t walk away from. It is just slowly leeching away at Ethiopia’s wealth and international standing, and of course with an incredible human cost.”³²¹ Ethiopia’s government, meanwhile, vigorously resisted this characterisation of the situation.

But on 28 May 2021 Ethiopia’s ruling Prosperity Party (PP) issued a statement that seemed abruptly to acknowledge the severity of the crisis facing the whole country, if only as a further reason to reject political negotiations: “The captains of a ship can negotiate internally and compete only as long as the ship survives. There can never be rights, dialogue, debate, negotiation or competition when the ship is sinking. It is the same when it comes to the affairs of a country.”³²² The statement, with its glossy accompanying video, seems to have been intended as an electoral appeal – seeking to draw on the well of Ethiopian nationalism in defence of a nation threatened. But it also begs the obvious questions: is the Ethiopian ship sinking, and if so, how, and why, and how did we get here? This paper briefly reviews key political and conflict dynamics behind the “vicious deadlock” in Ethiopia.³²³ It reviews conflict trajectories and risks beyond Tigray, focusing on shifting patterns in other parts of Ethiopia. It depicts the depth and extent of the differences of opinion between Ethiopia’s different political actors, and amongst those who observe and analyse them.

Truth has been a casualty of the polarisation of politics in Ethiopia in a context of limited information. This is a problem only exacerbated by insecurity, by acute constraints on travel during a pandemic, and by pressure and limitations on journalistic investigation.³²⁴ Anthony Shaw in this volume notes the evolution of two diametrically opposed accounts – contrasting truths – of the war in Tigray, and the same is even more true of wider events in Ethiopia, making the job of international observers and diplomats particularly challenging. In late May 2021, Crisis Group’s Will Davison commented: “the tragedy for me is that whether we take the Tigray conflict, or the situation in Metekel zone (and this is just the current crises), or the Wollegas, or the situation in South Wollo and around Atayé in Oromia zone in Amhara, whether we take the build-up to the war and the outbreak of the war, Hachalu’s assassination, etc. etc., all of these events need better reporting, they all need exposing – like all of these massacres that are occurring, Amhara civilians, other civilians, in Oromia and Metekel. Who are the perpetrators, who are the victims, who’s funding the perpetrators? It all needs to be exposed properly. It is a cliché but it is in this darkness that evil flourishes. [Lack of exposure] facilitates all of this murky violent political activity.”³²⁵

5.3 Conflict and the rule of law

Observers across the political spectrum seem to agree that Ethiopia has become more violent and unstable in recent years, and that the rule of law has disintegrated, or been allowed to disintegrate, in many parts of the country. The extent of the security and governance challenge was brought into focus when Ethiopia’s National Election Board (NEBE) Chairperson reported in April 2021 that, of 45,000 polling stations expected to be opened in January 2021,³²⁶ only half were operational, and that only 200,000 voters had registered across Addis Ababa municipality.³²⁷ After an extension of the voter registration period by several weeks and a strong governmental push, “at least 36 million” voters were reported to have been registered, still “at least 10 million short of what officials were targeting” according to the BBC.³²⁸ Significant parts of the country were excluded from the election on 21 June 2021, because of security issues,³²⁹ and defective ballot printing logistics. A further area did not vote pending the conduct of a referendum on the establishment of a new “South-West Ethiopia” region, which was itself also postponed in early June to September 2021, because of persisting insecurity in some areas.³³⁰ By the end of June 2021, no election results had been published, and NEBE reported that complaints had been lodged in 160 constituencies by 30 political parties, with five making broader claims of problems.³³¹

If all now agree that there is an acute and deepening security crisis they agree on little else. For opponents and critics of the TPLF/EPRDF (and of the ethnic federal system they designed, and other ethno-nationalist or federalist political forces), the cause of instability and violence has been clear and singular. National Movement of Amhara (NAMA) chairman, Belete Molla, summed up the view shared across federal government, ruling party, and pan-Ethiopianist and Amhara opposition groups: “TPLF was always a mafia group, orchestrating massacres across the country.”³³²

As massacres and conflict have continued, even intensified, over the months since November 2020, during which the TPLF has been fighting (apparently for its survival) in Tigray, the credibility of that simple narrative should presumably have begun to unravel. It persists, however, as an important thread of government rhetoric³³³ and analytical polemic,³³⁴ and is widely believed in Ethiopia. The narrative that there is a “trail of repeated pre-war ethnic styled massacres … where the hand of the TPLF providing money and logistical support has often been present”³³⁵ is a cornerstone of the campaign in favour of the war in Tigray: emotive and resilient even in the absence of published evidence. This position often conflates with strong antipathy towards “ethnic politics” in general, seen as the root of all of Ethiopia’s problems, and a natural consequence of the current federal arrangement.³³⁶ Ethno-nationalists are then dismissed as insurgent “terrorist groupings”, with no programme other than “nihilistic killings,”³³⁷ in a further depoliticization of analysis. This narrative has facilitated their exclusion from electoral competition.

The following discussion examines developments in Oromo and Amhara politics since 2018 (and briefly elsewhere in the country), before concluding with a resumé of other factors relevant to the challenges Ethiopia faces in mid-2021.

5.4 Oromia politics and conflict – optimism and excitement

In 2018, after four years of anti-government Oromo protests, the new Prime Minister rode to power on a euphoric and well-cultivated wave of Oromo nationalism. His party brokered the return of Oromo (and other) opposition organisations. Pre-eminent amongst them was the Oromo Liberation Front, OLF, established in 1973 during the Haile Selassie period.³³⁸ During a long period in exile (latterly hosted and trained in Eritrea) OLF toyed with a secessionist agenda, but this seemed to fade over time. Their return in September 2018 sparked more euphoria and wild optimism – and a violent backlash in and around Addis Ababa/Finfinne, as rival gangs of Ethiopianist and Oromo young men faced off. There were targeted killings of other groups, especially in Burayu.³³⁹ Elders were mobilised to broker community reconciliation, but the damage was done in terms of the urban fear of dangerous “ethnic conflict,” a designation which seemed to provide its own explanation Social media activists and journalists who had led the Oromo protest movement from the diaspora also returned to Ethiopia in 2018. They initially worked closely with the Oromo ruling party, reinforcing the early popularity of the new regime, and (often controversially) encouraging returning rebels to demobilise. A Muslim from Arsi, Jawar Mohammed was a polarising figure: disliked both by the TPLF/EPRDF against whom he had mobilised since 2014, but also by Amhara and Ethiopian nationalists; but wildly popular amongst young people in Oromia. His return was a tumultuous affair, provoking extreme reactions – and shocking violence.³⁴⁰ Although Government media sources were initially sympathetic to Jawar (and his Oromo Media Network, OMN, was given permission to broadcast), the Patriotic Ginbot 7 (PG7)-owned Ethiopian Satellite TV station (ESAT) and others campaigned against him and his followers as dangerous radicals fomenting ethnic violence.

A collapsing consensus

After a honeymoon period in 2018, Oromo nationalist euphoria began to subside at the end of the year. On their return to Ethiopia in September 2018, the OLF enjoyed very strong support in western Ethiopia, especially Wollega and Illubabor.³⁴¹ There was no clarity about the terms of their return and arrangements for demobilisation, or – remarkably – whether these had been discussed at all.³⁴² At least one armed contingent resisted re-integration and re-emerged as the Oromo Liberation Army, OLA. In late 2018, Ethiopia’s National Defence Force (ENDF) units were dispatched to the four zones of Wollega in what seems to have become an extremely brutal counter insurgency against armed units and factions, who had begun armed activity in western border areas.³⁴³ By April and May 2019 the OLF leadership had issued statements distancing the organisation from the OLA’s armed activity. Meanwhile between January and December 2019 pressure on alleged supporters of OLA/OLF increased, with mass arrests and extra judicial executions, notably in Guji and West Guji.³⁴⁴ In 2018, violent clashes between Gedeo and their (Oromo) Guji neighbours saw up to a million people flee their homes, triggering a humanitarian crisis and bringing Ethiopia to the top of global internally displaced persons (IDP) rankings.³⁴⁵ IDPs moved in large numbers from Kercha wereda of West Guji in Oromia into Gedeo; in smaller numbers also from several kebeles of Guji zone, Gedeb wereda, into West Guji. The displaced majority Gedeo were reluctant to accept government pressure to return home, and local attempts at peacebuilding were slow and uncertain.³⁴⁶³⁴⁷ Government blamed “violent criminals” for conflict, in the context of the raised ethno-nationalist rhetoric as diaspora forces returned to the country.³⁴⁸ Less discussed were the longer standing dynamics of inter-group relations and conflict on this border, which were reshaped by new opportunities for elite jockeying in the 1990s, and formed a known political flashpoint.³⁴⁹ Violence is reported to have returned to Guji in April and May 2021, hindering humanitarian access.³⁵⁰

In January 2019, there had been unconfirmed allegations of government airstrikes against the OLA in Kellem Wollega, as the ENDF moved into Wollega in force, undertaking a sustained military operation in the area.³⁵¹ The government crackdown cranked up again in the early months of 2020. By 3 January 2020 mobile and landline phone and internet services to the four Wollega zones were cut off.³⁵² On 21 January 2020, Oromo rights organisations had accused the government of “adding fuel to the fire.”³⁵³ In March 2020, The Economist reported that the crackdown in Western Oromia was “bloody and lawless.”³⁵⁴ Observers and rights organisations alleged a litany of extra judicial killings by the state.

Emerging Oromo opposition – neutralised

Nevertheless, in mid-/late-2019 most still anticipated that a free and fair poll would see a range of parties elected, and lead to a real political transition. A powerful Oromo coalition, including opposition figures, and with a clear popular mandate, was widely seen as likely to emerge, with the legitimacy to influence the direction of Ethiopia’s future evolution at national level. Polarisation grew in October 2019, with the controversial reopening of the renovated Menelik Palace.³⁵⁵ Later in the month, the PM gave a speech in parliament threatening to take measures against “media owners with foreign passports;” and the following day Jawar alleged that the police had tried to orchestrate an attack on him.³⁵⁶ In the febrile and violent uproar that followed at least 89 people were killed. In the absence of a credible investigation,³⁵⁷ and with plenty of social, economic and governance failings providing grounds for grievance, highly politicised narratives filled the vacuum.

Many Oromos had grown critical of what they saw as increasingly “Ethiopianist” or “unitarist” government rhetoric, disappointment which crystallised when the PP was established on 1 December 2019.³⁵⁸ Over the course of 2019 divisions had emerged between the PM and many of his Oromo allies, inside and outside the ruling party. Key Oromo figures grew uncomfortable with moves to a more unitarist “anti-federal” (for some even “anti-Oromo”) stance, but the PM drew support from elite politicians in the Oromo zones of Shoa, close to Addis Ababa. By the end of the year, his most popular ruling ally Lemma Megerssa had distanced himself. At the end of December 2019, the influential activist Jawar Mohammed finally declared that he would run for election and joined the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC). This abruptly raised the prospect of a strong pan-Oromo opposition movement, capable to mount a formidable challenge to the ruling party: with Jawar on board, OFC was recast as a nationally significant competitor, with appeal across Oromia zones of the protestant west (home of Bekele Gerba), and the Muslim east, as well its existing powerbase in west Shoa (home of Merera Gudina).

The prospect of a transformative election unravelled with the decision that they be postponed due to COVID-19 in the spring of 2020. When popular Oromo singer Hachalu Hundeesa was assassinated on 29 June 2020, three days of violence erupted during which hundreds of people died. Armed youths destroyed property in Addis Ababa on 30 June. Jawar and Bekele were accused of trying to politicise Hachalu’s funeral, and quickly detained, arguably fanning further violence. In Ambo, 3 policemen and 78 civilians, including Hachalu’s uncle were killed as the singer was buried.³⁵⁹ In Shashemene more than 150 people lost their lives, and non-Oromo communities (including Rastafarians) were reported to have been targeted.³⁶⁰

Analysis of these events is extremely divisive, and controversy persisted with the publication of the official Human Rights Commission (EHRC) investigation report.³⁶¹ Analysis produced six months later summed up the polarisation: “The party line is that officials who were negligent, disloyal, or complicit in the violence were removed. The counter-narrative is that the unrest was stoked and then used to purge opponents and ruling figures who sided with Lemma, or with the opposition, by falsely blaming them for orchestrating the violence.”³⁶² If the October 2019 violence and crackdown offered a test run for the identification and dismantling of Jawar’s qeeroo activist networks, July 2020 provided ample pretext for the arrest of opposition OFC and OLF leaders, along with tens of thousands of others. Lemma Megerssa and other critics were suspended from the ruling party in mid-August 2020. ³⁶³ Diplomatic sources concluded that the government crackdown across Oromia from July 2020 reversed the early gains of the “transition,” which was now widely seen as fundamentally derailed.

Over the period from 2018 to 2020, ESAT had entrenched the narration of

AmharaGenocide, establishing a context conducive to the narrative of “ethnic

conflict,” and the July arrests and September prosecutions were wildly popular beyond Oromo circles. OFC’s leaders were charged with extremely serious crimes,³⁶⁴ just a few days after the PM published an opinion piece stating that “individuals and groups, disaffected by the transformations taking place, are using everything at their disposal to derail them. They are harvesting the seeds of inter-ethnic and inter-religious division and hatred.”³⁶⁵ The wave of Oromo nationalism on which the PM had risen to power at the beginning of 2018 was silenced and discredited.³⁶⁶

Consolidation of a violent impasse

From the end of January to early March 2021 Jawar and other high profile Oromo prisoners went on hunger strike. By the time they finally agreed to call it off,³⁶⁷ both OLF and OFC had withdrawn from the election.³⁶⁸ All significant federalist and nationalist voices in Oromo politics had now been excluded, as a Shoa-dominated PP elite and its co-opted allies rolled out the ruling party election campaign on behalf of the PM. Although the pan-Ethiopianist opposition Ethiopians for Social Democracy (Ezema) will field candidates, and is likely to win support in some urban centres of Oromia, the ruling PP faces little or no competition elsewhere. Nevertheless, ongoing fighting and violence means that the election will not take place in significant parts of the region, including the four Wollega zones.³⁶⁹ Protest has been effectively and comprehensively repressed, but violent opposition and the killings of civilians seemed if anything to have increased over the period to the end of May 2021.

Little is known about the real strength and scope of the OLA. Its social media presence has grown since the beginning of 2021, and videos seem to suggest extensive recruitment and improved equipment. In the words of one commentator it “waged a blitzkrieg over the last few months, starting in Wollega and expanding quickly into Arsi and Bale.”³⁷⁰ The killing of civilians in Oromia exploded in the national narrative on 31 October 2020 when 54 people were “rounded up and killed”³⁷¹ in a school compound in Guliso, West Wollega,³⁷² in what Amnesty described as a “horrendous attack on a village by armed group […] The fact that this horrendous incident occurred shortly after government troops abruptly withdrew from the area in unexplained circumstances raises questions that must be answered.”³⁷³ EHRC described the attack as an “unconscionable” “massacre.”³⁷⁴

Unexplained attacks on civilians have persisted, and many are reported to target Amhara groups. In February 2021, 12 people were killed in Eastern Oromia, and on 6 and 9 March, 42 died in Hora Guduru zone in the west.³⁷⁵ At the end of March, 30 people were killed in West Wollega.³⁷⁶ On 29 April “at least” 20 people were killed in Limu Kosa, in Jimma zone.³⁷⁷ On 30 April, 15 passengers on a bus at Amuyu, close to Hora Guduru zone were killed.³⁷⁸ “OLF Shanee” is consistently blamed for atrocities right across the region and in April and May 2021 also in Amhara (see below). The OLA has equally regularly denied responsibility. In the absence of credible investigation, and with ongoing counter insurgency, polarised rhetoric has filled the vacuum: Ethiopians on all sides feel sure they know who killed whom and why.

On 6 May 2021, Ethiopia’s parliament approved a bill defining TPLF and OLA/“OLF Shanee” as “terrorist” organisations,³⁷⁹ finally introducing a measure which had been rumoured to have split opinion amongst PP decision-makers in late 2020 when first mooted. The move has been interpreted as an attempt to block international pressure for negotiations with the two organisations, as each has apparently begun to gain ground militarily.³⁸⁰ International observers have privately commented that the move has also shredded what remained of the credibility of Ethiopia’s likeable Attorney General.³⁸¹ The legal shift has been followed only by worsening brutality, including a qualitatively different level of “authorised” state violence, in which social media activists have seen parallels with Derg-era executions.

Kellem Wollega zone, in particular, has seen a number of gruesome murders blamed on the authorities in Dembi Dollo. At the end of April 2021 university lecturer and doctoral student Kajela Tasisa was killed.³⁸² On 8 May Oromo broadcast journalist Sisay Fida was assassinated, and the government and OLA traded blame.³⁸³ On 11 May 2021, authorities carried out the public parading and extra-judicial execution of 9th grader Amanuel Wondimu at a roundabout in the town, after reportedly calling members of the public including the boy’s family to witness the events. A video of them was posted onto Facebook by the local administration.³⁸⁴ Only a few days earlier, the EHRC (itself periodically critiqued by Oromo sources for alleged “anti-Oromo bias”) reported concerns about the treatment of large numbers of those detained in centres in Oromia,³⁸⁵ and now quickly expressed its alarm,386 as did Human Rights Watch.³⁸⁷ Later in May, unconfirmed reports of a second public execution, this time in Borana zone, circulated on Oromo social media, with reports that 300 family and community members had fled to Kenya.³⁸⁸

At the beginning of June 2021, Oromos in Horo Guduru zone and the OLF alleged that civilians were being abused and killed by Tigrigna-speaking Eritrean forces: a government spokesperson denied that Eritreans were present, and, as ever, blamed the TPLF.³⁸⁹ On 10 June, OCHA reported that an additional 55,000 people had been displaced by renewed conflict in East Wollega zone.³⁹⁰ On 11 June, a further OLF statement claimed that there had been a “new large-scale deployment” of Eritrean soldiers into Oromia and Benishangul Gumuz after 5 June 2021.³⁹¹ There was much speculation over the early months of 2021 as to whether a noncompetitive election in other parts of Oromia would provoke a backlash from the “Oromo street,” given the dramatic national leverage that Oromo protests achieved as they built steadily between 2014 and 2018. Two key drivers of the 2014-18 Oromo protests had been effectively eliminated – or at least silenced – during the intervening period: the critically important (tacit and active) support of OPDO ruling party cadres; and the network of social media information exchange and activism that animated the so-called “qeeroo.” A combination of financial co-option and forceful repression has apparently proved effective in much of Oromia. The ruling party ran unopposed in more than 100 constituencies in the region in June.

By 2021, the majority of the Oromo leaders of the ruling PP were from the zones of Shoa, close to Addis Ababa, where communities have tended to have a closer identification with the modern Ethiopian state centre, often involved in – or at least having a more positive experience of – its expansion at the end of the nineteenth century. The ruling PP can be expected to do well in many of these areas and especially amongst the new protestant church constituencies many of whose members have a particular enthusiasm for the PM. The scope for the completion of a peaceful process beyond these areas, remained to be seen at the end of June. Reports of governmental pressure on voters in Arsi surfaced in April/May 2021.³⁹²

After the emotive scenes of September 2018, there has also been particular concern about the poll in Addis Ababa (Finfinne), which it was thought could become a flashpoint for competing claims of Oromo and Ethiopian or Amhara nationalists, especially (but not only) if there were a shift in the balance of power (to Ezema or Balderas) as a result of the election. The decision of the cassation court on 24 May 2021 to allow four Balderas candidates (also jailed in the July 2020 crackdown) to stand for election in Addis Ababa has been highly significant and required NEBE to reprint 1.3 million new ballot papers.³⁹³ Pending the declaration of results, the move seems likely effectively to have split the opposition vote in Addis Ababa to the benefit of the incumbent. The concerns expressed by the NEBE Chairperson (herself a former judge) about the constitutionality of the last-minute court decision raised eyebrows, but are politically (and arguably also constitutionally) less surprising.³⁹⁴ At the end of June 2021, with results pending, many concluded that the opposition looked to have been neatly outmanoeuvred.

5.5 Amhara politics and conflict

If the dynamics of politics and conflict in and around Oromia are both murky and open to different interpretation, political developments amongst Amhara politicians, groups, and organisations, and in the Amhara region since 2018, are if anything yet more opaque, and subject to yet more speculation. The Amhara element of the EPRDF closely supported the election of PM Abiy in 2018, allying with Oromo peers, and belatedly withdrawing their own candidate, to ensure his victory. For some this was the culmination of the so-called “Oromara alliance,”³⁹⁵ which had seen a people-to-people conference in Bahr Dar in November 2017.³⁹⁶ Like the Oromo ruling party, the Amhara ruling party took early steps to distance itself from the EPRDF, renaming itself in mid-2018, and joining the PP in November 2019. With some notable exceptions (Deputy PM Demeke, for instance) there has been significant churn amongst Amhara ruling politicians since 2018, with rumoured tensions between different wings of the ruling party and across wider Amhara social networks, as to how, and how far, to support the PM.

A delicate balance – of power and perspective

Many observers have suggested that the outbreak and prosecution of the war in Tigray tipped the federal balance of power firmly in favour of the PP’s Amhara bloc, Abiy’s Amhara advisors, and President Isaias of Eritrea.³⁹⁷ After the initial declaration of victory at the end of November 2020, sharp exchanges between the Amhara and Oromo (and other) members of the PP leadership were rumoured to have persisted through to the end of the year, reportedly destabilising the delicate alliance forged in 2017/2018.³⁹⁸ Amhara and Oromo politicians’ concepts of Ethiopia’s history, their visions of the future, and readings of existing hierarchies, interests and party relationships seem to have continued to fluctuate and diverge within the PP.

One cannot generalise across groups of politicians, and political sociology would indicate that differentiation is likely to be marked by many issues. However, there are broad trends in political differences between the two blocs over three fundamental issues. Firstly, the future of federalism: many Amhara politicians are thought to been keener to see a return to a more unitary, or regional or at least non-ethnic arrangement than (many of) their non-Amhara ruling peers. (Amongst Oromo politicians, as noted above, willingness to move on this issue also tends to divide Shoa and non-Shoa elites.) Secondly, perceptions of the security and rights to land of Amharas living beyond the borders of Amhara region also diverge. Events in western and southern Tigray, and the prospect of further land annexation by the Amhara regional state greatly increased tensions relating to land. Military advances by the TDF in late June, and a unilateral federal announcement of “standing down” inflamed regional anxiety, and strong rhetoric.³⁹⁹ Finally, approaches towards righting the perceived “wrongs of the past” – for instance with respect to the position of Amhara politicians and businesses in the overall political constellation have hardened within the ruling party: many (opposition and ruling) Amhara politicians are seen as favouring the restoration of a more influential position, “commensurate with history” or with restoring the widely perceived injustices of federalism.⁴⁰⁰

While the PM and the PP’s Amhara politicians consistently assert they want a real national (even multinational) federation, there is a widespread view this is mere code for establishing a “geographic” (i.e. non-ethnic) arrangement. This could dissolve the nationalities-based federation established under the EPRDF and reinstall a more uniform, centralised – even unitary – system: familiar from Ethiopia’s past, and stripped of nationality rights to self-determination. It is unclear exactly who seeks what form of constitutional reform, and what scope of change would be feasible when. For many stakeholders from other groups, the ambiguity is chilling. Unifying assurances that “everyone agrees that we should retain a federal system” do not reassure.

The influence of radical Amhara nationalist voices has grown in the politics of Amhara region in 2021, and a number of potentially conflictual unknowns are in play: whether the social base of the Amhara PP think of “geographic federalism” in terms of expanding the existing territorial boundaries of the region; how far the Amhara PP may in turn be prepared to push for this; how the PM and other PP politicians would respond; and whether Amhara and Oromo elites, who together have a controlling stake in the PP by virtue of the size of their respective populations, can sustain an agreement on how to distribute power among themselves. Observers have indicated that this situation has evolved into a delicate game of poker within the ruling party: even as the PM relies on Amhara actors’ support, he is well aware that they may not necessarily constitute reliable partners who share his longer-term political objectives; just as Amhara politicians are aware that he may not necessarily be a reliable partner for the achievement of their (diverse, opaque and shifting) goals. Constructive ambiguity about the scope of shared goals, and highly personalised politics at the federal level have allowed this unstable situation to persist as crisis has grown.

Regional political instability and the return of the opposition

The depth of instability within the Amhara regional government was demonstrated in June 2019, when regional President Ambachew Mekonnen, who had then been in power for three months, was assassinated along with his Vice President and Attorney General, allegedly by controversial regional security head, General Asamnew Tsigé.⁴⁰¹ Asamnew was himself killed the following day, removing the prospect of further investigation of his motives. The incident was officially described as a “regional coup” attempt, seemingly by a more militant Amhara nationalist security boss of his moderate pro-federal colleague. Shocking in themselves, the significance of the Bahr Dar killings increased with the murder the same day of the ENDF Chief of Staff in Addis Ababa. There is much that remains unexplained. It may be that the simultaneous killings in Addis Ababa were serendipitously organised by other actors, but this is difficult to assess in the absence of a public investigation and published findings, or a public record from judicial process. ⁴⁰²

It seems likely that root causes of the “coup attempt” related to grievances from multiple overlapping interest groups over the direction and momentum of reforms, and their purchase over reforms at the regional and national levels. These issues remain unaddressed. Division may also have reflected zonal or historical “awraja” sub-region differentiation, with longstanding political competition between east and west: North and South Wollo versus the Gondar zones and East/West Gojjam. The PM quickly installed one of his national security advisors, a former colleague at the Information Network Security Agency (INSA), and the regional special forces were subdued, with a series of arrests. Deputy PM Demeke also tried to encourage rival regional ruling groups to agree on an agenda to settle insecurity. There was a broader reshuffle in September and October 2019, apparently geared at instilling loyalty and coherence within the regional administration.

The emergence after 2016 or return after 2018 of a range of opposition elites and organisations (notably the NAMA and PG7) to the Amhara political scene has also had the effect of radicalising the ruling PP within Amhara region, discouraging a more conciliatory stance on federal reform or land claims and pushing the party “into a corner.”⁴⁰³ When armed opposition groups returned to Ethiopia, the Amhara ruling party sought to incorporate many, including Amhara nationalist militants newly released from jail. As a result, Amhara PP and opposition NAMA and Ezema groupings all have complex links with one another. Key members of the Amhara political elite and the ANRS security apparatus had been hosted by Eritrea, and these links continued to be influential. Within weeks of his release from jail in 2018, and well ahead of the July Ethio-Eritrean summit, for instance, Andargachew Tsigé told BBC’s Hardtalk “our relationship with Eritrea is not really based on short term gain [..] In fact my view about Eritreans has helped in convincing the current PM to take the measures he has taken” “there is going to be peace [with Eritrea] and a very close relationship in all respects as well.”⁴⁰⁴

NAMA emerged into prominence in 2016-18, appealing primarily to a young generation of Amhara nationalists who had grown up under federalism. Amhara nationalism had long been associated with the pan-Ethiopianism of the Derg-era Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), and with its heirs in the 2005 Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), PG7 and (most recently) Ezema. NAMA’s rhetoric had a tougher and more ethnically-tinged edge. It gained ascendancy during the early phases of the transition in 2018, arguing that the TPLF had extended structural inequalities against Amhara into the constitution promulgated by the EPRDF in 1995.⁴⁰⁵ These (NAMA argued) limited political representation of Amhara interests to ANRS, undermining minority rights in other states where ethnic Amhara are also present. NAMA demanded the “return” of Amhara “ancestral” lands “removed by the TPLF” in the early 1990s. These included Wolkait “annexed” to Tigray,⁴⁰⁶ Metekel “annexed” to Benishangul-Gumuz, and parts of Shoa “annexed” to Oromia. This approach presaged increased violence between Amhara and those three neighbouring regions. In March 2021, in Addis Ababa, NAMA, the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), and Eskinder Nega’s Balderas agreed to work together in one Amhara-affiliated camp.⁴⁰⁷

Meanwhile, in May 2019, PG7, the EDP, All Ethiopian Democratic Party, Semayawi (Blue) Party, New Generation Party, Gambella Regional Movement, and Unity for Democracy and Justice merged, establishing Ezema, later adding ye-Ethiopia Ra’iy (Ethiopia Vision) party.⁴⁰⁸ From the known PG7 leaders, only (non-Amhara) Berhanu Nega joined the executive committee (with an Ethiopian passport he was allowed to stand and campaign from the district level for the Ezema leadership election). After the congress, Ezema embarked on expanding its organisational presence throughout the country, establishing branch offices in all regions and trying to organise officers in all electoral constituencies. Although facing a rocky start in the Amhara region when Berhanu and PG7 attempted to hold a rally in the febrile atmosphere of 2019,⁴⁰⁹ Ezema held large campaign rallies in Bahr Dar closer to the June 2021 election date.

By 2019, Amhara politicians across the political spectrum seemed to have come to share the belief that Amhara interests had been marginalised under federalism since 1991 often “speaking in unison.”⁴¹⁰ All, including longstanding members of the ruling party, blamed “Tigray domination” for their perceived loss of land and national prestige under the federation. They differed over the best strategy for reversing the situation. All of the Amhara parties (ruling and opposition) have supported the Tigray war, and the ruling party in particular “needed a popularity boost … needed to shake off the image of subservience and subordination … It needed a victory.”⁴¹¹ The effect of the war in Tigray and the pursuit of land claims

A reshuffle over the first weekend of the Tigray war increased the influence of Amhara politicians’ decision-making at the head of the federal government. The Amhara regional President was appointed head of National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) at the start of the Tigray war, and replaced by Agegnehu Teshager, widely considered more robustly anti-TPLF. The Deputy PM took on the Foreign Ministry portfolio and his predecessor became a national security advisor, rapidly shuttling to Khartoum to protest about Sudanese advances at Al-Fashaga, as ENDF forces were relocated. Further signalling the revival of a more robust Amhara nationalism Brigadier General Tefera Mamo, the late General Asamnew’s special forces commander, was brought back to head the regional special forces, launching a recruitment drive.

The Amhara regional government and its special forces have been heavily involved in the war in Tigray, and Amhara occupation and annexation of land in Western and Southern Tigray has hugely complicated the political landscape and brought international condemnation of a campaign of “ethnic cleansing” of Tigrayans.⁴¹² As with so many other issues, there are two incompatible narratives of the Western Tigray land issue,⁴¹³ and the establishment of new demographic facts on the ground in late 2020 pushed the achievement of a sustainable negotiated solution into the distance.⁴¹⁴ The Amhara regional government formally affirmed its intention to recover these areas in June 2020.⁴¹⁵ For many Amhara nationalists, including members of PP and NAMA, a key objective of the war has been the restitution of what they consider to be “ancestral” lands in Tigray, and the restoration of the old border of the Tigray Province of the imperial and Dergue eras, along the Tekezze River. They see the administrative area historically named Tigray as coincident with the “rightful” ethnic territory of Tigrayans, something the TPLF and Tigrayans reject.⁴¹⁶ For others, the annexation of land in western and southern Tigray since November 2020 now raises particularly complex issues of “just resolution of conflict” in the future.

Expansionist Amhara land claims reverberate more broadly across Ethiopia’s politics, well beyond Tigray. Over and above the issue of forced removal of the existing population, the effective expansion of Amhara region into Western (and Southern) Tigray would, if formalised, have serious implications for budgets, political representation, parliamentary seats, and the overall influence of Amhara at the national level. Other politicians will see this not only in relation to Tigray but in a broader context, with a knock-on effect on the federation. The quest for farmland underlies a number of tensions, either on the borders of the region, or where Amhara farmers have resettled (historically and during the 1980s) to other parts of the country.⁴¹⁷ They also have a regional implication. As Gumuz are pushed into Blue Nile state, Tigrayans into Gedaref and Kassala, and Beni Amer and others in Sudan are mobilised with the Sudan Armed Forces against “Amhara expansionism,” political dynamics internal to the Amhara region threaten to upend regional stability.⁴¹⁸

The flip side of this is that political narratives within the region, and amongst elites beyond its borders have been strongly coloured by anger and anxiety about ethnic targeting of Amharas in other parts of the country, including particularly (but not only) in Oromia (as discussed above) and in Benishangul Gumuz. Relations between the Gumuz and their Agaw, Shinasha and Amhara neighbours have long been complex, and a long history of slaving from the area has left a legacy bitterness between communities. When the federation was introduced in the early 1990s, Metekel zone of Bensighangul Gumuz was carved out of what had historically been Gojjam Province. Inter-ethnic relations were also complicated by the presence in Metekel of large numbers of highland farmers, who had been settled into Pawe wereda from elsewhere during the Derg’s 1980s resettlement programme.

Settlers complained in the 1990s that the new arrangements under federalism discriminated against them, denying them proper representation, and the issue went as far as the Council of Constitutional Inquiry and House of Federation. Relations stabilised in the context of intensive peace building work in the late 1990s and 2000s, but the controversy remained. With the mobilisation from 2018 of the large Amhara Special Force under Asamnew, which some observers saw as “out of control” of either regional government, conflict reignited: arguably less a function of ethnic difference than of poor local management of incendiary political interests.⁴¹⁹ A Gumuz militia soon emerged, some even suggesting that it was deliberately fomented. In April 2019, violence in Dangura wereda of Metekel zone⁴²⁰ sent IDPs into neighbouring Awi zone; large scale revenge killings in Gumuz villages in Jawi wereda of Agaw Awi were then reported.⁴²¹

Escalating violence

Social media claims of #AmharaGenocide in Metekel began to circulate. In October 2020, Deputy PM Demeke publicly called on civilians in the area to form militia to defend themselves from attacks by armed groups.⁴²² On 9 December 2020, the Benishangul Gumuz regional government began arresting Benishangul Gumuz officials it said were complicit in conflict – from the former Gumuz Vice President Adgo Amsaya to the PP head for Metekel zone. On 17 December 2020, sources claimed that a Benishangul Gumuz administrator was abducted by Amhara special forces who camped around the areas of Jawi and Menta Wuha on the border. In Guangua district in Agaw Awi zone, the communications bureau reported Gumuz attacks on civilians in Jawi wereda.

On 22/23 December 2020, a concerted armed attack killed a large number of highland civilians, in Bikuji kebele of Bullen wereda (Metekel). The EHRC reported that armed men killed more than 100 people, largely from the Shinasha ethnic group, setting houses on fire while people were asleep inside and using firearms (NAMA claimed more than 200 were killed). Over 100,000 IDPs were displaced from Dibate, Bullen and Mandura, as well as Wombera and Guba, between July 2020 and January 2021.⁴²³ The EHRC investigation found there were no security personnel assigned to the area at the time of the attacks. As the PM travelled to Metekel at the same time in late December, a participant in a town hall meeting he chaired said in a statement, later posted to Facebook, that Fano groups and militia under the late Gen. Asamnew Tsigé had sought the expulsion of the Gumuz from Ethiopia “claiming they were Sudanese”, and were taking the opportunity to burn Gumuz houses as the ENDF focused on Tigray. The depth of tension which has now been ignited in the area is unlikely to be settled soon. The Amhara regional government leads a Command Post which administers Metekel zone of Benishangul Gumuz region under emergency powers: an estimated 7,000 refugees had moved into Sudan’s Blue Nile State by February 2021.⁴²⁴

In March 2021, violence erupted in the Oromo zone of Amhara to the east, around Atayé town and the Kemissie area, killing around 200 people in April, displacing an estimated 358,000 civilians,⁴²⁵ and further ethnicising bitterness also in that area. The scale of the violence seems to have been significant, much greater than earlier rounds of tension.⁴²⁶ Conflict erupted in Atayé town when on 19 March 2021 an Oromo Imam was killed outside his mosque. It escalated over the subsequent days, with aggressively contradictory political rhetoric at national level. Diametrically opposing explanations of the violence emerged from the two wings of the ruling party: the Amhara PP blamed “OLF/Shanee and TPLF” for the violence, and the Oromo PP squarely blamed the Amhara Regional Government’s Special Forces.⁴²⁷ Their rhetoric seems to reflect community anger and fear on all sides⁴²⁸ and violence continued and escalated into April, as massive displacement continued. Local sources are quoted as saying that “it did not come out of the blue. It was a war. Each side was attacking the other.”⁴²⁹

At the beginning of April, the Amhara regional president claimed that the OLA was now operating in Amhara region, with the tacit support of some in the Oromia regional government, and called on the federal government to take emergency measures.⁴³⁰ OLA denied categorically that its forces are active in that area, alleging a fabricated excuse for “ethnic cleansing,”⁴³¹ and influential diaspora Oromo nationalist activists have drawn an explicit parallel with “ethnic cleansing” and land expropriation in Western Tigray.⁴³² Whatever the truth of the matter, Amhara sources blame “OLF Shanee” (OLA) attacks, whilst Oromos blame Amhara special forces. Lives and livelihoods lie in ruins.

Meanwhile in May 2021, there have been unconfirmed social media reports of fighting and killings between Qimant minority and Amhara security forces in Gondar, Chilga, and Aykel, a continuation of a brutal conflict which peaked in late 2018.⁴³³ The Qimant minority had lobbied since the 1990s for a separate administrative district uniting their disparate villages and giving them a voice at regional level. The government in Bahr Dar finally granted self-administration status for 42 kebeles/sub-districts in Gondar and surroundings. However, self-administration claims persisted from additional Qimant-community inhabited kebeles, and some regional politicians believed they saw interference from Tigray. After violence escalated from 2016, and pressure for a settlement built from the federal government, a referendum was held in September 2017.

This did not resolve the issue, and violence continued through 2018. In the second week of February 2019, 56,000 people were displaced in West and Central Gondar. After Asamnew’s death in mid-2019 and the reshuffles of September and October 2019, the mood shifted. The regional Security Council called for the intervention of federal security forces to end repeated violence in West and Central Gondar zones, the city of Gondar, and the Qimant administration. This decision seemed to acknowledge that partisan regional security forces could no longer arbitrate in the Qimant conflict. Nevertheless, in October 2019 another 22 people were killed in clashes between ANRS forces and the Qimant near Gondar.⁴³⁴

Identifying drivers of conflict and assessing the land claims of Amhara populations is now exceptionally divisive nationally: where some see evidence of “Amhara genocide” others claim that Amhara politicians have themselves been involved in fomenting conflict – to encroach on land in unstable areas, or to discredit “ethnic” federalism.

On the face of it, meanwhile, within the Amhara region, much of it⁴³⁵ looked set to have amongst the most competitive elections in the country in June 2021, with these polarising narratives interacting with local competition in complex ways. The ruling Prosperity Party faced at least two parties with relatively strong local constituencies, which represent a key “duality” of Amhara politics: the pan-Ethiopianist Ezema, and the Amhara nationalist NAMA. Ezema’s pan-Ethiopianist predecessor CUD polled strongly in Amhara in 2005, with many observers believing that it won the vote in the region (it clearly faced very significant violent intimidation); but there are signs that (until recently) the organization struggled to gain traction or win support in the region. Until 2015, Amhara political sentiment was broadly seen as aligning with a pan-Ethiopianist vision, but a younger generation of ethno-nationalists have been drawn to the more “assertive” (some would say exclusionary) politics of NAMA. In the run up to the June poll NAMA complained of unfair pressure from the ruling PP, and this can be expected to increase if their electoral popularity also seems to increase. They are reported to have presented a number of complaints to NEBE.⁴³⁶

During the first few months of the war in Tigray, the Amhara ruling PP seemed to have won strong popular support in the region because of its militarily assertive policy, the “restoration” of “Amhara land” (see above), and by placing few demands on farmers. Gondar and parts of Gojjam were thought to be particularly supportive. The mood in Wollo and Simien Shoa may have shifted after heavy conflict and displacement around the Oromia zone in March and April 2021 caused communities to reassess who would “best protect” them. But elections were postponed in these areas. As pre-election analysis concluded, at least in those areas where elections did then take place in June “there are no insurgent groups actively roaming the forests and mountains of Amhara. The opposition, although many experienced arrests in the wake of the June 2019 violence, remain largely free—but the regional political issues remain no less complex and uncertain.”⁴³⁷

5.6 The south, east and west

The Southern Region

The ruling EPRDF organisation in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) joined the PP in November 2020, although there are a number of key politicians who are thought to have been less than enthusiastic. Politics in the region has been complicated by agitation for the establishment of separate regions out of this “federation within a federation,” with the Sidama region finally inaugurated earlier in 2021. The ruling party now seems likely to push for a constellation of a further five states, reasonably similar to that which applied during a brief period in 1991/92. A referendum on the formation of a new South West region was scheduled to be held in the Kaffa, Sheka, Bench Sheko, Dawro, West Omo zones and Konta special wereda at the same time (and instead of) national and regional elections in those areas, but the vote was postponed for September due to ongoing conflict.⁴³⁸ The plans will see winners and losers, and have seen particularly vigorous opposition in Wolayita, triggering the detention of zonal politicians, and demonstrations and deaths especially in August 2020.⁴³⁹

Elections in many parts of the region were likely to see a contest between the ruling PP and Ezema, which is thought to be particularly strongly entrenched in the SNNPR, especially (but not only) in its urban areas. The opposition polled particularly strongly in Guraghe zone in 2005, and the same support could be expected for Ezema in 2021. Meanwhile, opposition Medrek leader Beyene Petros called for a rerun of the poll the week after it was held.⁴⁴⁰ Support for the ruling party would in principle have been expected likely to suffer across the region as a result of longstanding corruption and poor governance in the region, and political foot-dragging over the “separatist” zonal agendas, although protestant communities may have supported the PM, and (Muslim) Silte zone’s politicians are still prominent at federal level. The Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) may have benefited from its campaign for separate statehood, and ongoing frustration about a slow division of resources, and the relatively limited benefits which have so far accrued to the new region. Results remain to be seen.

As already noted above, violent conflict with the neighbouring West Guji zone (Oromia) affected the Gedeo zone in 2018, and many remain displaced, with insecurity rising again in recent months. Konso has also been hit by sporadic fighting in July, September, November and December 2020, with multiple deaths, and displacing almost a hundred thousand.⁴⁴¹ Karaté town authorities imposed a curfew in May 2021 to combat “lawlessness.”⁴⁴² Since an attack by unknown gunmen in October 2020 killed 31 Oromo and Amhara farmers at Gura Ferda, west of Tepi town, the newly created “Bench-Sheko zone” (amalgamating several pre-existing zones in September 2020, apparently with the intention of forming a new “South West Ethiopia” region subject to referendum) has also faced escalating insecurity.⁴⁴³ Incompetent management (or no management) of tensions over political restructuring as well as local animus have seen “ethnic others” often targeted.

5.7 Somali Region

Ethiopia’s Somali region arguably benefited more from the change of government in 2018 than any other region. The federal removal of a brutal existing regional President in August 2018 saw a new President appointed, who had returned from exile in Kenya, amidst a wave of euphoria. Also returning were the leaders, rank and file and long-exiled supporters of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), who had left government and returned to armed struggle in the 1990s, when their call for a referendum on independence was quashed.⁴⁴⁴ Reform of a brutal regional special police force was promised, and diaspora Somalis flocked to do business in a newly deregulated economic space. Trade, including contraband, boomed, and the Ethiopian Somali region’s natural international linkages with the rest of the Somali arena flourished – perhaps for the first time in Ethiopia’s modern history.

The optimism of 2018 and 2019 has given way to greater concern and cynicism as elections were postponed in 2020,⁴⁴⁵ and then in the run-up to polls planned in May, then in June 2021, and postponed again in regional constituencies to 6 September 2021.⁴⁴⁶ Opposition parties, including but not only the ONLF, have all voiced complaints of harassment and intimidation.⁴⁴⁷ Relations between the regional government and NEBE also suffered when NEBE decided not to hold elections in the 30 polling stations in 8 kebeles affected by Afar-Somali conflict.⁴⁴⁸ There have been controversies over the number of registered voters in the first half of 2021: voter registration was suspended in 7 constituencies amidst allegations of systemic irregularities.⁴⁴⁹ Problems escalated to such a level that in April 2021 three very diverse opposition parties (ONLF, Ezema, and the Freedom and Equality Party), and independent candidates in the region took the unusual step of writing a joint complaint.⁴⁵⁰ The Somali region held the most free and fair election in Ethiopian history in the early 1990s, and it remains to be seen whether this entirely exceptional event can be repeated.

A very serious period of conflict along the borders between the Somali region and neighbouring Oromia killed hundreds and displaced more than a million over the period from 2016 to 2018.⁴⁵¹ A long-disputed process of attempted border demarcation between two regions of pastoral communities with long histories of movement and inter-mingling offered fuel for political elites to ignite violence, in the period of heightened ethno-national consciousness and political contestation that brought the new PM to power. Here again, “Inter-ethnic strife [was] driven by interests that emanate from other places, namely regional and national elites.”⁴⁵² New governments in both regions, with new sets of interests, have been at pains to restore positive relations since 2018. Conflict has subsided, although many remain displaced, and ongoing resource claims are likely.

More recently Afar-Somali conflict re-erupted in relation to the three towns on the main Djibouti road which are within the borders of Afar but long claimed by the Somali region: Gedamaitu (Amibara), Undufo (north in Gewane) and Adaitu (north again in Mille). The towns are potentially lucrative entrepôts for informal Somali trade and contraband to access the asphalt highway and Ethiopia’s highland markets. As informal trade in the Somali region has boomed since the new regional government was established in mid-2018, the commercial significance of the towns has returned, and violent conflict with it.⁴⁵³ “About a hundred civilians” were reported killed in April 2021, primarily in Gewane,⁴⁵⁴ and national elections were quickly excluded in the 30 polling stations in the disputed areas.⁴⁵⁵ Pressure over the AfarSomali border and conflict with Somalis in Shinille zone is longstanding, and Afar see a historical pattern of Somali encroachment towards the Awash river: also a matter of vigorous – and violent – dispute. At the end of June 2021, it remained to be seen whether (and when) the election could be held in the Somali region without recourse to violence. The balance between the large Ogaadeen clan, and other smaller clans in the region has often influenced politics in the region (and drawn in meddling from Addis Ababa): since 2009, regional government and the ONLF have both been led by Ogaadeen politicians, and this remains the case in this contest, a change in the constellation of the cast of protagonists notwithstanding. The political dispensation amongst non-Ogaadeen clans may again prove crucial to the formation of a new regional government post-election. In the wake of polls elsewhere, many observers at the end of June 2021 considered the outcome of Somali region elections in September increasingly unlikely to influence the national outcome, but this remains to be seen.

5.8 Afar Region

The establishment of the PP in November 2019 formally brought Afar politicians into the ruling party at national level: as in Somali region, a locally popular move that also gave Afar individuals (including women) federal portfolios.⁴⁵⁶ Regional President Awol Arba was not a newcomer. He had earlier replaced his longstanding predecessor in 2015, and the PP largely took over the existing structures of the EPRDF-affiliated ruling party, the Afar People’s Democratic Party (APDP).

There was a significant turnover of political appointees and administrative staff at local level in Afar woredas during 2018, and (as in some other regions) a new generation of younger cadres came into local administration. They combined enthusiasm and optimism about the future with a lack of experience, and little indication of a new strategy for institutional development or what might change in practice. At the regional level, meanwhile, changes seem to have been more of a reshuffle, with more independent minded politicians replaced by those amenable to federal pressure. A spate of arrests at the end of 2019 ensured that the shifted constellation (which initially ruffled clan feathers) could settle in, and the preexisting cadre system continued to operate, with apparently limited change in practice.

Afar clans have taken a pragmatic approach to multi-party politics, each ensuring that it placed its key people in all of the contending ruling and opposition parties, to cover all eventualities. It is unlikely this strategy will change. Apart from the Afar chapter of the ruling PP, other political actors include the opposition Afar Liberation Front (ALF), The Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) and the Afar People’s Party (APP). ALF is closely associated with the Alimirah family (Awsa Sultanate with a historical base at Assaiyta) which fought the military regime through the late 1970s and 1980s; two of its members held the regional presidency from 1991 to 1996, before being replaced by an EPRDF ally who remained in position for nearly 20 years. ARDUF, also known locally as Uguguma, conducted armed operations in the “internal periphery” along the western border between Afar and neighbouring Tigray and Amhara. The organisation was thought to have been bought off in the 2000s, under a deal cut to allow commercial access to the salt pans at Afdera and Berahale.

The ALF and ARDUF were both registered with NEBE to compete with the PP and Ezema for the upcoming elections, along with the APP (which returned from Eritrea with its 400 fighters in 2016) and an Afar Peace and Democracy Party (APDP). APP in particular has been outspoken in its social media criticism of alleged strong-arm ruling party politics, and “fully rejected the whole process” in the wake of the June poll.⁴⁵⁷ Ezema’s predecessor, the opposition CUD, gained some support in the urban centres in Afar region in 2005, and they were fielding candidates again the region. Little is known about the reach of Ezema into Afar clan networks. On the face of it, a competitive election was not likely to be in prospect, with voting likely to accord with a pre-arranged deal between clans, cemented via the distribution of food aid.

The Eritrean opposition Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO) was based in Ethiopia during the EPRDF period but is thought to have been expelled since the peace-deal between Asmara and Addis Ababa. Afars live in all three states of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, and secessionism has long complicated the politics of the region. Afar politicians felt that they lost influence on the Ethiopian state with the loss of the port of Assab when Eritrea seceded in 1993, and access stopped with the outbreak of war in 1998. Plans to reopen Ethiopian use of Assab at some point in the future could change the pattern of Afar winners and losers, in unpredictable ways. Meanwhile, social media commentators alleged at the beginning of June 2021, that Afar regional bodies were also keen to annex land on the border with Eastern Tigray, reports which have not been confirmed. Afar loyalty forms an important plank of any national federal strategy to encircle Tigray.

5.9 Benishangul Gumuz

The ruling party in Benishangul Gumuz (B-GPDUF), which had been allied with the ruling EPRDF, joined the PP when it was established in November 2019. The existing regional President, Alshadli Hasen (Berta) had been appointed in 2016. He remained in position but removed many of his cabinet after the change of government in 2018, including a number of well-qualified Shinasha.

The balance of power between the five (controversially) so-called “indigenous” groups (Berta, Gumuz, Mao, Komo and Shinasha) and large populations of other “settler” groups (Amhara, Oromo, Kambatta and Tigrayan) dominates political sensitivities in the region. Whilst the constitutional arrangement nominally invests political power in the former, economic power and job opportunities have tended to remain with the latter. Sensitivities have been further exacerbated by disputes over land, and the demarcation of the region’s borders. In 1991 Benishangul Gumuz was carved from the pre-existing provinces of Gojjam (north of the Nile) and Wollega (south), a dispensation accepted neither by Gojjami Amhara nor by Wollega Oromos, as noted above. Land sensitivities expanded greatly when large tracts of land in the region were allocated to commercial investors both domestic and foreign, after 2001/2.

The geopolitical salience of Benishangul Gumuz has increased with the establishment of the GERD within the region. Recent tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan have seen Sudan realign itself with Egypt in the dispute over the filling of the dam and use of Nile waters. Benishangul Gumuz is host to around 65,000 refugees from Blue Nile (Sudan) and Upper Nile (South Sudan).⁴⁵⁸As noted above, the area north of the Nile (Metekel zone) remains under an emergency Command Post, and no election was to be held here in June. NEBE at the beginning of June 2021 added Kamashi zone to the list.⁴⁵⁹ In the zones south of the Nile, the Benishangul Gumuz ruling PP was unlikely to face strong opposition, although Ezema was fielding candidates in urban and settler areas. A longstanding opposition grouping, the Benishangul Gumuz People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM or Behenen), has strong roots in Berta-related communities in Damazien in Sudan. Although it agreed to return to electoral politics after 2018 and formed an alliance with a number of other smaller ethno-nationalist parties, its status remains uncertain.

5.10 Socio-economic stakes and the cost of the war

An overall assessment of the economic impact of the war, and of Ethiopia’s economy in the face of the wider patterns of conflict described above, lies beyond the scope of this paper. In a jaw-dropping speech on 29 June 2021, however, PM Abiy stated that his government had spent 100 billion Birr over and above the war. This is roughly equivalent to US Dollars 2.3 billion or 18% of Ethiopia’s current annual budget of 561.7 billion Birr.⁴⁶⁰ This figure would clearly give a substantial jolt to even the healthiest economy, and most robust political settlement.

Economic factors, however, will clearly be critical to the country’s ability to withstand and recover from what EU Commissioner Jutta Urpilainen in June 2021 called the “shaking of its whole fabric.”⁴⁶¹ Economic updates as recently as March 2021 focus not on the war or wider conflict but on the economic impact of COVID-19, and the implications of an associated collapse in global demand.⁴⁶² These reportedly drove a 4.1 percent reduction in merchandise exports (excluding gold) during July-December 2020, and a 20 percent decline in FDI during Financial Year 2020. A broadly upbeat analysis nevertheless acknowledges that Ethiopia requested debt treatment under the G-20 common framework and that “downside risks to this outlook loom large due to internal conflict.”⁴⁶³

Recent analysis of Ethiopia’s debt position observed that “investors and creditors have for years underplayed the political risks in Ethiopia. With the outbreak of conflict in Tigray, continued turmoil in Oromia, and the regional tensions around the government’s flagship investment —Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam— these are now impossible to ignore. In the meantime, the government’s response to these challenges has so far been inconsequential, with exercises such as the launching of the Ten-Year Pathway to Prosperity Plan that appears to be detached from the contingency of reality. It is doubtful that the ambitious goals set in the plan are going to be met when, according to OCHA, 23 million Ethiopians are currently in need of humanitarian assistance.”⁴⁶⁴

Ethiopia’s key vulnerability lies precisely here: in the scale of actual and potential poverty and food insecurity. The latest World Bank update acknowledges that “against a backdrop of a large vulnerable population, a shock across the country that reduces household consumption by 10 percent would, all else being equal, raise the poverty rate by 6 percentage points. This would bring about 6.5 million people into poverty, reversing all the progress made in poverty reduction between 2011 and 2016.”⁴⁶⁵ These risks have been well established, and long documented. As the world waits to see whether food supplies will be allowed to reach starving Tigrayan at the end of June 2021, the stakes could not be higher. Acute risks also pertain to the wider national picture.

Almost eight months into the war in Tigray it is salutary to return to a comprehensive analysis of national trends and potential developmental scenarios up to 2030, which was conducted in 2016/17.⁴⁶⁶ This concluded that “the possible consequences of the Crisis and Stalled Development scenarios paint an alarming picture. In the Stalled Development scenario, there could be roughly 14% more Ethiopians living in poverty, GDP per capita could be approximately 8% lower and Ethiopia’s HDI score could be nearly 3% lower in 2030 relative to the Current Path. In the Governance Crisis scenario, there could be about 25% more people living in poverty in Ethiopia, GDP per capita could be 25% lower, and the country’s HDI score could dip by more than 4%, relative to Ethiopia’s current development trajectory. Finally, in the combined Crisis Scenario, Ethiopia could be facing more than a 50% increase in extreme poverty, a 29% reduction in GDP per capita and a 6% reduction in its HDI score, relative to the [2016] Current Path in 2030.”⁴⁶⁷

Ethiopia must create two million jobs a year to keep pace with the number of young people entering the workforce; the most optimistic analysis suggests it is meeting less than one-third of that target.⁴⁶⁸ In this context, migration to the Gulf has been described as a “release valve,” and one which has steadily closed as Gulf states have placed blocks on informal migration.⁴⁶⁹

It is in this socio-economic context that Addis Fortune on 30 May 2021 reported that Amhara region was requesting two billion Ethiopian Birr (around US$ 47 million) for reimbursement of the costs of the medical treatment of members of the Ethiopian forces injured in the war.⁴⁷⁰ At the beginning of June Ethiopia approved an 18% rise in its annual budget,⁴⁷¹ but little is known about off-budget financing arrangements or international support. Observers can be forgiven for wondering just what scale of human and financial cost the country will pay for the deep political crisis of which the war in Tigray is a part; and for speculating about just how – and at whose expense – this charge will be met.⁴⁷²

5.11 Concluding remarks

Well-placed commentators⁴⁷³ and important political stakeholders⁴⁷⁴ have noted that the war in Tigray is only “the tip of the iceberg” of conflict and political crisis across Ethiopia. This paper documents these others conflicts: that dominant narratives about why are often superficial, and that they are always violently contested. It suggests that central tensions emerge not from “criminality” or “ethnic conflict” but rather from profound political divisions about the desirable shape of the Ethiopian state; from the current regime’s determination to marginalise and exclude uncompromising “federalist” stakeholders on one side of this political argument; and from its active political failure to manage and avert known conflict risks in good faith.

For many observers (on both sides of the political divide about “ethnic” federalism), the 2018 transition, and its culmination in the 2021 election was a second attempt by pan-Ethiopianist groupings to wrest control of, and potentially to reshape, a multinational federation that does not serve their interests: in essence an “Act Two” designed to succeed where they failed to take power in 2005. A year ago, as the “transition” evolved, one such commentator saw a “2005 Redux,” and warned “this time the risk is higher than 2005. The political narrative is no longer dominated by Addis Ababa and its Amharic-speaking elite. Indeed, the narrative is not even occurring in Amharic. It is clear now there are at least three main political power bases: Tigray and Afar; urban elites, including the PM himself; and the Oromo-dominated south. Add the heightened political consciousness produced by protest movements, social media, and regional structures, and Ethiopia’s political constituency looks sharply demarcated.”⁴⁷⁵

Over the intervening year since that commentary was written, violent political engineering achieved a dramatic weakening and discrediting of two of those three power bases – each at terrible ongoing cost: Tigray by means of the war; and what the commentator calls the “Oromo-dominated South” as a result of the clampdown on popular opposition post-Hachalu. It would be perverse not to look for the active hand of the third bloc in deliberately effecting these changes. The ground for these violent political exclusions has been laid incrementally over a lengthy period, and with a depth of propaganda and occlusion that has generated a fevered public enthusiasm. In 2005 the gamble was arguably confined to the ballot box: in 2018-2021 it has proved much more extensive and ambitious, and much more destructive in its scope.

That the regime, and the Ethiopian nationalist “bloc” has had external support from Eritrea in achieving its ambitions – in Tigray clearly, and now allegedly also in the theatre of conflict in Oromia – was an unexpected but all-too-intelligible aspect of the “transition.” Much depends on one’s view of Eritrea’s President Isaias and his likely motivation vis-à-vis Ethiopia: analysis which also lies beyond the scope of this paper.⁴⁷⁶ For anyone in doubt, Worku Aberra’s hair-raising account of the Ethio-Eritrean “common market” period from 1991-98, offers a further useful corrective to the saccharine rhetoric of Ethiopia’s current leaders.⁴⁷⁷

On 28 May 2021, the ruling Prosperity Party stated that “the main aim of the bodies who don’t want to see the civilisation of Ethiopia is to create a weak Ethiopia. Towards this end they use three methods: use every opportunity to put Ethiopia into war with its neighbouring countries, to weaken Ethiopia’s economy and to create conflict among Ethiopians based on religion and regionalism.”⁴⁷⁸ An alternative analysis is that these are precisely the processes in which (knowingly and perhaps unknowingly) the ruling and opposition politicians cultivating the popular narrative of Ethiopian sovereignty in the run up to national polls have colluded: in an attempt to undermine the federal arrangement, and demonise their ethno-nationalist opponents.

Treating the war in Tigray in isolation from Ethiopia’s wider political developments undermines analytical understanding of its political drivers and complexities: of the deeper power and ideational struggle of which it now forms a part. The narrative from Addis Ababa since the current Prime Minister came to power in March 2018 sought to separate the TPLF from other political actors. Ironically, the barbarity of the war has elicited a symmetrical desire for “uncoupling” on the part of a Tigrayan diaspora now mobilised in support of Tigray’s eventual independence of Ethiopia. This has been an impassioned response to the atrocity which has been the hallmark of the war – but also to the failure of other Ethiopian friends, neighbours and colleagues to call out these evils, a silence which has added insult to deep injury. After almost eight months of brutalisation, many Tigrayans say that they can no longer see a place for themselves in Ethiopia. Whether this view can evolve depends critically, at the time of writing, on whether the urgent delivery of emergency food and medicines reaches Tigrayans living in areas controlled by the Tigray regional government. In broader terms, meanwhile, it is hard to see how an Ethiopia as violently divided as it is in mid-2021 charts an inclusive future capable of drawing out the pain of all those affected by conflict.

The hope that elections might somehow provide a conclusion or resolution of Ethiopia’s crisis has preoccupied Ethiopians and outsiders for years. The US government in June 2021 expressed itself “gravely concerned” that the opposite may be true, given an electoral environment in which polarisation has hardened.⁴⁷⁹ Abadir Mohammed Ibrahim has argued that “going into transitional elections in a divided society before agreeing on core constitutional issues was never a good idea. If normal elections are a contentious process, transitional elections in which the “social contract” has not been negotiated risk turning into referenda on constitutional matters.”

Arguably, in this case partial June polls have now offered a referendum in which (in many places) only one side of the constitutional argument could be selected. But Abadir is also right to argue that Ethiopia is now well beyond the sequencing problem, and that elections will do nothing to resolve Ethiopia’s longstanding inability to move towards a politics of inclusion and consensus. Ethiopia, he notes, needs “a system in which its heterogeneous members have mutual assurances that their core interests are secure from being obliterated by the whims of electoral politics” – or indeed by war. This paper has set out the devastating scope of the consequences of the failure to achieve this beyond Tigray. We can only conclude with Abadir, that “Ethiopia may not collapse in the coming weeks or month. But that prospect is heightened with every mistake that is repeated.⁴⁸⁰

2020.  

6. Diplomatic Efforts

By Habte Hagos and Martin Plaut
Introduction

As the fighting in Tigray began the diplomatic effort to try and contain and then halt the dangerous conflict got underway. It would rapidly involve all the facets of the international community: from the African Union based in Addis Ababa to the European Union in Brussels and the UN in New York. In addition to these multinational initiatives, there were interventions from individual states. The scale of this involvement was justified: the conflict threatened far more than Ethiopia; it puts in jeopardy the whole of the Horn of Africa.

6.1 UN Security Council and the African Union

UN Security Council held the first of several meetings on 24 November.⁴⁸¹ No formal statement was issued and the meeting only went ahead at the insistence of the European members, with African states reportedly refusing to facilitate the discussions. “South Africa asked for time so that the envoys can conduct their consultations and refer the matter to the African Union. A statement could complicate the situation,” an African diplomat declared after the session.⁴⁸² In May 2021 President Ramaphosa was still hoping that the former African presidents whom he had nominated as peacemakers might be able to proceed with their work, but without any indication that the Ethiopians would accept the proposal.⁴⁸³ South Africa’s International Relations and Cooperation Minister, Naledi Pandor, posed the possibility that the mission might be rejuvenated once the Ethiopian elections, scheduled for June 2021, were out of the way.

While the African states prevaricated, the European Union began to increase the pressure on Prime Minister Abiy. The EU had provided Ethiopia with €815 million for the 2014-2020 budgetary period, plus more than €400 million from the EU Trust Fund for Africa.⁴⁸⁴ These funds gave officials in Brussels hope that this might persuade the authorities in Addis Ababa to de-escalate the conflict. An EU official said a political decision would be made in the coming weeks on whether or not Addis Ababa should continue to qualify for budgetary support from Brussels. “We are keen to have a common EU position on this,” the official said. “There will be consultation between the capitals and there could be a decision to stop budgetary
support.”⁴⁸⁵

The United States, among Ethiopia’s most important foreign partners, quickly expressed its concern about the war. But the Trump administration had never much engaged in African matters, and at the outset of the conflict it simply endorsed the Eritrean and Ethiopian view of things. In addition, the conflict erupted just as the US was caught up in one of its most bitter presidential contests in recent times: the electoral race between Donald Trump and Joe Biden, which culminated in balloting on the very days that the war began. Trump instantly disputed the Biden victory, leading to a crisis in domestic governance – possibly the gravest since the American Civil War – and to many additional weeks of diplomatic disarray. In a word, American attention was focussed elsewhere. As the Biden administration began forming in preparation to assume office, however, it not only turned head-on to addressing the Tigray conflict but reversed the U.S. position – to one highly critical of Ethiopian and Eritrean conduct. At this writing, the U.S. remains keenly critical, keenly engaged, and perhaps cautiously hopeful of progress toward a solution.

The European Union followed up its warnings to Ethiopia by suspending $107 million worth of aid until humanitarian agencies were granted unfettered access to Tigray.⁴⁸⁶ The EU’s senior diplomat, Josep Borrell, said Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed now needed to act. “We are ready to help, but unless there is access for humanitarian aid operators, the EU cannot disburse the planned budget support to the Ethiopian government,” Borrell said. To reinforce its concerns Europe sent the Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto to Addis Ababa, to try and gain access to Tigray for aid.⁴⁸⁷ The initiative did not go well. On his return, he said the crisis appeared “out of control”. “You have come to the situation which is militarily and human rights-wise, humanitarian-wise very out of control,” Haavisto told journalists in Brussels.⁴⁸⁸ Ethiopia reacted furiously.⁴⁸⁹ Hirut Zemene, Ethiopia’s ambassador to the EU, rejected the Finland’s foreign minister’s claims that the violence and suffering were “out of control”, describing them as “erroneous”.

6.2 The United States of America

The U.S. and Eritrea have had a somewhat hostile relationship for over a decade, but Ethiopia is a different matter. U.S. friendship toward, interests in and strategic reliance upon Ethiopia have been profound, enduring, and seemingly graven in stone. Ethiopia has served as not only a loyal U.S. ally but a somewhat stable anchor in the volatile Horn. It has also served as a partner in the struggle against militant Islam – which, among other things, in 1998 claimed U.S. embassy targets in Kenya and Tanzania. Ethiopia is also proximate to important U.S. markets and security interests in the Middle East, as well as the vital shipping channels of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. But clouds have appeared. Increasingly, for the U.S., Ethiopia has become a theater of Chinese economic and diplomatic competition. In addition, after an impasse appeared in the U.S. mediated negotiations between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (the GERD), the U.S. took the side of its other ally Egypt. Most specifically, on 23 October, 2020 – virtually the eve of the Tigray war – President Trump tweeted that Egypt might and probably should “blow up” the dam, and Ethiopia responded with outrage.⁴⁹⁰ The American response to the war in Tigray must be viewed from all those vantages. Whether the U.S. can sufficiently navigate its own national needs while facilitating a just, secure and humane outcome in Tigray will be a twin test of America’s conscience and its resourcefulness.

At the outset of the war, within the U.S. government, congressional voices were perhaps the first to publicly react. On 5 November, the day after the start of the war, the ranking (i.e., senior minority) member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives (the lower American legislative house) – a Republican – voiced his concerns.⁴⁹¹ The following day, six Democrats in the House expressed theirs.⁴⁹² On 12 November, the Republican chair of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate (the upper legislative house) followed in kind.⁴⁹³ On 18 November, that committee’s leading Democrat did the same.⁴⁹⁴ Bicameral, bipartisan congressional statements proceeded to gather force, growing more outraged at Ethiopian and Eritrean behavior as the weeks wore on and as atrocity reports mounted. Such was a rarity in the fraught American political discourse at that time, as it continues to be as of this writing. Altogether, to this date, several dozen members of Congress have weighed in, through dozens of joint and individual statements.

What motivated the members of Congress? No broad, grass-roots awareness of or concern for Tigray had arisen. Rather, some members likely were responding to calls for action by their constituents of Tigrayan and Eritrean descent. Such “ethnic” inputs have long figured in the formulation of U.S. foreign affairs – e.g., in Poland, Ukraine, Cuba, Taiwan, Israel, and quite recently India. Affected legislators have felt duty-bound to serve constituent interests, to serve their own re-election prospects, or both. In the matter of Tigray, however, many or most who spoke out probably acted from general principles – that is to say, through leadership, even absent broad popular concern. The first aim was to calm a potential melt-down in the Horn, which would not serve the U.S. well. The second was America’s vision of itself since the end of World War II as leading the march toward global human rights and democratization – a vision that remains deeply embedded in Washington, notwithstanding the country’s many failures in that regard, and notwithstanding the Trump administration’s four-year abandonment of that calling almost entirely. The memory of American and global failures relative to such human rights calamities as Bosnia, Darfur and Rwanda also seems fresh for some in that city. Those who serve on congressional foreign relations and foreign affairs committees have seemed particularly committed to the post-World War II vision, and in their tasks for their respective committees they seemed at least somewhat resistant to the hyper-partisanship of the Trump era. Of note, in the early weeks of the conflict in Tigray, Congress appeared to be ahead of the administration in sensing the gravity of what was unfolding, and it found itself urging administrative action. Even after the administration became fully engaged, and fully critical of the atrocities occurring intheater, congressional statements continued – although by then, conceivably, not so much to urge diplomatic action by the administration as to support and amplify it, by lending the imprimatur of the popular (congressional) will.

The administration’s early public statements, however, conveyed the opposite – a nonchalance, and a seemingly blurred perception of what was occurring. Even before the polls had closed on 3 November, the president himself was fully engaged in contesting what he claimed was a stolen election. His secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, was distracted as well, possibly in part by the sudden change in his personal fortunes. On 4 November, Pompeo used Twitter to condemn the TPLF’s attack on the ENDF’s Northern Command base.⁴⁹⁵ On 15 November, the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, also by Twitter, condemned the TPLF’s alleged missile attack on Asmara.⁴⁹⁶ On 17 November, Pompeo again blamed the TPLF, and went so far as to praise renegade Eritrea for its forbearance from retaliating against the Tigrayans.⁴⁹⁷ The administration clearly perceived villains in the fray, but they weren’t Eritrean or federal Ethiopian forces.

What was missing from this perspective? Tigrayan refugees were already flooding into Sudan.⁴⁹⁸ On 12 November, Amnesty International had reported a massacre at Mai Kadra^.499 On 13 November, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights had warned of chaos, heavy casualties, mass displacement and the commission of war crimes.⁵⁰⁰ On 19 November 19, a group of 17 senators wrote to Pompeo, expressing fears of a humanitarian catastrophe. The senators also urged Pompeo to engage directly with Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy, with a view to pursuing an immediate ceasefire, protection of civilians, humanitarian access, and respect for international humanitarian law.⁵⁰¹ On the same day, President-elect Biden’s incoming (but not yet confirmed) secretary of state, Antony Blinken, tweeted about the humanitarian crisis and regional risks.⁵⁰² By 20 November (if not earlier), reliable reports were emerging that Eritrea was participating in the war and that the Eritrean refugee camps in Tigray were under attack.⁵⁰³ On 23 November, Chris Coons – a leading Democratic senator and a personal friend of President-elect Biden – telephoned Abiy, presumably at Biden’s request.⁵⁰⁴ On 25 November, the incoming (also not yet confirmed) national security adviser Jake Sullivan Tweeted about war crimes and humanitarian needs.⁵⁰⁵ By then Abiy appeared to have been misleading, and believed by, some of the most senior officials at both the U.S. and the U.N.: about the progress of the war, about humanitarian access, and about Eritrea’s participation in the fighting.

Not until 30 November, did Pompeo call Abiy to express his “grave concern,”⁵⁰⁶ then Tweet that he had urged of Abiy an end to the fighting, a start of dialogue, and allow unhindered humanitarian access.⁵⁰⁷ On 23 December, the State Department announced that it was providing new funding for humanitarian assistance, calling for unhindered humanitarian access, condemning violations of international law, and urging the protection of Eritrean refugees in Tigray.⁵⁰⁸

At the same time, the domestic U.S. crisis in governance was still aflame. President Biden was nevertheless inaugurated without incident on 20 January 2021. It soon became apparent that Biden as determined to get to grips with the crisis in the Horn: both the war in Tigray and the controversy over the Ethiopian dam on the Blue Nile – the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – which was causing such consternation in Khartoum and Cairo.

Within days, the State Department reiterated its call for an end to the fighting and for unhindered humanitarian access; but now it added calls for Eritrea to leave Tigray, and for human rights investigations to begin.⁵⁰⁹ On 26 January, Antony Blinken was confirmed as secretary of state, and – with something approaching lightning speed, on 4 February – he called Abiy and urged humanitarian access.⁵¹⁰ On 19 January, at his congressional confirmation hearing, Blinken had already expressed his dismay about Tigray and about the safety of Eritrean refugees there. He also had noted that the U.S. was now engaged, rather than “being AWOL” – a pointed rebuke, it appeared, of the preceding administration.⁵¹¹) On 19 February, the U.S. said that it would tie further economic assistance to Ethiopia to that country’s conduct in Tigray.⁵¹² The State Department on 25 February again condemned the human rights violations, again called for the protection of refugees, and again asked that Eritrean forces be withdrawn.⁵¹³ On 26 February, The New York Times reported (presumably by way of a deliberate leak) that the U.S. government had determined that Ethiopian federal forces and allied militia fighters were conducting a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing.⁵¹⁴ On 27 February, Blinken again condemned the atrocities and the humanitarian crisis, reiterating the call for a ceasefire, humanitarian access, and human rights investigations.⁵¹⁵

State Department denunciations of the atrocities continued.⁵¹⁶ On 1 March, Biden’s new U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Linda Thomas-Greenfield, decried what she referred to as “conflict-induced starvation.”⁵¹⁷ On 2 March, Blinken called Abiy, pressing for the protection of civilians, an immediate end to hostilities, the withdrawal of Amhara and Eritrean forces, and the commencement of independent human rights investigations.⁵¹⁸ At the U.N. Security Council, on 4 March, ThomasGreenfield called for a halt to the atrocities.⁵¹⁹ On or around that date, Blinken reportedly called Abiy again.⁵²⁰ On 10 March, he publicly told Congress that ethnic cleansing was occurring, that a reconciliation process and an independent human rights investigation were essential, and that Eritrean and Amhara forces needed to leave.⁵²¹ The following day Thomas-Greenfield told the Security Council starkly that the hunger crisis in Tigray was “man-made.”⁵²² In the end (although in truth it was only the beginning), the Trump administration’s distraction, credulousness and nonchalance had been fully reversed by its successor administration. By several accounts, the U.S. diplomatic engagement with the war in Tigray had become one of its most serious priorities in sub-Saharan Africa.

However, the endeavor was stymied. Abiy was simply not responsive to American or to any other diplomatic pressure. The State Department, meanwhile, was not yet adequately staffed, having been impeded in that project by the Trump administration during the presidential transition, and now further impeded by the avalanche of domestic crises besieging the White House: including the coronavirus pandemic. Short-staffed and departing from protocol, Biden requested that Senator Chris Coons, an old friend, to visit Abiy in Addis Ababa on his behalf.⁵²³ Coons arrived on 20 March.⁵²⁴ The move seemed hopeful and bold. Afterwards Coons claimed some progress: that Abiy had agreed to international dialogue and had condemned the ongoing human rights violations.⁵²⁵ In addition, within days Abiy publicly acknowledged the presence in Tigray of Eritrean forces ⁵²⁶ – a seeming predicate to agreeing to remove them from his country. But that was all. Nothing more eventuated, and Coons soon expressed disappointment – no ceasefire, no acknowledgment of ethnic cleansing.⁵²⁷ And no international dialogue began. A sense of disheartenment and deflation appeared to emanate from the U.S. government.

But presently momentum returned. On 16 April, Thomas-Greenfield challenged the Security Council with these words: “Do African lives not matter as much as those experiencing conflict in other countries?”⁵²⁸ On 22 April, China and Russia allowed a Security Council resolution calling for “a scaled-up humanitarian response and unfettered humanitarian access” as well as “a restoration of normalcy.” The resolution also expressed “deep concern about allegations of human rights violations and abuses, including reports of sexual violence against women and girls”; and it urged “investigations to find those responsible and bring them to justice” together with “full compliance with international laws.”⁵²⁹ It was a start. Ireland had drafted the resolution.⁵³⁰ Thomas-Greenfield, who appeared to have done much of the heavy lifting, was plainly thrilled.⁵³¹ As of 20 April, the U.S. had committed some $305 million in humanitarian assistance for Tigray.⁵³²

On 23 April, Biden appointed Jeffrey Feltman, a seasoned diplomat, as Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa, with an immediate mandate to engage on Tigray.⁵³³ On 26 April, Blinken again called Abiy, and he again demanded the withdrawal of Eritrean forces.⁵³⁴ Three days later Feltman left on a tour of the region, which included discussions about the GERD in Egypt and Sudan.⁵³⁵ On 6 May, Feltman had met with Isaias in Asmara⁵³⁶ and by 10 May with the Ethiopian Foreign Minister Demeke Mekonnen in Addis.⁵³⁷ The Asmara event marked the first high-level meeting between the U.S. and Eritrea in years.⁵³⁸ During the same period, Coons and another U.S. senator held high-level meetings in Sudan.⁵³⁹

Despite these initiatives ethnic cleansing and other atrocities continued. The U.S. (like Europe and the U.N.) appeared frustrated that its efforts were not bearing fruit. Chinese competition and other geo-strategic interests loomed large on the horizon. Russia and China continued to block more direct and effective action at the Security Council. The U.S. did pause most of its non-humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia, and it linked a resumption of that assistance to progress on humanitarian matters.⁵⁴⁰ It had imposed a range of sanctions against Eritrea and on 23 May, Blinken announced that visa restrictions would be imposed on Ethiopians involved implicated in the atrocities in Tigray, and their families.⁵⁴¹ The Ethiopian authorities – stung by the rebuke – issued a formal statement saying that the measures “send the wrong message” at a time when the country is gearing up for elections.⁵⁴²

The sanctions announced on 23 May are clearly not the last measure in the US armory. President Biden is reported to be considering cutting financial support via international organisations, including the World Bank and IMF.⁵⁴³ Since Ethiopia is the biggest recipient in Africa of U.S. foreign aid, receiving about $1 billion last year, Washington has considerable clout. The U.S. administration plans to ratchet up the measures, with further sanctions planned if the situation does not improve. This was made clear at a Senate hearing on 27 May.⁵⁴⁴ The Acting Assistant Secretary of State and head of the Bureau of African Affairs, Robert Godec, made clear in his testimony, that unless human rights were observed, aid was allowed to proceed and Eritrean forces removed “Eritrea and Ethiopia can expect further action.” Godec also said that President Biden’s special envoy, Jeffrey Feltman, would be returning to the Horn of Africa in early June, to try to end the crises in Tigray and on the Nile.

6.3 European Union

The European Union defines its relationship with Ethiopia as that of a key partnership. Not only for the EU but also for many individual member states, Ethiopia functions as a key aid partner in the Horn of Africa. The EU also seeks to have close relations with other countries in the Horn, including with Eritrea, with whom they have sought to implement a ‘dual track approach’ of political dialogue and aid funding through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Only recently, and after persistent criticism from human rights organisations and the European Parliament, has the EU withdrawn most of its aid to Eritrea.⁵⁴⁵

The EU reacted to the start of the conflict with expressions of concern and calls for ceasefire. In addition, the EU started funding for emergency assistance to refugees crossing into Sudan.⁵⁴⁶ The European Parliament chipped in on 26 November 2020 with an urgency resolution⁵⁴⁷ which mainly reiterated support for the African Union-led mediation efforts of the AU Special Envoys that had been appointed. In addition, the Parliament called for the “EU to continue to use all necessary diplomatic means to engage with the federal and regional authorities, as well as with regional partners and multilateral institutions, in order to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner.”

European Commission representatives, mostly European Commissioner for Crisis Management Janez Lenarčič and High Representative of the European Union Josep Borrell, gradually started using more forceful wording to express their concern over the conflict. Starting mostly with calls for peace talks and mediation, the main call from the EU gradually started revolving around humanitarian access. In December, the EU warned it would delay budget support to Ethiopia if the situation did not improve. On 15 January 2021, Borrell indicated that “possible war crimes” had been committed in Tigray.⁵⁴⁸ At the same time, the EU announced it had suspended budgetary aid to Ethiopia worth 88 million EUR, until Ethiopia would grant access to humanitarian organisations to deliver aid to Tigray.⁵⁴⁹ Around that same time, in the middle of January, EU representatives started to openly acknowledge the presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray.⁵⁵⁰ However, it only called for Eritrea to withdraw its troops after the US had done so.⁵⁵¹

The EU followed up the halting of budget support and the calls for Eritrean troops to withdraw by a renewed attempt at diplomatic engagement in the form of an EU special envoy: Finnish foreign minister Pekka Haavisto.⁵⁵² Haavisto had experience and contacts in the region. Haavisto visited the region in early February 2021, going on a Horn-tour starting with a visit to refugees who had fled the conflict.⁵⁵³ He debriefed EU Ministers on 22 February 2021. In comments in the days following the debriefing, Haavisto led on that he saw the situation as “out of control” and relating that Ethiopia’s government had not provided a “clear picture” during his visit.⁵⁵⁴ The Ethiopan embassy in Brussels sent a letter to DEVEX in complaint of the wording used by Haavisto, who had stated Ethiopia was ‘in denial’ over Tigray.⁵⁵⁵

Despite Haavisto’s strong words, EU Ministers delivered a mixed message in the European Council conclusions of 11 March 2021. This is hardly surprising, given the diverse nature of the EU and how keen some states are to retain links with Ethiopia for trade and commerce. It was also difficult for diplomats to make a sharp U turn; from regarding Abiy as an exemplary leader and Nobel Prize winner to a war-monger, responsible for the so many atrocities. The EU leaders firstly stressed “Ethiopia’s important role as a strategic partner and a key multilateral actor,” and reiterated their “great concern regarding the situation in the Tigray region and the wider region” after.⁵⁵⁶ The Council concluded that the EU wished to pursue a constructive dialogue with the Ethiopian government on these concerns. Many analysts saw the Council conclusions as a failure of the EU as a whole to decisively follow up on its words.

EU envoy Haavisto made another visit to the region in early April. This included a visit to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and he was also able to visit Mekelle. After the second visit, he warned the situation was dire. However, Josep Borrell indicated the EU wanted to send an election observation mission if the situation allowed.⁵⁵⁷

The EU has continued to stress the need for de-escalation and has threatened to impose sanctions, including asset freezes and visa bans, if UN workers would be blocked from delivering aid.⁵⁵⁸ Key messages of the EU remain: unrestricted aid access, investigation of human rights violations, withdrawal of Eritrean soldiers, ceasefire, and the start of discussions. It has also halted Eritrean development aid, partly due to the Tigray conflict, instead re-routing some of that funding to help refugees fleeing the Tigray conflict. At the same time, the EU seems to struggle with taking a firm stance, while not alienating a key partner in the region, Ethiopia, too much.

The EU fails to take a lead in making a stance, as shown by weak Council conclusions; this ensures that stronger EU calls fall on deaf ears. In addition, although EU countries such as Ireland are making a push for action in the UN Security Council, the EU does not – openly at least – make effective use of strategic alliances to make a stronger call for an end to the hostilities and human rights abuses.

5.4 Britain

Apart from the African Union, China, Russia and India, all major world players including the UN, the US, EU, G7 and others have condemned the horrific human rights abuses in the Tigray war. Britain, which has a long relationship with Ethiopia, has echoed these calls, but without going very much further. British – Ethiopian (Abyssinia) relations go back some two hundred years or more. During World War II, Ethiopia was under Italian occupation and Emperor Haile Selassie joined the resistance groups. From 1936 -1941, Haile Selassie was exiled to the city of Bath, England and eventually returned to power as emperor of Ethiopia in 1941 with the help of the British. Britain also played a major role in alleviating the terrible famine of 1984-85. Yet London has been remarkably reticent about applying any more than verbal pressure on Addis Ababa to end the conflict.

This is the assessment of the UK’s development department, Dfid, now part of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office [FCDO]: “the UK relies on a stable Ethiopia that is supportive of our foreign policy priorities in the Horn of Africa, particularly in relation to Somalia and South Sudan. Ethiopia is the largest contributor of peacekeeping forces in the world and particularly in its neighbourhood”.⁵⁵⁹ The British government’s position is very similar to that of the Ethiopian Embassy in the UK. The Embassy in its political-affairs section reaffirms that: “over the centuries, Ethiopia has enjoyed close economic, diplomatic and cultural relations with the United Kingdom. … Historically, Ethiopia and the United Kingdom have enjoyed rich diplomatic relations covering a range of areas, including, but not limited to, trade, culture, education and development cooperation”.⁵⁶⁰

In return for this close friendship and cooperation between the two counties, the Ethiopian government has received billions of pounds in aid from the UK over the years. In 2019, Ethiopia received the second largest amount of foreign aid from the UK—£300 million – just behind Pakistan which received £305 million and above that given to Afghanistan of £292 million.⁵⁶¹ It is worth noting that while as many as 100 countries had their aid from Britain cut as the UK reneged on its commitment to spend 0.7% of GDP on aid, Ethiopia was not among them.⁵⁶² Eritrea did not have its aid renewed in 2020/21, this was because of a decision not to fund spending on a major road project linking the Eritrean ports and Ethiopia because the Eritreans were using ‘National Service’ conscripts – a form of slave labour.⁵⁶³ The cut had nothing to do with the war in Tigray.

On 21 December 2020, while the EU was considering withholding aid from the government of Ethiopia due to the Tigray conflict, Lord David Alton of Liverpool asked the British Government, how much aid was given to Ethiopia; (a) last year and (b) over the past decade. In reply, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, the Minister of State FCDO, said “the UK is engaging with partners, including the EU, on the implications of the current situation in Tigray on development and humanitarian assistance, which plays a vital role in supporting the provision of basic services and lifesaving support across the whole country. Ethiopia is the UK’s largest aid programme, reaching millions of poor people while supporting UK interests. In Financial Year 2019/2020 [April 2019 to March 2020] the UK delivered £292 million in bilateral aid and about £3 billion over the last ten years”⁵⁶⁴.

In January 2021 and in response to Eritrea Focus, James Duddridge MP, Minister for Africa, stated that the UK provided over £100 million of humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia in 2020/2021. This included £19 million on humanitarian assistance to provide food, shelter, healthcare and protection to those affected by the conflict in Tigray. The aid was provided via UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross, rather than through the Government of Ethiopia. By June this figure
had risen to £22 million.⁵⁶⁵

Although the British government says – repeatedly – that it has raised human rights issues with the Ethiopian authorities “at the highest level” and called for a cessation of the conflict, the authorities in London appear reluctant to go further.⁵⁶⁶ Both UK Houses of Parliament have been pro-actively engaged with the crisis in Tigray. In the seven months since the outbreak of the war they have raised the conflict and its consequences on at least ten occasions; six times in the House of Commons and four in the Upper Chamber (House of Lords) raising numerous questions with the government. ⁵⁶⁷ The Foreign Secretary has written to and spoken with Prime Minister Abiy and other ministers have also played their part.

On 24 November 2020, two members of parliament, Laurance Robertson and Stuart McDonald, asked the Foreign Secretary, Dominic Rabb what recent assessment he has made of the; (a) political and (b) security situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia⁵⁶⁸. The Foreign Secretary provided a length reply along the following lines:

“We are very concerned about the conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, in terms of both the humanitarian impact and the risk of spill-over and spread through the region… I spoke to Prime Minister Abiy on 10 November. We have made it clear that there needs to be a de-escalation of violence, humanitarian access and protection of civilians. Of course, there are also all sorts of regional implications, which is why I have also spoken to the Prime Minister of Sudan and the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and South Africa. This will require not only regional but international efforts to secure peace and protect the humanitarian plight there. I share the hon. Gentleman’s horror at some of the reports of the civilian casualties. We take this incredibly seriously, energetically and actively at the United Nations. Let me reassure him that UK funding is already helping those in urgent need of assistance. In Ethiopia specifically, the UK funds the World Food Programme, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF and the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs”.

This answer broadly represents the UK’s position on the war in Tigray. Despite the deepening crisis and the danger of the conflict spreading across the Horn, the British government has refused to take a more robust stand. At present the UK has no financial sanctions against either Ethiopia or Eritrea, despite the mounting evidence of atrocities.⁵⁶⁹ The British are essentially awaiting a lead from the Americans, as reflected in this answer given by the African Minister, James Duddridge on 7 June.⁵⁷⁰

“The Foreign Secretary discussed concerns about the situation in Tigray with Secretary of State Blinken on 3 May. We continue to closely engage US counterparts on the full range of human rights issues in Washington DC, Addis Ababa and in capital-to-capital discussions, including with the US envoy for the Horn of Africa, Jeffrey Feltman. We will continue to work closely with the US on this issue.”

The UK has worked to raise the Tigray conflict in the UN Security Council – mostly behind the scenes – but since India, Russia and China have repeatedly prevented any action against either Eritrea or Ethiopia, this has failed to make progress.⁵⁷¹ The March 2021 draft resolution made no mention of sanctions, merely noting “with concern” the humanitarian situation in Tigray, “where millions of people remain in need of humanitarian assistance” and the challenge of access for aid workers. It called for “the full and early implementation” of the Ethiopian government’s statements on February 26 and March 3 committing to “unfettered access.” Council diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity because consultations were private, said China wanted the statement to focus only on the humanitarian situation, with no reference to the violence in Tigray. India only wanted a minor change, and Russia reportedly supported its ally China at the last minute, the diplomats said.⁵⁷²

The EU has cancelled millions of Euros worth of aid to Ethiopia, but the UK has been reluctant to follow this lead, despite calls for it from politicians. This issue was posed in a question by Viscount Waverley in the House of Lords at the start of the conflict: “Is the world going to stand by yet again, knowing that mayhem is seemingly set to unfold, do nothing and then have to deal with the added consequences of regional instability and the combination of Somalia, Sudan and Yemen across the way ripe for Islamist groups or Governments to exploit?”⁵⁷³ The call for action could not be clearer, but has not been heeded.

At the same time, there has been a considerable effort by the UK’s communities of Eritreans and Ethiopians to try to prevent the war from causing divisions between them. While – as in other locations – there are very different views in and among them, the British diasporic communities have managed to remain on relatively good terms. Demonstrations by Tigrayans in London have been large and supported by a substantial number of Eritreans.

5.5 Arab nations

The relationship between the Horn of Africa and the Arab nations of the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa are ancient and deep. Egypt sent expeditions along the Red Sea coast to Eritrea in search of gold, ivory and incense as long ago as 2,500 BC. Egyptians founded the port of Adulis and the Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox churches looked to Cairo for spiritual guidance. Arab nations traded across the Red Sea and the Al Negashi Mosque in Tigray is among the oldest in Africa, having been constructed by early followers of the prophet fleeing persecution in Mecca. In more recent times, Cairo was home to Eritrean nationalists pressing for their country’s rights as early as the 1950’s. Ethiopia came to suspect that the Egyptians were supporting Eritrean independence for duplicitous reasons. Ethiopians believed that Egypt was using the conflict with Eritreans as a means of diminishing the Ethiopian state and keeping the country poor, so that Addis Ababa was unable to use the waters of the Blue Nile, upon which Egypt was so dependent.

One element of the relationship with the Arab world was therefore distrust. Another was reliance. The Eritrean independence movement depended on Arab states for support as they fought the Ethiopian state. Arab nations from Syria to Yemen gave Eritrean movements training, some military equipment, financial and diplomatic support. Somalia provided diplomatic assistance. These relationships only increased Ethiopian concerns about the motivation of their Arab neighbours.

It is possible to see both elements at play today.

Eritrea’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE

President Isaias is nothing if not pragmatic about his foreign relations and he is willing to drop friends and change direction if it suits his purposes. His ties with Iran illustrate the point. In 2007 the President began cultivated his relations with Tehran. He made positive statements about Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, at a meeting of the Non-Aligned movement.⁵⁷⁴ In May 2008, President Afwerki met with Iranian President Ahmadinejad in Tehran to bolster cooperation between the two states. The Eritrean government granted Iran access to Assab Port, providing Tehran with a base from which to conduct maritime operations in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Iranian warships began to visit Eritrean ports.⁵⁷⁵ There were even suggestions from Eritrean opposition sources that Iranian arms were being supplied to Houthi rebels in the Yemen.⁵⁷⁶

Yet Eritrea also turned its back on its long-term relations with Iran when it did not suit them. Qatar took the lead in wooing Eritrea away from Iran. Qatar mediated a ceasefire between Eritrea and Djibouti in their conflict over their border conflict, and, in June 2010, sent 200 troops to the Eritrea-Djibouti border to monitor the settlement.⁵⁷⁷ Eritrea transferred its allegiance to the Saudis and the UAE – on the opposite side of the Sunni-Shia divide. President Isaias has been a visitor to Riyadh since 2015. In return the UAE and the Saudis have been allowed to build bases in the Eritrean port of Assab and to use Asmara airport for attacks on Yemeni forces.⁵⁷⁸ It is quite possible that these links go further, but this much at least is known.

In 2016, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported on “the rapid construction of what appears to be a military base with permanent structures” at Assab.⁵⁷⁹ According to security analysts, the base includes its own port, airbase, and a military training facility⁵⁸⁰, where the UAE has trained elite Yemeni forces⁵⁸¹, according to the Middle East Institute.⁵⁸² The UN Monitoring Group also reported that the base has “expanded to encompass not only personnel from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, but also Yemeni troops and other troops in transit.”⁵⁸³ In return, the Eritreans are reported to have received aid from the UAE to upgrade their infrastructure.584 Human Rights Watch accused the UAE of torturing Yemenis on Eritrean soil.⁵⁸⁵

The UAE has been reportedly supported the Eritrean war effort in Tigray. It has been repeatedly claimed by the Tigrayan military that drones were flown from the UAE base to attack their troops and to hit their heavy artillery.⁵⁸⁶ This has not been supported by careful research by the open-source analysts, Bellingcat.⁵⁸⁷ As they concluded: “In sum, the claims made by the Tigray forces are not impossible, but so far they seem improbable. Satellite imagery confirms the presence of Chinese-produced drones at the UAE’s military base in Assab, but that is all it confirms. There is currently no further evidence that these same drones have been involved in operations in support of the Ethiopian air force, though there have been confirmed sightings of Ethiopian jet fighters in the conflict zone.”

Facilitating the Eritrea – Ethiopia alliance

Many nations and initiatives were involved in ending the bitter ‘no-peace, no-war’ stalemate that followed the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea border war.⁵⁸⁸

Some of the first moves came quietly from religious groups.⁵⁸⁹ In September 2020, the World Council of Churches sent a team to see what common ground there was on both sides. Donald Yamamoto, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, and one of America’s most experienced Africa hands, played a major role. Diplomatic sources suggest he held talks in Washington at which both sides were represented. The Eritrean minister of foreign affairs, Osman Saleh, is said to have been present, accompanied by Yemane Gebreab, President Isaias’s long-standing adviser. They are said to have met the former Ethiopian prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, laying the groundwork for the deal. Yamamoto visited both Eritrea and Ethiopia in April 2018.590 Although next to nothing was announced following the visits, they are said to have been important in firming up the dialogue. But achieving reconciliation after so many years took more than American diplomatic muscle.

Eritrea’s Arab allies also played a key role. Shortly after the Yamamoto visit, President Isaias paid a state visit to Saudi Arabia in April 2018, meeting King Salman.⁵⁹¹ Prime Minister Abiy also made a trip to see the Saudis the following month.⁵⁹² Formerly, little was revealed about the visit, with the bald official statement that “The Prime Minister held talks with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on bilateral, regional and global issues of mutual concern.⁵⁹³ It was Abiy’s first visit outside of Africa, and he followed it up with a visit to the UAE.⁵⁹⁴ Abiy is reported to have taken an important initiative during his time in Riyad.⁵⁹⁵

“He said while in Saudi Arabia he has asked the crown prince to help to bring peace between the two countries. PM Abiy told the participants, after he promised the crown prince that Ethiopia will abide by the Algiers Agreement if the regime in Asmara can sit down to talk on other issues, the crown prince tried to call Isaias Afeworki. The call was not returned but he is hopeful with Saudi and US help the issue will be resolved soon.”

The door to peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea was beginning to swing open, with the Americans, Saudis and the UAE playing critical roles. On 3 July 2018 President Isaias, following PM Abiy’s footsteps, visited the Emirates.⁵⁹⁶ There are suggestions that large sums of money were offered to help Eritrea develop its economy and infrastructure.

What was discussed in confidence in the UAE has not been revealed, but less than a week later, PM Abiy arrived in Asmara for the first visit by an Ethiopian leader since the border war ended eighteen years earlier.⁵⁹⁷ On 14 July, President Isaias made a return visit to Addis Ababa: the hostility and enmity of nearly two decades was at an end.⁵⁹⁸ The relationship was sealed with a formal peace deal, signed – significantly – in Saudi Arabia, on 16 September 2018.⁵⁹⁹

While the Arab nations and the Americans had played key roles, others had no doubt been supporting. Behind the scenes, the UN and the African Union were encouraging Ethiopia and Eritrea to resolve their differences. This culminated in the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, flying to Addis Ababa in September 2018 – just hours after the joint declaration.⁶⁰⁰ Guterres told reporters that in his view the sanctions against Eritrea could soon be lifted since they would soon likely become “obsolete.”⁶⁰¹ It was an impressive combined effort by the international community, who had acted in unison to try to resolve a regional issue that has festered for years. However, as the conflict in Tigray has escalated, with no end in sight, there are suggestions that the UAE is changing tack. The United States has gone out of its way to consult its various Arab allies, including the UAE and this appears to be bearing fruit. On 10 June 2021 Africa Confidential reported that: “…UAE, which has been supplying weapons, money and diplomatic support to Addis, seems to be changing tack, cutting its associations with Ethiopia’s military after prodding from Washington.”⁶⁰²

Somalia

The dramatic ending of the years of bitterness between Eritrea and Ethiopia obscured the fact that there was a third party in this relationship: Somalia. In July 2018 – in the same month as Prime Minister Abiy visited Asmara to seal the peace deal between Eritrea and Ethiopia there was a three-day visit to Asmara by Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’.⁶⁰³ President Farmajo’s trip to Eritrea was the first by a Somali leader for fifteen years. A spokesman for the Somali president, said on Twitter that the country “is ready to write a new chapter of its relations with Eritrea.” Economic and security concerns are at the top of the agenda, as well as “regional issues of interest to both countries,” Eritrea’s information ministry said. There were further bilateral visits in August 2018 and April 2019.⁶⁰⁴ This culminated in a summit between the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia on 27 January 2020 held in Asmara.⁶⁰⁵ The formal statement spoke of the three leaders agreeing to: “bolster their joint efforts to foster effective regional cooperation” while co-operating on security questions.⁶⁰⁶

When the Tigray war began in November 2020 the immediate impact on Somalia was the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops who had been fighting al-Shabaab. As Bloomberg reported: “Ethiopia is redeploying about 3,000 troops to help with the Tigray offensive, the people said, asking not to be identified because they’re not authorized to speak to the media. The troops being withdrawn are Ethiopian National Defence Force soldiers and don’t fall under the command of the 5,000- strong African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia, they said.” ⁶⁰⁷

This re-deployment caused immense problems for the Tigrayan members of the Ethiopian contingent in Somalia. Between 200 and 300 Ethiopian troops who were ethnic Tigrayans found themselves forced to hand in their weapons.⁶⁰⁸ Reuters was sent an explanation of this decision by the Ethiopian authorities. “The peacekeepers are not being disarmed due to ethnicity but due to infiltration of TPLF elements in various entities which is part of an ongoing investigation,” said a text message to Reuters from the State of Emergency Taskforce, a body set up to deal with the Tigray conflict. No further information was given.”⁶⁰⁹

By January 2021 reports were emerging that young Somalis had been sent to Eritrea to be trained to fight in Tigray.⁶¹⁰ Voice of America reported that the Somalis had been transported to Eritrea as early as November 2019 – a year before the war in Tigray broke out.⁶¹¹

“Maryam Ahmed is the mother of a Somali soldier sent to Eritrea over a year ago. She says mothers like her haven’t heard from their boys since they left for training. Ahmed says their sons are missing since November 2019 and they have no contact from them since then. We don’t eat, drink or sleep due to their unknown situation, she says. We urgently need their information, says Ahmed and are calling on the president, the prime minister and all government officials to tell us where our sons are and whether they are dead or alive. The parents’ concerns were raised after former deputy of Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency Abdisalan Yusuf Guled this month claimed more than 370 Somali troops had died fighting in Tigray.”

The parents of the troops protested in Mogadishu, calling on President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo’s government to provide information on their whereabouts. The Daily Telegraph reported that the Somalis had officially been recruited by Somalia’s government to work in Qatar, only to later find out they had been sent to Eritrea and forced to serve as soldiers.⁶¹² Families of soldiers who were killed in these operations were offered up to $10,000 in compensation.⁶¹³ They had been told they were going to work in Qatar – only to find the destination was Eritrea. The Qatari government reacted angrily.⁶¹⁴ The Gulf state “condemns any abusive and duplicitous recruitment of any individual who was falsely told they were moving to Qatar for employment opportunities. The State of Qatar stands against such practices and urges all governments to investigate such abuses.”

Since this story broke there has been relatively little news of the Somali involvement in the war in Tigray. But the New York Times published a story in April 2021 which confirmed the continuing involvement in the conflict. ⁶¹⁵ “Critics say Mr. Mohamed appears to be taking his cues from Eritrea’s autocratic president, Isaias Afwerki, who has become a close ally in recent months. The two leaders regularly speak on the phone, according to several Western officials and a former senior Somali government official, and Mr. Afwerki’s military recently trained a contingent of about 3,000 Somali soldiers who were expected to return home recently.” It is stories like this that underline President Isaias’s continuing ability to influence events across the Horn to his advantage.

Sudan, Egypt and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

The Tigray conflict can be seen in a wider context. The Somalis were by no means the only nation drawn into the war; the Sudanese were immediately affected. As we have seen, the first major offensive by Ethiopian and Eritrean was into western Tigray – to capture the town of Humera and cut the Tigrayan forces from access to Sudan. To supplement the troops at his disposal, Prime Minister Abiy withdrew forces that had been occupying territory that was contested between Sudan and Ethiopia. Sudanese media reported this – and the Sudanese reaction. “The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) have reportedly taken control of the area of Khor Yabis in eastern El Gedaref on the border between Sudan and Ethiopia…the army recovered Khor Yabis in El Fashaga El Sughra, off Barakat Norein, after 25 years of absence.”⁶¹⁶

The Fashaga triangle has a long and tangled history, dating back to the early years of the twentieth century and treaties in which Britain, Italy and Ethiopia all had a hand.⁶¹⁷ Suffice it to say, the area was claimed by both Sudan and Ethiopia, but that for many years large areas of this fertile and well-watered triangle had been inhabited by Ethiopian farmers. Many were Amhara and they had been guarded by Ethiopian forces, which had been withdrawn to fight in Tigray. As they left the Sudanese seized their chance and established control of the land, a development which was greeted with fury by the Amhara farmers. There was an attempt by Amhara militia to re-capture the area on 12 December, leading to clashes with the Sudanese, who had reinforced their positions.⁶¹⁸ Local Sudanese farmers swore that they would never give up the territory.

Since then, there has been a tense stand-off, with occasional clashes between Sudanese and Ethiopian forces. In March 2021, the Bloomberg news agency, quoted UN sources as saying that the Ethiopians had been reinforced by Eritrean troops who had crossed into the Fashaga area.⁶¹⁹ ‘“The conflict along the border between Sudan and Ethiopia remains active, with Sudanese Armed Forces and Ethiopian — including Amhara militias — and Eritrean forces deployed around Barkhat settlement in Greater Fashaga and clashes reported since early March,” the UN said …in its latest situation report on Ethiopia.’

This was by no means the only issue that divided the nations. As soon as the war broke out Tigrayans began flooding across the Sudanese border, with Khartoum playing the role of host to the refugees, as it has done down the years. Camps were established by the UNHCR and its associated partners. By April 2021 these were home to over 63,000 men, women and children, most of whom were Tigrayans, but with some Eritreans and other ethnicities.⁶²⁰ The number would probably have been considerably higher, had the Ethiopians not deployed troops along the border to try to prevent the refugee flight. As the Sudanese media reported in January 2021. ⁶²¹ “The Ethiopian army began closing the borders with Sudan, deploying troops, patrolling the border and building a fence to prevent refugees from reaching Hamdayet camp,” an eyewitness told the Sudan Tribune.

A third, and potentially most difficult question, bedevils relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. It is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile, situated inside Ethiopia, just 45 kilometres from the Sudanese border.⁶²² This is not the place to rehearse the long and complex dispute over the project, which divides Ethiopia from its neighbours downstream. Sudan worries that a flood of water could wash away farms if the water is released to rapidly while Egypt (which relies almost exclusively on the Nile for its water) is afraid that its people will be left without this vital resource. For these reasons Egypt and Sudan would like a binding treaty to govern the dam and its waters. Ethiopia, on the other hand, argues that that the dam is only to produce hydroelectricity and will therefore not deprive Cairo’s residents of their water. Moreover, Addis argues, the rains feeding the Blue Nile fall on its mountains and it can therefore use the water as it wishes. As a result, Ethiopia rejects binding treaties or international monitoring, preferring to try to have the African Union mediate between the three nations. This issue has bedevilled relations between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt for years and shows no sign of resolution. Indeed, President al-Sisi has signed military co-operation treaties with Sudan and warned that Egypt would not accept any diminution of its Nile water. ““I say once again no one can take a drop from Egypt’s water, and if it happens there will be inconceivable instability in the region.”⁶²³

The Arab nations clearly have an interest in the Horn and a stake in its future. Through their wealth the Gulf states and the Saudis also have considerable influence. But it is a complex relationship. The Eritreans are rarely open to persuasion – although they are not immune from it. Ethiopia is so deep in crisis it would appear that Prime Minister Abiy’s primary objective is survival and he has little time to concentrate on external concerns. Egypt and Sudan have their own agendas which do not necessarily coincide with those of their Arab brothers and sisters. Overall, the situation is as complex and hard to read as any other aspect of the current conflict.

5.6 Conclusion

By the end of June, the collective pressure exercised by the international community through diplomatic pressure appeared to have made little impact on the situation in Tigray. The war was continuing, humanitarian access was still limited with large areas remaining inaccessible and the UN officially declaring a famine.⁶²⁴ Journalists and international observers were regularly refused permission to travel through the region. The G7 meeting by the British seaside in Cornwall adopted a statement which was no more than previous resolutions adopted by the EU, US or UK.⁶²⁵ The British government – when challenged in the House of Commons – did little more than play for time, with the Minister, James Duddridge, hoping that once the 21 June Ethiopian election was out of the way a “pivot point” would have been reached, enabling Prime Minister Abiy to take more radical steps.⁶²⁶ He may be correct, but at present there is little to indicate that he will be proved right.

The most important steps required to ending the war include the withdrawal of Eritrean troops, the opening of talks between the Tigrayan authorities and the Ethiopian government and – flowing from such talks – a mutually acceptable ceasefire, leading to a long-term solution. All sides know this, and know that if this was done, and a vast humanitarian push was allowed to get under way, tens, if not hundreds of thousands of lives could be saved. Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias appear currently to be joined at the hip: their mutual fates resting on inflicting a decisive defeat on the Tigrayans; an outcome that presently appears unlikely to be achieved. The future of both governments, and the Horn of Africa as a whole, looks uncertain unless a lasting peace settlement can be agreed by all parties.

7. The Humanitarian Situation: Aid, Food Security and Famine

By Felicity Mulford⁶²⁷

7.1 Food Security in Tigray

To fully understand the devastating impact the ongoing conflict could have on food security in Tigray, it is essential to recognise the regions history of food insecurity, conflict and development. This chapter aims to provide an overview of the environmental and human factors which have led to food insecurity in the past, before setting the unnerving scene unfolding in Tigray today. Not only is starvation currently being used as a weapon of war, but lifesaving food aid is being obstructed from reaching those in need. Despite decades of improvement in food security across Tigray, a famine far exceeding the devastation of the 1984-85 famine could indeed occur in the coming months. The chapter will end by painting a solemn picture of what we can expect in the region, if unfettered access is not granted to humanitarian workers, if relief is not delivered or capacities of Tigrayans enhanced.

A historically food insecure region

“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” the World Food Summit ⁶²⁸

When one thinks of Ethiopia, it is hard not to picture the devasting images which emerged during the famines of 1973-74 or 1984-85. The harrowed faces of thousands of people, skin and bone, waiting in line for aid distributions. The distressing realisation that they were the lucky ones. The events which unfolded in 1973-74, were by no means new. In fact, famines and droughts have been reported in Ethiopia as far back as 250 BC.⁶²⁹ Written over a thousand years ago, a letter in the ‘Book of Saints of the Ethiopian Church’ from the Christian Emperor of Ethiopia conveyed suffering in Ethiopia: “Great tribulation hath come upon our lands and all our men are dying of the plague, and our beasts and cattle have perished and God hath restrained the heavens so that they cannot rain upon our land…”630

Although historical records are incomplete, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that monstrous famines have devastated Ethiopia more than 40 times in the past 500 years.⁶³¹ Some centuries, such as the 13th and 20th appear historically significant, with more than 4 calamitous famines on record.⁶³² In the 20th century alone, the region of Tigray dealt with devastating famines in 1958-59, 1965-67 and in 1973 -74, the last of which many scholars argue never ended and merely moulded into the 1984-85 famine.⁶³³ The total death toll for the famine events during the 20th century is speculated to have reached around 1.8 million people, however the real figure will never be known.⁶³⁴

A combination of interrelated factors has contributed to the region of Tigray’s vulnerability to chronic hunger and food insecurity. These include recurrent drought and environmental degradation due to population pressures, poor policy planning and implementation, and perhaps most significantly, intermittent conflicts.

7.2 Environmental drivers of hunger
The Tigrayan region of Northern Ethiopia is situated in the highlands amongst rugged terrain. Set within the Tekezze Basin, the region is characterised by steep escarpments juxtaposed against flatlands. Miles of cropland are interrupted by the occasional bush, shrub or patch of grassland, while forests are few and far between.⁶³⁵ Three quarters of all Tigrayans live in rural communities, often living from harvest to harvest, relying on subsistence farming to provide their main source of food.⁶³⁶ This has meant that, historically, harvest failures could be enough to plunge rural families into famine throughout the highlands of Tigray. The stony soils contribute to the constantly low crop yields⁶³⁷ and many households rely on the freedom of movement for seasonal work to ensure that they can pay for additional food when it’s needed.

Droughts and Rainfall

Tigray faces repeated droughts.⁶³⁸ Although droughts have been recorded throughout Ethiopian history, analysts have indicated that these instances are becoming more pronounced as a result of climate change.⁶³⁹ Every two to five years, moderate to severe droughts have affected Tigray, limiting water availability and increasing the vulnerability of livestock to diseases, including Pasteurellosis.⁶⁴⁰ The droughts can be explained by a combination of climatic and human factors.⁶⁴¹

Increasingly, extreme temperatures and irregular rainfall are seen across the Horn of Africa.⁶⁴² Since 1950, research has shown that temperatures have risen by 0.37 degrees Celsius every ten years.⁶⁴³ Studies of rainfall indicate substantial decreases in rain over the same period. Rainfall varies between 400 to 1800 mm per year, with higher levels of rainfall near the cliffs and escarpments. The Southern region of low-lying Western Tigray receives the most rainfall, creating a more fertile and prosperous environment for agricultural production.⁶⁴⁴ With wet days becoming fewer and further between, and days and nights warming⁶⁴⁵ the crop growing periods are reducing, as is crop yield.⁶⁴⁶ A lack of rainfall hits the many subsistence farmers the hardest. Without irrigation systems which feed off the limited groundwater supply or harnessing the naturally flowing rivers and lakes, the crops struggle to grow. The near total reliance on rainfall for food production leaves families very vulnerable to even the slightest changes in the climate. Water shortages for personal consumption and for food production limit the livelihoods of people in rural areas. As a result, climate variability can have significant implications on food security, nutrition, and health.⁶⁴⁷

Growing seasons vary within the region, with areas in the North Western and Western Tigray having slightly longer growing periods. North East Tigray, near the Rift Valley escarpment suffers from the shortest growing periods and the least variation in rainfall. This makes North East Tigray more predisposed to crop failure than the rest of region.⁶⁴⁸ Growing periods in the majority of Tigray span from June to September, in line with the Kiremt rainfall. In preparation for the Kiremt rain during 2021, from May onwards farmers will plough their fields. This might not be possible due to the ongoing conflict in the region, providing great cause for concern for food insecurity amongst subsistence farmers. For areas where risk of crop failure is already high and chronic hunger is rife, the ongoing conflict will likely have huge consequences if agriculture is disrupted.

The ‘belg’ rainfall period lasts from February to May and is important for farmers in the South Eastern Woredas of Tigray. In March 2021, this rainfall had reduced by 25- 50% compared to the normal average according to remote sensing imagery. Insufficient rainfall has already impacted 26,000 hectares of arable land and over 70,000 households.⁶⁴⁹ The challenge of producing enough food for survival is already immense. The impact of limited rainfall and ongoing conflict compound the existing challenge of producing enough food for survival in difficult terrain.⁶⁵⁰

Population Pressures and environmental degradation

Drought is caused not only by the increase in temperature and decrease in rainfall, but also by environmental degradation and desertification – a result of human activities, such as overgrazing, overcultivation, deforestation and poor developmental policies.⁶⁵¹ The social pressures caused by an increasing population has contributed to the environmental degradation and desertification of the already harsh landscape.

The majority of Tigrayans live in the highlands, where the climate is moister, risk of disease is lower and volcanic deposits have led to strips of fertile soils. People are congregated in towns, or rural areas where rainfall is higher.⁶⁵² Despite the tough growing conditions, subsistence agriculture is the main land use in Tigray. Crops vary across the region, depending on altitude and soil type.⁶⁵³ In the highlands wheat, barley and pulses are grown, while the lowlands maize, sorghum and sesame are produced.⁶⁵⁴ Farmers rely on livestock for a number of essential roles: to plough and prepare fields, to transport grains for sowing and produce to market, for natural fertilisers and for food security should times get hard.⁶⁵⁵

The inhabitants of Tigray rely on mixed farming methods across fragmented and overused land.⁶⁵⁶ The population pressures mean land is not left fallow. By repeatedly cultivating the land, the farmers remove the essential nutrients from the soil and ultimately turn soil into dust,⁶⁵⁷ a process known as desertification. Although environmental stewardship in the long term would be better for food production in the region, the UN Environment Programme noted that the lack of immediate benefits to the people living on the land has often prevented long-term planning in the region. Poverty is a major contributor to environmental degradation.⁶⁵⁸ A number of studies have highlighted the “self-perpetuating cycle of increased human demand on the ecosystem and vulnerability to famine.”⁶⁵⁹ Desertification reduces the ability of the soils to sustain life, resulting in low productivity and food production.⁶⁶⁰

Additional research indicates that the absence of vegetative cover causes a higher level of reflection of the sun’s radiation, leading to drier soils and the formation of fewer clouds.⁶⁶¹ Through overgrazing and desertification, farmers are contributing to the persistent cycle of droughts in the region. The combination of a loss of vegetative cover, the compaction of the land from the movement of livestock and dry weather can contribute to an overall reduction in soil fertility and an erosion of the little fertile topsoil. With topsoil eroded, land becoming sandier and fewer rains, the ability of Tigrayans to grow crops will diminish.⁶⁶² Some scholars have even argued that topsoil erosion was a major contributing factor to the 1984 famine.⁶⁶³ In 1990, it was estimated that 1,900 million tons of soil was being eroded annually due to human activities, with 76% of the highlands significantly eroded, and 4% unable to support food production. In the 1990s projections estimated that by 2010 18% of the highlands would be bare rock and un-farmable.⁶⁶⁴ Considerable effort has been made since the 1990s to look after the environment through government-led initiatives. By 2020, the rate of soil erosion was a loss of 2.2 tons per hectare of land per year.⁶⁶⁵

In 1950 Ethiopia’s forests covered 44% of the total land. Wood is required for fires and cooking and as the population has increased, deforestation has reduced Ethiopia’s forest covering to just 4% of the total land by the 1980’s.⁶⁶⁶ Some commentators have described the highlands as ‘bald’.⁶⁶⁷ Today forests are rare and located in isolated, often protected areas.⁶⁶⁸ Natural woodlands still exist along the Rift Valley’s eastern escarpment, in an area that is not suitable for farming.⁶⁶⁹ However not all of the rugged cliffs have scared off farmers. Lack of farmable land has led people to farm unprotected areas. This too has had a negative impact on the ecosystem, as the thin topsoil is then exposed to the wind and rain, and blown or washed away during the infrequent rains.⁶⁷⁰

To combat these problems, over the past few decades woodland regeneration projects along with an array of conservation measures have helped to boost the amount of small shrub and tree species, and protect the vital ecosystem from further harm^.671 Although soil and water conservation measures have improved the level of environmental stewardship in the region, much of the environment is still being stretched beyond its agronomic limits.⁶⁷² Since the 1990s agricultural policies have focussed on building the resilience of the soils and water supplies to make the region more productive. Since then, vegetative cover, groundwater availability and agricultural outputs have improved. Along with the rise in environmental protections, irrigation systems have been implemented in areas, including the Sesame growing regions of Western Tigray, boosting productivity and local engagement in water conservation.⁶⁷³

Desert Locusts

Cereals form part of the staple diet in Tigray and unsurprisingly represent the most common crop. Unfortunately, desert locusts are a recurrent problem in the region^.674 The desert locust invasion at the end of 2020 was the worst in 70 years, destroying crops across 120,300 hectares of land in South, South East, Eastern and Central Tigray.⁶⁷⁵ According to the Tigray Bureau of Agriculture, 25% of the harvest in these regions was destroyed by locusts. Many farmers harvested their crops early to avoid losing too much to the plague. This meant that the cereals harvested would not have been fully grown, instantly reducing the farm’s output. To make matters worse, reports indicate that the locusts got into many grain stores across the region, ravaging what was harvested as well as the seed which would have been used for the following harvest. This increased Tigray’s vulnerability to food insecurity before the conflict began.

The combination of human activities coupled with the changing climate is
contributing to the vicious cycle of poverty and food insecurity in Tigray. Traditional agricultural practises, land degradation and poverty mean that food insecurity in Tigray is pervasive,⁶⁷⁶ and many families rely on safety net programmes to support their dietary needs.⁶⁷⁷ When these vulnerabilities compound with biblical plagues of desert locusts and ongoing conflict, it is unsurprising that food insecurity is prevalent.

7.3 Policy Driven Hunger 1970-1991

There is no doubt that the climate in Tigray has contributed to food insecurity in the region. However, this alone did not cause the famines of 1973-74 and 1984-85, or the food insecurity seen today. The climate and population pressures have been intensified by a series of poor policies, implemented by successive regimes in Ethiopia between 1971 and 1999.

Chronic hunger under Emperor Haile Selassie’s regime (1971-1974)

Across history books, Emperor Haile Selassie reputation is debated. He bears the reputation of a great leader, an international figure, a god-like character and a moderniser. In the 1930’s and under his rule the Italian colonial armies were successfully fought off, freeing Ethiopia from the threat of colonialism. Infrastructure across Ethiopia improved greatly, in the form of new roads, airports, and a national airline. His legacy has remained vibrant across Africa as the lead advocate for the formation of the OAU, and his contribution to African history was reaffirmed when his statue was unveiled in Addis Ababa outside the African Union’s headquarters in 2019.678 To those who follow the Rastafarian religion, he was God incarnate and tributes to him can be heard in Bob Marley’s music.⁶⁷⁹

However, during his reign little attention was paid to the issue of chronic hunger, which was rife throughout Ethiopia.⁶⁸⁰ For the average Ethiopian, Haile Selassie’s regime was no more than a leech sucking the life from their communities. Through crippling taxes, pillaging by the army and the squashing of any rebellions, lives were restricted, and ethnic divisions were engrained.⁶⁸¹ Consecutive famines occurred in Ethiopia under this regime. When warnings reached Addis Ababa about famine like conditions in Wollo in 1970, for fear of political embarrassment, Haile Selassie didn’t acknowledge the situation and very little was done by the Ethiopian regime. By the time the story broke in the news, the situation in Wollo was devastating. The relief which reached Wollo was too little, too late for many. Hundreds of thousands died of hunger while Haile Selassie fed red meat to his caged lions. Limited political will to deal with the causes and consequences of chronic hunger in Ethiopia, and the draconian bureaucratic processes in place meant that aid was severely delayed and
many lives lost.⁶⁸²

“[B]ad government, every bit as much as bad weather has been a crucial factor in the historical susceptibility… to drought and famine” Graham Hancock⁶⁸³

The famine in Wollo was arguably the breaking point for many Ethiopians. It represented the breakdown of the illusion of a god-like ruler, who ultimately allowed his people to starve just to protect his own political reputation.⁶⁸⁴ This period exemplifies how political decisions can have terrible consequences for human life and dignity. The revolution which led to the overthrow of Haile Selassie’s regime in 1974 was fuelled by a loss of faith in the existing power structures and a quest for social justice in Ethiopia. For too long Ethiopians had lived in servitude to an imperial regime which served the interests of a small group of aristocrats.

Chronic hunger under Mengistu’s Marxist regime (1977-1991)

Following the revolution in 1974, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party’s (EPRP) promised to end famine and improve the welfare of everyday Ethiopians. Ending famines and chronic hunger in Ethiopia became a political symbol for the revolution, stirring great support across Ethiopia.⁶⁸⁵ The regime known as the Derg, was led by Colonel Mengitsu Haile Mariam, who took inspiration from Lenin’s Marxist
ideologies and fostered geopolitical ties with Russia.

In the beginning, there was evidence of real progress. The Derg set up the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), the first state level mechanism which focussed on the prevention of widespread hunger. Through fact finding missions, this group assessed the needs of the people and the causes of the previous famines, with a view to improve the lives of everyday Ethiopians. The RRC was crucial in instigating a number of structural reforms which sought to improve food security, including the abolishment of the system of feudal land tenure in March 1975.⁶⁸⁶ However, the RRC has been criticised for not including famine-vulnerable people in their political processes. For example, the EPRP’s representatives in Tigray imposed these new land reforms by measuring and dividing the land in Tigray, with no public consultation.⁶⁸⁷ People were moved from land they had always farmed with almost no warning. The people of Tigray were suspicious of the new leadership.

Despite attempts to understand and improve food security, ten years later in 1984, Wollo and Tigray were yet again hit with famine. The world awakened to the horrors of famine, with news coverage and reports reaching all corners of the increasingly interconnected world. Even this regime, which had symbolised the fight against famine in their rise to power, could not fend off famine in the region. In fact, many
scholars argue that poorly planned and implemented development strategies directly contributed to recurring food insecurity and underdevelopment in the region.⁶⁸⁸ Some scholars have even found trends between areas worse hit by the famines of 1977- 1988 and specific government initiatives.⁶⁸⁹

Scholars identify a number of policies carried out by the Derg which may have contributed to famine-like conditions in Tigray and Wollo. This includes the Government resettlement programmes, the ‘Surplus producing Woredas’ scheme, also known as the ‘Producer Cooperatives’, the Villagisation initiative, and perhaps the least spoken about, their counter-insurgency campaigns. Although the RRC had played an important role in famine relief work in the 1970s, during the 1980s the Derg began to use the RRC to control and implement these new policies. Some commentators have indicated a belief that it was their intention to reduce food security in the Tigray region and neighbouring Eritrea (which was then part of

Ethiopia) to starve their political opponents.⁶⁹⁰ Extremely high taxes including, rather ironically, the ‘Famine Relief Tax’ placed additional burdens on those already struggling to meet their basic needs.⁶⁹¹

Government Resettlement

The Derg acknowledged the environmental degradation and population pressures faced in the highlands. To lessen the strain on the environment, the Derg began a resettlement scheme which moved people to more fertile areas elsewhere in Ethiopia. This was a highly unpopular policy. Ethiopia’s regions are inhabited by several distinct ethnic groups with different languages and cultures. During the famine of 1984 resettlement from Tigray was scaled up by the Derg, forcefully relocating people from the highlands as part of their famine response.

The resettlement scheme faced political and social criticisms. Little attention was paid to the chances or opportunities at the destinations for the people who were relocated. Additionally, the main food producing and politically active age group was relocated, starving the Tigray region of its workforce and in many cases, of its leadership. Prior to the famine the resettlement scheme had had limited success. A study from 1984 found that none of the people who had been resettled prior to the famine were food secure or self-sufficient, instead they relied on government subsidies to stay alive.⁶⁹² When resettlement was scaled up to combat the 1984 famine the Derg already knew that the scheme was not an effective strategy for improving food security. This has led commentators to question the motives of the Derg, including fears of genocidal intent and the dissolution of political opposition.⁶⁹³

Unfortunately, the highlands of Ethiopia are no more fertile as a result of this mass forced relocation, and many who were resettled became reliant on food aid and government subsidies within the resettlement camps.⁶⁹⁴ One source indicates that in 1987, 800,000 people were resettled, however, 150,000 of these died as a result and 100,000 chose to leave their new locations in the search for better opportunities.⁶⁹⁵ Other more conservative estimates note that a minimum of 50,000 died from the resettlement scheme. Médicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) along with other aid agencies operating in the region at this time, including Oxfam and World Vision, believe that more people died of famine-like conditions and limited access to essential services in the resettlement camps, than those who escaped forced relocation and remained in Tigray. If verified this would be a shocking revelation.

Surplus producing Woredas

In the early 1980s the Peasant Agricultural Development Extension Program (PADEP), under the auspices of the World Bank and Ministry of Agriculture, suggested a plan for creating a set of policies which improved agricultural productivity in a number of ‘surplus producing arejas’ within the country, which could sustain intensive agriculture. However, following domestic and international criticism of the government’s handling of the 1984-85 famine, and in an attempt to maintain control of their socialist agenda, the Derg rebranded the program as the ‘surplus producing weredas’. The Derg’s policy was more expansive than the PADEP plan, introducing surplus producing woredas across Tigray, in locations which were not suitable for intensive agriculture due to insufficient rainfall and infertile soils.

These centrally controlled, state farm systems often ignored the interests and knowledge of local farmers. Decisions made from above on the use of fertilisers and poor choices of crops meant that many of these sites were not surplus producing at all. Strict grain quotas placed an additional burden on those living in these areas as they were often unable to meet their own needs, let alone produce more to provide
to the Derg. New policies which restricted trade in these locations meant that petty trading was no longer an option when additional funds were needed. As such, the state farms provided an additional level of control over the Tigrayans, with non-farm activities also restricted and a ban on migration for seasonal labour. The farms removed the ability for many to sustain themselves through secondary income streams.⁶⁹⁶ Unfortunately, when the drought of 1987 hit, the farmers living in surplus producing areas were affected worse than other areas. Many more people had to rely on food aid within these Woredas than in other localities which did not receive the same government regulation.⁶⁹⁷ The mismanagement and reliance on unpaid labour led many disgruntled farmers to flee these systems for more autonomy.

Villagisation

Although development in Ethiopia was one of the Derg’s priorities, under its banner “Ethiopia First”, it is clear that the policy choices and attempts to speed up development were not always effective; some policies were even counterproductive. From 1985 onwards, the government sought to shortcut development of the rural sector by forcing families to move and create towns and villages,⁶⁹⁸ an initiative
known as the villagisation scheme. On instruction and often through intimidation, families dismantled their homes, carried them on their backs and rebuilt them in new villages in locations selected by the government. The villagisation scheme faced intense resistance from families in the highlands. However, this resistance was met with new restrictive policies which coerced people into moving. For example, new
legislation came into force which prevented families living in rural areas outside of the new village systems, from re-thatching their roofs. These policies sought to make it impossible for families to stay in rural communities.⁶⁹⁹

The houses were built in rows, similar to a western style town complex, something alien to the families who had lived spread out across the Ethiopian highlands. By 1988, the government claimed that nine million people in Tigray and Eritrea had moved into these villages, accounting for one third of the rural community in less than four years.⁷⁰⁰ However, again this policy was hastily rolled out across the region. The new villages were not located in areas suitable for the influx of the surrounding rural communities. They quickly placed enormous stress on the immediate environment, leading to environmental degradation and a drop in agricultural productivity.⁷⁰¹ Populations soared and local facilities, such as schools, couldn’t cope with the increased demand. With less food being produced, more people and accelerated environmental degradation, the villagisation scheme did not achieve its goal to develop the rural community and improve food security. Instead, food insecurity and hunger soared in the new villages across Tigray.⁷⁰²

A similarity across these three policies is the top-down approach applied by the Derg. Little care or consultation was given to the views of those forcibly resettled, those living within surplus producing woredas, or the people affected by villagisation. Scholars have argued that the agricultural development policies under Mengistu “reveals a legacy of unforgivable folly, mismanagement and neglect.”⁷⁰³ These policy choices were met with intense scrutiny. Commentators have expressed their beliefs that there was a strong link between the development agenda of the Derg and food insecurity in the region

Critics suspicious of the Derg have cited potential motives including population and ethnic control, and the suppression of insurrection.⁷⁰⁴ Under Mengitsu’s Marxist regime, it is unknown how many people really died as a result of these policies.

“What is less well understood is that poor harvests lead to famine only when malign rulers allow it. It was not the weather that killed perhaps 1m people in 1983-85. It was the policies of a Marxist dictator…” The Economist⁷⁰⁵

Other examples corroborate with the theory that government policies contributed to food insecurity in the 1980s. For example, the international relief effort was impeded by the government: ships of grain donated by the international community faced severe import fees and the government seized surplus grains from individual families which would usually allow them to make it through harder times.⁷⁰⁶ Most significantly, the government refused to supply trucks to the relief effort, and later used the internationally donated trucks to aid the forced resettlement agenda rather than to move aid around the region to those in need.⁷⁰⁷

7.4 Conflict-induced hunger

“A dangerous cocktail of the war combined with fragile soils, population pressure and poverty and climatic adversity led to a famine of biblical proportions in the Ethiopian Highlands of northern Ethiopia, including Tigray” The World Peace Foundation⁷⁰⁸

The least discussed, yet the most significant factor which has contributed to food insecurity in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, is conflict.⁷⁰⁹ Decades of civil wars, counter-insurgency campaigns and border conflicts have drastically disrupted development and food production in the region.⁷¹⁰ Tigray sits along the northern border with Eritrea; in many locations, the border is highly disputed. War is arguably the most devastating cause of food insecurity and is often overlooked by government policies and excluded from historical reports. Many accounts of the famine of 1984-85 ignore conflict as a cause of the famine at all. Rather than solely overpopulation or natural disasters, political failures or decisions appear integral to almost all famines.⁷¹¹ This was clearly the case in 1973-74, and 1984-85, and there are legitimate concerns about the impact of the ongoing conflict on food security.⁷¹²

The 1984-85 famine is widely acknowledged, yet acknowledgement of the full situation on the ground appears to be less documented. Although drought, harvest failures, as well as the agricultural and economic policies of the Derg all contributed to the famine, a significant cause of food insecurity in the region was the regime’s counter-insurgency campaign in Tigray and north Wollo from 1980 to 1985 combined
with the then ongoing war in Eritrea.

Critical literature on the famine indicates that the droughts the region faced were not bad enough to cause the widespread suffering seen in the news reports and documentaries. By using biblical language, the famine was placed out of human control. Analysis of the famine and information which creeped out of the area reveals that this was not the case, and it appears those on the ground knew. However, the
idea that the famine was a result of a drought, and environmental factors was not only misleading, but usefully disguised the real factors which contributed to, and prolonged the famine. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that successive droughts were fabricated by the Ethiopian government, with the support of the RRC. In 1984 the RRC claimed there had been a shortfall in food production in the years leading up to the famine due to successive droughts, despite their earlier reports outlining a high level of food production. Further evidence indicates that there was a drought in 1984, however, not the years prior. The drought provided an effective narrative for Mengitsu’s regime, as it allowed them to access international aid, without the international community’s awareness of the real causes of the crisis. The RRC was
essential for procuring international assistance and fuelled the ‘drought’ narrative of the Derg.⁷¹³ In fact, evidence has shown that international aid was even syphoned off to help the counter-insurgency effort.⁷¹⁴

The counter-insurgency campaign led by the Derg in Tigray from 1980 till 1985, focussed on a number of Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) strongholds in the region. Starvation was used as a weapon of war, with sinister consequences: “the zone of severe famine coincided with the war zone, and the phases of the developing famine corresponded with the major military actions”.⁷¹⁵ The Derg restricted the freedom of movement within Tigray and imposed trading restrictions, while markets and transport links became the frequent target of aerial bombardment. This alone had significant consequences in both Tigray and Wollo during 1984-85 as it undermined the security of the rural community to migrate to earn money, and to sell their produce,⁷¹⁶ directly reinforcing the belief that starvation was a government policy. With new checkpoints and permits needed to allow movement, the rural economy was destabilised. Conscription to the army, as well as the forced resettlement programme, removed many able-bodied men from the agricultural sector.⁷¹⁷ This has had long term impacts on the region, as research has found that many households in Tigray were headed by women due to high fatalities during the wars along the Eritrean border and against the TPLF under the Derg’s regime.⁷¹⁸

The Derg carried out scorched earth tactics, destroyed crops, ruined farmland, and slaughtered animals which were essential for agriculture, such as oxen This reduced the capacity of the rural community to produce food, impacting not just one harvest, but subsequent harvests too. Food systems were further targeted by sieges, food blockades and enforced rationing.⁷¹⁹ As such, food production and supplies to the
TPLF controlled areas were disrupted, causing food prices to soar above the means of many Tigrayans. The destruction of land, crops and the obstruction of aid not only posed a risk to human security but was a tool used by the Derg. In 1984, the Foreign Minister Tibebu Bekele was even quoted saying “food is a major element in our strategy against the successionists”,⁷²⁰ indicating the systematic use of food to quail the rebellion in Tigray. To make matters worse, in July 1985 the tensions between the TPLF and Eritrea [EPLF], fuelled by contestation of the borders, caused further disruption to aid deliveries. The Eritrean army intercepted the aid supply lines from Sudan, preventing food aid from reaching Tigrayans at a critical time.⁷²¹ To combat this the Tigrayans had to create a new supply line at great human cost.

The policy of starvation led by the Derg was also evident through the obstruction and manipulation of aid. Only 5.6% of the donated international aid went to families impacted by the famine in Tigray during 1984-85.⁷²² Aid was sent to governmentcontrolled areas and distribution sites, and never reached many of the millions of people in the rural areas. The rural Tigrayan subsistence farmers have often borne the brunt of conflict in the region. It is clear that the aid agencies working on the ground were in an impossible situation; by exposing the regime, they would lose access to the people in desperate need of life saving assistance. This meant that many went along with the narrative to ensure they could carry out their work and gain international funding. This moral dilemma was brought to life when Médecins
Sains Frontiers were expelled from Ethiopia for expressing their concerns regarding the situation.⁷²³ Despite famine shaking the region, the soldiers never went hungry.This redirection of aid to the military was widespread during the 1984-85 famine. Retrospective evidence even suggests that the United Nations Emergency Office for Ethiopia (UNEOE) was aware of the counter-insurgency campaigns, that aid was
being diverted to militias and that the policy of forced resettlement was ongoing and harmful. This information was not included in their reports at the time, and it appears little was done to prevent this continuing, even when relief programmes and aid organised by the UNEOE were attacked. The double-edged sword was that aid prolonged the counter-insurgency campaigns, causing more suffering across Tigray and saving few of its intended beneficiaries.⁷²⁴

Despite the crisis being portrayed through an environmental lens, the international community was slow to provide aid. This was partly a result of Ethiopia’s ideological and political alliance with the Soviet Union and the limited coverage on the ground due to the refusal of journalists’ visas. However, the large national expenditure on the military was of great concern to the international community. The Derg controlled the largest army in Sub-Saharan Africa, draining the country’s natural resources and wealth.⁷²⁵ During 1984, 46% of the national budget was spent on arms for their war with Northern Separatists. International donors felt that the Ethiopian Government should divert some of their own national GDP to the crisis rather than rely on international funding.⁷²⁶

The images of starving children which predominated in the media, created the illusion that all that was needed was food. In reality food could only keep people alive, it wouldn’t stop a famine caused by conflict. This means that ending famines…

“demands more than Live Aid concerts or airdrops. It requires ending wars, securing human rights, abating population growth and preparing in advance for predictable disasters” The New York Times⁷²⁷

7.5 The Development Decades (1999 – 2020)

After the overthrow of the Derg during the Ethiopian People’s Revolution of 1999, the following three decades marked considerable development and progress in the standard of living for Tigrayans, and Ethiopians at large. Although consecutive droughts have impacted rural livelihoods and ongoing border conflicts increased displacement, governmental policies have been implemented which aimed to reduce
hunger and prevent disasters on the scale of the 1980s. For example, the new regime put in place a long-term Agriculture Development Led Industrialisation (ALDI) strategy which aimed to improve farmers’ food security across Ethiopia. The Tigray Regional Government followed suit, creating their own strategy based on conversation and rehabilitation of the natural landscape, with the aim to improve food
security.⁷²⁸ The plan included hillside rehabilitation through afforestation and terracing, the development of irrigation systems through the construction of reservoirs, and the diversification of crops grown in the region. Help was given to farmers through subsidies for fertilisers and micro-finance mechanisms.⁷²⁹

This long-term plan, which relied on active participation from local people (rather than the top-down policies of the Derg) has seen a number of benefits across the region. By providing access to new technologies and sharing knowledge on farming practises that were suitable for the land, small farmers were able to improve their output. In 2002, the plan was revised and updated, reflecting the continued
emphasis by the regional government on improving food security in Tigray.⁷³⁰ A study which investigated the effectiveness of this plan indicated an 8.6% increase in food self-sufficiency in Tigray between 2000 and 2008.731 Another successful policy supporting local families included the food-for-work program, which improved food security and asset procurement in rural areas of Tigray.⁷³² The successes felt by the regional government proved that policies can be effective when implemented with local knowledge at local level.⁷³³

Although these measures improved food security in Tigray, a combination of overpopulation and insufficient land meant that families, specifically in the Central and Eastern areas of Tigray, could no longer be self-sufficient relying on subsistence farming alone.⁷³⁴ Thus, many families rely on multiple income streams to ensure that they can meet their needs and buy food from the local markets. In recognition of this, the regional government invested in creating new labour opportunities. Commercial sesame production began, alongside a boom in artisanal mining and other industry, providing more seasonal and migratory work options for households across the region.⁷³⁵ Tigray is the second largest sesame producing region in Ethiopia, producing one third of the country’s sesame exports.⁷³⁶ The seasonal sesame industry employs 200,000 labourers in Tigray,⁷³⁷ and supports up to 15% of the regional population.⁷³⁸ Many families in Western Tigray, where sesame production is largely concentrated, benefit from the influx of seasonal workers and rely upon this freedom of movement. regional population.⁷³⁸

The regional government also supported the creation of a conglomerate of over 30 manufacturing companies under the EFFORT scheme. Research has indicated that these businesses were established using resources which were accumulated by the TPLF during the counter-insurgency against the Derg in the 1980s, indicating the strong links between these businesses and the TPLF.⁷³⁹ The businesses ranged
from construction, to pharmaceutical manufacturing, mining and food production. The EFFORT conglomerate created approximately 47,000 jobs for people across Tigray and had assets worth over $500 million.⁷⁴⁰ Haile Selassie once stated that Ethiopia could become a global leader in gold, due to the rich deposits found in Western Ethiopia.⁷⁴¹ However, it was only in the 2000s that mining licenses began to be granted. Now mining is a lucrative business, with gold mining employing 120,000 Tigrayans by 2018⁷⁴² and Sapphire mining north of Aksum, employing a further 10,000 people. These labour opportunities are integral to the survival of many families. In response to the movement of people for work, the regional governmentinvested in road infrastructure. As a result, according to the World Bank by 2016 more than 50% of Tigrayans lived within 2Km of a well-conditioned road. This was
higher than the national average which sat at 22%.⁷⁴³

In 2005, the Ethiopian federal government introduced the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) with support from USAID, the World Bank and a suite of European donors.⁷⁴⁴ This set of mechanisms came in various forms including food vouchers, food or cash. According to the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), these transfers could have covered up to 50% of a rural household’s food needs.⁷⁴⁵ During 2015, when 80% of Tigrayans were still classified as subsistence farmers,⁷⁴⁶ a harvest failure hit Tigray. However, it was not as disastrous as it could have been, as the PSNP payments allowed its beneficiaries to remain on their farms, without having to sell off their assets, such as their livestock which were essential for farming.⁷⁴⁷ The benefits of this system have been celebrated by other African nations, many of which are now looking to set up their own PSNP systems. In 2018, it is estimated that 18% of the Tigrayan population was reliant on these PSNP payments to meet their food needs.⁷⁴⁸

Between 2003 and 2014 the number of people receiving emergency aid dropped from 15 million to 5.6 million. By 2016, the number of Ethiopians who were food secure rose by 20%, leaving only 24% of population without access to enough calories for survival.⁷⁴⁹ Although food insecurity was not eradicated, this signifies considerable progress.⁷⁵⁰ This improvement has been attributed to the work of international donors and the PSNP.⁷⁵¹ Since the end of the Derg regime, the lifting of restrictions on business has allowed the private business sector to flourish.⁷⁵² The international donor community in collaboration with the regional government worked hard to improve food security in the region to make sure that a calamity of the scale of the 1980s didn’t happen again.⁷⁵³

Even with the immense progress seen across Ethiopia, specifically in Tigray, in 2014 research demonstrated that more than 2 in every 5 children were stunted due to a lack of nutrition. This has long term impacts and can lead to physical and cognitive impairment. As such, the World Food Program estimated that the long-term impact of chronic hunger and malnutrition cost Ethiopia 16.5% of its GDP annually.⁷⁵⁴
Between 1991 and 2019, Ethiopia’s Human Development Index had greatly improved, with the sharpest rise in indicators such as education and income, noted between the years 2000-2014.⁷⁵⁵ By 2018, the poverty rate had halved, child mortality had been reduced by 70% and measures had been introduced which aimed to mitigate the impact of drought.⁷⁵⁶

Although there was progress for food security, restrictive policies were impacting the right to engage in political life and advocacy across Ethiopia. TPLF strongholds significantly benefitted from resources and favourable policies. Mekelle’s bustling streets, improved connectivity and facility of services provided evidence that resources were being channelled away from the majority of Ethiopians, to one ethnic minority.⁷⁵⁷ The inequitable development, ethnic divisions and discontent led to a series of violent protests against the government and its military, who consisted mostly of the former TPLF party. Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn responded to anti-government protests by resigning in 2018, and was replaced by Abiy Ahmed, the current Prime Minister. It was clear that the Ethiopian population was fed up of being left behind, and was seeking change.

By 2020 Ethiopia had one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, leading the world bank to speculate that by 2030 Ethiopia could be a Middle-Income Country (MIC) if development continued.⁷⁵⁸ This appeared to be a goal for many in the leadership, a way to shake off the historical image of chronic hunger that Ethiopia has carried since the famine of 1973-74. The improvements in Ethiopia are noticeable, with a reduction in poverty, economic growth and lengthening of life expectancy. The government has promoted women’s education and family planning in an attempt to control the population and lessen the burden on the strained environment.⁷⁵⁹ However, reaching an MIC status relies upon peace being maintained and environmental stability.⁷⁶⁰ In 2020 prior to the onset of conflict, the Global Hunger Index (GHI) trends for Ethiopia were promising. From 2000-2020 Ethiopia’s GHI score had been improving, with undernourishment, stunting, wasting
and infant mortality all on the decrease. Ethiopia was ranked 92nd of the 107 countries investigated for Global Hunger, with the level of hunger in the country calculated as ‘serious’. This means that despite improvements many were still living
on the edge of food insecurity.

Table from the Global Hunger Index⁷⁶¹

Food security in Tigray before conflict began

In Tigray, three decades of development had improved living standards. Although poverty reduction has been seen across Ethiopia, it was perhaps most pronounced in Tigray, as federal resources were directed to the region, which represented a TPLF stronghold. ⁷⁶² Poverty reduction was also perhaps the most observable in Tigray, as only 30 years earlier the famine had made headline international news. More children were attending school than ever before, health services were more efficient, and women’s rights were on the rise, a result of grass-roots level activism.⁷⁶³ The creation of an effective banking system in Tigray had allowed many Tigrayans to save their money in banks, improving families’ security during harder times.

According to the UN’s Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), an internationally recognised measure for the level of food security in specific geographic areas, prior to the conflict Tigray was deemed food secure (IPC Phase 1).⁷⁶⁴ Harvest outputs had been near average between 2016 and 2019, although this still meant that chronic hunger existed in a number of areas of Tigray.⁷⁶⁵ By October 2020, the IPC measure indicated that food security in Tigray was ‘Stressed’ (IPC Phase 2) whilst Western Tigray was food secure.⁷⁶⁶ Similarly, using the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS NET), another mechanism for determining food security, in November 2020 prior to the conflict most of Tigray was deemed food secure (similar to IPC Phase 1) while some areas were viewed as Stressed (IPC Phase 2).⁷⁶⁷

Summary of the IPC Classification for Food Security⁷⁶⁸

In November 2020, the IPC framework predicted that the state of food security in July-September 2021 would have been ‘Crisis’ (IPC Phase 3), uncoincidentally combined with the ‘annual hunger season’ – a period of the year where there is often food insecurity as it falls between the two harvests. At this point, it is predicted that lifesaving support would be needed, even if there had been no conflict. The situation this year was exacerbated by the covid-19 pandemic, its impact on migratory work, and a locust invasion which had consumed the grain reserves in South, South East, Eastern and Central Tigray.⁷⁶⁹ Although some scholars have refuted that the desert locust invasion was devastating for food security,⁷⁷⁰ others believed the desert locust invasion alone could have caused another famine in areas of Tigray.⁷⁷¹ The rise in safety net systems, banking and additional revenue streams could have prevented food insecurity from reaching famine level in the affected areas. However, the addition of conflict severely hampers attempts to maintain food security.

The desert locust invasion had impacted the September-January harvest, leaving many vulnerable. The conflict which erupted in November 2020, has also disrupted the remaining September-January harvest and prevented the essential practises of land preparation during the months of April and May before the Kirempt rainy season begins in June. This means the impact of the current conflict on food insecurity is not yet fully understood, but it could be devastating.⁷⁷² For humanitarians, there is grave concern that history is going to repeat itself should the conflict not be stopped and food security prioritised. This time, in comparison to 1984 and despite the attempted information blackout, the world is aware of the conflict and it is watching.

Conflict and Hunger

“First there was COVID, then locust swarms, then disruptions and destructions due to war, including burning and stealing of crops” Jan Nyssen, Professor at Ghent University⁷⁷³

Despite the developments which benefitted Tigray, before conflict began OCHA estimated that 950,000 people were reliant on food aid for survival in Tigray. Shortly after the onset of conflict, an additional 1.3 million people were in need of emergency assistance, while 62,225 Tigrayans had fled across the border into neighbouring Sudan.⁷⁷⁴ Despite a communications blackout in the region, since November 2020 there have been horrifying reports of massacres, ethnic cleansing, torture, forced conscription and attacks on refugee camps.⁷⁷⁵ Human rights organisations corroborated by open-source evidence, indicate that pillaging, looting, the destruction of property, slaughtering of livestock and burning of land is indeed widespread and systematic.⁷⁷⁶ Sexual based violence against women has been widely reported, including accounts of women being forced to exchange sex for essential items, such as food and water.⁷⁷⁷ These activities have made the people living in Tigray even more vulnerable to food insecurity, as they are unable to access objects indispensable for their survival.

The latest conflict began during the peak harvest season of September-January.From the locust invasion to conflict, harvests were impeded across Tigray. The locust invasion was particularly damaging in South Tigray, while ongoing conflict with Amhara militia interrupted the harvest in Western Tigray. The harvests in towns and villages along the main roads throughout Tigray were also disrupted by Eritrean and Ethiopian troops.⁷⁷⁸ Many had to harvest crops early to limit the impact of the locusts, and before conflict reached their communities. As such, the grain that was harvested in many locations was not fully grown and so of limited use, decimating the agricultural output of the region early on in the conflict. Furthermore, witness accounts highlight a frightening trend that little of the harvested crops remained within the rural communities, with immediate impact on the food security of many households.⁷⁷⁹

Food security is more than food availability, it is also whether food is physically and economically accessible.⁷⁸⁰ This means that displacement, the targeting of food systems and shocks to the economy can have a direct impact on food security. The decades of development seen in Tigray have increased its ability to deal with droughts through economic development and technical innovations in the agricultural sector. However, these developments have also left Tigray more vulnerable to the impacts of conflict. For example, as well as cutting the region off from national funding, the heralded new banking system which had provided Tigrayans with economic security has been targeted and has remained inaccessible since November. The improved seasonal and migratory labour opportunities Tigrayanshave valued over the past few decades, have also come under attack. The roads which helped the region to develop, are now a vehicle for destruction, allowing the Ethiopian Government, Eritrean Army and Amhara forces to easily negotiate the countries landscape, looting and devastating on their way.⁷⁸¹ By focussing on these new vulnerabilities through an economic offensive and a military campaign, it appears that starvation is a tool and a political objective of the federal Government.

By January 2021, aid workers were beginning to use the word famine to describe their view of what was happening on the ground in Northwest Tigray. Leaked minutes from the Tigray Emergency Coordination Centre meeting noted that:“People are dying because of starvation. In Adwa people are dying while they are sleeping.”⁷⁸² The figures in January ranged from 2.2 million⁷⁸³ to 4 million people already in need of food aid.⁷⁸⁴ In the North-western, Central and Eastern woredas of Tigray, up to 50% of the inhabitants were already estimated to be in desperate need of humanitarian assistance.⁷⁸⁵ In Adigrat, “Everybody is asking for food” said the Médecins Sans Frontiers’ emergency programme coordinator in an interview in January. “Every time we reach a new area, we find food, water, health services depleted, and a lot of fear among the population.”⁷⁸⁶

In a joint statement by the Tigray Independence Party, Salsay Weyane Tigray, and National Congress of Great Tigray in February, the parties stated that without immediate food aid and medical supplies to the region, a “looming humanitarian disaster of biblical proportion” would be a “gruesome reality in Tigray”.⁷⁸⁷ However, access restrictions implemented by the federal government has greatly impeded the work of relief agencies, including the United Nations. The limited agencies which have been allowed to operate in the region have been met with hostility and some have become the targets of attacks.

“Today it could be one, two or three, but you know after a month it means thousands… After two months it will be tens of thousands” Abera Tola, the president of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society commenting on the death toll⁷⁸⁸

By April 2021, approximately 6 million people were impacted by conflict, with every part of Tigray hit by devastation.⁷⁸⁹ In a written statement on the 15 April, Linda Thomas Greenfield the US Ambassador to the United Nations Security Council, indicated estimates that as many as 5.2 million people were food insecure and required assistance. ⁷⁹⁰ This assistance has been continually hindered by the presence of Eritrean forces and the federal government’s restrictions on humanitarian access.

“The campaign of deprivation goes beyond immediate needs. It is sending Tigray back to a stone-age economy in which people are forced to live hand-to-mouth and depend on charity” Alex de Waal, Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation⁷⁹¹

In a closed-door meeting of the UN Security Council in April 2021, Mark Lowcock reiterated earlier claims that people were already starving to death.⁷⁹² Many conflict affected communities have been left without food supplies, seeds for the next harvest, livestock or safe housing. Their financial savings and supplementary incomes have been removed. When information does seeps out from behind the communication blackout, it indicates that the conditions on the ground in Tigray are far worse than any predictions.

“[H]unger, among peasantry, is crippling” Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Senior Fellow at the World Peace Foundation & TPLF member⁷⁹³

It is imperative to view the ongoing conflict within the context of a region which has faced historical food insecurity due to conflict, poor governmental policies and climate vulnerability. Unfortunately, the Covid-19 pandemic, locust invasion and now conflict has created a fragile situation for many. While the term ‘famine’ has political ramifications, especially in a country with a history like Ethiopia’s, the classification of a famine is procedural. To classify as a famine the crisis must have a death rate of two in 10,000 people each day from malnutrition, more than 30% of children under five need to classify as acutely malnourished, and at least one in five households will be facing an extreme lack of food.⁷⁹⁴ This means that prior to reaching a ‘famine’ there has been considerable loss of life and widespread suffering. Although the criterion was not met across the whole Tigray region, by June, both the IPC and the UN Humanitarian Chief Mark Lowcock had confirmed the international community’s fears. IPC Phase 5 ‘famine’ had struck Tigray again, within several woredas.

“[T]his report… paints a picture of a very, very extreme situation. There is famine now… there is famine now in Tigray. The number of people in famine conditions, in IPC 5 conditions, is higher than anywhere in the world, at any moment since one quarter of one million Somali’s lost their lives in 2011. There’s another 2 million people just a step away from those extreme situations…. And this is going to get a lot worse.” Mark Lowcock, Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-SecretaryGeneral for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Despite denials by the Ethiopian Government,⁷⁹⁵ the IPC’s report suggests that in June, 350,000 people were already facing famine-like conditions.⁷⁹⁶ No area within Tigray remained within the “minimal” IPC Phase 1 classification.⁷⁹⁷ Humanitarian workers relayed the worrying scenes from IDP camps in Axum and Adwa in early June. Starvation was already visible among women and children. Gaunt and lethargic, their energy conserved to keep them alive.⁷⁹⁸ The improvements to food security outlined earlier in this chapter have been undermined. Decades of development undone in a matter of months. A cause of great concern for theinternational community which has invested in this region’s development, improving its capacity to prevent a repeat of 1984. Foreign charities and donors are watching in shock, as years of hard work unravel before their eyes.⁷⁹⁹

7.6Starvation in international law

“It is a crime to starve civilians deliberately by shutting down electricity, water, road transport, banking services, food distribution; and denying access to humanitarian services for over 65 days” Jan Nyssen, Professor at Ghent University⁸⁰⁰

Starvation is unacceptable in peacetime or war. The international community have expressed this shared belief through the codification of the right to food, across an array of agreements, including the United Nations Charter,⁸⁰¹ International Human Rights Law,⁸⁰² Customary International Law, International Humanitarian Law,⁸⁰³ International Criminal Law,⁸⁰⁴ thematic treaties,⁸⁰⁵ and thematic resolutions.⁸⁰⁶
Removing access to food through displacement, obstruction of aid, and destroying people’s means to access food is illegal in international law.⁸⁰⁷ Starvation used as a weapon or tool of war is prohibited in the Geneva Convention and its Protocols,⁸⁰⁸ and starvation is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’.⁸⁰⁹ The War Crime of Starvation refers to more than the deprivation of food, but also of objects indispensable to survival.⁸¹⁰ This includes medicines, safe drinking water, sanitation, financial savings and shelter.

As information has slowly leaked out of Tigray, the international community has been awakened to the horrors behind the communication blackout. Humanitarians on the ground also paint a solemn picture. A report by the World Peace Foundation, entitled ‘Starving Tigray’ collated the evidence available on the conflict as of March 2021. It appears that through systematic and widespread attacks on objects indispensable to survival and the wilful impediment of humanitarian relief, the Governments of both Ethiopia and Eritrea are starving the people of Tigray.⁸¹¹ In Western Tigray, the targeting of civilians by Amhara militia has been described as ethnic cleansing.⁸¹² Thus, raising concerns that what we see unfolding may constitute a genocide of the Tigrayan people.⁸¹³ Derogatory language has been used to describe Tigrayans within the Ethiopian media, such as ‘daylight Hyenas’ or the ‘unfamiliar others’.⁸¹⁴ Restrictions on movement and targeted human rights violations provide additional evidence that ethnically motivated violence is occurring in Tigray.⁸¹⁵

“Ethiopia’s government appears to be wielding hunger as a weapon; a rebel region is being starved into submission” The Economist⁸¹⁶

The situation in Tigray poses a great challenge to the international community, as the remainder of this chapter will show. Despite the communication blackout and attempts made to restrict information leaving Tigray, evidence suggests that ‘Starvation crimes’ have and continue to occur.⁸¹⁷ The Ethiopian Penal Code prohibits starvation crimes, and acts of genocide, and provides possible avenues for prosecuting perpetrators.⁸¹⁸ For example, the Marxist leader Mengitsu Haile Mariam was charged with genocide in 2007 for crimes under his leadership in the 1970s. Accountability was achieved, but many years later.⁸¹⁹ As such, it appears inconceivable that this route for accountability would be taken in the near future, considering the perpetrators are the Federal Government and its Eritrean and Amhara partners. For now, the responsibility must fall to the international community to collect, protect, and review the evidence of starvation crimes in Tigray.

The gravity of the human rights violations ongoing in Tigray has raised discussions on whether there should be international accountability using International Criminal Law. For example, the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court entered into force in 2002 to deal with the most severe crimes of concern to the international community. In international criminal proceedings, whether the conflict represents a Non-International Armed Conflict or an International Armed Conflict could impact the routes for gaining accountability. Although there is widespread belief that Eritrean troops are operating in collaboration with the Ethiopian government, other unverified reports signal the presence of Emirati drones and Somali soldiers.⁸²⁰ Given the evidence currently available, the conflict appears to be a Non-International Armed Conflict between Ethiopia (supported by Eritrea) and the TPLF; however, lawyers would need to confirm this when carrying out criminal proceedings. In 2019 the War Crime of Starvation was amended to include Non-International Armed Conflicts; however, this has not yet come into force.⁸²¹

To complicate matters, Ethiopia is not a state party to the Rome Statute. This means that the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over Ethiopia. There are only two ways accountability using the Rome Statute could be possible: if the United Nations Security Council refers the case to the court;⁸²² or if a domestic court which has universal jurisdiction over War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity decides to pursue accountability. The former seems unlikely given China’s policy of noninterference and Russia’s recent objections to Security Council Statements on the conflict.⁸²³ On 2 June, the Belgian Federal Prosecutor announced that it is investigating War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Ethiopia.⁸²⁴ Testimonies by Belgian victims of the conflict have sparked the investigation. Their families had been executed, property looted and destroyed. As well as accountability at the international or domestic level, there are also regional options. The African Union may wish to gain accountability through the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, rather than at the International Criminal Court. Long-standing suspicions of the International Criminal Court by African nations might prevent the case to the passed to the International Criminal Court, and favour this option instead.⁸²⁵

There appears to be international recognition that food is being used within the conflict as a leverage to stamp out dissent, with commentators labelling it a “war of starvation”.⁸²⁶ Starvation is in itself, a means to an end. It is a tactic to remove the TPLF and its sympathisers from the region, removing and destroying the threat to the federal government, and its Eritrean and Amhara allies. The ongoing conflict in Tigray represents one of the first challenges for the United Nations Security Council on the thematic issue of ‘Conflict and Hunger’, in respect to resolution 2417. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2417, signed in 2018, outlined the increased threat and association of conflict and hunger and called on all state parties to acknowledge and abide by existing international law on the matter.⁸²⁷ It also outlined the possible avenues the United Nations Security Council could take, such as sanctions, investigations into violations of international law, and accountability through domestic or international law.⁸²⁸ The resolution could have been written specifically for the Tigray crisis. It will be interesting to watch whether the resolution, which has not yet been implemented, is used in the context of Tigray. If it is not, then the international community should question the utility of the resolution in combatting the rising threat of conflict and hunger.

The international community is watching Tigray, with a rise in media attention and discussions at the United Nations Security Council. At the United Nations Security Council debate on Conflict and Hunger in March 2021, eleven of twenty State Representatives and speakers referred to the situation in Tigray and written statements directly referred to reports of “starvation being used as a weapon of war.”⁸²⁹ However, the council could not agree on a statement to condemn the violence and immediate need for humanitarian assistance, following objections from
India, Russia and China, who reinforced the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and its sovereign responsibility within its jurisdiction.⁸³⁰ Despite barriers to national and international accountability at the time of writing, fact-finding missions mandated by other national, regional and international bodies have begun. On the 25th March 2021, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) announced a joint investigation into the ongoing atrocities.⁸³¹ Following this the African Union also announced a Commission of Inquiry to investigate alleged violations of human rights.⁸³²

On 10 June a high-level EU-US roundtable was held, following the failure of the UNSC to reach a consensus and the declaration of famine by Mark Lowcock. It aimed to shed light on the deteriorating situation in Tigray. Members expressed their concerns about the lack of international action and funding, the impediments at the UNSC level, and the need to prevent a repeat of 1984. The provision of aid will not be enough to prevent mass starvation in Tigray. The roundtable provides recognition that humanitarian crises such as this, do require high-level political action. If the international community doesn’t use its position to condemn the situation, or take action, this will represent a failure to live up to the rhetoric of the recent conflict and hunger debate and resolution 2417, potentially diminishing respect for existing international law.

“We can’t put reliable numbers on the hunger, sickness and death in Tigray, but we know enough to be sure that an immense tragedy is unfolding.” Alex de Waal, Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation ⁸³³

We are in an era where international human rights institutions are facing mounting criticisms for their ineffectiveness. For those who support a rules-based order, this is particularly worrying. The quest for peace and universal freedoms is at risk. This is pertinent in the context of Ethiopia. In 2019 Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for improving Ethiopia’s relationship with Eritrea.⁸³⁴ This new friendship between the Ethiopian and Eritrean administrations may have temporarily resolved old rivalries, yet it has arguably been done so at the expense of the TPLF and the wider Tigrayan ethnic group. Interestingly, the 2020 Nobel Peace Prize laureate was the World Food Programme, for their role in improving global food security, and their work on the prohibition of starvation as a weapon of war.⁸³⁵ The irony of these consecutive winners eats the soul.

The Undermining of Food Systems: Destruction of Food

One of the clearest attempts to damage food security and deprive civilians of the essentials for life, is through the deliberate destruction of food. Across Tigray, food stores have been pillaged and scorched earth tactics have been used by the Eritrean and Ethiopian forces.⁸³⁶ There have been a staggering number of reports that whole villages, warehouses, expanses of fields and crops, mango orchards and grain stores have been destroyed.⁸³⁷ With the destruction of mango orchards in Adeba and Tseada Sare appearing to have “[n]o rationale except hatred and destruction”.⁸³⁸

A number of news outlets, including Sky and the Economist, have spoken to witnesses on the ground who described the repeated scenes of destruction. One farmer told Oxfam that he had lost 10 months of food supplies to systematic scorched earth tactics.⁸³⁹ Satellite imagery shows that this destruction first seen in November 2020 has carried on through to March 2021, with little of Tigray escaping the smoky chaos.⁸⁴⁰ Across the region, open-source satellite imagery, fire tracking data from NASA fire information and resource management system (FIRMS), fires in settlement (FIRIS) and US Government internal reporting, show that the Eritrean and Ethiopian militaries are burning whatever they cannot carry;⁸⁴¹ leaving behind a scorched wasteland in their fiery wake. This information was corroborated by news reports from the ground.⁸⁴² These cruel strategies not only destroy the unharvested crops, but limit the ability to grow crops during the following harvest period as the soil’s nutrients are burnt away. This act leaves many households unable to sustain themselves, particularly those who are reliant on farming as their primary source of food. Scorched earth tactics are prohibited in international law because of the collateral damage they cause, which disproportionately effects civilians.⁸⁴³ Fires set off by Eritrean and Ethiopian ground forces and aerial bombardment have left many areas desolated, food is destroyed, and the land’s capabilities to grow food in the future are burnt away, leaving behind a barren waste land.

“I’m afraid that the campaign in Tigray is at best a scorched earth policy and at worst it is genocidal in terms of tactics and intentions” Matt Bryden, a political analyst based in Nairobi, former roles with UN, and the Horn of Africa International Crisis Group⁸⁴⁴

The slaughtering of animals, from oxen to chickens has been reported.⁸⁴⁵ One eyewitness recalled a merciless scene where “an Eritrean soldier crushed baby chicks under his foot.”⁸⁴⁶ For the lucky individuals whose livestock has escaped this inhumane treatment, finding enough food for the livestock poses another major challenge.⁸⁴⁷ Farmers have expressed their torment following their encounters with Eritrean Soldiers. In one report, survivors of attacks told Vice News that “Farmers were forced by Eritrean soldiers to slaughter their cows and prepare food for the soldiers. They later doused the homes of these same farmers in gasoline.”⁸⁴⁸

Unfortunately, reports of farmers being threatened are ubiquitous. Farmers are reporting threats such as: “You won’t plough, you won’t harvest, and if you try, we will punish you.”⁸⁴⁹ This malicious intent and destruction of food provides evidence that starvation is being used as a weapon of war. Many farmers have abandoned their lands, as the lack of oxen, seeds or fertiliser has shattered their hopes to grow during the next season. The more daring, or desperate farmers have resorted to ploughing at night to avoid detection.

The Undermining of Food Systems: Looting and Pillage

As well as destroying available food supplies and the ability to grow food, looting and pillaging have left Tigrayans without the means to make or buy food. Despite international laws prohibiting these acts,⁸⁵⁰ it’s clear that no place is off limits to the looters, with hospitals, hotels, houses, churches, universities, refugee camps and shops raided across the region.⁸⁵¹ Forced displacement caused by the conflict has also provided opportunities for the Eritrean forces to loot houses and shops of anything left behind.⁸⁵² In Adigrat, Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) reported that even the hospital ambulances had been stolen.⁸⁵³ Similarly in Amhara occupied Western Tigray, hospitals have been looted of medical supplies and generators, while harvests, water tanks and pumps and clothes have been looted.⁸⁵⁴ Even the
storage facilities at refugee camps have been targeted by looters, according to the World Food Programme.⁸⁵⁵

Accounts suggest that the Ethiopian military has been responsible for the looting of banks and the regional government’s assets, while Eritrean forces have taken personal possessions through house-to-house and village wide raids.⁸⁵⁶ This pattern of looting and destruction has impacted the mining and manufacturing industries across Tigray. Almost one quarter of manufacturing jobs in the region have already been lost to the conflict, leaving more than 47,000 people in urban areas without their primary income stream.⁸⁵⁷ The EFFORT manufacturing conglomerate has been subject to the looting of premises and financial attacks. In November, EFFORT’s bank account, and its 34 subsidiaries were frozen, before the Federal government dissolved EFFORT, moving its assets to Federal companies. The conglomerate provided a substantial income stream for the Tigrayan regional government indicating that this is an attack on the financial stability of the TPLF. Nonetheless the loss of jobs has meant an estimated 76,000 people in urban Tigray have been left unsupported financially. By removing these funds, the Federal Government has removed necessary access to food for these families.⁸⁵⁸

“[T]hey literally destroyed the wealth we accumulated for thirty years in Tigray” Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Senior Fellow at the World Peace Foundation & TPLF member

In January 2021, it was reported that a wide range of shops in Mekelle, which previously sold anything from hardware to clothing had converted to grocery stores, as food had become the most lucrative good.⁸⁵⁹ However, markets have been badly affected by the conflict. The high risk of violent raids, looting of goods, and the disruption of trade has resulted in food shortages and elevated food prices.⁸⁶⁰ As such, in some Woredas, the limited available food is extremely expensive.⁸⁶¹ By February, with conflict intensive areas in the Eastern and Central zones impacted the worst,⁸⁶² the destruction of harvests and the instability of markets was contributing to a significant rise in hunger across Tigray.⁸⁶³ Even for the lucky ones who do have access to grain, the destruction of mills, limited electricity and shortage of matches means that in many areas, this grain cannot even be processed.⁸⁶⁴ Local aid organisations adapted their response by organising flour deliveries, rather than grains, in Adigrat and Irob. But this response was not regional.⁸⁶⁵ Eyewitness accounts and interviews reveal that people have had to resort to eating raw grain or the leaves off bushes and branches.⁸⁶⁶ In one interview, a women described how she had drunk water from a hole she had dug in the ground, after the water infrastructure had been damaged.⁸⁶⁷

In February, during a phone call from a remote hillside cave where he was seeking refuge, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, a Senior Fellow at the World Peace Foundation and TPLF member, told Alex de Waal about the events he had witnessed across Tigray.He recalled scenes of killings, looting, pillaging and the widespread burning of crops that were ready to be harvested.

“They have started looting the produce of the peasants, from all the villages beyond the black road that crosses Tigray towards Eritrea. And they kill whomever they find in whichever village they get in.” Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Senior Fellow at the World Peace Foundation & TPLF member.

Fear permeates through the eyewitness accounts on the ground. The NonGovernmental Organisation Mary’s Meals, which had been providing school lunches to children in Tigray before conflict began, made contact with the Nun who coordinates their operations in Tigray.⁸⁶⁸ She told them of the collective pain and suffering Tigrayans are facing. She herself recently having lost several family members. The schools she worked with are no longer providing education but are overcrowded with the internally displaced. These sites, however, are still not safe from looters:
“Some of them were telling me that at night, sometimes they are looted, people come in with knives and dangerous things, to take away whatever they get – like it could be food portions, it could be clothes they get. There are young people that come from outside drunk, and take away what they get also, so they are not safe.” Nun (remains anonymous for her safety)⁸⁶⁹

By mid-March, OCHA revealed that the agricultural systems had been shattered, a result of fighting, looting and destruction. The state of food security had reached catastrophe, and the desperation of farmers was mounting. ⁸⁷⁰ For those who have been lucky enough to receive food aid, the risk of it being looted is high. Interviews with families in the region indicate the desperate measures which are being taken to keep the received aid safe, including burying the aid to avoid looters finding it. By June, humanitarians operating on the ground reported a worrying trend: whole villages along the main roads were looted and deserted. There was nothing and no one left.⁸⁷¹

The Undermining of Food Systems: Banking and Payments

The modern banking systems which had contributed to the improved freedom, security and development throughout Tigray, now restrict survival, becoming an additional noose for its people. In the past, households would protect their wealth by buying more livestock or land, improving their agricultural output. The rise of microfinance and banking allowed Tigrayans to store their wealth in banks instead.
By October 2020, more than 400,000 people in Tigray had savings in the banking system amounting to over $100 million.⁸⁷² Banks have since been looted and records destroyed or frozen.⁸⁷³ As such, this conflict has resulted in hundreds of thousands of people losing the money that they had earned, saved and entrusted to the banking system and with no way to prove their loss. Arguably the traditional mechanisms for saving might not have provided a greater level of security given the destruction of land, food and the slaughtering of livestock. But the modern banking systems across Tigary, have provided yet another vulnerability to economic attack. The cash shortages coupled with an increase in food prices has led to food being outpriced for many Tigrayans.⁸⁷⁴ By June, banking services had resumed in several towns, however disruptions in services remained common. Accessing bank notes has continued to be difficult, with people walking miles, then queueing for hours or even days to retrieve cash.⁸⁷⁵

In November 2020, as tensions between the federal and regional governments increased, the federal government withheld the nationally organised PSNP (safetynet payments) which supported one million people in Tigray. The PSNP has been a lifeline for many in the rural economy, the most vulnerable people across Tigray being dependent on these payments,⁸⁷⁶ and its removal has exposed an estimated 18% of the Tigrayan population to immediate and life-threatening food insecurity.⁸⁷⁷ In March 2021, the PSNP payments hadn’t yet resumed, whilst many woredas had seen no humanitarian aid, labour opportunities disrupted and wages frozen.⁸⁷⁸ By June, it remained unclear how many of the PSNP beneficiaries were amongst those receiving aid, indicating that many of the most vulnerable could be facing extreme food insecurity. By removing the means to buy food and denying access to the safety net system which had improved food security in Tigray, the options for many have become extremely limited.

The Undermining of Food Systems: Displacement and Immobility

The conflict has caused mass displacement within Tigray and by December 2020 over 62,000 people had fled across the border into neighbouring Sudan.⁸⁷⁹ Displacement has a huge impact on immediate and long-term food security, as people move away from their lands, often taking only what they can carry. In Tigray, the September-January harvest was disrupted by conflict limiting existing food supplies, while little aid reached those displaced. Mass displacement throughout Tigray has complicated this further, as it means that the next harvest may also be disrupted. Without fertile land to cultivate or grain to sow, when the next rainy season comes in June, it is unclear if there will be anything growing in the fields. For those who have been repeatedly displaced by the fighting, the ability to grow their own
food in the upcoming agricultural season looks bleak.

Internal displacement

Just five months after the conflict began, UNHCR stated that over 2 million people had become internally displaced (IDPs) and over 1,000 people were arriving in Shire daily, mainly from Western Tigray.⁸⁸⁰ The real number of IDPs in Tigray may be far higher than the speculations, as people have moved from rural areas where conflict is ongoing to reside with family members in large towns, or are taking refuge in remote areas, such as caves hidden amongst the rugged landscape.⁸⁸¹ Farmers in these locations expressed their hopes that rather than travel to big cities for refuge, they would wait out the fighting close enough to their land, enabling them to return in time to sow their fields ahead of the next rainy season.⁸⁸² Despite these remote locations having potentially protected their families from the conflict, they are not sheltered, however, from the dangers of food insecurity. The majority of these areas are accessible only by ‘rural access roads’, community-maintained road systems which link Tabiyas with the main roads. Many of these are walking paths with space for donkeys, not aid convoys.⁸⁸³ In March it was believed that over one million people who were in need of assistance had been displaced into inaccessible locations. ⁸⁸⁴ This being said, by April the little food aid that made its way into Tigray was not reaching further than the cities, towns and a handful of villages.⁸⁸⁵

The situation for those who make it to IDP camps within Ethiopia is also meagre. Schools and universities have been repurposed as shelters,⁸⁸⁶ and the risk of contagious diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea and pneumonia are high.⁸⁸⁷ By January, Aksum University Shire Campus housed more than 40,000 people, many of whom required urgent medical attention.⁸⁸⁸ Another 40,000 people were residing across the Shire Preparatory School and the Primary School. With limited medical and food supplies, these camps do not provide much comfort in these times of need.⁸⁸⁹ For the IDPs who are not registered, the situation is worse, as they may face barriers to accessing food assistance and other forms of security. OCHA and UNICEF visited IDP camps in Axum and Adwa during May, which housed more than 360,000 IDPs. The sites had received just one food aid delivery since the conflict began in November. The situation is desperate; the majority of people now living in these camps have not received any food aid.⁸⁹⁰

Before fighting began, Tigray was home to 96,000 Eritrean refugees living across a number of camps. Regrettably, refugee camps within Tigray have been targeted, destroyed, and vandalised by militia.⁸⁹¹ Additionally, government restrictions on humanitarian access has disrupted deliveries of food and clean water, leaving many people desperate. According to a UNHCR spokesman, Eritrean refugees in Tigray have resorted to drinking from muddy puddles and eating plants, tree bark and leaves.⁸⁹² The camps which remain functioning are overcapacity and underresourced. Between November 2020 and June 2021, food insecurity for those displaced in Tigray deteriorated at an alarming rate.

Cross-border displacement

The conflict has caused immense social dislocation; people are fleeing fighting in one area, to find violence in another. For some the journey across the border to Sudan seemed like the only option. However, the route to safety in Sudan is fraught with danger. Alem Mebrahtu, a 30-year-old refugee recalled how the Tekeze riverbed separating Sudan with Tigray was littered with around 50 bodies: “Some were face-down. Some were looking up at the sky”. ⁸⁹³ This story has been repeated by many who are taking refuge in camps in Sudan, having safely made it across the river without drowning or being shot by patrolling Eritrean or Ethiopian forces. Since December this route has become even more dangerous as the Ethiopian-Sudanese border was closed, while testimonies from families in Sudan say that Ethiopian soldiers are preventing their loved ones from leaving.⁸⁹⁴ The camps in Sudan are struggling to keep up with the demand for food aid, and even in November the supplies in local markets had all but run out.⁸⁹⁵ Salah Ramadan, the head of the Sudanese Border town’s administration told reporters of the struggles they faced: “People are hungry and the flow of refugees is continuing but we have little to offer”.⁸⁹⁶

The camps were ill-prepared for the influx of refugees with unsanitary conditions, and limited shelters and food supplies being reported. By February Médecins Sans Frontiers claimed that hunger was widespread.⁸⁹⁷ Although porridge and lentils are served every day, the small portions often run out before everyone has eaten, and many families had only just received their first food parcels, with a lack of clarity over
when the next ones would arrive. ⁸⁹⁸

“Every day they tell us the food is coming and every day it does not come.” Maryam, Tigrayan Refugee in Sudan

Displacement and Immobility

As well as displacement, immobility through the implementation of military checkpoints and travel permits has restricted the freedom of movement. As aforementioned, the ability to move for work has sustained households across Tigray over the past few decades, with jobs in manufacturing and sesame production providing an additional income stream for many families. However, moving around Tigray is dangerous and passing through checkpoints increases vulnerability to harassment, mugging or even extrajudicial execution.⁸⁹⁹ Without this movement,
households are more vulnerable to food insecurity as they face a reduction in household purchasing power.

In western Tigray, rather than welcoming an influx of seasonal workers to help with the sesame harvest, the 140,000 people who inhabit the Woredas have been forcibly removed from their land and homes by Amhara militia.⁹⁰⁰ In an area that has seen such progress over the previous decades, the lives of many Western Tigrayans have been majorly impacted by widespread destruction, death and displacement. This
information has been corroborated by the arrival of Western Tigrayans in refugee

camps in Sudan and urban areas in East Tigray.⁹⁰¹ The Amhara forces state that they have an ancestral claim to the land, which was taken from them during the decades when the TPLF dominated the Ethiopian Government.⁹⁰² The land is of high economic value due to its fertility,⁹⁰³ making it suitable for sesame production. More than 200,000 people are employed each year by the sesame industry, representing
the most lucrative employment for seasonal workers in Tigray. The disruption to which will greatly dampen the food security of many households.

In February, a US report leaked in the New York Times, provided a damming insight into the situation on the ground, claiming that the Amhara and Ethiopian forces were “deliberately and efficiently rendering Western Tigray ethnically homogeneous through the organized use of force and intimidation” and that “Whole villages were severely damaged or completely erased”.⁹⁰⁴ The World Peace Foundation confirmed these accounts using Google Earth imagery, demonstrating the “comprehensive nature of the scorched earth policy of various Amhara forces”. ⁹⁰⁵ In March, Secretary of State for the United States, Anthony Blinken, used the phrase “ethnic cleansing” to describe the situation in Western Tigray. ⁹⁰⁶ Accounts from witnesses on the ground verify this, indicating that those who identified as Tigrayan were expelled, raped or killed by Amhara militia, while many people remain unaccounted for. ⁹⁰⁷ One witness noted their beliefs that in Amhara, mothers “hope that their son will get a piece of land in western Tigray”.⁹⁰⁸ Reports suggest that by March, shops, hotels, homes, offices and businesses had been taken over by Amhara authorities. The western Tigrayans pushed out, wealth looted, their livelihoods on the brink as a result.⁹⁰⁹ The Amhara forces responded to these allegations stating that they were in Amhara, not Tigray,⁹¹⁰ providing further evidence that there was an agenda to recapture the profitable lands of Western Tigray, which they viewed as their own.

The implications of the conflict on the sesame and manufacturing (through looting) industries will be devastating for food security. These industries account for up to 1/3

of Tigrayans’ income streams.⁹¹¹ With income decreasing, and food prices increasing, with no hope of growing food due to the scorched earth tactics, it will be a huge challenge for many to access enough nutritional food to survive. The longer this conflict continues, the harder it will be recovering the food security in the region.

Obstruction of Humanitarian Access and Assistance

“The fear is that the combination of an informational black hole and the systematic and deliberate dismantling of a food economy means that best-practice food security assessment and forecasting is likely only to diagnose a famine when it is too late.” The World Peace Foundation ⁹¹²

Access – information and the humanitarian response

Under international humanitarian law, it is essential that civilians in conflicts are given adequate protections, including the ability to receive humanitarian assistance.⁹¹³ However, since the conflict began humanitarian access has been disrupted, obstructed and restricted. The communications blackout, compounded by constraints on physical access have meant that the sheer extent of the human rights violations across Tigray is not yet known.⁹¹⁴ Reports could reflect just the ‘tip of the iceberg’.⁹¹⁵ It is clear that the Ethiopian government is trying to prevent information leaving Tigray. Journalists have been targeted, arrested, deported, or killed, while translators and fixers have been intimidated. ⁹¹⁶ Many people have been separated from their loved ones, and without communications systems in place, they have no
idea if their families are still alive.

Ethiopia’s Director of Action Against Hunger Panos Navrozidis referred to Tigray as a “black hole”, as with limited access via communication channels and the majority of the region off limits to aid agencies, the extent of food insecurity on the ground was unclear.⁹¹⁷ The communications embargo within the region has certainly complicated the aid effort. In many cases, humanitarian staff had been unreachable for months, due to the lack of phone or internet services, which had been down intermittently since November.⁹¹⁸ This made predicting the extent of food insecurity and the level of assistance required extremely hard for aid organisations. In November Catherine

Sozi, the United Nations resident coordinator in Ethiopia told reporters about the conditions: “[t]he telecommunications are down, road access is closed, and fuel, water and cash in particular for our remaining staff and civilians to buy food wherever they may be is cut off.”⁹¹⁹ From November till January, supply routes for food and humanitarian aid had been cut off almost entirely.⁹²⁰ Activities such as the nutritional support programmes run by the World Food Programme, which had been in operation prior to the outbreak of the conflict, providing essential support to families whose nutritional intake was already dangerously low, had to be put on hold. ⁹²¹

here were repeated calls for a humanitarian corridor to allow aid supplies into the region, culminating in an agreement between the UN and the Ethiopian Government at the beginning of December. ⁹²² Despite this, there was little evidence of it coming into effect till January, a result of bureaucratic hold ups.⁹²³ The United Nations, facilitated by the World Food Programme, was given permission to deliver three aid convoys to two refugee camps and Mekelle in December.⁹²⁴ One of the UN Convoys providing supplies was shot at by militia and access to the camp was denied.⁹²⁵ This instance demonstrated the fragile nature of the conflict and the dangers of providing life-saving relief in an active conflict zone where there is a disregard for international law.⁹²⁶ Most humanitarian agencies, such as UNICEF, UNHCR, Médecins Sans Frontiers and Oxfam, were only given permission to access the region in early January, more than two months after the conflict began. Once the bureaucratic barriers were overcome, the organisations were granted restricted access to main roads and towns in areas free from ongoing fighting.⁹²⁷ Given the large rural population and growing food insecurity, this was an immediate concern for humanitarian agencies.

In January UN Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric told reporters that “Humanitarian assistance continues to be constrained by the lack of full, and safe, unhindered access to Tigray, caused by both insecurity and bureaucratic delays”.928 He went further to state that “Aid workers have been able to deliver assistance in some areas, mainly in cities, where access has been granted by the authorities. However, the number of people reached is extremely low compared to the 2.3 million people we estimate are in need of life-saving assistance”.929 These fears were mirrored by Albert Vinas, the Emergency Coordinator for Médecins Sains Frontiers in Ethiopia,

who said: “we are very concerned about what may be happening in rural areas” ⁹³⁰ Ongoing clashes and lack of permissions had meant that the majority of Tigray was off limits to the agency, however reports were reaching them of the grave situation faced in these locations: “community elders and traditional authorities have told us, that the situation in these places is very bad”.⁹³¹ When the agency did reach new
towns, the situation was already desperate.

Despite attempts to limit the information leaving Tigray, reports of soaring malnutrition were reaching the United Nations. By mid-January, UNICEF had set up emergency clinics in Shire and reported that the leading cause of death was starvation.⁹³² However, by the end of the month, the Ethiopian Red Cross raised its concerns that 80% of the region was still not receiving aid.⁹³³ These concerns were mirrored in leaked minutes from the Tigray Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC) which stated that they were “not able to reach 99% of the people in need”.⁹³⁴ Nonetheless, according to the UN Chief for OCHA, aid was available in January. Mark Lowcock told reporters that there was “450 tonnes of supplies [that] we’ve been trying to get in that are stuck.”⁹³⁵ Painfully slow bureaucratic processes for approving access, tight restrictions on permitted locations for aid operations, stringent permit checking at various sites within Tigray by the different actors, and limited numbers of UN personnel permitted on the ground, has obstructed aid from reaching those starving within Tigray. In an update, the UN revealed the struggles faced by the various agencies trying to provide relief assistance in Tigray, as “the ‘rules of the game’ change on a day-by-day basis”, paralysing the aid effort.⁹³⁶ Repeated calls by various international organisations, humanitarian agencies and states have reaffirmed the need for “unhindered”, “unimpeded” and “unfettered” access to those in need of assistance.⁹³⁷ By February, three different diplomatic negotiations led by the United Nations had been signed with the Ethiopian Government. However, the agreed upon unhindered access, personnel and cargo clearances, and six-monthblanket travel permissions for UN agencies and NGOs, sadly have come to little effect.⁹³⁸

On 8 February, two of the major Tigrayan humanitarian organisations, Tigray Development Associated (TDA) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) were taken over by the Federal Government.939 The takeover of REST is symbolic. REST played a substantial role in overcoming famine in the 1980s and has helped to build

resilience in the region ever since. REST’s mission was to prevent famines in the region through capacity building, the procurement of international funding and its distribution to those in need.⁹⁴⁰ Despite this, evidence suggests that REST also could have played a role in the cross-border smuggling of arms and diversion of funds to the TPLF during the counter-insurgencies in the 1980s.⁹⁴¹ Although REST had separate offices and staff, to many in the region it was seen as synonymous with the TPLF.⁹⁴² By March, its 11 offices had been looted, its 33 warehouses of aid were destroyed and 70 of is trucks had been stolen.⁹⁴³ The new ‘caretaker administrative board’ has replaced the old management and board members with individuals largely from the Amhara ethnic group.⁹⁴⁴ Criticism quickly began to mount, indicating that the new leadership, in collaboration with military actors, are selling aid on forprofit, rather than delivering it to those in need.⁹⁴⁵

On 11 February, the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed made the following statement: “Ending the suffering in Tigray and around the country is now my highest priority. This is why I am calling for the United Nations and international relief agencies to work with my government.” This statement appears contradictory to the reports from aid organisations and human rights groups. Just a day earlier at a webinar hosted by Chatham House, Mark Lowcock raised his fears that due to continued access restraints and conflict related complications 80% of the population was still not being reached by humanitarian agencies operating in the region.⁹⁴⁶ These concerns were mirrored by OCHA Official Jens Laerke, who noted that access permissions were significantly holding up the delivery of aid: “The problem is access both to get into Tigray in the first place and also getting from Mekelle into the countryside where most of the people in need are.”⁹⁴⁷ Many of the north-western
Woredas and Kebeles were off limits to aid agencies throughout February, as actors on the ground denied them access.948 Additionally, in OCHA’s February report, it is clear that the shortage of personnel was hampering the aid effort: “Although progress has been made, with an increasing amount of humanitarian cargo mobilized, critical staff needed to scale up assistance have not been able to travel to Tigray.”949 Despite humanitarian workers being poised and ready to move in to assist with the aid distribution, the agencies needed clearance from the Federal government to bring in more staff for the humanitarian response, which even in

February was still pending.⁹⁵⁰ As such, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s statement appears detached from reality.

Reports of increasing hunger and malnutrition continued to flow out of Tigray during February, with OCHA reporting that “[a]ccess to essential services, telecommunications, cash and fuel remains largely disrupted, compounding an already acute situation, and preventing people from meeting their vital and most basic needs.” ⁹⁵¹ Thousands of people in Tigray had not received any assistance for the four months since conflict began.⁹⁵² At this point, only 1% of nutrition treatment facilities located across Tigray were reachable.⁹⁵³ Despite being granted greater access than other humanitarian agencies Médecins Sains Frontiers and the International Commission of the Red Cross faced significant impediments to access due to security issues and lack of authorisation. ⁹⁵⁴ The Ethiopian Red Cross was given the most access permissions but still reported only being able to access 20% of those in need.⁹⁵⁵ As the number of people taking refuge in remote areas was still unknown due to a lack of access, many more people could have been in need of lifesaving support than originally believed. Despite this, the Ethiopian government claimed to have already helped 1.8 million people through the delivery of 31,000 tonnes of critical food supplies by mid- February.⁹⁵⁶ Commentators have suggested that these aid deliveries had little impact on slowing the deterioration of food security within the region, implying either negligence, incompetence, or nefarious activity within the governments aid distribution system.⁹⁵⁷

“You see their skin is really on their bones. You don’t see any food in their body,” Abera Tola, President of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society ⁹⁵⁸

Humanitarian Access to Tigray by 20th February 2021 ⁹⁵⁹
In her 40 years of experience in the field, Secretary-General of the Norwegian Refugee Council Jan Egeland claimed that she had “rarely seen a humanitarian response so impeded and unable to deliver.”⁹⁶⁰ By March, the little aid that had been allowed into Tigray was concentrated along the main road from Alamata to Shire. Some humanitarian agencies, including Action Against Hunger and World Vision, had managed to reach a number of smaller towns off the main road.⁹⁶¹ To make matters worse, the situation has been dangerous for the aid workers allowed into the region. A clearly marked Médecins Sains Frontiers convoy and two public busses were pulled over at what appeared to be the aftermath of an ambush.⁹⁶² The men from the busses in front were shot at the side of the road in front of the Médecins Sains Frontiers’ staff. The Médecins Sains Frontiers’ driver was beaten with the soldier’s gun and threatened. A spokesperson for Médecins Sains Frontiers said “Our teams are still reeling from witnessing the senseless loss of lives from this latest attack”.⁹⁶³

Things began to improve in March, when OCHA reported that more aid convoys and humanitarian staff were given access to the region. By 22 March, the UN had 240 staff on the ground,⁹⁶⁴ and had managed to secure use of working satellite dishes, nonetheless, they were still awaiting approval for satellite phones and communication equipment, which were restricted up until mid-March. An estimated 1 million people in urban areas and their surroundings had been reached with food aid by 22 March,⁹⁶⁵ although the Federal Government claimed this figure was much higher at 4 million people. ⁹⁶⁶ Despite the rise in the number of aid beneficiaries, reports indicated that the frequency of aid deliveries was low. Those who had received aid, did so only once or twice in four months.⁹⁶⁷ Additionally, if the widely used estimate of 4.5 million people in dire need of aid is correct,⁹⁶⁸ then the number of those who actually received any form of aid is less than half. Arguably the real
number is lower again.

At the United Nations Security Council debate on Conflict and Hunger in March, the situation in Tigray was highlighted by David Beasley, Chief of the World Food Programme. He told state representatives of the dreadful situation in Tigray, the worsening food insecurity and hampering of aid efforts.⁹⁶⁹ This indicates an acknowledgement by the international community that the situation in Tigray was deteriorating and provided a sign to the Ethiopian Government that the world was keeping a close eye on the reports which have leaked out from behind the information blackout. The ongoing violence in Central, Northern and Western Tigray continued to limit humanitarian access.⁹⁷⁰ Additionally, the continued fighting and control of main roads by militia has not only limited the distribution of aid, but also limited movement to aid distribution sites.⁹⁷¹ Despite repeated claims by Mr. Abiy’s office that Ethiopia had provided “unfettered” access to humanitarian agencies in Tigray, on the 8th April, repeated calls for better access to the region and the cessation of hostilities were raised at the United Nations Security Council.⁹⁷²

Humanitarian Access to Tigray by 23rd March 2021 ⁹⁷³ (slight improvements from February)

Since March, the distribution of aid has not been without challenges. Fuel shortage have impacted the delivery of aid. Large swathes of the region are controlled by armed groups, where heavy fighting has restricted humanitarian access.⁹⁷⁴ Despite the Prime Ministers’ Office declaring that aid workers had ‘unfettered’ access across Tigray, new checkpoints manned by soldiers in uniforms have demanded permits
and refused entry arbitrarily. These factors have caused significant delays in the movement of aid.⁹⁷⁵ The lack of access and excessive bureaucratic hurdles are compounding the already dire conditions for households in Tigray. One farmer told the BBC: “We were eating small remains of crops that we managed to hide, but now we don’t have anything. Nobody has given us any aid. Almost everyone is on the
verge of death – our eyes are affected by the hunger, the situation is perilous. Death is knocking on our door. You can see the hunger on the face of each of us.”⁹⁷⁶

The worrying report that many in Tigray face Phase 5 ‘famine’ conditions has provided a rallying cry for aid agencies. The World Food Programme has ramped up their emergency food aid operation, deploying 180 more staff and scaling up food distributions. However, the Director of the WFP, David Beasley laments: “The brutal
reality for our staff in Tigray is that for every family we reach with vital food, there are countless more, especially in rural areas, that we cannot reach”.⁹⁷⁷ All humanitarian agencies operating in the region have reported continued difficulty reaching those in need, especially in rural areas. Although the UN officially stated that 2.8 million people had been reached with food aid by June, humanitarian workers believe this figure to be considerably lower at only 13% of the 5.5 million people in need of food aid; a result of continued hostilities and barriers to access.⁹⁷⁸

Access for nutritional support

Following the resumption of nutrition activities in February, UNICEF were reporting a worrying trend. For the month of February, more children were admitted for treatment of Severe malnutrition’ (SAM) at a small number of UNICEF clinics, than the pre-conflict region-wide figure.⁹⁷⁹ By April nearly 10% of the children across Tigray had been screened by humanitarian agencies in collaboration with the Regional Health Bureau. According to the World Health Organisation, the level of ‘moderate malnutrition’ (MAM) and SAM in children under 59 months provides an
indication of the entire population’s food security.⁹⁸⁰ Alarmingly, 25% of the children screened fell under the MAM category, while 2.9% were identified as SAM.⁹⁸¹ These statistics are even more disturbing when placed in the context of the decades of improvement in nutrition which preceded the current conflict. At the time, commentators were speculating that 100 children were dying each day due to malnutrition.⁹⁸²

In some areas the figures are even more concerning. At one mobile clinic, run by the International Rescue Committee and UNICEF, at the IDP camp in Mai Tsebri, the demand for nutritional assistance by both IDPs and the community is overwhelming. In just four days, 643 children were screened, 12% and 23% were diagnosed with SAM and MAM respectively.⁹⁸³ “IRC/UNICEF are providing us with all the necessary
drugs to treat children. What we are lacking is essential drugs to treat adults,” says Berhe Gebremeskel, a Health Officer at Mai Tsebri, Mobile Health and Nutrition Team (MHNT). “For example, we have screened 54 pregnant and lactating women today and 26 have moderate acute malnutrition. And from the 205 children screened for malnutrition this morning, 139 are moderately malnourished.”⁹⁸⁴ Ready-to-Use
Therapeutic Food (RUFT) donated by USAID is being handed out to parents for their malnourished children and emergency drug kits have been procured with UK Government funding. This is just one of 22 Mobile Health and Nutrition Teams (MHNTs) operated by UNICEF in the region since access was granted, indicating the
severity of food insecurity. However, by June, OCHA reported the desperate need for more Ready-to-Use-Therapeutic Food (RUFT) Vitamin A and Albendazole for children in Eastern Tigray.⁹⁸⁵

Worke Tsegaye, a twenty-year-old young mother had left her home in December, travelling for three months through active conflict zones to reach safety and find treatment for her two-year-old son’s fever.⁹⁸⁶ Her husband remained behind, reluctant to leave his home, so with no way of getting in touch, Worke does not even know if he is still alive: “We were so scared of the conflict and everyone left the town all at once. We moved from one place to the other until we reached in Mai Tsebri. It was difficult.” She walks two hours a day to the IDP site, where she receives water, healthcare, and hygiene products.⁹⁸⁷ Having been unable to afford treatment for her son at the local health centre, the mobile clinic has provided them with a lifeline. Her story is just one of many which remain untold

7.7 The politicisation of aid

There are mounting concerns that although food aid has now reached Tigray, it is not enough and is not reaching those who it is intended for.⁹⁸⁸ Widespread looting and interference with aid distributions has led to reports of aid being diverted to Eritrean and Amhara militia.⁹⁸⁹ An investigation into the official amount of aid donated and eyewitness testimony within Tigray shows a discrepancy between the amount of aid donated and what has been received. In Shire, two deliveries of food aid were distributed by the Federal Government in December and January.⁹⁹⁰ The December delivery amounted to between 1100 and 1760 tonnes of food aid. The first of the deliveries should have provided the inhabitants and IDPs with 15kg of food aid per person, while the January delivery was believed to be able to last inhabitants for two months. However, conversations with people in Shire illustrate a different reality. Not all the intended recipients received food aid, and many that did were forced to sign for 15kg when they only received 7kg.⁹⁹¹ This activity is not restricted to Shire, and many rural areas have not seen any aid at all.⁹⁹² The same investigation revealed that Eritrean soldiers had stolen food aid from IDPs who were living in the

Aksum University Shire Campus.⁹⁹³ Further evidence suggests that the individuals in charge of distributing the aid were syphoning it off and selling it on for profit.⁹⁹⁴

In a similar fashion, reports from northern areas of Tigray near the Eritrean border indicate that despite food aid reaching the woredas, it was all promptly stolen by the Eritrean army.⁹⁹⁵ One humanitarian worker recalled their sorrow when they witnessed this first hand: “We went to bring food aid to a town in a woreda that is fully controlled by the Eritrean army. All the food aid that we brought was taken by the Eritrean soldiers. I was so sad.”⁹⁹⁶ Unfortunately these events are common in Tigray. In early June, the Ethiopian Defence Forces apprehended INGO trucks containing flour and essential non-food items. They arrested the trucks drivers and confiscated the aid. The goods in question had been purchased with money from the Ethiopian Humanitarian Fund, the United Nations fund collected from international donors.⁹⁹⁷ The ethical concerns associated with the misappropriation of aid by Ethiopian soldiers are alarming. This pattern has been repeated since the conflict began. The limited data available makes it difficult to assess how much aid has been looted or has reached the intended beneficiaries. Researchers from the University of Ghent indicate that no aid has been distributed in areas under Amhara control and several other woredas where access has been denied due to pervasive fighting.⁹⁹⁸ It is estimated that over 2 million people have not received any aid between the beginning of the conflict in November and June 2021.

Since 10 February, Ethiopian soldiers have prevented food aid from reaching Hawzena and Tembein, known TPLF strongholds. They ordered the aid to be returned to Mekelle, so as to prevent it from entering a region inhabited by their opposition. The Ethiopian forces thus demonstrated that starvation is a tactic, if not a policy objective of their campaign. In further support of this, individuals operating on the ground have outlined how the Ethiopian government’s relief plans do not discuss how aid could be distributed within the TPLF controlled areas.⁹⁹⁹ Similar tactics have been used by the Eritrean soldiers, who have withheld aid from those suspected to be TPLF sympathisers or fighters.¹⁰⁰⁰ In one nterview, a witness from Irob recalled the horrifying scene when Eritrean soldiers threatened her by saying: “If you don’t
bring your father, your brothers, you don’t get the aid, you’ll starve”.¹⁰⁰¹ Should the men in the family be handed over to the Eritrean soldiers, their fate would almost certainly have been death.

OCHA have been recording each denial of humanitarian, and by 10 June there had been 131 incidents. A rise in violence against humanitarian workers has increased the risk of operating in the region. Aid workers have been intimidated, arrested, assaulted, and even killed.¹⁰⁰² In May, Samantha Power, the administrator of USAID raised her concerns over the intentional attacks on aid workers, which by this point had left eight humanitarian workers killed in action.¹⁰⁰³ Of the 131 violations, 54 were undertaken by Ethiopian soldiers, 50 committed by Eritrean soldiers, 4 by combined Eritrean and Ethiopian forces, 21 by Amhara militias and 1 by Tigrayan opposition forces.¹⁰⁰⁴ As such, no parties to the conflict have clean hands.

Other worrying reports of the politicisation of aid have seeped out of Tigray.

Civilians trying to reach aid distribution points face perilous journeys, with the risk of hitting roadblocks, extortionate bribes, or targeted violence. One farmer told the BBC: “When we want to go to the place where there is aid all roads are blocked… Even if we try on foot, if the militias from Amhara found us they force us to pay 4,000-5,000 birr [between $90 and $115] each.” Another farmer added: “If we try to
go to the place where there is aid we will be killed in the forest”.¹⁰⁰⁵ What’s more, in many woredas, unless a Prosperity Party administrator (the Ethiopian Federal Government’s party) was appointed, aid was withheld. Additionally, local NGOs have reported that those who became Prosperity Party members were rewarded with larger rations of food aid.¹⁰⁰⁶ This use of food as a means to bribe starving civilians for political support, while withholding food from dissidents, is a calculated, inexcusable, inhumane act. The patterns of despair, misery and malnutrition which have been reported illustrates a daunting picture of devastation across Tigray, which will only get worse if unhindered access is not granted and hostilities ceased.

7.8 Is history repeating itself?

As has been demonstrated, conflict and poor policy decisions led to the calamitous events in 1984.¹⁰⁰⁷ Since then, the region had been the site of impressive development, with food security and health improving across the board. The growth

of industry and microfinances provided Tigrayans with new freedoms through financial security. It is painful to view the ongoing conflict in the light of these developments; decades of hard work have been undone in a matter of months. Although the Coronavirus pandemic and locust invasion impacted the region, the conflict has devastated all hopes of immediate food security. The alarming reports of human rights violations which have occurred since November, and which continue to unfold, will scar Tigray for many years to come.

The September to January harvest was damaged by locusts, then interrupted by the beginning of the conflict. The sowing season from April-June 2021 ahead of the kiremt rainy season has also been disrupted. The soils have been scorched of their fertility, people have been displaced from their land, and grain stores have been looted. It is unclear how many farmers still have access to fertile land or seed. With livestock slaughtered and equipment pillaged, it is uncertain how many farmers will be able to plough what land still remains. The Bureau of Agriculture has begun a three-month plan to assist farmers in accessible areas ahead of the kremti rains, however there is a desperate need for a ceasefire so that farmers can sow their crops safety.¹⁰⁰⁸ There is also a demand for seed, as grain has been consumed in order to stay alive. Despite these efforts, many people remain inaccessible, do not have land or seed to sow, or are in sites of ongoing conflict. Fears that the upcoming growing season from June to November will be lost are mounting. If this happens, it could be a year until the people of Tigray are able to grow their own food. This would further decimate hopes for long-term food security in the region, as recovery to pre-conflict levels of food security could take many years. As such, the battle wounds will not fade if the next harvest is prevented…

“Farmers express their hope that the war should be over before kremti, otherwise there will be huge famine and starvation next year.” Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Senior Fellow at the World Peace Foundation & TPLF ¹⁰⁰⁹

Despite attempts to conceal the real extent of the human rights violations from the world, information has leaked out of the region and modern techniques (open-source investigations and satellite imagery) have been used to corroborate reports of widespread and systematic starvation crimes against the civilian population. However, the communication blackout and limited access to the region means the sheer extent of suffering is still unknown. By keeping networks down and limiting access, starvation crimes are being concealed.

“One day I fear an ashamed world will apologize to the people of Tigray for not doing more. The communication blackout in the region and the distraction of a global pandemic will not stand up as adequate excuses. We know too much already” Magnus MacFarlane-Barrow, Founder and CEO of Mary’s Meals.¹⁰¹⁰

The disruption to economic activity, destruction, looting and pillaging of food supplies, inaccessibility of financial savings, withholding of wages, and high levels of displacement, have left over 5.5 million people in Tigray food insecure. The IPC report released in June should shock the world. This is now the worst food security crisis since Somalia in 2011 and without immediate action more lives will be lost. If the conflict does not escalate further and 60% of the population are reached with aid, it is still predicted that 400,000 people will be facing famine-like conditions by September.¹⁰¹¹ Unfortunately, this could be the best-case scenario if action is not taken immediately.

Portrays May-June 2021 food security, and predicted food security for July-September 2021 ¹⁰¹²

“We cannot make the same mistake twice, we cannot let Ethiopia starve” Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, US Representative to the United Nations

At the US-EU roundtable on the eve of the G7 summit in June, the UN’s Humanitarian Chief outlined, with uncomfortable gravity, the process of dying of starvation. With no food, the metabolism slows down to preserve energy for the vital

organs. Fatigue, irritability, and confusion sets in. The immune system loses strength. The likelihood of dying from other diseases, such as cholera or Covid-19 increases. For those who escape disease, but remain without food, the vital organs wither and fail. Eventually the body devours its own muscles. Hallucinations and convulsions prelude the heart stopping. “[T]his is a terrible agonising and humiliating death, it is going to happen to a lot of people [in Tigray]… and that is particularly cruel in a world like ours where there is in fact more than enough food for everyone. This is a solvable problem and we really have to solve it” Mark Lowcock, OCHA

There is evidence to suggest that starvation is not only being used as a tactic, but also as a weapon of war in Tigray. Through the destruction of harvests, scorched earth tactics and slaughtering of livestock, the ability for Tigrayans to produce their own food has been removed. hrough the looting and pillaging of possessions and businesses, as well as the attacks on the banking system and work opportunities, the ability for Tigrayans to buy food has been removed. Through the obstruction, diversion and withholding of aid, the ability of Tigrayans to access lifesaving food has been removed. A famine far exceeding the devastation of the 1984-85 famine could indeed occur in the coming months, if unhindered access to all areas of Tigray is not granted to humanitarian workers and if relief is not delivered to all those in need rather than used to fuel the war. A cessation of hostilities is essential for food security in the region.

8. The plight of Eritrean refugees

By Mike Slotznick ¹⁰¹³

Introduction

Within weeks after the start of the war in Tigray, Eritrean troops began invading United Nations-supported camps that sustained Eritrean refugees there. The camps, situated just inside the Ethiopian border, housed nearly 100,000 Eritreans who had fled the brutal Eritrean regime. The troops killed some of the refugees, obliterated two of the four camps, and forced several thousand refugees back into Eritrea, where they faced conscription into the invading army, or imprisonment and torture for having initially fled their home country. Eritrean refugees elsewhere in Ethiopia, particularly in the capital city Addis Ababa, also became subject to abduction. Armed Tigrayan actors also attacked some of the refugees in the camps. All of those activities constitute violations of international law.¹⁰¹⁴

The atrocities committed against the Eritrean refugees occurred contemporaneously with those committed against Tigrayans and others. In many ways they were all of a piece, reflecting the overall ascendance of violence, demolition of societal order and

erasure of human dignity. The author does not compare them, one to the next. Rather, he has attempted in this chapter to narrow his topic to its title.

8.1 Who are the refugees, and why are they in Ethiopia?

Eritrea is one of the most repressive countries on earth. It is widely referred to as “the North Korea of Africa” – due to its hermetic isolation, and to the government’s brutalization and enslavement of its own people, even as they suffer from malnourishment and destitution. Major human rights organizations have amply documented those conditions. In 2016 a United Nations investigatory panel – the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea (COI) –accused the ruling regime f crimes against humanity.¹⁰¹⁵ But the regime has been impervious to its
widespread condemnation, and the abuses have continued.

There has been no census of Eritrea in modern times, so there is no authoritative figure for its population. The Eritrean government provided an estimate of 3.65 million in 2015.¹⁰¹⁶ By contrast, the CIA estimate for 2021 is a population of 6.15 million.¹⁰¹⁷ Either way, it is extraordinary that by 2018 some 500,000 Eritreans had fled to other lands, including to the Tigray region of Ethiopia.¹⁰¹⁸

To explain the flight, we should first describe its causes.

a) Crimes against humanity.

After a 30-year war of secession from Ethiopia, Eritrea gained its independence – de facto in 1991 and officially in 1993. The secessionists had promised the Eritrean people democracy, and a democratic constitution was ratified in 1997. But the constitution was never implemented; the new state never became democratic; elections were never held; and, from the start, the country was ruled by the iron hand of the secessionist leader, Isaias Afwerki. The repression avalanched shortly after Eritrea’s 1998-2000 border war with Ethiopia, in which over 100,000 combatants in the aggregate are estimated to have died.¹⁰¹⁹ The war had been waged nominally over a disputed boundary, but broader tensions had preceded it, and the armistice resolved nothing. In any event, the war was widely considered not only a defeat but
a catastrophe for Eritrea, which had fired the first shots. Enraged, humiliated, possibly fearing an overthrow, and in any case bent on retaining control his country, Isaias moved to shutter all internal political dissent. What ensued was a near-total evisceration of personal freedoms and an acute violation of human rights, as documented by major governmental, inter-governmental and human rights organizations and as summarized in a paper posted by The America Team for

Displaced Eritreans (hereafter, The America Team) in October 2016.¹⁰²⁰ Since then, the regime’s human rights abuses have continued, and The America Team has continued to track and post reports of them.¹⁰²¹ A restatement of the core reporting in the October 2016 paper follows.

➢ Authoritarian police state. The governing regime is authoritarian; no elections have been held for decades; only one political party is permitted; independent non- governmental associations are forbidden; public assemblies for all but recreational or government-sponsored purposes are outlawed; academic freedom is restricted; foreign organizations (and funding from them) are mostly banned; citizens are
subjected to constant governmental surveillance and intimidation; the judiciary is not independent; justice is administered without rule of law; and the regime governs by sowing fear. (A documentary film entitled “Escaping Eritrea,” produced and directed by Evan Williams and released by the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) on May 4, 2021, describes in horrific and graphic detail the conditions that have forced Eritreans to flee their homeland en masse.¹⁰²²)

➢ Throttling of press and political expression. No freedom of the press or political expression is permitted. Journalists and political opponents have frequently been jailed, often never to be heard from again.

➢ Harsh imprisonment, including of family members. Any suspected dissent on the part of citizens is routinely punished by imprisonment, commonly in underground shipping containers, and commonly under intolerable, inhumane conditions – including starvation, overcrowding, lack of medical attention, rape of female prisoners, lack of sanitation, and extreme cold and heat – which conditions, separately or in the aggregate, often lead to death in detention. Arrests are commonly arbitrary, and prisoners are not informed of charges against them. Political prisoners are held incommunicado and are denied access to lawyers or family members. Family members for their part are often imprisoned or otherwise
punished as well: sometimes for merely inquiring about the location or status of their imprisoned loved ones; for the failure of a loved one living overseas to pay the 2% income tax that the government imposes on Eritreans worldwide; or for a loved one’s desertion from the country’s slave-like military service (see below).

➢ Religious persecution. The practice of only four religions is permitted, and Eritrean faith institutions are controlled by the government. The Orthodox Church’s freely chosen patriarch has been under house arrest for years, and in May 2021 he was deposed and replaced by the regime.¹⁰²³ Sunni leaders have been imprisoned and tortured. Various Protestant sects are harshly persecuted: dissent by their followers
and unauthorized religious practice are routinely punished by imprisonment. In prison, religious dissidents are often tortured until they renounce their faith.

➢ Torture. Imprisonment for any of the above offenses commonly results in gruesome physical and psychological torture, from which many prisoners are
believed to die. Many detention facilities are known to exist throughout the country, where tortuous conditions and mistreatment are likely to exist

➢ Travel restrictions. Entering and exiting the country is tightly controlled. Those who exit without visas – notably, to escape the regime overland in pursuit of refuge in another country – are in peril for their lives, in that government security forces have at times had orders to shoot-to-kill at the country’s borders. While those orders have been variously enforced in recent years, at a minimum, would-be escapees
who are captured are frequently imprisoned and sometimes tortured.

➢ Slave-like national service. All citizens are subject by conscription to mandatory national service, either military or civil. Children are routinely conscripted at age 17, and sometimes as young as 15. The service may last for an indefinite term of years, sometimes decades; follow-up reserve duty (or required participation for older citizens in a “people’s militia”) can also last indefinitely, and reservists are sometimes
called up en masse; food is inadequate; wages are negligible, thus impoverishing the conscripts’ families; farms are left with inadequate labor; long-term conscripts are unable to form families or to fully participate in family life; conscripts are commonly forced to work for government and military officials in their private affairs or for government-controlled and even foreign enterprises, often in harsh conditions; female conscripts are commonly abused sexually by their commanding officers and others; and any dissent while in the national service (including the practice of prohibited religions and refusing sexual advances) is commonly punished by imprisonment and torture. In sum, the national service has been widely viewed, including by the COI, as amounting to forced labor, and even slavery.

➢ Killings and disappearances. The regime has engaged in extrajudicial executions, arbitrary killings, forced disappearances, mass murders of ethnic minorities, and executions of military deserters.

➢ Rape. The rape of Eritrean women in the military and in detention, as described above, has been characterized in and of itself by the COI as a crime against humanity.

Where to flee?

From the outbreak of the war of liberation in the 1960s, Eritreans had sought refuge in regions adjacent to their homeland – either in Sudan or in the non-Eritrean parts of Ethiopia (of which Eritrea was a part until 1991). Following independence and then the 1998-2000 border war with Ethiopia, Eritreans continued to flee to Sudan and Ethiopia. As a consequence, both countries came to hold large Eritrean populations. But refugee life in Sudan was (and remains) highly insecure, even in camps supported by the office of the UNHCR. Eritreans have at times been in danger of being robbed, murdered and kidnapped, then trafficked and tortured for ransom. While some older Eritrean communities in eastern Sudan have felt safer, newer arrivals often have not. The refugees in Sudan thus have often sought to move elsewhere. Ethiopia thus became a nearby, alternative haven of preference for many. And many of those refugees who fled to Ethiopia settled in UNHCR-supported camps in Tigray, just south of the Eritrean border.

195
Prior to 2018, Ethiopia and Eritrea were still bitter enemies, and the Ethiopian government could be generally relied upon for securing those camps. Ethiopia had welcomed and protected many thousands of refugees of many nationalities; plus, its government saw its protection of Eritrean refugees there as an embarrassment for the enemy Eritrean regime. Thus secured, genuine communities arose within the camps in Tigray, replete with education provided by international NGOs, former Eritrean teachers and the Ethiopian government. There were adequate (or barely adequate) food, water and sanitation, as provided by UNHCR and the NGOs; petty commercial enterprises run by refugees for refugees; and refugee civic councils interfacing between the refugees, on the one hand, and UNHCR, the NGOs and the Ethiopian government, on the other. In addition, the Tigrayan communities surrounding the camps acquiesced to or even affirmatively welcomed the Eritrean refugees – which is not always the case in refugee loci around the world. Why? Most Eritreans and the Tigrayans spoke Tigrinya. Many Eritreans also had family ties in Tigray, in that, until Eritrean independence, the border had been nominal and individuals had moved freely between the regions. Indeed, Eritreans and Tigrayans often expressed a general ethnic consanguinity and affinity with one another. Since the border war, in which Tigrayan-led Ethiopia was pitted against Eritrea, the Tigrayans also shared with the Eritrean refugees a hatred for and fear of the Eritrean
regime. Tigrayans and encamped refugees enjoyed ongoing reciprocal trade, sometimes shared worship services and sometimes even shared the schooling of children.

But life in the Ethiopian camps was a dead-end for the residents. The living standardwas rudimentary. As in refugee camps everywhere, one could not easily flourish as a vital participant in a nation, economy or fully constituted society. And there was little prospect in Tigray for any of the three ultimate destinies that UNHCR wishes for the refugees that it supports everywhere: safe return to one’s homeland, resettlement in
a third country, or absorption by the host country (including full participation in its civic and economic institutions). As to the first, Eritrea remained an inhospitable dystopia. As to the second, only a small fraction of UNHCR-supported refugees are ever resettled anywhere. And as to the third, Eritrean refugees could live in Ethiopian cities, but (until 2019) they could not lawfully work there.¹⁰²⁴ Forward migration thus
beckoned, not only for the Eritreans in Sudan, but for those in Tigray as well.

Where then to migrate? Across the Middle East, Eritreans were unwelcome. Migrations to Israel by way of Egypt resulted in horrific rape, torture and extortion for cash at the hands of outlaw Bedouin tribesmen in the Sinai desert. Even the initial Israeli tolerance of African migrants who reached that country beginning in 2007 devolved into a backlash as their numbers grew. The Eritreans were physically safe there. But by 2012, Israel had enacted an “anti-infiltration law” targeting African migrants; it had constructed a fence at the border with Sinai to keep additional African migrants out; and it had begun to sorely pressure its existing Africans to resettle elsewhere.¹⁰²⁵

Contemporaneously, with the collapse of the Libyan state and the onset of massive African migrations across the Mediterranean from that country to Europe, Eritreans joined in the flow – passing through Sudan to Libya, where smugglers set them afloat in unseaworthy boats. Those migrations, or attempted migrations, reached a peak between 2015 and 2017. Many Eritreans and other migrants drowned or otherwise died at sea.¹⁰²⁶ Many of those who survived found themselves resented in Europe as part of what was widely referred to as a global migration crisis. In Libya itself they and other Africans were – and they continue to be – routinely enslaved, raped, tortured, extorted and otherwise savagely brutalized. Even the EU has participated in the tragedy, by funding and encouraging Libya’s militias and its coast guard to capture and detain those attempting to sail to Europe. The detentions in Libya are intended to keep the refugees from attempting the Mediterranean crossing again, and the conditions of detention are horrific. In sub-Saharan Africa, resentment and a dearth of economic opportunities also have greeted those Eritreans who have arrived. So small numbers of Eritreans (hundreds annually, not thousands) have chosen to head for the U.S.: they have undertaken a journey across Africa to South America and then northwards through the perilous jungles of Panama toward the U.S.-Mexico border. In America many have won asylum, but others have not.

In sum, outside of Tigray, there has been no ready haven for those on the run. A great many thus have remained concentrated in Ethiopia. On the eve of the Tigray conflict, UNHCR was supporting four Eritrean refugee camps in Tigray: Shimelba and Hitsats in the north – that is, closest to the Eritrean border – and Adi Harush and Mai Ayni further south. As of November 2020, UNHCR counted 8,702 refugees in Shimelba, 25,248 in Hitsats, 32,167 in Adi Harush, and 21,682 in Mai Ayni. In addition, the agency operated a reception center in Endabaguna for refugees first crossing the border into Ethiopia, where they would stay temporarily pending distribution to the various camps. It also counted 8,424 Eritrean refugees residing in towns in Tigray pursuant to the Ethiopian government’s Out of Camp Policy, bringing the total figure in Tigray to 96,223. In addition, some 51,800 Eritrean refugees were living in Ethiopia’s Afar region (many of those in UNHCR-supported camps), and
30,722 in Addis. The total number in Ethiopia was thus 178,745.¹⁰²⁷ As of 2015, around 100,000 Eritrean refugees were living in the camps in Tigray. When the war began in Tigray in 2020, the number was approximately the same. Yet for much of that time, thousands per month had been entering the camps from Eritrea. How to account for the relatively steady state of the camp population? Apparently as many as were arriving were moving on – whether to Ethiopian cities such as Addis; to Libya and then Europe (or the bottom of the Mediterranean); or
elsewhere, wherever circumstances might permit, but not often with comfort or joy.

For its part, how did the Eritrean government view the refugees? Their having escaped the country was seen not merely as an embarrassment, but as likely to generate anti-regime narratives and agitation within whatever countries they landed in, including in the West. Regime operatives in Europe and the U.S. often harassed

and occasionally assaulted refugees and asylees there. The regime particularly suspected refugees in Ethiopia of anti-Eritrea activities, and of being stoked in that by the Ethiopian government. In addition, the departure of refugees had bled Eritrea of both work force and military force. Not surprisingly, then, official Eritrean policy branded the refugees as traitors – particularly if they had escaped from or avoided military service, or if they had expressed opposition to Eritrea before or after fleeing. And for their treachery, if they were forcibly returned by another country, they stood to be imprisoned, tortured, and possibly killed. But in truth, the regime’s actual outlook seemed more nuanced, or more confused. For example, in some ways, the regime may have been pleased that malcontents had taken their heterodox opinions elsewhere. Refugees in the West had also become an essential source of remittances and foreign exchange, as they supported their families back home in Eritrea. Further, the surge of asylum seekers into Europe resulted in Europe making substantial grants of development assistance to Eritrea (and to other countries of origin), which Europe hoped would stanch the in-flow. In addition, Eritrean border guards often accepted bribes from escaping refugees, and some high-ranking officers appeared to be trafficking in refugees for profit. Overall, the attitudes within in Eritrea relative to those who had escaped thus were mysterious from the outside, and possibly also from within.

As for the families left behind, there too was a mix. They felt terrified for those who had gone off to the perils of Sinai, Libya and the Mediterranean. And they felt anguished when they were extorted for cash to free those who were tortured en route – exorbitant sums, that could ruin a family financially for a generation. But if and when the refugees found a safe destination in which they could work, their families at home took much comfort in the remittances. Some relatives also hoped to rejoin in the West those who had succeeded in gaining refugee or asylum status there.

8.2 The rapprochement

Beginning in June 2018 and formalized by agreement in July, the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments made peace.¹⁰²⁸ The world thrilled to the development, and for that achievement Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize. Among the many hopes for the rapprochement were that Isaias – no longer at war – would demobilize his army and end the brutal servitude of its conscripts and of the Eritrean people at large. As the borders opened between the countries, cross-border commerce flowered, and separated families united. A new wave of refugees – Eritrea was still a horrific place to be – freely fled into Tigray. It seemed too good to be true.

In fact, it was. Within months the borders closed once again. Although various rationales for the closing were circulated – some by the Eritrean government, some by others – the actual reasons were unknown, as were the terms of the peace arrangement. The lockdown on information flow within Eritrea did not abate. Both in the camps and in Addis, Eritreans felt a foreboding, that the rapprochement foretold an ascendancy for Isaias within Ethiopian affairs and a marked peril for themselves. Out of fear, expatriate Eritreans linked to oppositionist activities stopped traveling to

Ethiopia. Asylum seekers who faced expulsion from the U.S. likewise rejected opportunities to return to Ethiopia. In April 2020, Ethiopia announced that it would no longer grant prima facie refugee status to fleeing Eritreans.¹⁰²⁹ It also made plain that it wished to close the northern camps and relocate the refugees.¹⁰³⁰ It expressly announced that month that it planned to close Hitsats and move its residents to Mai Ayni and Adi Harush, despite the already crowded conditions there and concerns for the spread of the coronavirus in such circumstances.¹⁰³¹ By the summer of 2020, rumors were rife that Abiy and Isaias were plotting to target the refugees. What had begun as the realization of a dream of peace was now looking more like a nightmare

8.3 The war in Tigray begins

The war began on 3 November 1032 with an attack by Tigrayan forces on multiple bases in Tigray serving the federal government’s Northern Command,¹⁰³³ followed by a counter-attack by federal forces on 4 November.

The Ethiopian federal government – which even before the war had been harassing and repressing the press – immediately banned international news outlets from the theater. They remained banned for several months. Unverified propaganda from warring factions filled the information void. As one consequence, the chronology of events that follows in this chapter often reflects piecemeal and sometimes uncorroborated information. Sometimes reports appeared weeks or months after the reported events; sometimes dates and details were murky; sometimes a particular

event seemed to originate from multiple sources with somewhat differing detail, and thus to possibly consist of multiple events. Sorting it out was and remains challenging, and almost certainly imperfect. Another consequence of the ban on reliable media coverage were that international actors such as the United Nations, Western governments and major human rights organizations – lacking direct evidence of wrongdoing – were for months reluctant to accuse warring factions of specific human rights abuses.1034 Nevertheless, for The America Team, which has followed both published and unpublished reports continuously, the overall flow of events has seemed manifest. In this chapter, we have attempted to relate them more or less chronologically, and at the same time thematically, in our best attempt at coherence.

➢ The first days. Already on November 5, UNHCR raised alarms about its ability to provide for the camp refugees.¹⁰³⁵ The federal Ethiopian government cut telecommunications throughout Tigray, and Sudan (possibly with the acquiescenceor encouragement of Ethiopia) closed its border, such that camp residents couldneither communicate nor flee to the west.¹⁰³⁶ At least one observer, a leading champion of Eritrean refugees, expressed fears that the refugees could become caught in the crossfire, could become pawns of the belligerents, could be driven out
of the camps, or could be refouled to Eritrea where they might be arrested, imprisoned and tortured.¹⁰³⁷ Eritrea was quickly suspected of being involved in the war.¹⁰³⁸ By November 11, thousands of refugees – mostly Tigrayans, as opposed to Eritreans – had managed to flee to Sudan, notwithstanding the border closure.¹⁰³⁹ As of November 13, as fighting approached the Shimelba camp, UNHCR was trying to remove the refugees living there to the Hitsats camp or elsewhere.¹⁰⁴⁰

➢ Terrified at the camps. The war escalated. On November 14, Tigrayan forces launched a number of missiles at Asmara.¹⁰⁴¹ While they inflicted little damage, the pretext was laid for more overt participation by Eritrea in the war. But Eritrea was already reported to have been shelling the city of Humera in the northwest corner of Tigray.¹⁰⁴²

2 The fighting was now reportedly furious across the region. On November
17, UNHCR reported military clashes near one of the camps.¹⁰⁴³ Also on that date, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that UNHCR staff were cutting back their support for the camps due to security issues, and that they were especially concerned for the safety of those in Shimelba.¹⁰⁴⁴ The Red Cross too voiced its concerns for the encamped refugees.1045

Basic sustenance at the camps was imperilled, and fuel for pumping water there was running dangerously low. Across Tigray, the provision of food and medicine and even access to banks were blocked by the federal government. Communications also remained blacked out. Aid workers in the region were reported to be frantic. Their organizations were negotiating with the federal government for a humanitarian
corridor through Tigray, but that failed to materialize.¹⁰⁴⁶ Soon international workers for UNHCR and the NGOs withdrew from the camps and from Endabaguna entirely.¹⁰⁴⁷ By November 18, all four camps were reportedly experiencing incidental attacks, although the identity of the attackers was not widely known or immediately revealed.¹⁰⁴⁸ On November 20, UNHCR reported that, having not heard from its local
camp staff since November 16, it was “very worried.”¹⁰⁴⁹

➢ Flight to Sudan. Some of the Eritrean refugees did flee to Sudan.¹⁰⁵⁰ Why had more not done so? No survey of course was taken. But the author of this chapter speculated at the time that, first, the refugees did not fear federal Ethiopian forces, which historically had protected them. In addition, the flight to Sudan through the war zone was precarious, and the border was officially closed. What was more, at the camps in Tigray the refugees enjoyed infrastructure, community organization, international NGO support and ethnic coherence. In Sudan, by contrast – despite meritorious emergency responses by UNHCR and other international actors – at that point there was nothing but chaos. In retrospect, many of the Eritreans may have wished they had decided differently and risked flight to Sudan. But there too, no survey likely has been taken.

➢ The Eritrean military moves in. By November 18, unconfirmed reports of Eritrean ground forces operating in theater had begun to emerge. Even acting from a distance, Eritrea’s involvement in the war was reported as being multi-form: hosting federal Ethiopian troops who then shelled and attacked Tigray from the north; forcing Eritrean locals – themselves underfed – to feed those Ethiopian troops; treating
wounded Ethiopian soldiers at Eritrean medical facilities; and rounding up Eritrean conscripts in apparent preparation for deployment in Tigray.¹⁰⁵¹

➢ The worst unfolds. At that point, the atrocities against the refugees began to occur. On or around November 19 (as reported much later), Eritrean forces killed some Eritrean refugees in the town of Adigrat and removed others to Eritrea.¹⁰⁵² On November 20, a report appeared that Eritrean refugees were being arrested in Addis and Shimelba.¹⁰⁵³ At approximately that time (also as reported much later), federal
Ethiopian forces shot a refugee in Selekleka.1054 On November 20, another report appeared of sweeps of Eritrean oppositionists in Addis – possibly some of them well

settled there, and thus not even living as refugees.1055 During a significant fire fight
on November 24 at Adi Harush – involving Tigrayan militia, Amhara militia and
regular Ethiopian federal forces – several refugees were killed, some of the Tigrayan
guards were captured, and other guards fled for their lives.¹⁰⁵⁶ Also on November 24,
Eritrean forces were credibly reported to be engaged in heavy ground fighting,¹⁰⁵⁷ as
well as the shelling of Tigrayan targets from Eritrea and abductions from
Endabaguna.¹⁰⁵⁸ Additional reports of Eritrean ground force activities emerged on
November 26.¹⁰⁵⁹ According to one unpublished report, Eritrean forces took over
Shimelba for several weeks during this period and disappeared five refugee council
leaders; publicly executed five other refugees whom they perceived to be Eritrean
oppositionists; and shot seven others dead as they attempted to flee the camp.
Later, after Tigrayan forces had re-taken the camp, more refugee residents were
killed during fighting between Eritrean and Tigrayan forces.¹⁰⁶⁰ In Hitsats as well, the
camp exchanged hands as between Eritrean and Tigrayan forces, now with
Tigrayans – as reprisals for the savagery of Eritrean forces elsewhere in Tigray –
persecuting, starving, disappearing and killing Eritrean refugees, and with Eritrean
forces abducting them and looting.¹⁰⁶¹ On November 27, UNHCR predicted that the
four camps would run out of food within days.¹⁰⁶² The same day, an additional attack
on Adi Harush was reported, as well as abductions of refugees from Hitsats and
Shimelba.¹⁰⁶³ The level of panic, privation and displacement was now intense.¹⁰⁶⁴
The Red Cross reported some 1,000 Eritrean refugees having fled the camps to
Tigray’s capital, Mekelle.¹⁰⁶⁵

➢ Mass abductions, mass flight, and the killing of aid workers. In the gravest of
developments, on November 28 and the days following, multiple sources reported
the abduction by Eritrean forces of thousands of refugees from Hitsats and
Shimelba. Those who were able to flee had continued doing so. All humanitarian aid
workers by then were long gone from the camps.¹⁰⁶⁶ On December 1, UNHCR itself
acknowledged the reports of abductions and conscriptions from the camps,¹⁰⁶⁷ and
many refugees were reported to be fleeing from even Adi Harush – one of the
southerly (and thus seemingly safer) facilities.¹⁰⁶⁸ On December 2, the flights were
reported more categorically: many or most able-bodied residents were escaping

several camps (probably the northern two), leaving behind mostly elderly and women
with young children. Looting at some of the camps, by indeterminate actors, was
reported as well.¹⁰⁶⁹ On the same day, several Ethiopian aid workers were reported
to have been killed at one of the camps in November.1070 Other reports of aid
workers being killed ensued.¹⁰⁷¹ UNHCR acknowledged the same.¹⁰⁷²

➢ The perpetrators. Who were the perpetrators in these episodes, and how
concerted were the offenses? Plainly, Eritrean forces committed the abductions and
conscriptions, and just as plainly those operations were purposeful, even strategic.
Indeed, by early December, observers were beginning to speculate that Eritrea may
have contemplated the abductions before the war began, and that abductees were
being forced to fight against Tigrayans at the front.¹⁰⁷³ As for the killings at the
camps, some were attributed to identified forces acting deliberately. But others were
of more varied or ambiguous nature. Some may have been accidental; others
inspired by passion and indiscipline rather than tactic; yet others incidental to
concerted criminal activity such as looting or abduction. In late November, Eritrean
troops specifically were reported to have killed a number of refugees at Shimelba,
possibly as those refugees had attempted to flee (reports varied considerably,
ranging from seven to 100 victims).¹⁰⁷⁴ But for the most part, no broad, deliberate
massacre of camp residents appeared – in contrast to deliberate massacres that
were befalling Tigrayans and other populations elsewhere.

➢ Incidents in the south. Reportedly, reprisals by some Tigrayans against the
refugees – for simply being Eritrean – now manifested themselves in the south. On
or around December 2, Tigrayans confiscated agricultural produce headed for Mai
Ayni and killed a refugee there.¹⁰⁷⁵ Also on December 2, a refugee at Mai Ayni was
killed in Tigrayan-Eritrean crossfire,¹⁰⁷⁶ and more crossfire injuries there were
reported on December 5.¹⁰⁷⁷ On December 14, a rape by armed but ununiformed
actors at Adi Harush was reported.¹⁰⁷⁸ At this point, the widespread flight from the
camps was attributable not only to the abductions by Eritrean forces (in the north)
but to fear of Tigrayan cross-fire and vengeance (in the south).¹⁰⁷⁹

➢ The UN stymied. UNHCR announced on December 2 that it had reached an
agreement with the Ethiopian government to resume aid in areas that were under
federal control. But as of December 4, the agency was still unable to access the
refugee camps.¹⁰⁸⁰ Indeed, on December 7, federal forces blocked and shot at a UN

security team as it was traveling in the vicinity of Shimelba – a quite extraordinary
event.¹⁰⁸¹

➢ At Hitsats and Shimelba: abductions confirmed, vengeance proceeds. As the
weeks passed, reports of Eritrean forces abducting and killing refugees at the two
northern camps in November and December became legion,¹⁰⁸² including reports by
the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees,¹⁰⁸³ as well as by the UN’s Special
Rapporteur for Human Rights in Eritrea ¹⁰⁸⁴ and by the UN’s High Commissioner for
Human Rights.¹⁰⁸⁵ One report, on December 9, held that Eritrean forces armed
refugees at Hitsats and sent them out to pillage Tigrayan farms.¹⁰⁸⁶ A report that 26
named abductees were seen in Eritrean prisons appeared on March 7.¹⁰⁸⁷ But, as
before, not just Eritrean forces were implicated. Reports that several women had
been raped by Tigrayan militia as they were fleeing Hitsats appeared on March 9
and March 18.¹⁰⁸⁸ A report that Tigrayan militia killed nine refugees at Hitsats on
December 24 appeared much later.¹⁰⁸⁹ Reports of severe privation at the northern
camps continued into December as well,¹⁰⁹⁰ as did additional reports of looting ¹⁰⁹¹
and of refugees fleeing the camps.¹⁰⁹²

➢ In Addis. Contemporaneously, a new alarm sounded. On December 8, reports
emerged that refugees who had fled the camps and arrived in Addis were being
arrested and detained;¹⁰⁹³ and within days the Ethiopian government was reported to
have forcibly transported them back to Adi Harush, to their considerable peril.¹⁰⁹⁴
Some of those detained had also reportedly been threatened with deportation to
Eritrea.¹⁰⁹⁵ Some had reportedly been beaten in Addis as they had attempted to
flee.¹⁰⁹⁶ In subsequent weeks, the returns to Adi Harush were confirmed; and
additional episodes appeared of Eritrean refugees fleeing the camps, being detained
in Addis, and then being forcibly returned by federal actors to the camps.¹⁰⁹⁷ Other
reports emerged of Eritrean troops being encamped in Addis with the specific
mission of rounding up and refouling Eritrean dissidents.¹⁰⁹⁸ On January 7 and 10,
Ethiopian authorities were reported to be denying exit permits to Eritrean refugees
who had been approved by UNHCR to travel abroad for family reunification – thus
trapping them in Ethiopia.¹⁰⁹⁹

➢ At Adi Harush and Mai Ayni. At length, a small but life-saving bit of relief arrived:
on or around December 15, UNHCR managed to deliver food to the southern
camps.¹¹⁰⁰ But aid workers had not yet resumed significant operations at those
camps, which remained devoid of security, sanitation items and medical care.1101
Sickness went untreated, looting by outsiders was continuous.¹¹⁰² In one terrifying
and debilitating episode, on or around December 21, five indeterminate assailants at
Adi Harush confiscated some 180 to 200 cell phones at gunpoint.¹¹⁰³ On December
24, a man with a saw attacked and injured a refugee at Adi Harush.¹¹⁰⁴ Federal
troops detained refugees from Mai Ayni and Adi Harush on or around Christmas Day
as they travelled to a nearby town to retrieve money sent by their families to a
bank.¹¹⁰⁵ On January 18, incidents of emaciation at the southern camps were
reported. (Starvation had appeared across Tigray more generally.)¹¹⁰⁶ Beginning
January 23, in multiple episodes, federal troops and militias robbed additional

refugees traveling to banks from Adi Harush.¹¹⁰⁷ On January 27, unknown external
assailants shot a refugee woman in Adi Harush.¹¹⁰⁸

➢ The destruction of Shimelba and Hitsats. Conditions in Shimelba and Hitsats
remained largely opaque.¹¹⁰⁹ But on December 19, satellite images detected fires at
Shimelba.¹¹¹⁰ The next day, a journalist on the ground reported that that camp was
empty.¹¹¹¹ As of January 7, humanitarian relief had still not arrived; indeed, there had
been no international activity at the northern camps for almost two months: no food,
medicine, security.¹¹¹² And then arose one of the starkest crimes of the war. On
December 28, The New York Times posted satellite images of scorched earth
around Hitsats.¹¹¹³ AFP on January 2 and Bloomberg on January 9 reported that
new images showed the systematic and widespread destruction of both camps.¹¹¹⁴
On January 15 and January 19, Al Jazeera reported similarly.¹¹¹⁵ As reported by the
Associated Press on January 17, the images now showed even greater
devastation.¹¹¹⁶ By January 21, and in the weeks afterwards, published reports –
following earlier unpublished ones from well-informed sources – emerged that
nothing was left of the two camps, and that all residents had been conscripted, had
been forced back to Eritrea or had fled into Tigray, eating leaves for their
sustenance.¹¹¹⁷ On February 1, UNHCR confirmed the mass exodus from the
north.¹¹¹⁸ But as of February 2, the northern camps were still inaccessible, even to
the UN. ¹¹¹⁹

➢ Again at Adi Harush and Mai Ayni. On January 23 it was reported that Eritrean
forces were telling Eritrean refugees in the Sheraro area (that is, likely including
some of those who had fled Hitsats and Shimelba) not to attempt to reach the two
southern camps – as though wishing to abduct more of them.¹¹²⁰ But as of January
24, the Ethiopian federal government was still returning scattered refugees to the
southern camps.¹¹²¹ On January 20-25, a second food shipment by UNHCR and the
World Food Program arrived there.¹¹²² On February 1, UNHCR’s High Commissioner
nevertheless said that conditions in those camps were abysmal, that the residents

206
were living in fear, and that, altogether, some 20,000 refugees were unaccounted
for.¹¹²³

➢ Destruction of Shimelba and Hitsats confirmed. On February 9, the Ethiopian
government announced, disingenuously, that it had decided to “close” Shimelba and
Hitsats, and that it would seek to bring the refugees scattered about Tigray to the two
southern camps.¹¹²⁴ Observers called out the deceit,¹¹²⁵ whereupon, on February 11,
Ethiopia’s deputy prime minister acknowledged that the camps no longer existed.¹¹²⁶
The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, a weak but reportedly well-meaning
internal body, also acknowledged the destruction of the camps. The Ethiopian
government’s refugee unit, the Agency for Returnees and Refugee Affairs (ARRA),
claimed that the destruction was “overstated.”¹¹²⁷ But on March 18, the first
international relief NGO to arrive in Shimelba and Hitsats confirmed their
destruction.¹¹²⁸ On March 24, a British news outlet, reporting from the two camps,
graphically described the ruin.¹¹²⁹ On March 26, UNHCR reported that it too had
reached the camps, and had likewise found them obliterated, with the humanitarian
facilities looted and vandalized.¹¹³⁰

➢ Continuing trauma and fear in the south. Nevertheless, the federal government’s
undertaking to concentrate all Eritrean refugees in the two southern camps
proceeded, and on February 18 UNHCR announced that it was anticipating receiving
some 15,000 refugees from Hitsats and Shimelba there.¹¹³¹ Yet – in addition to the
previous Tigrayan attacks on those camps – on February 19 and 20 it was reported
that Tigrayans were again threatening the refugees in Adi Harush, and on March 2
that they attacked and looted.¹¹³² A comparable report emerged on February 27 from
Mai Ayni, where the intimidation was accompanied by shootings, looting and a
mutilation.¹¹³³ Residents of both camps pleaded with UNHCR for protection or
evacuation, even as UNHCR was concentrating more Eritrean refugees there.
UNHCR, itself under enormous pressure, appeared to have had no solutions to offer
them.¹¹³⁴ Still the agency persisted in its mission to support the two camps: on March
31 it reported that it was gradually restoring relief services there.¹¹³⁵ As of April 9, it
had received from elsewhere 3,633 Eritrean refugees at Adi Harush and 4,299 at
Mai Ayni. (Others among the scattered were being accounted for in Mekelle, Adigrat
and Addis.)¹¹³⁶ Yet the camps remained terrifying. On April 8, Adi Harush was

attacked, and Eritrean refugees were abducted, at least some of them by Eritrean
soldiers. ¹¹³⁷ By April 10, Eritrean troops had abducted 17 Eritrean refugees from
that camp.¹¹³⁸ In early April, Tigrayan militia seriously wounded a refugee in Mai
Ayni.¹¹³⁹

➢ In Addis, again. On February 17, it was again reported that Eritrean oppositionists
who had long resided in Addis and elsewhere in Ethiopia were facing harassment
and intimidation at the hands of Eritrean and Ethiopian security operatives.¹¹⁴⁰
Similarly, the arrest of 156 Eritreans in Addis over the past three months was
reported on February 22.1141 On April 16 and 19, Eritrean agents were reported to be
sweeping Addis neighborhoods on foot and by car in search of Eritreans, with a view
to abducting them.¹¹⁴²

➢ Most recently.¹¹⁴³ On May 14, OCHA reported that, of the approximately 20,000
Eritrean refugees who were previously residing in the northern camps of Hitsats and
Shimelba (a number different from the 34,000 cited above in this chapter), UNHCR
had now verified some 10,000 refugees who were in Adi Harush, Mai Ayni, Mekelle,
Adigrat or Addis Ababa, but that 7,000-10,000 Eritrean refugees were still in hard-to-
reach areas across the region.¹¹⁴⁴ On June 2, Relief Web posted a UNHCR report to
the effect that nearly 8,100 refugees from Hitsats and Shimelba had arrived at Adi
Harush and Mai Ayni; that many refugees continued to likely be scattered about
Tigray; that many refugees outside of the camps were in need of life-saving
assistance; that many refugees were likely moving to Addis, where they felt they
would be safer; and that UNHCR was attempting to protect those in Addis.¹¹⁴⁵ On
June 6, Relief Web posted another UNHCR report, to the effect that the Eritrean
refugee count in Tigray was now 87,420, down from the pre-war count of 96,223;
and that essential services, including primary education, had been restored in Mai
Ayni and Adi Harush.¹¹⁴⁶ Separately, through mid-June, scattered episodes of
Eritrean troops forcibly seizing Eritrean refugees in Tigray and returning them to
Eritrea were reported to The America Team, as were episodes of violence by
Tigrayans and possibly Eritrean forces against residents of the southern camps.¹¹⁴⁷
On June 29, the abduction, imprisonment and re-conscription of at least some of the
refugees from Hitsats and Shimelba who had previously deserted the Eritrean
military was confirmed.¹¹⁴⁸

8.4 A Dark Future

➢ Status. The Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia have become victims of multiple
violations of international law. The killing, wounding, robbery and rape of innocent
civilians at the hands of organized military actors have amounted to war crimes and
crimes against humanity, in the view of many observers. The invasion of refugee
camps in a neighboring country, the abduction and refoulement of refugees there,
and the obliteration of camp facilities – all as perpetrated by the Eritrean military –
have abridged multiple principles involving the protection of refugees, such as have
rarely occurred anywhere in recent decades. The return of refugees to the unsafe
camps in Tigray by the Ethiopian government violates principles of refugee
protection as well, as does Ethiopia’s failure to protect the refugees generally.¹¹⁴⁹ On
January 28, February 24 and May 12, The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Eritrea expressly called out many of the above
activities as potential violations of international principles and legal accords.¹¹⁵⁰

As of this writing, the Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia appear to be trapped there. Those
residing in UNHCR-supported camps at Mai Ayni and Adi Harush are highly
vulnerable to attacks by both Eritrean forces and Tigrayan militias and individuals.
Indeed, the federal government’s determination to concentrate Eritrean refugees in
those two camps would appear to make even more of them vulnerable. The camps
were never intended to withstand any material invasion, and they are not able to do
so. Just as international relief workers fled the camps at the outset of the conflict,
they would certainly flee again if circumstances again deteriorated.

Those refugees residing in and around IDP camps in the Sheraro, Shire and Mekelle
areas are suffering acute privation, and they may also be vulnerable to attack. Those
who had been in Addis when hostilities began, or who subsequently fled from Tigray
to Addis, are vulnerable to removal to the refugee camps by the Ethiopian
government and to abduction and refoulement by Eritrean security forces. Tigrayans
and others who have fled to Sudan could remain there indefinitely – they appear to
be barred from re-entering Tigray by Ethiopian and allied forces, who have shot
some refugees who have attempted to do so.¹¹⁵¹

As described above, even if any of the refugees, wherever situated, were somehow
able to move outside of their current confines, there are no welcoming countries that
they could readily access. A fortunate few with international resources will probably
escape – for example, to the West. The rest will probably not.

➢ Prospects. For how long these conditions will last will likely depend on such
factors as the status of the war and of the Eritrean-Ethiopian alliance. But, in the
view of the author, as long as that alliance continues to any extent, the refugees’
prospects for a secure future in Ethiopia remains grim. Even if Eritrean forces were
to exit Tigray – as international actors have been demanding for months, and as Abiy
has promised – they could seemingly re-enter at any time and pounce upon the
refugees. And even short of fresh attacks on the camps by Eritrean forces, Ethiopian
and Eritrean security personnel could continue to cherry-pick Eritrean refugees in
Addis and elsewhere for refoulement or other harsh actions. Further, even short of

such events, the federal government could deny sanctuary to the refugees (with
unknowable implications) or otherwise make their lives even more miserable – in an
effort to please the Eritrean regime, or otherwise.
One potential rescue operation could consist of removing the refugees to other
countries altogether. But as stated above, permanent resettlement of individual
refugees in third countries is statistically uncommon. Mass relocation to refugee
camps in third countries, alternatively, would require not only host country consent
but a major investment in infrastructure, logistics and re-deployment on the part
UNHCR and its partner NGOs. Such a wholesale transplantation would possibly
have little precedent; but it perhaps could be justified by the extraordinary and illegal
attack on the camps in Tigray by Eritrean forces. A substantially more manageable
variation might consist of moving the camps out of Tigray and further south into
Ethiopia, rather than into another country. That could be faster, less expensive, and
actually welcome by the Ethiopian government – which could tout the move as
demonstrating its good faith in protecting the refugees. But, as stated above, it would
not achieve full protection, as long as Ethiopia and Eritrea remain allied. Notably, on
May 5, UNHCR reported that plans were proceeding to build a new camp in the
Amhara region of Ethiopia – directly south of Tigray – to house some 20,000 Eritrean
refugees.¹¹⁵² But the number fell far short of the combined Mai Ayni and Adi Harush
populations; and the plan did not appear to contemplate protection of either those
camps or the new camp from future incursions by Eritrean forces.

To complicate matters, notwithstanding their current peril, some refugees in the
camps in Tigray may not relish migrating from their established in-camp communities
and their Tigrinya-speaking environs. Some in Addis may hold out hope for the safer,
more open and more vital urban life there than can be offered by any refugee camp
anywhere. So individual refugees too could have to confront difficult choices, even if
choices were offered.

Other means for protecting the refugee camps could include a range of multinational
military operations. But any such undertakings would almost certainly necessitate far
broader diplomatic considerations and military operations – that is to say, relative to
the direct, still raging conflict between Tigrayan forces, on the one hand, and
Eritrean, Amhara and federal Ethiopian forces on the other – not just to refugee
protection. Of course, a military approach would involve significant economic and
strategic costs and risks for the intervening countries – not to mention political risks,
both domestic and international.

Still, the potential for such interventions stands as a question. In Bosnia, Liberia,
Rwanda and elsewhere in recent decades, international interventions – or earlier
interventions than at length eventuated – were widely seen after the fact as having
been tragically delinquent. But as compelling as the author finds the question, and as
much as he has cogitated upon it, he lacks expertise in that area and thus will stand
down from pursuing it here. He instead will conclude simply: by urging that the
refugees be moved to safer locales, following due consideration by those with the
means to do so, but otherwise expeditiously.

9. Sexual violence in the Tigray conflict

By Sally Keeble ¹¹⁵³

Extreme sexual violence is a brutal hallmark of the armed conflict in Tigray. After
Ethiopian and Eritrean forces invaded the territory, it quickly became clear that
sexual violence was being used as a deliberate act of war, accompanied by
ethnically-abusive language indicative of genocide. Acknowledgement by the
international community of the prevalence of the crimes, let alone their genocidal
implications, has been slow.

Justice has been completely lacking for Tigrayan survivors of rape, conservatively
estimated to number 10,000 in March 2021.¹¹⁵⁴ It’s led to a warning from former
New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark, that without action over the abuses in
Tigray, the commitments made by the international community to ending sexual
violence in conflict are no more than paper promises.¹¹⁵⁵

The Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church added his voice to the outrage over
the rape of women in Tigray with a message smuggled out of the country on a
mobile phone in May 2021. ¹¹⁵⁶ The UK bears a particular responsibility for the
inertia, as the leader of the global campaign announced in May 2012 at the start of
the UK’s presidency of the G8. ¹¹⁵⁷

The war started when Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, sent the Ethiopian
National Defence Force into the Tigray in November 2020 following an attack on its
Northern base by forces of the regional government headed by the Tigray People’s
Liberation Front (TPLF). Ethiopian forces were quickly joined by those of Isaias
Afwerki, Eritrean President. It was an alliance founded in the peace process between
the two countries, for which the Ethiopian leader was awarded the Nobel peace prize
in 2019. Reports soon surfaced on social media and from refugee camps in Sudan
where women arrived telling of horrific sexual violence by the invading forces. The
troops’ attacks were directed at Tigrayan women and also Eritrean refugees at
camps in Tigray. The trickle of stories soon became a torrent, despite the
communications blockade imposed by the Ethiopian government.

9.1 A timeline of sexual violence

Between November 2020 and the end of March 2021 the pattern of sexual violence
in Tigray became horrifically clear. It would be easy to fill this entire book with the
women’s stories. The suffering, courage and dignity of all of them is respected.
Below are just some of the testimonies that emerged on social media, were reported
by NGOs and online agencies, and latterly covered by mainstream media.

➢ November 2020: The first accounts of rape reached Tigray Media House ¹¹⁵⁸, the
major online platform for the Tigrayan community, soon after the fall of the regional
capital, Mekelle in November 2020.

➢ Between December 2020 and January 2021 numbers rocketed and the first
warnings emerged of the scale of the problem The UN Human Rights Office reported
that 136 cases of rape were recorded in hospitals in Mekelle, Ayder, Adigrat and
Wukro in the east of Tigray, with warnings that many more attacks went unreported
due to stigma attached to the crime, and lack of access to services. The report,
released in March 2021 said health ¹¹⁵⁹ facilities throughout the region had been
systematically destroyed by the invading military.

➢ January 2021: Reuters carried a report of a young Tigrayan woman at Hamdayet
refugee camp who was treated on arrival by the camp doctor, Tewadrous Tefera
Limeuh.¹¹⁶⁰ He was one of the first to identify the genocidal nature of the sexual
violence being deployed in his homeland. He treated the young woman for a
pregnancy and sexually-transmitted diseases and guided her to a psychotherapist.
The young woman said the soldier who had attacked her at gunpoint had given her a
stark choice – to be killed or raped.

➢ February 2021: Agence France Presse carried a report of a gang rape of a young
woman from Edaga Hamus who was attacked on three separate occasions by
groups of Eritrean and Ethiopian soldiers. Meanwhile in Mekelle sexual assaults
were taking place with impunity and in daylight on students at the Ayder Referral
Hospital details of which were included in an extensive report posted in early March
by EEPA, the Europe External Programme for Africa, a Belgium-based NGO.¹¹⁶¹

➢ March 2021: Agence France Presse posted a lengthy report recording the
sadistic nature of the attacks by invading soldiers, including their practice of
abducting and detaining Tigrayan women for the purposes of sexual abuse. This
included an account ¹¹⁶² of a woman abducted off the streets by Ethiopian soldiers,
held in a cell in a military camp and raped by groups of up to ten soldiers over a
period of two weeks. After being taken back home, she was then raped again, with
her three children in the next room. In another incident, an 18-year-old girl from Abiy
Addi fought off the soldier trying to rape her and was shot in a hand and leg. Her
hand was later amputated at hospital in Mekelle. Images of a hand, accompanying
her testimony, went viral.¹¹⁶³

However, it was pictures and a video circulating on social media later that month
which came to symbolize the sadistic nature of the sexual abuse by then being
deployed wantonly against Tigrayan women. These showed objects being extracted
from the genitals of a woman raped multiple times by Eritrean and Ethiopian soldiers

during an 11-day ordeal. The objects included a blood-stained rock, two 3-inch nails,
and plastic items. 1164
A report that identified key features of the campaign of sexual violence in Tigray was
published at the end of March by Insecurity Insight, a Swiss-based research
institute ¹¹⁶⁵. It analysed 36 incidents of sexual violence in Tigray in which 106 girls
and women were attacked by at least 144 soldiers. Almost half the perpetrators were
reported as being Ethiopian, and a third Eritrean, with the rest Amharan, a
combination of Ethiopian and Eritrean, or unidentified. Three quarters of the women
said they were raped by several men. The report cites numerous cases of women
being raped in front of family members, and of men being told to rape female
relatives and beaten or shot if they refused. In one particularly appalling case the
report described how six women were gang raped by 30 Eritrean soldiers who joked
and took photos during the women’s ordeal. One escaped, but was caught again by
Eritrean soldiers, stripped, stabbed, injected with drugs and raped for ten days. Her
12-year-old son was shot dead in front of her. A preliminary analysis by the
International Rescue Committee of gender-based violence experienced by women in
camps for internally-based people set out the continuing problems and erosion of
women’s safety generally. The Committee’s full report is due out in late May.¹¹⁶⁶

By the time mainstream international media started carrying major reports of the
sexual violence, the evidence was overwhelming. Nima Elbagir’s report on CNN from
Hamdayet refugee camp in Sudan at the end of March carried accounts of survivors.
It also gave important evidence from the camp’s doctor Tedros Tefera who said,
“The women that have been raped say that the things that they say to them when
they were raping them is that they need to change their identity – to either Amharise
them or at least leave their Tigrinya status… and that they’ve come there to cleanse
them… to cleanse the blood line.”¹¹⁶⁷ The CNN report showed photographs of the
objects the doctor removed from a patient’s vagina. However, the reporter said the
video, which had clearly caused her distress, was too graphic to be shown on
mainstream media. Reports on Channel 4 by Jamal Osman included footage from
the clinic for women and children at Mekelle Hospital which had dealt with 260 rape
victims ¹¹⁶⁸. The nurse in charge was overcome when talking about the experiences
of her patients. South Africa’s eNCA ¹¹⁶⁹ and public broadcaster SABC ¹¹⁷⁰ carried
reports of men being forced to rape their family members.

9.2 Number of rapes

Figures of numbers of women raped in Tigray range from a low of 108 to a high of
more than 10,000. Exact numbers are impossible to verify, although the evidence set
out above shows the that use of sexual violence by Ethiopian and Eritrean forces
against women in Tigray is endemic.

The low figure comes from the Ethiopian Commission on Human Rights ¹¹⁷¹ which
reported on 11 February 11 2021 that it had found 108 rape cases in a handful of
clinics over a two-month period; 52 cases in Mekelle, 22 in Adigrat, 7 in Wukro and
27 in Ayder. It admitted actual figures could be higher. Its assessment was
conducted in part remotely due to the insecurity and remoteness of the region, made
more difficult by the lack of official infrastructure. The Commission did not say who,
or what, was behind the number of rapes, although it noted a number of prisoners
had recently escaped.

However, these low figures are flatly contradicted by other assessments. Seven
hundred and fifty women were raped and admitted to Ayder hospital in Mekelle
alone, according to a report by the Australian-based Dedebit media in January 2021.
In Adigrat the public hospital reported it had received over 174 rape survivors since
the beginning of the war.¹¹⁷² In March, Wafaa Said,¹¹⁷³ the deputy UN aid co-
ordinator in Ethiopia, was reported as saying that at least 516 rape cases had been
reported by five medical facilities in Mekelle, Adigrat, Wukro, Shire and Axum.

However, due to the closure of most health facilities in Tigray, and the stigma
associated with rape, she said that the actual numbers would be much higher. In
its detailed report of 8 March, quoted above, the EEPA set out a series of reports
from aid workers, health facilities and agencies with numbers of women involved. It
concluded, “Ten thousand women: this is the conservative estimate of the number of
victims of rape in Tigray.” The figure has been widely quoted since with little
challenge

Since then, there have been two very much higher figures – both from impeccable
sources – of women affected by the sexual violence in Tigray. The first is from the
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict,
Under-Secretary- General Pramila Patten. At a high-level meeting between the US
and EU on the eve of the G7 meeting in Cornwall, UK, she said that 22,500 women
in Tigray were in need of medical treatment as a result of sexual violence during the
conflict. Further information on the meeting is set out below.¹¹⁷⁴

An even higher figure came from the UK during a question-and-answer session on
Tigray in the UK Parliament on 14 June ¹¹⁷⁵. In response to a question about the
sexual violence in Tigray, James Duddridge MP, Africa Minister, said, “We fear that
probably at least 26,000 people are likely to require support in the coming months.
That is based on UN estimates. It is very difficult to give more precise figures on the
types of atrocities and the perpetrators, given that we do not have full access.”

9.3 Distinctive characteristics of sexual violence in the Tigray conflict

The cases cited above show the distinctive characteristics that have emerged of the
deployment of sexual violence in Tigray. These include, as referenced above:

• Linkage to attacks on Tigrayan men attempting to protect women from assault.
  EEPA reports people in Axum being shot for attempting to go to the assistance of
  women raped during the massacre in the town.¹¹⁷⁶
• Kidnap and detention of women and repeated rapes over a period of time as
  recorded by Agence France Presse.
• Gang rapes by groups of soldiers as recorded by Insecurity Insight.
• Rapes of young girls. CNN reported a doctor who said the youngest person she
  had treated for rape was eight years old.
• Men forced to rape family members, like the grandfather of the young woman in
  Abiy Addi who was taken out and shot for refusing to comply with the soldier’s
  instructions to have sex with his granddaughter.
• Use of extreme violence, including the mutilation of women’s genitals as reported
  by CNN and Reuters.
• Specific reference to rape being used to “purify” or “cleanse women,” including the
  case referred to below, widely reported, including by Al-Jazeera. A trenchant
  description of the genocidal nature of the rape in Tigray came from Cara Anna, in
  her article published by Associated Press on 7 April. She reports soldiers who told
  a woman they attacked, “Claim to be Amhara and we’ll give you back your house
  and find you a husband. But if you claim to be Tigrayan, we will come and rape
  you again.”¹¹⁷⁷
• The covering up of crimes by soldiers threatening their victims with further
  violence if they seek help, and also threatening, or attacking, those who try to help
  survivors. Such threats, recorded by Insecurity Insight among others, has been
  linked to the reluctance of women to access medical care.

The sexual violence deployed in Tigray is the worst the humanitarian sector had
seen for many years, according to Robert Mardini, director-general of the Geneva-
based International Committee of the Red Cross. He said the reports received by his
organisation’s staff in hospitals and clinics were, “extremely horrific, very shocking….
I haven’t heard such terrible accounts for more than two decades in the humanitarian
sector,” ¹¹⁷⁸ In his denouncement of the sexual violence the Ethiopian Orthodox
Church’s Patriarch Abune Mathias, said what was happening in Tigray was a
genocide and governments of the world knew it. In the article cited above, he
described the raping of women as being among the worst of the crimes: “The men
who died are better off than them (the women). On Tigray women, they are placing
mental scars that will never be erased in their entire lives. …. Such an injustice has
never been done or heard of before. It is very dreadful. Especially the raping of
women is slimy and very filthy deed. The taboo of taboos, the despicable of
despicable is being committed. Is it really right to commit such bold and filthy deed?”

9.4 International law on sexual violence in armed conflict

Rape and other forms of sexual violence in armed conflict are specifically prohibited
under international humanitarian law. The broad principle was set out in the Fourth
Geneva Convention which says in Article 27 on protection of civilians in times of war
that, “Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in
particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”

Since then, a complex of statutes and judgements of international tribunals has
developed spelling out the details of the provisions and the implications both for
civilians and the military, and also setting out a broad definition of sexual violence to
include psychological as well as physical abuse. Importantly the provisions apply
both in cases of international and internal conflict. A full discussion is contained in
the UK government’s “International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation
of Sexual Violence in Conflict.”¹¹⁷⁹

It sets out three possible approaches to dealing with sexual violence in conflict.
i) as a war crime or a violation of the laws and customs of war – Sexual violence
may constitute a war crime if it’s committed against a civilian during an
international or internal armed conflict, and associated with the conflict, by a
perpetrator who is aware of the context.
ii) as a crime against humanity – This may apply if the sexual violence was
committed as part of a widespread or systematic general attack, which could
include in the context of Tigray, the massacres, on a civilian population. Again, the
perpetrator would need to be aware that he was acting in the context of a conflict.
iii) as genocide – This may apply if there was evidence that the sexual violence
formed a constitutive act of genocide, as set out below, and also that it was
committed with the intention of destroying in whole or part a national, ethnic, racial
or religious group.

There’s clear evidence that the sexual violence in Tigray meets the criteria set out in
the third of these categories and is genocidal. It meets the criteria of being genocidal
in that it has caused bodily and mental harm and prevented births among Tigrayan
women. The language reported being used by the attackers also makes it clear that
the aim was the destruction of the Tigrayan community. Further evidence of this
came in a case of literally searing brutality reported by Al Jazeera in April. A young
woman was held and repeatedly raped by Amhara militia who then cauterized her
vagina with a hot metal rod. When she finally reached safety, she reported that the
soldiers told her, “You did nothing bad to us…. Our problem is with your womb. Your
womb gives birth to Woyane. A Tigrayan womb should never give birth.”¹¹⁸⁰ Woyane,
Kassa says, is a derogatory term used to refer to the TPLF, whilst a blog post on the
London School of Economics website describes “Death to Woyane,” being used as
abusive chant by people in Oromia and Amhara ¹¹⁸¹. Norwegian academic, Kjetil
Tronvill, was among the first to make the argument in February 2021.¹¹⁸² His
analysis was echoed by Dr Tefera at Hamdayet refugee camp.¹¹⁸³

The UN Security Council has passed five resolutions condemning, in trenchant
terms, sexual violence in conflict

The first, in October 2000, was Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security ¹¹⁸⁴.
It calls on all parties to armed conflict “to take special measures to protect women
and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual
abuse.” It also says all states must “put an end to impunity and prosecute those
responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those
relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls” and that they should
“exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions.”

9.6 The international community’s response

Despite the overwhelming evidence of the sexual terror unleashed on women in
Tigray, the number of harrowing pictures and testimonies from refugee camps and
medical facilities, and the plethora of instruments for enforcement action against
perpetrators, the response of the international community has been slow. Any justice
for the women has been missing in action.

The first to call out the sexual violence and express her concern about it was
Michelle Bachelet, the former president of Chile, and currently UN Commissioner for
Human Rights. ¹¹⁸⁶ She is an outspoken and long-standing advocate for the role of
women in peace processes. In a news conference in Geneva on 9 December 2020,
she said her office had corroborated information “of gross human rights violations
and abuses – and serious violations of international humanitarian law, including
indiscriminate attacks that have resulted in civilian casualties and destruction of
civilian objects, looting, abductions and sexual violence against women and girls….
There is an urgent need for independent monitoring of the human rights situation in
the Tigray region, for all necessary measures to protect civilians, and for
accountability for violations.”

The European Union cited sexual violence in Tigray as one of the factors in its
decision to postponing aid to Ethiopia. In a blog on 15 January, High Representative

Josep Borrell wrote, “The situation on the ground goes well beyond a purely internal
‘law and order’ operation. We receive consistent reports of ethnic-targeted violence,
killings, massive looting, rapes, forceful returns of refugees and possible war crimes.
The European Union has been and will remain a reliable partner of Ethiopia…. Just
in terms of bilateral development cooperation, we have provided € 815 million over
the last 7 years (2014-2020). On top of this, Ethiopia is benefiting from € 409 million
worth of projects under the EU Trust Fund for Africa, focused mainly on support to
refugees and host populations. To help Ethiopia face the COVID-19 pandemic, the
EU mobilized €487 million to support the government’s Health Preparedness and
Response Plan. And several budget support operations were fast-tracked to enable
the country to face the economic strains of the pandemic. However…. under the
current circumstances, in particular in the absence of full humanitarian access to all
areas of the conflict, we have no alternative but to postpone the planned
disbursement of €88 million in budget support.”1187

Later in January 2021, a statement of great concern came from the UN’s Pramila
Patten.1188. She urged all parties to commit to a zero-tolerance policy of all forms of
sexual violence. She noted the high number of alleged rapes in Mekelle, and also
said there were, “Disturbing reports of individuals allegedly forced to rape members
of their own family, under threats of imminent violence. Some women have also
reportedly been forced by military elements to have sex in exchange for basic
commodities.” “Survival sex” was also documented by the International Rescue
Committee’s May 2021 report cited above.

Despite the evidence that the sexual violence was overwhelmingly being committed
by Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, she called on all parties to the conflict “to commit to
a zero-tolerance policy for crimes of sexual violence, in line with their respective
obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law. While taking note
of the monitoring and investigation missions recently conducted by the Ethiopian
Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in Western Tigray and the Amhara region, I call
on the Government of Ethiopia to further exercise its due diligence obligations to
protect all civilians from sexual and other violence, regardless of their ethnic origin
and those displaced by conflict, and to promptly allow for an independent inquiry into
all allegations of sexual and other forms of violence, to establish the facts and hold
perpetrators accountable, provide redress to victims, and prevent further grave
violations. My Office and the United Nations system stand ready to support national
authorities to put in place rigorous measures to prevent and respond to possible
violations.”

The commitment to support the Ethiopian Government’s investigative efforts became
something of an elephant trap for the UN. The Ethiopian Government agreed a joint
inquiry between its arms-length Human Rights Commission and the UN, which
parked the issue while the Ethiopian and Eritrean troops continued their abuse of
Tigrayan women. The UN Security Council expressed “deep concern” about the

continuing sexual abuse in late April1189. There continue to be calls for the UN to
launch a fully independent investigation into the sexual violence in Tigray.¹¹⁹⁰

At the end of February, the new US administration under Joe Biden called for
Eritrean troop withdrawal, citing their involvement in sexual violence.1191 “We
strongly condemn the killings, forced removals and displacements, sexual assaults,
and other extremely serious human rights violations and abuses by several parties
that multiple organizations have reported in Tigray. We are also deeply concerned
by the worsening humanitarian crisis. The United States has repeatedly engaged the
Ethiopian government on the importance of ending the violence, ensuring
unhindered humanitarian access to Tigray, and allowing a full, independent,
international investigation into all reports of human rights violations, abuses, and
atrocities,” the US Department of State said.

Notable by its silence has been the UK government, despite its role in the global
campaign against sexual violence in conflict. Former UK Foreign Secretary William
Hague, teamed up with Angelina Jolie, Special Envoy of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, in 2012 to launch a global protocol for action published two years
later.¹¹⁹² The guidance was updated in 2017 ¹¹⁹³, and in June 2020 Lord Ahmad of
Wimbledon, Foreign Office Minister and the Prime Minister’s Special Representative
on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict launched a new code created alongside
Nobel Laureate Nadia Murad and the Institute for International Criminal
Investigations (IICI), to strengthen justice for survivors around the world.”¹¹⁹⁴
Lord Ahmad said, “We are determined to tackle these most abhorrent of crimes. The
UK remains committed to take action – action to prevent violence, action to support
survivors and tackle the stigma they face – the appalling sense of stigma – and
action to hold perpetrators to account.”

Yet the UK Government has said little, let alone taken any action, over sexual
violence in Tigray. In March 2021, in response to a question from Sarah Champion
MP specifically about sexual violence, the Africa Minister James Duddridge MP said
the government would monitor work of the task force set up by the Ethiopian
government. The response was later, and exceptionally, corrected to say the UK
government had strongly condemned killings of civilians and acts of sexual violence
“via a joint statement on Ethiopia with 41 other countries at the 46th Session of the
Human Rights Council.”

Later that month, Helen Hayes MP,¹¹⁹⁵led a parliamentary debate in which she
asked the UK Government to, “Specifically ensure that evidence of the widespread
use of rape and sexual violence in the Tigray conflict is collated and that the
perpetrators are brought to justice in line with UN Security Council resolution 1820. It
is wholly unacceptable that soldiers from the Ethiopian and Eritrean armies should
be able to rape women with impunity. Equally, it is unacceptable that their
commanders-in-chief should permit their forces to use rape as a weapon of war or
fail to bring to justice those under their command who commit such crimes.

Yet the Foreign Office minister who responded to her speech, James Cleverly MP,
failed to mention sexual violence at all.

Finally, at the UK International Development Select Committee inquiry into Tigray in
April, Africa minister, James Duddridge MP, conceded that there had been rapes. In
response to a question about whether he thought rape was being used as a weapon
of war, he said, “That is what people are saying is happening, and I have no reason
to believe that is wrong. There are verbal accounts of what has happened, but
getting the solid evidence is tricky. I know that sexual violence was reported to
Christian (McPhail, UK Ambassador to Ethiopia) and his team. Where you draw the
line between it being just something that is horrific, where it is targeted at a
population and where it becomes a weapon of war.”¹¹⁹⁶

The strongest condemnation yet from the international community came on 22
March 2021. A joint statement was issued by 11 leaders of UN agencies, including
Mr. Mark Lowcock, Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Ms. Michelle Bachelet, High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR), Mr. Filippo Grandi, High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General, World Health
Organization (WHO). They said, “Amid a worsening humanitarian situation in the
Tigray region of Ethiopia, reports of indiscriminate and targeted attacks against
civilians, including rape and other horrific forms of sexual violence, continue to
surface. This must stop. We call on all State and non-State parties to the conflict to
fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law; ensure
their forces respect and protect civilian populations, particularly women and children,
from all human rights abuses; explicitly condemn all sexual violence; and take action
to bring perpetrators to justice where abuses do occur. “¹¹⁹⁷

With 70 per cent of health facilities looted, they said only one provided the full range
of services for clinical management of rape survivors. Emergency contraception was
fully available in less than half of the facilities assessed. An independent
investigation into conflict-related sexual violence in Tigray was essential, with the
involvement of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. They
concluded, “It is only with a concerted and comprehensive effort, fully grounded in
respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, that the humanitarian
response in Tigray will match the scale of humanitarian need, especially for women
and children.”

Another unprecedented statement came on 2 April 2 from the G7 foreign Ministers of
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States

of America and the High Representative of the European Union. They expressed
their grave concern about human rights abuses and violations of international
humanitarian law in Tigray.¹¹⁹⁸ “We condemn the killing of civilians, sexual and
gender-based violence, indiscriminate shelling and the forced displacement of
residents of Tigray and Eritrean refugees. All parties must exercise utmost restraint,
ensure the protection of civilians and respect human rights and international law.”
Finally on 22 April came the UN Security Council’s first – belated – statement on
Tigray.¹¹⁹⁹ Earlier attempts to reach a consensus on Tigray had been blocked by
China, India and Russia. The statement, drafted by Ireland, came a week after UN
aid chief Sir Mark Lowcock briefed the council that the humanitarian situation in
Tigray had deteriorated, with people dying of hunger and reports of “gang rape, with
multiple men assaulting the victim” sometimes over a period of days, and girls as
young as eight being targeted.¹²⁰⁰

The Security Council praised the Ethiopian Government for its efforts to increase
humanitarian access. It also welcomed the joint investigation by the OHCHR and the
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission into alleged human rights violations and
abuses. However, it also said, “The members of the Security Council expressed their
deep concern about allegations of human rights violations and abuses, including
reports of sexual violence against women and girls in the Tigray region and called for
investigations to find those responsible and bring them to justice…“The members of
the Security Council stressed the need for full compliance with international law.”
This was a statement, not a resolution, and was not accompanied by any monitoring
or enforcement measures.

The international community gave more attention to Tigray in the run-up to the G7
summit in June in Cornwall, UK. On 10 June 2021, on the eve of the summit the
USA and EU held a joint high-level roundtable chaired by Nima Elbagir, the CNN
journalist who did much to bring the sexual violence in Tigray to the world’s attention.
¹²⁰¹ Pramila Patten, one of the roundtable panelists, said women’s bodies were being
used as a battleground in the conflict, and said the world did not need to wait for a
full investigation before taking action over the sexual violence. ¹²⁰² She said that
service providers in Tigray were reporting increased demand for emergency
contraception, abortion services, HIV-related services and counselling, all indicative
of sexual violence, and said that UNFPA anticipated 22,500 would need such
services. In “Their Own Words,” an e-book she was publishing on 17 June 2021,
there were reports of a 45-year-old woman gang-raped in Tigray by 16 Eritrean
soldiers, and a 32-year-old woman gang-raped in the region on the same day, also
by 14 Eritreans. She welcomed the joint investigation by the Ethiopian Human Rights
Commission and UNHCR, which she said had sexual violence as one of its priority
areas. She also welcomed prosecutions by the Ethiopian Attorney-General of
Ethiopian soldiers. She said she was working with the Ethiopian Minister for Women,
Children and Youth Affairs to develop a comprehensive prevention and response
strategy. It would need, she said, “political commitment at the highest level” and

called on the G7 to assist in delivering this by making the tackling of sexual violence
one of the outcomes of its discussions on Tigray.

9.7 The Ethiopian Government’s response

Initially the Ethiopian government’s response was one of denial; that the Eritreans
were in Ethiopia at all, that the reports of rape were anything other than falsehoods
put about by their opponents, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. However, in the
face of mounting criticism, it has had to backtrack.

The Ethiopian Government first acknowledged the existence, if not the extent of the
sexual violence committed by its troops in February 2021. A statement that rapes
had happened came from Ethiopia’s Minister of Women, Ms Filsan Abdullahi ¹²⁰³ who
said, “We have received the report back from our Taskforce team on the ground in
the Tigray region, they have unfortunately established rape has taken place
conclusively and without a doubt. “She said the task force was still processing data
to establish the number of victims, and that the government was “strengthening the
protection and prevention of gender-based violence against women in the Tigray
region.”

In its report cited above, the International Rescue Committee found that there are
now fewer social sanctions against the continuing gender-based violence generally
in Tigray, limited opportunities for prosecutions and more taboos around women
speaking about the attacks on them.

Ethiopian prime Minister Abiy Ahmed conceded in a speech in parliament on 23
March that Eritrean troops were in Ethiopia and that they “may” have been involved
in rapes. He also implied that these actions were collateral damage of war. The
concession came in the wake of the statement by UN agency chiefs. On 1 April,
ahead of the G7 statement, he confirmed that rape had taken place, appearing to
implicate his own forces, and pledged that, “Anyone who raped our Tigrayan sisters,
anybody who is involved in looting, will be held accountable in a court of law.”¹²⁰⁴

More recently the top public health official in the new government-appointed
administration in Tigray, Dr Fasika Amdeselassie, has said that women in Tigray
were being kept in “sexual slavery” – some for days or weeks at a time.¹²⁰⁵ “The
perpetrators have to be investigated,” she said.

Shortly before the G7, on 3 June, and in the face of mounting concern about the
sexual violence in the conflict, the Ethiopian Government held a news conference
that dealt specifically with the allegations about the brutality in Tigray.¹²⁰⁶ Attorney-
General Gedion Timothewos attributed the killings and sexual violence against
civilians to some “bad apples” among the soldiers who had broken the rules of
engagement which had been issued to them in a pocketbook. Pressed on the
numbers involved, he said there were reports of several hundred sexual assaults
reported by the regional authorities. Military authorities had indicated about 30

soldiers were responsible for these. Twenty-five soldiers had been charged by
military prosecutors, and four had been convicted. However, he said that there were
“exaggerations” and “disinformation” on the subject, and some of the reports should
be taken with “a pinch of salt.” Such language goes to the heart of what Pramila
Paten described as “A deep-rooted culture of denial of sexual violence.”¹²⁰⁷ The
Attorney General did not say what was happening about prosecutions of Eritrean
soldiers accused of sexual violence.

9.8 Conclusion – meaningless paper or justice for Tigrayan women?

While the rhetoric has ramped up, the estimated 26,000 Tigrayan women who have
survived rape are still waiting for justice. Helen Clark, former New Zealand Prime
Minister and head of the UN’s Development Programme has pointed out that to be of
any worth, UN resolutions must be backed by action. Writing for Foreign Policy with
Rachel Kyte, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,¹²⁰⁸ she says: “It
takes courage for any woman to speak about her experience of rape. In a
conservative society such as Ethiopia’s, it takes special bravery for a woman to
share the most intimate and agonizingly raw details about her ordeal. Every
journalist or humanitarian worker who has interviewed these survivors says that the
reported cases are only a fraction of the true number.

“The world knows enough to say that war crimes are happening in Tigray. We should
not need to wait until we are able to conduct full and thorough investigations before
we act to stop rape as a weapon of war. We should not have to count the graves of
children before we act to stop starvation crimes. (UN) Resolutions … are
meaningless pieces of paper unless the world acts on their solemn commitments.”

As yet, the jury on that is still out.

10 The destruction of Tigray’s world important cultural heritage
By Anthony Shaw

In the last six months, Ethiopian government troops and the Eritrean forces in Tigray
have repeatedly shelled churches and mosques as well as towns and villages. The
shelling has been carried out with total disregard for the buildings or their
importance. Many are not simply of local or national importance, but are cultural
treasures of global significance. The attacks have been usually accompanied by the
killings of dozens of local people as well as priests and deacons and by extensive
looting. So deliberate has this been, that it must be considered to be a conscious
decision by both the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments, part of a determination to
try to destroy the cultural heritage and the social fabric of society. In Tigray, the vast
majority of the population is Christian, and so churches have suffered most, but
Islam has also been targeted. And this has been done on a scale which suggests
this is part of a policy designed to destroy the organisational fabric of civil society,
with both priests and imams, as well as other religious devotees, subject to abuse
and killing.

In any unregulated conflict situation, which in this case amounts to a civil war
coupled with the added involvement of an outside enemy power, it is hardly a
surprise that collateral damage occurs, and mistakes happen. Given the quite clearly
random nature of some of the artillery bombardments that have been taking place
since early November, some of the damage and casualties may be the result of
unintended damage. But the sheer number of churches and mosques that have
been damaged, manuscripts looted and the deliberate shelling of famous sites as
well as the extensive massacres of people and religious personnel indicates
something more.

It is, in fact, clear that the Federal troops, and the Eritrean forces which now make up
most of the troops fighting in Tigray, have been specifically instructed to ignore any
considerations of civilized behaviour. The numerous, detailed, eye-witness accounts
of the killings and destruction that have been carried out, and the obstinate and
determined refusal to open any dialogue or discussions, or to try to bring an end to
the abuses clearly being perpetrated across the Tigray region, suggest the aim is the
destruction of a people rather than any simple attempt to carry out a ‘law
enforcement’ operation to arrest the few leaders of a political organisation. Certainly,
activities since November have been grossly in excess of what would be required for
any rational ‘law enforcement’. And while the Federal government has claimed that
Tigrayan fighters have been hiding in or using religious sites, and this is why they
have been attacked, it has produced no evidence in support of its claims.

In any deeply religious society such as rural Tigray, whether among Christian or
Muslim believers, the general feelings of insecurity and trauma induced by
ongoing conflict will be massively increased by attacks on the examples of stability
and continuity to be seen in religion, and in the churches and mosques to be found
across the region. Attacking these massively underlines the scale and intent of the
intended destruction. Indeed, as the conflict has continued and the reports and
evidence of devastation, looting and killing have multiplied, with the Eritrean forces,
in particular, behaving like an occupying army bent on annihilating its enemy, it
seems that the aims appear to include obliteration of the Tigray region, of its people,
its resources and its cultural heritage. The region’s religious traditions, religious
buildings, manuscripts and monuments, have been a major subject of attack, and in
some cases of wanton destruction and/or extensive plundering and looting.

And there is much to loot and destroy. The Tigray region was the centre of a Pre-
Aksumite civilisation, which dates to more than 3000 years ago. This area, together
with part of neighbouring Eritrea, was the centre of the Aksumite empire between the
1st and 7th centuries CE, one of the great empires of Late Antiquity in the Middle
East, along with the Byzantine and Sassanid empires. The Aksumite King Ezana
converted to Christianity in the 4th century CE and Tigray is home to the earliest
Christian churches in Ethiopia, with buildings certainly dating back to the 6th-7th
centuries and probably earlier. Ethiopia was one of the earliest countries to adopt
Christianity. Indeed, the region is home to the world’s greatest collection of rock
churches, around 125 of the 200 or so known in Ethiopia are to be found in Tigray.
But Tigray religious connections are not confined to Christianity. Islam is the
second largest religion in Ethiopia. The remains of one of the earliest Muslim
settlements in Africa including a mosque is found in the modern town of Negash in
Tigray, dating to the 7th century CE. Traditional history recounts that some early

followers of the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca, including a daughter and son-in-
law, faced persecution and were forced to flee. They were granted refuge by a
Christian Aksumite King who protected them from those in pursuit, as explained
below. Aksum also has extensive links with the third of the Abrahamic religions,
Judaism, through the story of the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon and the Ark
of the Covenant, believed by many to rest in Aksum today. Pre-Aksumite remains,
at Yeha and at nearby remains at Beta Samati, take Tigray, and Ethiopia’s political
history, back for at least another millennium.

Home to hundreds of religious and historic sites and thousands of cultural objects,
significant to Tigrayans, the Tigray region is indeed steeped in history, but it is, of
course, the history of Ethiopia as well as of Tigray, and of Africa. Tigray has some of
the earliest standing monuments in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as artefacts and
sites that provide material evidence for the history of Christianity and Islam and
Judaism in Africa. Copies of Jewish and Christian biblical texts, some richly
illustrated, and others found nowhere else, as well as some of the earliest of
Christian buildings, shed light on the religious practices and Christianisation of
northeast Africa and on cultural exchanges with the Mediterranean world over many
centuries. The empire of Aksum provided the link between the Roman world and the
eastern civilizations of India and China. Medieval wall paintings, rock-hewn churches
and other material objects show the way Christian Ethiopians expressed their identity
and beliefs over many centuries while also being prepared to accept ideas from
Islamic and other communities. Paintings and manuscripts, many of which still
remain unexamined by the outside world, provide evidence of the spiritual devotion,
theological erudition and the elegance of generations of holiness.

The city of Aksum was recognised in 1980 by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site ¹²⁰⁹
due to its cultural importance as the centre of the Aksumite empire, one of the four
great powers of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern world of the 3-7th centuries
along with the Roman and Byzantine empires and the Sassanid empire in Iran. The
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) claims the Ark of the Covenant which
contains the Tablets on which the Ten Commandments are inscribed is housed in a
small chapel next to the 17th century Cathedral of St Mary of Zion and the new
Cathedral completed in the early 1960s under Emperor Haile Selassie. Ethiopian
tradition identifies Aksum as the city from which the Queen of Sheba journeyed to
visit King Solomon in Jerusalem. Aksum is considered to be the holiest city in
Ethiopia and is an important site of pilgrimage. “If you attack Aksum, you attack first
of all the identity of Orthodox Tigrayans but also of all Ethiopian Orthodox
Christians,” (Dr. Wolbert Smidt).¹²¹⁰ Predominate among the archaeological remains
are the giant carved stelae which now include the 24-metre-high Obelisk of Aksum,
taken to Rome in 1937 and finally returned and reinstalled in 2008, King Ezana’s
stelae, and the collapsed and broken 33m Giant Stelae. Three others measure over
15m in height. Other attractions in Aksum include the Ezana stone, an account of his
victories written in Sabean, Ge-ez and Greek, the Queen of Sheba’s Bath (a
reservoir), the remains of the 4th century CE Ta’akha Maryam and 6th century CE
Dungur palaces and various other remains scattered throughout the town as well as
its archaeological and ethnographic museums.

Destruction of cultural sites and remains carried out in the name of extremism has been a characteristic of many of the recent conflicts across the Middle East. Some has also appeared to be casually destructive. In Tigray, churches have been shelled on days when large crowds could be expected at religious festivals; on other occasions, churches have been damaged as part of apparently random bombardment of towns and villages, designed to cause fear in general or encourage alarm or flight to allow for pillaging. Bombing attacks must have been more deliberate. Destruction and damage has not been limited to churches. Mosques have also been targeted, including the al-Nejashi mosque.¹²¹¹ Looting has been reported in many places. There are museums at Aksum, Wukro, Adigrat and Yeha in Tigray, and all four places have been the scene of fighting and of damage. The Society for the Promotion of Museums in Ethiopia has reported that at least one of these has been partly damaged and plundered. The full extent of damage to the heritage of Tigray, and thus of Ethiopia and indeed of Africa, remains uncertain because of the continued fighting and the Ethiopian government’s refusal to allow full access for journalists and others even into areas which they claim are under government control. What is, however, clear is that the damage is extensive and the threat to the heritage of Ethiopia, and to the ‘cultural property’ of Ethiopia, and of Eritrea and especially of the Tigray region, is enough to alarm researchers and scholars across the world.

Protection of these assets has long been the responsibility of local communities, but sites are administrated by the Tigray Bureau of Culture and Tourism, who are now overwhelmed with cases of heritage destruction. Under current circumstances when state security institutions are deeply involved in conflict, and an outside military force is also participating, their ability to preserve these treasures becomes limited. The
safety of a major part of Ethiopia’s cultural heritage is now in danger of destruction or removal. Given the disregard by Eritrea’s government for all diplomatic and intellectual norms, the current evidence of widespread looting by its troops, and the apparent determination of its President to destroy the region, the possibility that much of the cultural heritage of Tigray, and therefore of Ethiopia, is in the process of being stolen or destroyed appears high. Much of it may well end up falling into the hands of international criminals and being sold abroad.

While Eritrea appears to be the more active participant in the looting of manuscripts as well as of Tigray more generally, these activities are, ironically, also destroying much of Eritrea’s own heritage with damage to the historic remains of Aksumite civilisation and pre-Aksumite remains, as well as early Christian and Muslim religious sites. The early history of Tigray, of Aksum, and of all Ethiopian history prior to the 1880s is also part of the pre-colonial history of Eritrea. The central areas of what is now Eritrea were consistently part of the different polities that held power in northern Ethiopia from the 1st millennium BCE. Half the population of Eritrea today are, of course, Tigrinya speakers. The destruction of the cultural heritage of Tigray of course destroys a past in which many Eritreans are directly involved.

10.1 Attacks on Churches and Mosques

As Ethiopian and Eritrean troops advanced towards Mekelle in the second half of November, they shelled most of the towns along the main roads, irrespective of whether they faced any resistance from Tigrayan forces. There was fighting in some places but many towns were abandoned by Tigrayan forces before their arrival. At Negash, the al-Nejashi mosque was badly damaged with both the main building and
minaret were directly hit by artillery fire. These are some of the most important parts of the mosque, whose foundations are old, even though parts have been rebuilt repeatedly. Government media later claimed Tigrayan fighters had dug trenches near the mosque in order to resist their advance, implying that this would make the mosque a legitimate target. Apart from the fact that this does not provide any excuse for shelling such a building, locals are insistent that by the time Eritrean and Ethiopian troops approached the town, Tigrayan fighters had long gone. Certainly, there was no attempt to defend either the town nor any response to the preliminary shelling. The compound of the mosque was subsequently looted extensively by Eritrean troops. ¹²¹² A church in the area, St. Amanuel, was also hit by seventeen shells from tanks and badly damaged. ¹²¹³

Al-Nejashi is one of the major heritage sites of Tigray and holds an important place in Islamic history. Located near the town of Wukro, it was the first mosque to be built in Africa and the second in the world. It was founded in 612 CE by some of the earliest followers of the Prophet who fled from persecution by the ruling Quraysh tribe in Mecca and found safe haven in Aksum. The group included the Prophet’s daughter Ruqayuya and her husband Uthman, and the mosque was established with the consent of the then Negus of Aksum, Armah (Ashama ibn Abjar). Some of the group remained in Ethiopia and the mosque contains the tombs of 15 of the companions of the prophet. Restoration of the mosque by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency TIKA was only completed three years ago.

Middle East Eye (MEE) investigated the reports of the damage and the casualties. ¹²¹⁴ It reported that artefacts, including religious manuscripts, books and letters dating as far back as the seventh century, were looted, and a shrine holding the remains of followers of the Prophet Muhammad in the Mosque was also damaged. A representative of the regional International Association of Muslims in Tigray, Ahmed
Siraj, said Eritrean soldiers killed civilians trying to prevent pillaging; some reports have put the number at over 80. The Association has also reported attacks on another historic mosque near the town of Nebelet: “Eritrean soldiers entered the mosque, shot dead two brothers who were guardians of the mosque, then looted it of its valuables before hitting it with heavy weapons and significantly damaging it.” A mosque in Adigrat was also damaged. The damage to these mosques underlined that the attacks have not been confined to Christian churches but have been aimed more widely at religious sites.

Another city which suffered random shelling and extensive killing was Aksum, the centre of the first Ethiopian state, with its 16th century CE Cathedral of St. Mary, the place of coronation of Ethiopian emperors, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, and the home of the Ark of the Covenant. Exactly what happened in Aksum between 19-29 November is still a matter of uncertainty, but it does seem clear that dozens, if not hundreds, of civilians were deliberately killed on 28-29 November by Eritrean troops, possibly in supposed retaliation for some earlier resistance to their presence. In their reports on what happened, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International blamed Eritrean troops and said mass killing left hundreds dead, mostly civilians. ¹²¹⁵Amnesty said: “Over an approximately 24-hour period on 28-29 November, Eritrean soldiers deliberately shot civilians on the street and carried out systematic house-tohouse searches, extra-judicially executing men and boys”. Both suggested the number of dead ran into several hundred. On 10 May, a report from the Federal Attorney-general said the Eritrean forces had killed 93 people but this had occurred during “heavy fighting” against forces loyal to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). ¹²¹⁶

One eye witness claimed that the first attack on Aksum came on 19 November with heavy and random shelling by Ethiopian and Eritrean artillery, followed by the arrival of Ethiopian and Eritrean troops after a two-day battle at Selekleka. There were no Tigrayan forces in the city. When the Ethiopian troops left after a week, some Eritrean troops remained and set up a base on the edge of the city on 27 November.
They started patrolling the city and the surrounding area. Some fighting broke out the next day when some local militia and youths from the city attacked the Eritrean force. Later in the day, large numbers of Eritrean reinforcements arrived, some in Ethiopian army uniforms. They began shooting at any civilians around on the streets.

The witness said: “It is hard to estimate the exact number of people shot dead by the time the one-day battle was over, except that the number of corpses buried at the church of St. Marry of Zion was claimed to be around 720.” The next day killing continued and was accompanied by extensive looting of houses with truckloads of goods being taken away. The looting went on for three days. ¹²¹⁷ How much damage was caused to the stelae, obelisks, monuments and other historic remains scattered around the city is still unknown. Another concern is the state of the Aksum Museum, its exhibits and storerooms in which are housed archaeological materials excavated since the early 1990s when large scale archaeological projects resumed in the Aksum area. It is not clear what has happened to these treasures. Much of the killing is said to have taken place in the compound of the Cathedral, where people had gathered to prevent any attempt to remove the Ark which is kept in a chapel in the Cathedral compound. There were rumours that Eritrean troops planned to take it to Eritrea or that it was going to be taken to the Amhara region, for ‘safety’.

According to eye witnesses Debre Damo, one of the oldest and best-known monasteries in Ethiopia with a church certainly dating back to the 6th century CE was the target of shelling by Eritrean troops on 11 January. The accounts of the shelling suggest the bombardment was not aimed at any specific target in the monastery. It came from three different places and according to witnesses while “the upper part of the monastery was hit by more than 18 shells, and a total 28 shells landed in the monastery, another 100 shells fell around the base of the sheer-sided amba, [mountain], on which the monastery stands, without causing casualties.” The shelling is said to have lasted nine hours in all. One monk was killed and 26 monastic cells/houses destroyed. Eritrean troops subsequently searched the monastery on two occasions, on January 12 and 14, taking significant quantity of materials away. ¹²¹⁸ Debre Damo hosts a significant collection of manuscripts and cultural objects. The soldiers have been quoted as telling the monks the shelling had taken place because they had been told TPLF leaders had taken refuge there.

Debre Damo is close to the border with Eritrea and a number of other churches in the border areas have been damaged, some severely. The newly constructed Aba Zewengel Church of Maebino Holy Cross monastery was reported demolished; and Cherkos church in Zalambessa suffered at least one direct hit from artillery fire.

The interruptions in communications and the continued difficulties of access to large areas of Tigray has meant it remains difficult to confirm the reports of destruction and death. Details of the numbers killed, of the damage caused to churches and mosques or of the looting that has taken place, often remain uncertain even if in the last few months more and more evidence has accumulated of the destruction of
heritage assets. The damage to buildings and the numbers and identification of those killed are steadily being revealed and documented.

10.2 Other massacres/damage to churches and religious sites

Damage to churches and associated killings has clearly been quite deliberate on occasions, and it appears that on some occasions Ethiopian and Eritrean troops chose dates on which such activity would have the maximum impact in terms of causing casualties. The annual feast day of the church at the Medhane Alem church of Gu’itelo (Eastern Tigray) was 5 January. On that day, after shelling the church, Eritrean troops arrived, forced the members of the congregation still present to line up and then shot them. Four of the priests were shot and killed at the residence of the church teacher. In addition to the damage at the church, the troops killed a total of 30 civilians as well as another 16 people in the adjacent villages of Firedashum and Ara’iro, including 6 priests and 3 deacons. ¹²¹⁹

Dengelat is close to the town of Edga Hamus, on the road between Adigrat and Wukro. Its rock church of Maryam Dengelat in the cliffs above the village was reopened with the help of Italian mountaineers and re-consecrated by the Bishop of Adigrat only two years ago. The route to the church had been closed by a rock fall in the 17th century when the path was swept away. A new church was built near the village. Eritrean troops arrived there during the feast of Tsion Mariam and opened fire while hundreds were celebrating mass. Many were killed in the church compound; others tried to escape up the cliffs; the troops followed spraying the mountainside with bullets. ¹²²⁰ At least a hundred people died then and more over the next three days before the soldiers left. Many of those killed included people who had fled a few days earlier from fighting near Adigrat

The church of Medhanie Alem Gu’etelo in Gulomekeda (Eastern Tigray) was shelled by Eritrean artillery on the occasion of the annual Feast of Jesus on 5 January. During a four-hour bombardment, at least thirteen shells hit the church and its compound, seriously damaging the church, shattering its windows and roof, and killing many of the congregation. When the Eritrean troops reached the church, they lined up the remaining congregants and shot them. They also killed four of the priests, altogether a total of 28 people, including nine women. ¹²²¹

Another massacre occurred on 5-6 January near the monastery of Debre Abay. The nearby small town of Mai Hrmaz was shelled before Ethiopian and Eritrean troops went on a killing spree, reportedly leaving more than a hundred dead. ¹²²² Whether any of those killed included people from the monastery, or whether the monastery itself suffered attack is unclear. Debre Abay is a famous monastery, founded in the monks and scholars. The building was bombed by the Italians in 1935 but rebuilt in 14th century CE with a notable reputation for learning, and supporting over a hundred the 1950s.

The Freedom of Religion or Belief blog for Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) in February called for swift international action to save the region of Tigray. It spoke of confirmed massacres of Tigrayans and the deaths of ‘significant numbers’ of clergy and worshippers. It said it had reports of 154 deaths, including the murders of around 48 Orthodox priests in a church in Adi Fetaw, close to the Eritrean border, and of 24 priests in Edaga Arbi. It believed the attacks on churches appear to be timed to coincide with annual religious festivals, possibly to inflict maximum casualties. It quoted a Tigrayan official: “They kill whomever they find in whichever village they get in. In the village I was in yesterday – it’s a small village – they killed 21 people, out of which seven of them were priests.” ¹²²³ CSW’s Head of Advocacy said: “The extensive destruction and looting, including of sites of historical religious importance that generate income from tourism, point to a deliberate effort to deprive the region of every means of survival and recovery.”
A letter obtained by the UK Daily Telegraph newspaper in May, apparently from EOTC members in Tigray and addressed to the Holy Synod in Addis Ababa, claimed that at least 78 “priests, deacons, choristers, and monks” had been massacred in one zone of Tigray alone in the last five months.¹²²⁴ The newspaper’s report quoted other priests who thought the numbers could be much higher. It mentioned the churches of Gergera Maryam, Adi’Zeban Karagiorgis, Kidanemihret Bosa, Taksa and the monastery of Da Abune Ayzgi as some of the churches where clergy had been killed. Witnesses have claimed Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers specifically target the churches on saint’s days in order to find larger numbers to kill. On 9 January, at a celebration of the birth of the Virgin Mary at Adi’Zeban Karagiorgis, eight Ethiopian soldiers arrived, took out 12 deacons between the ages of 15 and 20 and shot them.; at Gergera Maryam, a dozen Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers entered the church where six priests were praying. All six were shot, one survived.¹²²⁵

A partial list of major sacred sites that had been attacked, drawn up in February, listed four churches (Cherkos in Zalembesa, burnt down by Eritrean troops; Inda Mariam and Inda Abune Aregawi, at Adi Dairo, both shelled; and Medhanie Alem Gu’etelo; three monasteries (Yeha, looted by Eritrean troops; Debra Damo, shelled and looted by Eritrean troops; and Qheretsa Mariam); Samre, bombed by the Ethiopian air force; and the Al-Nejashi mosque, Wukro, shelled and looted by Eritrean forces. ¹²²⁶ All were significant historic and religious centres.

These attacks emphasize that any right of sanctuary, a long-held custom in Ethiopia, is no longer acceptable to the armed forces of either Ethiopia or of Eritrea. At one level, much of the shelling of towns and villages appears to be arbitrary, as in the urban areas of Shire, Humera or Mekelle which Human Rights Watch, in a report in February this year, described as ‘indiscriminate’, though it emphasized that this was also a clear violation of the laws of war. ¹²²⁷ At the same time, the repeated coincidence of the shelling of churches and other religious sites, including mosques, on holy days when large crowds might be expected, underlines deliberation and intent.

10.3 Attacks on the ‘Sacred Landscapes’ and ‘Cultural Heritage’ of Tigray’

There is no doubt that the conflict, and the way President Isaias and Prime Minister Abiy have conducted it, has damaged or threatened to damage churches and mosques, as well as archaeological remains, buildings, inscriptions, manuscripts and documents. The reported behaviour of both Ethiopian and Eritrean troops suggest that President Isaias and Prime Minister Abiy have, quite deliberately, decided to destroy some of the earliest records of both Christianity and Islam in Africa. Indeed, it appears that the President of Eritrea, in his petulant determination to take revenge for military defeat in a war he himself instigated twenty years ago, and a Prime Minister of Ethiopia, aiming to ensure the removal of any critics of his policies of centralisation, acting together in an almost unparalleled demonstration of barbarism and stupidity, have decided to orchestrate the destruction of much of the major leading elements of the cultural heritage of Tigray, ignoring their value to Ethiopia, to Eritrea or to the world. Their targets have included: the al-Najashi mosque, Aksum, Debra Damo, the 7th century BCE temple at Yeha, the oldest free-standing stone structure in sub-Saharan Africa; the greatest collection of rock churches in the world, over 120 ranging from the 4th to the 15th centuries CE; and some of the earliest Christian and Muslim manuscripts. Aksum is already a UNESCO World Heritage site, but Yeha and three groups of the rock churches, those in the Gheralta, Tembien and Atsbi, are all under consideration as World Heritage sites.

The cultural heritage, now being destroyed in Tigray, is irreplaceable. Churches, monasteries and mosques have been damaged by the shelling or bombing of Ethiopian and Eritrean forces. Historical manuscripts have been looted by Eritrean troops. One early list of damaged religious sites and of the numbers of killed priests and monks included 14 churches and four monasteries damaged by bombing and artillery fire, as well as looting by Ethiopian and Eritrean troops since the start of the war. The number continues to rise.

The churches of Tigray have attracted pilgrims and worshippers for centuries. With their “stunning murals with depictions of Ethiopian history”, they have in recent years become a major international tourist attraction. They range from monolithic to rock-hewn and built structures, and the earliest date back to the 5th century CE or even earlier. Tigray is home to the largest collection of medieval and early medieval rock churches in the world and there has been repeated military activity near or around many of the most famous churches. The town of Hawzien, for example, has been a major centre for tourism in the Gheralta mountains where the some of the most spectacular rock churches lie, and it has been attacked or occupied on several occasions by Eritrean or Ethiopian forces.

In February 2018, the Federal Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Ethiopia submitted its nominations for the ‘Sacred Landscapes of Tigray’ to the tentative list of World Heritage Sites in the cultural category. ¹²²⁸ In its application, the Ministry said: “Tigray is home to 121 rock-hewn churches, believed to represent the single largest group of rock-hewn architecture in the world. Eighty of these churches, dating from the 5th to 14th centuries AD, as well as a small number of masonry-and-timber built churches, which include some of the oldest timber structures surviving worldwide (6th – 10th centuries AD), are located in the Sacred Landscapes of Tigray.” It added that a significant number of churches had wall-paintings and many retained treasures in the form of manuscripts, portable paintings and liturgical objects, including examples which had survived from the Middle Ages.

The Ministry’s nomination covered three separate areas in eastern Tigray: ‘The Sacred Landscape of Gheralta’; ‘The Sacred Landscape of Tembien’; and ‘The Sacred Landscape of Atsbi’.¹²²⁹

Gheralta includes twenty-eight rock-hewn monuments carved into the sandstone were excavated at different dates from the 5th – 14th centuries CE. They are located in a “spectacular landscape of great scenic beauty, access to many of them is extremely challenging and, in some cases, involves climbing vertical surfaces … or walking along a narrow ledge with a vertical drop below.” Wall-paintings date from the 13th –19th centuries CE. All remain in use and many hold paintings, crosses, crowns, sistra, drums and other religious artefacts. Tembien has twenty-eight rockhewn churches dating largely to the second half of the Middle Ages and are a coherent group in terms of age and function. Many are associated with living monasteries. Many possess important ecclesiastical treasures, especially manuscripts and crosses.

Atsbi to the east is at the eastern edge of the highland plateau and includes twentyfour rock-hewn churches, as well as three very early timber-and-masonry built churches. Among the rock-hewn churches is Mikael Amba, 8th – 10th centuries CE which incorporates important early woodwork; others are Mikael Barka, Mikael Mitsua and Abuna Aregawi Afa’anti. Debra Selam Mikael is a cave church of timberand-masonry construction with the upper parts and the rear wall carved out of the solid rock, and together with Tcherqos Agabo and Zarema Giyorgis, are amongst the oldest churches in Ethiopia and the oldest timber structures in the world, dating between the 6th and 10th centuries CE. Debra Selam Mikael also has an outstanding and extensive series of wall-paintings, dating to the 11th/12th century.

The Ministry’s justification of outstanding universal value for these Sacred

Landscapes notes that they incorporate “the largest group of rock-hewn architectural ensembles in the world.” The spiritual practices associated with them preserve “in an Ethiopian context a living survival of the oldest forms of Christian monasticism”. They exist in a landscape whose integrity has been maintained by the continuation of traditional farming practices, and which have survived without threat from development. The rock-hewn churches retain their original form, design and materials, in their original setting, with few subsequent alterations. They also illustrate successive influences on Ethiopian culture from 4th century Egypt to the Italian Renaissance in the 15th century CE, and provide a testimony to the civilization of medieval Ethiopia.

The area around Hawzien town and the Gheralta mountains appears to have been
the scene of considerable fighting for several months. ¹²³⁰ One eyewitness account
of the activities of Ethiopian and Eritrean troops noted military operations at Hawzien
and along the road running past the Gheralta mountains in November 2020.¹²³¹

There were reports in January of “extensive looting” in the Gheralta area, and that Hawzien had been seriously damaged by shell fire. Additional Eritrean troops were said to have appeared in late January, and there was further fighting and indiscriminate bombing of Hawzien in mid-February and early March. Ethiopian and Eritrean troops shelled Hawzien in April with 30 deaths reported. The most recent report was in May when there was “active and random shelling in Hawzien and its vicinity”, and of fighting at the village of Abune Y’ma’eta Guh, closest to one of the best-known of the rock churches, on May 7 between Ethiopian troops and Tigrayan forces. Villagers said after the fighting Eritrean troops arrived the next day and shot 21 of the villagers. 19 died, including 7 children under 10, one a month-old baby. Nine belonged to one family. Four-and-a-half-year-old Samrawit, shot twice in the leg and also attacked with a machete, survived and her father managed to get her to hospital in Mekelle after a two-day journey. ¹²³²

Fighting in and around Hawzien poses a direct threat to many nearby churches in the Gheralta area, among the best-known of which are: Abraha wa Atsbha, Debre Tsion (Abune Abraham), Selassie Dugum, Debre Maryam Korkor, Daniel Korkor and Abuna Yemata Guh. Some of these churches are, of course, exceptionally difficult to reach. In the past, their isolation has protected them, but tourism has put them firmly ‘on the map’. They have become a major tourist destination in the last decade or so with the town of Hawzien developing as a tourist centre with hotels and lodges being built in and around the town and along the road, including the highly recommended Gheralta Lodge and Korkor Lodge. The former has reportedly been destroyed. Now the churches are no longer hidden, and fighting in this area puts all of them seriously at risk, particularly with Eritrean and Ethiopian troops under orders to loot and destroy.

A number of archaeological sites have also been affected by the conflict – Mai Adrasha, a pre-Aksumite site at Shire which has been the scene of some heavy fighting. A total of 14 or so archaeological excavations were taking place in Tigray and at least half a dozen, including Beta Samati, Mifsas Bahri, Adi Ketema (Adi Gorazu), Gulo Makeda, Wukro Gaewa, and Yeha, have seen fighting or suffered from looting. Eritrean troops looted Yeha and surrounding villages as well as taking church materials form the nearby Abune Mezraete monastery. There were also reports that the archaeological site had been looted. ¹²³³ Yeha and the nearby site of Beta Samati are both of major archaeological importance. Only nine months before the outbreak of war in Tigray, the Federal Ministry of Culture and Tourism submitted an application for ‘The Cultural Heritage of Yeha’ to be declared a World Heritage Site to UNESCO, in March 2020. The site includes two monumental buildings, the Grat Be’al Geubri Palace and the Great Temple of Yeha and two cemetery areas, the rock cut shaft tombs of Da’ero Mikael and the tombs of Abiy Addi dating to the early and middle of the first millennium BC. ¹²³⁴ The Great Temple of Yeha, whose walls are well preserved up to 14 metres, which dates to about the 7th century BC and was dedicated to the god Almaqah.¹²³⁵ It was converted to a monastery in the 6th century CE, the Monastery of Abune Aftsie, one of the Nine Saints who came to the area at the end of the 5th century CE from Syria. The monastery was moved to its nearby present location in the early 20th century. The Palace of Be’al Geubri dating to the 8th century BC, lies close to the north east of the Temple. It measured at least 27 meters high, a multi-storey palace, constructed in wood-stone architecture and is the largest known timber-framed building in East Africa and South Arabia and the oldest example south of the Sahara. It marks the beginning of a long tradition of wood-framed constructions in the region. The Da’ero Mikael rock tombs, seventeen rock-cut graves dating to the first millennium BCE, are believed to have belonged to the rulers who lived at the palace. The other group of nine tombs at Abiy Addi have collective burials and also date to the first millennium BCE.

The Ministry’s application points out that Yeha offers early evidence for the emergence of a complex culture in the Northern Horn or in the sub-Saharan Africa in general. It was a “political, religious and cultural Centre of highly centralised complex societies in the early first Millennium BC, the first capital city of the Ethiopia state before its transfer to Aksum.” It notes the buildings are of high quality and the Great Temple, one of the best preserved architectural remains in Africa, is the earliest surviving structure in sub-Saharan Africa. It provides unique evidence of the cultural exchanges between Africa and Saudi Arabia, as well as archaeological evidence for metal working and for the introduction of the working of metals, the first evidence for the formation of a centralized state in Ethiopia.

Yeha is at the centre of an area of major tourist and archaeological interest. Only a few miles away is Beta Samati where recent archaeological excavations have produced major discoveries in the last few years. It seems to have been an administrative centre occupied from 8th cent BCE to the 7th cent CE, and excavations have found the complete layout of an ancient basilica, with characteristic Aksumite architectural walls and a Ge’ez inscription probably reading ‘for this entrance, Christ be favourable to us’. The site also shows evidence of food preparation, (with the bones of cattle, sheep, goats, dik-dik, donkeys, camels and chickens along with wild birds, as well as t’ef, wheat and barley), metal and glass production, as well as commercial activities and long distant trade, including pottery from the Byzantine empire. ¹²³⁶ Beta Samati provides important new evidence of Aksumite and preAksumite societies and the continuity between them. It offers the chance to increase knowledge of Aksum’s international trade, the conversion to Christianity and of the end of the Aksumite empire.
There are also other sites beyond Yeha, including Meqaber Ga’ewa, some 90 km to the south east, dating to the 8th to 6th centuries BCE, where there is also a temple, some of whose details are similar to those of Yeha. It again shows links with South Arabian cultures and the remains, including votive offerings, demonstrate “the convergence of local and South Arabian cultural traditions of the first millennium BC.”

10.4 The concern of international scholars

Scholars around the world have been horrified by the increasing cultural and
religious losses in Tigray. It has been called ‘cultural cleansing’, an attempt to literally
erase Tigrayan culture. But it is also far more. It is a deliberate effort to destroy the
central elements of the cultural heritage not just of Tigray but of Ethiopia, and of the
other peoples of Ethiopia, including the Amhara and the Oromo, and of Eritrea. The
destruction of the one involves the destruction of the other. Indeed, it also involves
the destruction of a substantial element of the world’s cultural heritage. Among the
treasures at risk are some of the oldest Christian manuscripts, religious relics, and
historic Islamic sites in the world.

The levels of destruction and the seizures of property of all kinds in the towns as
Ethiopian and Eritrean troops advanced towards Mekelle, as well as the obvious
intent to loot, has raised international alarm over the fate of church treasures. It
seems clear that in some cases at least, the pillaging of towns and churches, have
been intended to profit those involved. Almost as soon as Eritrean troops were seen
in Tigray, there were reports of looted goods turning up on the streets and markets of
Asmara. As might be expected, these did not include church treasures nor
manuscripts. Valuables seized from religious sites are unlikely to end up on the
streets of Asmara; they will go to those more able to benefit from their greater value
when sold overseas.

The treatment of churches and other religious sites, however, and the killing of
priests has reinforced worries about the possible fate of what amounts, in total, to
one of the great treasures of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church in Tigray and
in Ethiopia, and indeed of Christianity: the collections of Geez manuscripts, found in
the churches of Tigray. They have been described as “indispensable sources for
scholars of early Christianity, late antique Ethiopia and even early Islam…not only
among the earliest complete texts of the Christian scripture, but also [providing] us
with a rare glimpse into the language, religion and history of ancient Ethiopia.” One
Canadian scholar, Professor Gervers, professor of history at the University of
Toronto, stresses they are of the highest importance for Christian culture and the
cultural heritage of Judeo-Christianity, and “their loss or displacement would be
disastrous”.¹²³⁷

Concern has been growing as more and more reports have detailed the destruction
being carried out by Ethiopian and more often by Eritrean troops during the fighting
in November and subsequently. An article in the UK’s Daily Telegraph in January
said: “Churches and mosques in Ethiopia are being attacked and their sacred
treasures looted, with international experts warning of historical vandalism and
cultural cleansing”.¹²³⁸ The report said there were reports of Christian manuscripts
being stolen from churches and monasteries, and burned, some manuscripts as old
as the 13th century, and of historic Muslim sites being damaged and looted.
Professor Gervers described this as “cultural cleansing;” it appeared “The
government and the Eritreans want to wipe out the Tigrayan culture… The looting is
about destroying and removing the cultural presence of Tigray… They’re emptying
the physical evidence of culture from the province.” He said there had been reports
that around 800 Ge’ez manuscripts had been looted from the Shire region. German
academic, Dr. Wolbert Smidt, said the “attacks and battles around, at and nearby
such sites, show a very great danger for them”. Breaking “the traditional rule of
sacred places being absolute sanctuaries”, he said, was a tragedy, both for an
“already deeply-shocked local population” and the world’s heritage. The Telegraph
report said it was also believed that artefacts had been stolen from the Al-Nejashi
Mosque, including religious manuscripts, books and letters, dating back to the
seventh century. ¹²³⁹

The humanitarian crisis rightly takes precedence over everything else, but the sacred
sites and treasures of Ethiopia that are now at risk are of incalculable value to the
history of Christianity and its development and to the people of Ethiopia and their
history and culture. Professor Alison Phipps, Professor of Languages and
Intercultural Studies at Glasgow University, has underlined that: “Attacks on cultural
heritage are devastating in the context of war as they speak of the destruction of the
soul of a people, of things which have endured through the ancestors.”

Professor Catherine D’Andrea, director of the Eastern Tigray archaeological project
at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, Canada, said the region was “truly
blessed with numerous and varied forms of tangible and intangible cultural
patrimony”.¹²⁴⁰ They include monumental architecture such as the UNESCO world
heritage site of Aksum, rock-hewn churches and remains of one of the earliest
mosques in Africa. “In addition, there are less visible cultural treasures, including
manuscripts, paintings, oral traditions and artefacts held by churches and
monasteries scattered throughout rural areas of Tigray. These tend to be not fully
documented, so we can’t even begin to calculate the potential losses if destroyed or
pillaged.” Overall, there are believed to be some 4,000 churches and monasteries in
Tigray.

The specific threat to cultural and religious buildings was underlined in report in
January, written by Alula Tesfay Asfha a lecturer at Mekelle university who
specialises in heritage conservation in Tigray.¹²⁴¹ He notes the early invasions under
which Tigray suffered conflict, destruction and pillage: Yehudit Gudit, an Agaw queen
in the 10th century CE, Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi, Emir of Adal in the 16th century,
CE, and the Italian invasions of 1894-96 and 1935-41. And goes on: “With this
historical reality in mind and in light of what we know of the current conflict in Tigray,
it is not difficult to determine that the War on Tigray poses a great risk to cultural and
religious heritage be it from intentional destruction, as collateral damage, or
organised looting. There have been reports and photographic evidence of intentional
attacks against buildings (mosques and churches included) and monuments
recognized as both local and international historical heritage sites.” ¹²⁴²

The prestigious Hiob Ludolf Centre for Ethiopian and Eritrean Studies issued an
appeal In January for ‘the salvation of the cultural heritage of Tigray’. It was signed
by 23 scholars and endorsed by another seventy from around the world. It
emphasized the concern of the scholastic and academic community for the “highly
endangered and directly affected” cultural property of Tigray. It noted Tigray hosted
an “extraordinarily rich cultural heritage that had contributed to the development of
the region and the entire country and has increased the visibility of Ethiopia as one
of the most vibrant tourist destinations in Africa.” It pointed out there had been
extensive progress in recent years in studying and preserving “newly recorded
historical artefacts and manuscripts, archaeological sites, new museums, restored
historical buildings, paintings and manuscripts, and collections of research data”. It
expressed concern over the reports that hostilities had been taking place close to
renowned cultural sites and that some might have been plundered and looted,
mentioning ‘sites of symbolic importance for all of Ethiopia’ including Yeha, al-
Najashi Mosque, the church of Maryam Dengelat, the monastery of Dabra Abbay
¹²⁴³, the monastery of Dabra Dammo, and Aksum city, already on the UNESCO
World Heritage List.

The Centre noted reports that manuscripts were being looted from churches and
monasteries and the danger that they might now be taken out of Ethiopia to be sold
abroad. It appealed for state institutions to do everything possible to protect ‘the
cultural property of Tigray’ from further destruction, to investigate reported cases of
loss and looting and do everything possible to protect research materials from
misappropriation and dispersion. The scholars also called on all parties to refrain
from attacking this heritage and to respect the places where it had been preserved
The Centre said it was “increasingly concerned by the effect of the conflict on the
cultural heritage of Tigray.” It appealed to all parties “to abstain from attacking the
cultural heritage and to respect the integrity of the places, both religious and secular,
where this heritage is preserved”. ¹²⁴⁴

One of the recent projects of the British Library’s Endangered Archives Program
(EAP) was Identifying endangered monastic collections in the Säharti and Enderta
regions of Tigray (Ethiopia) (EAP357)’.¹²⁴⁵ It aimed to make a survey of the monastic
libraries in the Säharti and Enderta regions, travelling to thirty or so selected
churches or monastic sites and documenting the content of each library holding to
identify rare books and collections. The team visited and surveyed 32 sites, finding
the majority of the collections were of hymns, liturgical manuscripts, homilies,
Psalters, and scriptures (particularly of the Gospels). Three of the libraries consulted
had a wide range of theological, philosophical and exegetical works, including rare
manuscripts both in Geez and Amharic, but held in poor storage.

Others in the region have become concerned. Five exiled opposition Eritrean
organisations at the end of December 2020 called for an end to killings and looting in
Tigray by Eritrean Forces.¹²⁴⁶ They said the killings had been accompanied by
widespread looting, including centuries-old religious artefacts, by organised groups
coordinated from Eritrea. It referred to reports of lorries being sent to accompany
Eritrean units whose specific mission was to remove anything of value that they
could lay their hands on. This loot was being taken to Eritrea, where most of it was
being stockpiled though some was appearing in local markets. The statement said:
“These crimes go against Eritrean core values of decency, respect for fellow human
beings, honesty and integrity. Theft and looting are frowned upon and thieves treated
as ‘outcasts’ in our society. These values are ingrained in Eritrean society and make
us who we are. The abuses, looting and killings that are now being perpetrated in
Tigray are a clear manifestation of the atrocities our people endured in the hands of
President Isaias over the last three decades. They are cowardly, disgusting,
abhorrent and shameful acts.” The call was signed by Eritrea Focus; Global Initiative
to Empower Eritrean Grassroots Movement; Human Rights Concern Eritrea;
Release Eritrea; and Yiakl (Bayto)-UK.¹²⁴⁷

At the end of January, the Global Society of Tigray Scholars addressed a letter to
Audrey Azoulay, Director General of UNESCO, drawing attention to “issues that
squarely fall under your good office’s purview and express our deepest concern
about the unprecedented damages that are being purposefully and systematically
perpetrated on heritage sites across Tigray. We note that what is going on in Tigray
is pertinent to many articles featured in the “1972 World Heritage Convention” as
well as the “Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954”.¹²⁴⁸ The letter
notes the “exquisitely carved 1,700 years old monolithic tomb marker obelisks” which
risk crumbling if explosions occur nearby. It speaks of the “credible reports of
widespread state-sponsored looting and destruction occurring in many locations
within the Aksum World Heritage site. It stresses many monuments, archaeological
sites, artefacts and ancient manuscripts are focus of looting despite resistance of
local people and the clergy, adding that “with Eritrean forces and their Ethiopian
enablers apparently determined to ransack Tigray of its precious heritage, almost all
sites and antiquities of Tigray face imminent danger and pillage.” They are clearly at
risk.
In January, Tigrayan scholars were sure that the Ethiopian government, the Eritrean
army and Amhara regional forces were openly engaged in heritage destruction and
looting. The situation has only deteriorated further.

Ethiopian Christian manuscripts written in Ge’ez, contain precious and vital
information on the history, culture and traditions of Ethiopia. There remain, according
to some estimates, over 350,000 Ethiopian Christian manuscripts in Ethiopia, a
major proportion of them to be found in Tigray. There has previously been some
concern over their state as Ethiopia has no national preservation program to identify,
document and assemble valuable monastic collections. Even before the
opportunities now offered by civil war and military looting, manuscripts have been
disappearing. The Tigray Bureau of Culture and Tourism had been working to
compile a list of manuscripts found in some churches and monasteries. But this is
neither complete nor exhaustive.

One major item of concern has been the Garima Gospels, an illuminated gospel
book in two volumes, kept in the Abba Garima monastery, to the east of Adua in the
Mehakelegnaw zone of Tigray. They are of incalculable importance as radio-carbon
dating suggests the possibility they might even have actually been written by Abba
Garima himself, one of the nine Syrian saints believed to have arrived in Ethiopia
around 480 CE. One volume is now dated to between 390-570 CE; and the other to
between 530-660 CE. ¹²⁴⁹ They are therefore likely to be the world’s earliest
surviving illuminated Christian manuscripts. Michelle Brown, a former British Library
curator, described the Garima Gospels as casting “vital light upon early Christian
illuminated manuscript production and the role of sub-Saharan Africa”. They offer an
example of the lost late antique art of Ethiopia, as well as the Christian East. They
are closely related to Syriac, Armenian, Greek, and Georgian gospel books and to
the art of late antique (“Coptic”) Egypt, Nubia, and Himyar (Yemen), demonstrating
how the distinctive Christian culture developed in Aksum, and its links to the late
antique Mediterranean world.

The survival of the Garima Gospels has been almost miraculous, not least because
the monastery has been in the frontline before. Even if it survived the fall of Aksum
unscathed in the 8th century CE, it was probably overrun and looted in the 16th
century by Ahmed Gran; in the 1890s the area was subject to Italian invasion; and
the main church of the monastery was destroyed by fire in the 1930s. Despite their
long history, the manuscript’s illuminations remain bright, vibrant and colourful. It
suggests they were hidden away in the dark, and only rediscovered fairly recently.
Today, they are facing new dangers.

In mid-February, employees of the Mekelle Diocese which includes a total of 45
monasteries, issued a statement which noted that “most of the tangible and
intangible heritages registered with UNESCO” were held by the Tigray Orthodox
Tewahedo Church and were at “risk of being looted and destroyed”. The statement
said almost all monasteries and religious schools in Tigray had been bombed or
shelled. It claimed: “Historic and religious books and archives that belong to different
monasteries and churches which are symbols of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and
sources of tourism have been looted and destroyed.” This was still continuing. They
called upon the Eritrean and Amhara region invaders to stop all atrocities, the looting
of public property, artefacts, and treasures, and to leave Tigray immediately. Noting
Tigray was the cradle of ancient civilization and religion and was known for being the
home of the Ark of the Covenant, they stressed most of the tangible and intangible
heritage for Ethiopia registered with UNESCO were from the Tigray Orthodox
Tewahedo Church. They called for “the immediate return of artefacts, treasures, and
properties looted by the invading Eritrean army and the Amhara forces” and for the
“protection of our heritage”, as well as for the international community to provide
humanitarian assistance to the priests, deacons, and monks in the monasteries and
churches who had been deprived of food and water due to the war. ¹²⁵⁰

Some responses have been surprisingly muted. Despite the human rights’ abuses
committed in Tigray and the destruction of churches, neither the Patriachate of the
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) in Addis Ababa, nor the other
churches in Ethiopia, have had much to say about events in Tigray. The head of the
Roman Catholic Church in Ethiopia, Cardinal Berhaneyesus Souraphiel, did send as
delegation to investigate the damage to Catholic church facilities in Adigrat in
January. The delegation reported that that priests and nuns in a church compound
were forced to witness heavy fighting after a church compound had been taken over
and used as a military command centre, that the Adigrat seminary building and water
tanker were damaged by shelling, a chapel at the cemetery was damaged, and
windows of the church school were damaged and broken. It noted that an Orthodox
church, a mosque and other church buildings near the Catholic church were
damaged. The delegation also reported that offices and classrooms at the Wukro St.
Mary’s Catholic College were broken and looted, with laptops and computers stolen,
and the solar panel for power taken.

The Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahdo Church, Abune Mathias, has also
spoken of the threat to the heritage of Tigray, of the destruction of churches and the
killing of priests. His message was recorded on the IPhone of a visitor in April and
smuggled out of Addis Ababa. So it was only on 7 May, that in his first public
message since the start of the war, he was able to speak of barbaric deeds being
committed in Ethiopia and especially in Tigray: “What is happening in Tigray is of the
highest brutality and cruelty… Genocide is being committed now, especially
[targeting] our civilian brethren.” He spoke of the killing of innocent citizens in cities,
villages, homes, the raping of women, the complete looting of Tigrayan property,
“aiming at wiping out the people of Tigray”, and of massacres, forced starvation, and
of the destruction of churches and looting. “They shoot at churches; they shoot at
monasteries, at Aksum, at Debre Damo. The cannon bombardment at Debre Damo
is very shocking…. The monks of Waldibba have been driven out of their home
where they had lived their entire lives and have been dispersed…. It’s not just
Aksum and Debre Damo; the new church in Asimba, Bahitawi Zewengel, has been
hit. In Mariam Denegleat, people who had been praying had been made to fall like
leaves outside the church.” The Patriarch asks God to strengthen the people of
Tigray – “All shall pass, so this too may pass…May God take away all this and bring
us an era of peace”, before concluding “What has the people of Tigray done, what is
its crime, so much so that they strive to wipe it off the face of the earth? Genocide is
being committed. The world ought to know.” ¹²⁵¹

The conflict has caused divisions within the church and the statement by the
Patriarch has underlined the divide. Back in mid-November, the Synod of the EOTC
publicly announced its support for the ‘I stand with the Ethiopian Army campaign” in
Tigray launched by the Prime Minister. Since then, the Synod has made no criticism
of the destruction of churches, the killing of priests, and religious figures or the
impact of the war. Following the statement by the Patriarch, the Holy Synod did hold
an emergency meeting but only to distance itself from the Patriarch. The Secretary-
General of the Synod, Abune Yosef, gave a press conference to stress that the
message of the Patriarch regarding the situation in Tigray did not represent the Holy
Synod and to insist that any official Church announcement had to be approved by
the general assembly of the Holy Synod. The Patriarch, who is himself from Tigray,
did not in fact mention the Synod or the Church.

The failure of the Synod to condemn what has been happening in Tigray, its
apparent support for the government’s policies in Tigray, and the virtual house arrest
of the Patriarch, has led to calls to establish a separate Tigray Orthodox Church. A
Global Orthodox Tewahdo Association of Tigrayan Clergies was set up on 21
November, “to enable our [Tigrayan] people to retain their Orthodox Tewahedo
religion, [Tigrayan] culture, and history and instil these Tigrayan values into their
children, …. and make every necessary preparation for the establishment of a
Church Council of the Tigray Orthodox Tewahido Church of the future state of
Tigray.”¹²⁵²

Volume 2: July to December 2021

11. Foreword
By Right Honourable Helen Clark¹²⁵³

The Tigray crisis

In the fifteen months since the war in the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray erupted
in November 2020, it has become the bloodiest conflict in the world. It is also among
the least reported. It is thought that some 100,000 people have died, but no-one can
be certain. The region is hermetically sealed off from the outside world. This is no
accident: it is a strategy adopted by the governments of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and
Somalia to prevent information from reaching the outside world.

For the people of Tigray, this has meant that their plight has gone all but unreported.
Cameras and television crews have seldom managed to gain access to the
frontlines, and even then, have mostly reported from the Ethiopian side of the war.
Rarely have reports come from inside Tigray itself; none have been received on the
conflict from Eritrea or Somalia.

Volume 1 of “Tigray War and Regional Implications” provided a rare glimpse into the
situation with chapters by regional experts. Its publication was welcomed by scholars
across the world, with almost 5,000 making use of the report. Volume 2 builds on
that work. It is urgently needed: the situation in Tigray could hardly be more critical.

Tigray is now under the equivalent of a medieval siege. It seems that there is a
deliberate attempt to starve Tigray’s six million people into submission. The 100,000
Eritrean refugees who were sheltering in Tigray at the start of the war, in camps
under the protection of the UNHCR, have been scattered, conscripted, and/or killed.
Those who remain survive in the most appalling conditions.¹²⁵⁴

The United Nations and international aid agencies have done their best to reach the
neediest. They have – occasionally – been allowed to move vital supplies by truck or
planes, but the quantities are so small that they hardly amount to more than a drop in
the ocean of need.

As the World Food Programme said in a statement on 24 February 2022: Nearly
40% of people in Ethiopia’s Tigray are suffering “an extreme lack of food.”¹²⁵⁵ Their
assessment found that found 4.6 million people in Tigray — or 83% of the population
— were food-insecure, two million of them “severely” so. “Families are exhausting all
means to feed themselves, with three quarters of the population using extreme
coping strategies to survive,” the WFP said.

In the largest hospital in Tigray region, a child wounded in an air strike recently bled
to death after doctors ran out of gauze and intravenous fluids. A baby died because
there were no fluids for dialysis.¹²⁵⁶ Doctors at the Ayder Referral Hospital in the
regional capital Mekelle, told Reuters by phone the lack of supplies is largely the
result of a months-long government aid blockade on the northern region. “Signing
death certificates has become our primary job,” the hospital said.

With images appearing on social media of the elderly and children close to
starvation, no-one can be in any doubt of the seriousness of the situation. Yet still
the people of Tigray are undefeated, with their army largely intact. Complex
negotiations are now under way involving the African Union and many international
actors, including the United States.

Tigray War & Regional Implications (Volume 2)

Volume 1 took the narrative from the start of the war in November 2020 until June
Volume 2 takes it from June 2021 until the end of December 2021.

Written by experts inside Ethiopia and in the outside world, it attempts both to build
on the information in Volume 1 and to provide fresh information on topics that have
not previously been explored. Volume 2 includes:

• A first cataloguing of the tragic looting and destruction of Tigray’s unique religious
  and cultural sites – some of which have global significance;
• The first consideration of the potential role of sanctions against Eritrea to halt
  President Isaias Afwerki’s continued attempts to exercise dominance in the Horn
  of Africa;
• An authoritative explanation of how the war unfolded and the deepening food
  insecurity situation in the months to the end of 2021
• The questions of sexual violence and international diplomacy that were chronicled
  in Volume 1 have been updated and looked at afresh.
  There is an urgent need for this information to spur the international community to
  action.

2021.  

While the Biden administration has led international efforts to resolve the crisis,
others have been poorly engaged, or have gone out of their way to exacerbate the
situation. The role of Turkey and China in providing drones to the Ethiopian military
via the UAE is reprehensible. Their drones have not only hit military targets; they
have also killed dozens of civilians.¹²⁵⁷ Russia and China have consistently kept the
question of Tigray off the agenda of the UN Security Council, while the African Union
has been ineffective in settling a conflict on its doorstep. The European Union has
allowed the United States to take the lead, while Britain – stripped of European
influence – has been reduced to a bit-player.

The lessons learned from the atrocities in the Balkans or Rwanda appear to have
been largely forgotten. The ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ which allowed for an
international intervention in critical situations even if the action overrode questions of
sovereignty, is seldom discussed.¹²⁵⁸ If the Tigray war – largely invisible and
therefore off the world’s radar – is to be ended, this trend needs to be reversed.
Engagement, not indifference, need to be the watchword of capitals from Beijing to
Washington.

12. Preface
By Habte Hagos and Martin Plaut¹²⁵⁹

This report builds on the work that was done for The Tigray War and Regional
Implications (Volume 1) that was published by Eritrea Focus and Oslo Analytica in
June 2021. Both reports are driven by a single motivation: a concern for the tragic
consequences for the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea in particular, and the Horn of
Africa at large, of the war that erupted in November 2020. The conflict pitted the
Tigrayans people against troops from Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia with the support
of the UAE, Turkey, Iran, and China, amongst others. The warring factions have paid
a very heavy price; so too have the civilians caught up in this brutal war.

None of the tragic suffering has been as under-reported as the death and casualties
inflicted on the people of Eritrea. Already trapped in Africa’s worst dictatorship,
without recourse to independent courts, judiciary or a functioning constitution,
Eritreans have also had to endure pain that is little recognised by the outside world.
The dictatorship of President Isaias Afwerki has meant that the media – local and
international – are either suppressed or so tightly controlled that only the
government’s version of events emerges. Faint whispers emerge from inside Eritrea;
families have heard from their loved ones; brave individuals smuggle truths out of the
country, but overall, the country suffers in silence.

What we know is that Eritreans in their tens of thousands have been sent to the front
lines as “National Service” conscripts. They have only two options: fight or flee.
Some have fought in Tigray and have been responsible for appalling atrocities that
have certainly been tolerated by, and probably been encouraged by, their officers.
Some have fled to Sudan or deserted from the Eritrean army while inside Tigray or
Ethiopia. Many have paid with their lives; still more have returned to Eritrea to live
with their disabilities as best they can. This report contains information about the
financial underpinnings of the Eritrean regime, much of which has never been
brought together before. We are determined to continue collecting information about
the intolerable persecution Eritreans face and making it public.

Having said this, the majority of this report focusses on the war and its
consequences for the people of Tigray and their neighbours. We are enormously
grateful to everyone who has contributed, but are particularly grateful to the Right
Honourable Helen Clark, former Prime Minster of New Zealand, for her unstinting
support and encouragement. Some of the authors must unfortunately remain
anonymous, or rely on nom de plumes, but we are happy to acknowledge the
contributions of Prof. Araya Debessay, Prof. Desta Asyehgn, G. E. Gorfu, Dr. Hagos
Abrha Abay, Sally Keeble, and Felicity Mulford. We are very grateful for the work of
Reclaim Eritrea¹²⁶⁰ in providing the maps which are a graphic guide to the
development of the war in Ermias Teka’s chapter on the Progress of the War. Prof.
Kjetil Tronvoll, who is our co-publisher, had played a vital role in backing the report
and contributing an important and insightful introduction.

As the report is published there has been a lull in the fighting. There are reports of
intensive negotiations to end the war: we hope they are productive and end the
suffering, allowing the political and physical reconstruction to begin. If this
opportunity is not seized there is every indication that the conflict will become
entrenched and could last for years. This tragedy must be avoided at all costs.

The views expressed in this report is that of the authors, and do not necessarily
represent the views of Eritrea Focus or Oslo Analytica.

13. Introduction: An end to the Ethiopian civil war?
By Professor Kjetil Tronvoll¹²⁶¹

The Ethiopian civil war, which unleashed devastation and horrors since it began in
November 2019, continues unabated in 2022. The frontlines have continuously
shifted, displacing millions of civilians and ruining infrastructure across Tigray,
northern Amhara, and Afar regional states. Attempts to facilitate a secession of
hostilities and peace negotiations by international envoys have all failed, as the
political objectives of the various belligerent parties appears irreconcilable.

The Ethiopian war theatre was the largest armed conflict in the world in 2021. Tens
of thousands of combatants have perished on the battlefields, thousands of civilians
have been massacred, and rape and famine have been weaponised. A confounding
element in the Ethiopian war is the involvement of a host of belligerent parties, the
key being the Tigray Defence Force (TDF) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) as
allies on one side, fighting against Ethiopian federal and regional government troops
and militias, irregular Amhara militias (Fano), and – not least – the Eritrean Defence
Forces (EDF). Furthermore, minor resistance movements and localised militia or
vigilante groups have allied themselves with one or other of the key belligerents,
further complicating the analysis of the war, the attribution of war crimes and
atrocities committed, as well as the pursuit of an overall peace process.

This report is a sequel to last year’s study (Volume 1) which inter alia detailed the
outbreak of the conflict, its humanitarian impact, and diplomatic efforts to end the
hostilities. Through this volume we continue our efforts to document and expose the
devastating ramifications of the war. A detailed overview of the evolvement of the
war, including illustrative maps, is presented by Ermias Teka. The dire humanitarian
impact, with millions in need of aid and hundreds of thousands starving, is analysed
by Felicity Mulford. Sally Keeble focuses on the horrendous sexual assaults inflicted
upon girls and women by the warring factions as part of their war strategy. The war
in Tigray also involves eradicating the region’s cultural and religious heritage. The
looting and destruction of religious and cultural artefacts have been widespread, an
issue investigated by Hagos Abrha Abay. The US sanctions on Eritrea for its atrocity
warfare on Tigray is discussed by Habte Hagos. The internationalisation of the
Ethiopian civil war is also notable with the involvement of the Eritrean and Tigrayan
diaspora in either furthering the conflict abroad, or trying to assist their communities
back home, an issue analysed by a group of prominent scholars. Ethiopia’s
diplomatic contacts and influence across the region are discussed by an expert in
the subject matter who wishes to remain anonymous.
Finally, since the outbreak of the war, various diplomatic initiatives have been
launched and special envoys tasked to try to bring the belligerent parties to the
negotiation table, a process examined by Martin Plaut.

Volumes 1 and 2 of the Tigray War and Regional Implications provide the most
comprehensive and up to date analysis on the tragic civil war currently unfolding in
Ethiopia.

The ebb and flow of war

After reclaiming control of Mekelle and central Tigray in June 2021, the TDF’s steady
march towards Addis Ababa surprised many observers. When the strategic towns of
Dessie and Kombolcha fell under TDF control at the end of October, it created
widespread concern of a potential collapse of the Federal Government. Prime
Minster Abiy Ahmed declared a nationwide State of Emergency. A month later, at the
end of November, the combined TDF/OLA forces reached Debre Sina, a town only
220 km north of Addis Ababa. The diplomatic community scrambled to evacuate
their citizens and Addis Ababa’s authorities asked alarmed inhabitants to be
prepared to defend the city at any cost. In response to the imminent threat, PM Abiy
declared a ‘total war’ against the rebels and vowed to go to the frontlines to lead the
fight himself. Thenceforth, however, a set of factors contributed to a shift in the tide
of war in favour of Ethiopia government and its allies.

In early December, TDF started what they called a tactical retreat of its forces from
the southern frontline, easing the pressure on the capital Addis Ababa. By calling it a
‘tactical’ retreat, it signalled that the strategic objective of their struggle remained
unchanged, but the military tactics to achieve them had to be revised. Subsequently,
the TDF announced that all its forces were withdrawing from the Amhara and Afar
regional states to return to Tigray.

It appears that there were three key reasons for the TDF tactical withdrawal, rooted
in military, political, and diplomatic concerns. First and foremost, it seems clear that
the military balance on the battlefield tilted in the Ethiopian government’s favour. A
key factor for this change was the massive arms purchases undertaken by the
government during 2021; acquiring among other equipment combat drones. The
long TDF supply route from Tigray to the southern front was particularly vulnerable
for drone attacks and destroyed lorries supplying fighting units. Furthermore, the
extended TDF lines offensive made their flanks vulnerable from attacks from the east
by Afar units and from the west by Amhara forces. At the same time, it is important
not to underestimate the effect of PM Abiy’s call for a total war and his
encouragement of civilians to join him on the frontline. This created a surge of
national fervour among his supporters, who willingly offered to sacrifice themselves
in combat. Although Tigrayan officials claimed that they had their fighting army
remains intact, as they pulled back without engaging in battle, it seems plausible that
a sustained high attrition rate would be difficult to sustain, given the comparatively
smaller TDF recruitment base.

As alluded to by Tigrayan officials, however, there were diplomatic and political
concerns as well, which compelled them to withdraw, which are key to a possible
negotiated solution to the war. Politically, a coherent and consolidated agreement on
a possible transitional government with their ally OLA and representatives from the
‘federalist alliance’ seemed to be wanting. The TPLF has been clear that they have
no interest or ambition in regaining central rule over Ethiopia. The responsibility to
lead a possible transitional government, achieved militarily or politically, would thus
rest on a broader Oromo led political opposition. This has yet to be consulted,
because of the political context in the country. No doubt there is deep political
distrust of the TPLF among many of the pro-federalist political opposition fronts in
Ethiopia; mistrust based on their experiences of the draconian rule of EPRDF over
27 years. To craft a new joint political platform among former adversaries in haste
during a war turned out to be difficult. A stable Tigrayan-Oromo political relationship
would have to be carefully mended, and then extended to other movements, before
a creditable alternative to the Prosperity Party rule could emerge.

In the end it was the diplomatic pressure brought to bear on the TPLF that was the
most important factor in halting the final offensive on Addis Ababa. The US
administration has been critical in this regard, with its special envoy ambassador
Jeffrey Feltman, giving an unequivocal messaging to TPLF. He declared in
November: “We oppose any TPLF move to Addis or any TPLF move to
besiege Addis.” The TPLF leadership are, perhaps a little paradoxically, astute
internationalists who put considerable efforts into maintaining and balancing
international relations. They therefore seemed hesitant to continue an advance on
Addis in the face of broad international opposition. Speculation is rife about the
possibility of a confidential agreement between US and Tigray government on a
peace deal with the Ethiopian government. However, none of the parties have
confirmed this.

‘National dialogue’ without peace?
The TDF withdrawal created an opportunity for political dialogue between Mekelle
and Addis Ababa. This could have led to a cessation of hostilities, paving the way for
peace negotiations to find a durable solution to Ethiopia’s intrinsic political
challenges. President Debretsion Gebremichael of Tigray has explicitly stated that
only an all-inclusive negotiation process can solve the mounting challenges facing
Ethiopia.

In a letter to UN Secretary-General Guterres on 19 December 2021, the Tigray
regional president Debretsion Gebremichael made a notable proposal, without any
preconditions, for “an immediate cessation of hostilities followed by negotiations.” In
the letter, however, the TDF leader lists a set of issues that should be addressed by
the UN Security Council and resolved as integral part to a peace process. Among
these are restoring the full legal authority of the Tigrayan government over all its
territories and lifting of the siege. The Ethiopian government did not officially respond
to the call, but instead, according to TDF spokesperson Getachew Reda, continued
its military operations against Tigrayan, including reportedly bombing Mekelle. This
Is apparently to deflect international attention from a call for a cessation of hostilities
and peace negotiations. In spite of this, the Ethiopian government has fast-tracked
its attempt to establish a so-called “National Dialogue Commission” that is tasked to
reconcile the deeply politically divided country. The objective of the Commission is
supposedly to create an inclusive and participatory process to reach a consensus on
how to tackle the challenges facing the nation. However, when presenting the
proclamation establishing the Commission, the speaker of the House of
Representatives Tagesse Chafo, firmly rooted its work and vision in the Prosperity
Party’s ideology and programme. He framed it as a political tool to gather support for
the incumbent’s agenda, and not as a vehicle to establish an all-inclusive dialogue
process fostering a common understanding among the manyfold political opinions
and groupings in the country to be enshrined in a new social contract with the
citizenry. Tagesse concluded stating that the “terrorists” i.e., TPLF and OLA cannot
participate in the national dialogue and will be dealt with according to the law that
relates to them. A similar sentiment was later echoed by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed,
calling the TPLF and OLA “devil forces.” In this vein, state minister Redwan Hussein,
has claimed that there are actors other than the TPLF who represent the Tigrayan
people. He said that one might expect government friendly Tigrayan parties, such as
the Tigray Democratic Party and the Tigray People’s Party might represent Tigrayan
interest in the national dialogue process.

In early January 2022, the Government dropped charges against, and released
some key opposition leaders, who had been in detention for a year and a half, with
the stated intention that their participation was needed in the national dialogue. On
the day of his release, Eskinder Nega from Baldaras for Democracy party praised
the ENDF and the Fano militia’s war against Tigray. Bekele Gerba and Jawar
Mohammed from Oromo Federalist Congress, on the other hand, contemplated the
situation. After several days they issued a statement calling for an all-inclusive
dialogue process and declined to participate if the OLA and TPLF were not included.

At the same time, TPLF leaders captured during the war were also released from
prison, most notably Sebhat Nega, the “father” of the Front, and Abay Woldu, the
former party chair and regional president. They were released on ‘humanistic
ground’ due to their old age and ill health. Their participation in a national dialogue
were not wanted, and the government’s “terrorist stigma” on TPLF remains in place.
If not peace negotiations now, then what?

It seems clear that western pressure on Ethiopia to accept negotiations has failed, as
Ethiopia has obdurately rejected what they term neo-imperialists interference into
their sovereign affairs and has accused the US and EU of being supporters of the
TPLF’s agenda. An additional element of concern is the obvious fact that Prime
Minister Abiy Ahmed does not exercise authority over all his allies in the war against
Tigray. It seems equally doubtful that President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea or the
Amhara leadership will accept a peace process which, for instance, entails Eritrean
political concessions or the return of west Tigray under the control of Mekelle. So
even if Abiy Ahmed and some individuals in the Prosperity Party leadership might,
hypothetically, be interested in settling the dispute with the Tigrayan leadership, the
Prime Minister may be prevented from doing so by his brothers in arms.

For the time being, it seems that the Ethiopian leadership and their allies have
abandoned the prospect of defeating the TDF. Abiy Ahmed admitted that the war on
Tigray had turned its people against the central government. Instead, Ethiopia and
its allies have settled on conducting a siege warfare against Tigray by halting their
advances and blocking all access to the region. At the same time, they have
continued their aerial bombardment of cities and important sites across the region.
The objective of the siege is to grind the Tigrayan people and leadership into
submission. The Prime Minister hopes that the people will eventually revolt against
the TPLF leadership. A similar strategy was previously attempted by Mengistu
Hailemariam and the Derg military junta in the war against the Tigrayan insurgency
in the 1980s, without success. There is no sign that it will be any more successful
today.

Facing siege warfare, the TDF cannot afford to remain idle for long. Their only
option, apart from surrender, will therefore be to re-engage militarily to try to shift the
balance of power on the battlefields once again. President Debretsion informed this
author in a satellite conversation in late December that the window of opportunity is
brief: “We have a huge army intact and cannot sit idle to watch our population starve
to death.” The Ethiopian government did not respond to Tigray’s call for a cessation
of hostilities and the siege of the region remains in force.

The TDF started a new offensive in Afar region in late January 2022. At the time of
writing the military and political objectives of this offensive are unknown. Speculation
is rife that the TDF may launch a new offensive to recapture (parts) of west Tigray, to
create a corridor to the Sudanese border. Retaking west Tigray, constitutionally
defined as part of the territory of the Tigray regional state, would not breach with the
international consensus that TDF should remain within the region of Tigray. West
Tigray would connect the region to Sudan and provide the Tigrayans access for
humanitarian supplies. The Sudan cross-border circumvent the siege imposed by the
Ethiopian government. At the same time, necessary military supplies might also
reach Tigray from potential allies in the region that would enable the TDF to
strengthen their defence and anti-drone capacities, rendering the siege war
outmoded. If such a shift of military strategy is successful, it might compel the
Ethiopian government to acknowledge the Tigray government as a counterpart in a
genuine peace negotiation process.

After war – Ethiopia reconfigured?

There are few signs today that a comprehensive peace process between the
TDF/OLA and the government alliance will take place in the near future. Hence, the
likelihood of a sustained civil war is high. However, if all-inclusive peace negotiation
were to take place, it is hard to envisage that ‘Ethiopia’ as we knew it before the
outbreak of the war would be re-established. The war has partly been fought over
competing visions of what Ethiopia is, and how it should be organised, mainly along
a continuum of centralised vs a devolved model of statehood. Finding a durable
solution to this question is a daunting task that peace negotiators will need to tackle.
The fundamental issue is how the Ethiopian state ought to be reconfigured to create
sustainable peace between the “nations, nationalities, and peoples” of the territory. Is
it at all possible to achieve a compromise which will allow a “living-together” model,
after what many perceive to be a genocidal war? Many observers doubt this and are
warning of a Balkanisation of Ethiopia, at par with former Yugoslavia.

The 1991 “Transitional Charter”, which provided the framework for the 1995
Ethiopian Constitution, was supposed to serve as a forward-looking peace
agreement. The two main architects of the Charter, the TPLF (led by the late PM
Meles Zenawi, PM at that time) and the OLF (led by Leenco Lata), designed a
multinational (ethnic) federal state model with the objective of creating permanent
trust between the central government and the “nation, nationalities, and peoples” of
the land. They did so – at least on paper – by reversing the direction of authority and
the repository of sovereignty. “All sovereign power resides in the Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia” states the Ethiopian Constitution (Art. 8.1); as
such the country is defined as a ‘coming-together’ federation. Furthermore, by
including an ‘exit-clause’ (Art. 39.1) allowing any group to leave the federation, it was
assumed that there would be no reason to harbour distrust towards a potential
power-abusing central government.

The genocidal warfare waged against Tigrayans by the combined forces of Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and Amhara, (with Somali support) has possibly created such a deep schism
between Tigray and rest of Ethiopia that it will be impossible for the majority of
Tigrayans to live in trust and safety among their former adversaries. Concomitantly,
the continued Oromo insurgency will also take its toll on the Ethiopian state model.
The Tigray government has stated that the status of Tigray in Ethiopia after the war
must be left to the Tigrayan people to decide through a referendum. If the question in
the referendum will be yes or no to independence, it seems likely that a majority of
Tigrayans will vote ‘yes.’

However, no internationally facilitated peace negotiations could entertain a process
which would lead to the break-up of the Ethiopian state. A break-up of Ethiopia, or
the secession of Tigray and possible Oromia, could only be achieved, (if it is desired)
through a military victory of these forces and the establishment of a transitiona
government in Ethiopia which would accept such a solution. It would be on a par with
the arrangement in 1991 which endorsed the independence of Eritrea.

If secession is out of the question, what model of government can be designed to
appease the Tigrayan and Oromo (and others) who are distrustful of a centralised
Ethiopian state, while at the same time preserving the territorial integrity of Ethiopia?
A possible model maintaining the polity of Ethiopia intact is to transition into a
confederate state model (or a so-called ‘loose federation’). A split-sovereignty
confederation, where sovereignty rests with the member states of the confederation
and the confederate government holds power over a limited number of issues (like
fiscal/currency, aviation, etc), will preserve the integrity of “Ethiopia” while
concomitantly guaranteeing the political self-governing rights and security interests
of the member states.

Reaching a consensus on a new Ethiopian state model would be an uphill task,
considering the antagonistic, divided, and confrontational political context existing in
the country today. A state model is also a reflection of the identity it represents.
Presently there is no common, all-embracing understanding of what “Ethiopianess”
consists of. It is a defining characteristic that is fiercely contested by the many
belligerent parties to the conflict.

International actors can only serve as facilitators of a peace process at the behest of
the warring parties; a sustainable solution must be found and agreed upon by the
Ethiopians themselves. At every other crossroads in Ethiopian political history, the
victors have imposed their solutions on the vanquished, whose interests have been
neglected and suppressed. As the current discourse suggests, this seems to be the
approach being taken by the current powerholders in Addis Ababa. How durable it
will be this time around, remains an open question. The outcome of the war is
uncertain at the time of writing, but one thing seems clear – Ethiopia is unlikely to
ever return to the status quo ante.

14. An overview of the Tigray conflict: June to December 2021
By Ermias Teka

14.1 Introduction

Barely seven months after facing military annihilation at the hands of the Ethio-
Eritrean army, Tigrayan forces pulled off one of the most significant military reversals
in recent African history.¹²⁶²

The Tigrayans avoided, as much as possible, prolonged fighting. Unless strategically
significant, maintaining defensible territories was never their priority. Upon facing a
stronger, determined offensive, they retreated quickly to save their strength and
countered by choosing the time and place when the opponent was vulnerable. Unlike
the EPLF’s military tradition, the ‘Woyane’ as the Tigrayans were known, adopted
highly mobile guerrilla strategies which were honed and perfected by TPLF military
commanders during the 17 years armed struggle which ended with their capture of
Addis in 1991. Even during conventional battles, TDF’s units employed quick and
focused attacks preceded or followed by constant shifting of positions using similar
principles as in a guerrilla warfare. They rarely deployed larger than battalion sized
units at a time but used several of them from multiple sides to launch coordinated
attacks. To this end they employed the wealth of experienced medium and high-level
military leaders had at their disposal to pull of remarkably well orchestrated
manoeuvres between their units.

In a series of battles in central Tigray, the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF), led by the
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), succeeded to neutralize some of the best
trained and highly-experienced divisions within the Ethiopian National Defence
Forces (ENDF). The ENDF subsequently withdrew from the Tigray. Determined to
break what the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) labels a ‘de facto aid blockade’ and to regain lost territories, Tigrayan forces
then went further and launched operation “Tigray Mothers.” It was their first in a
series of conventional battles to retake southern and southwestern Tigray which
remained under federal government and Amhara control. A series of brief but intense
battles with the ENDF and Amhara forces saw the TDF recapture areas around Mai
Tsebri in southwestern and southern Tigray – territories fiercely claimed by the
government of the Amhara Region.

Contrary to the expectations of many, the TDF refrained from carrying out major
operations to take back western Tigray which would have served as a crucial supply
corridor to Sudan. Similarly, territories to the northwest remained firmly under the
control of Eritrean forces and the Tigrayans made little or no effort to reclaim them
militarily.

This meant that, despite the relatively significant TDF military successes against the
formidable Ethio-Eritrean alliance, Tigray remained under siege. The federal
government insisted the withdrawal of its forces showed its commitment to peace
and rejected accusations that it was intentionally facilitating man-made starvation in
Tigray. However, all services; including banks, telecommunications, electricity, and
land transportation remained largely blockaded by federal authorities and lifesaving
humanitarian aid was largely denied access.

and rejected accusations that it was intentionally facilitating man-made starvation in Tigray. However, all services; including banks, telecommunications, electricity, and land transportation remained largely blockaded by federal authorities and lifesaving humanitarian aid was largely denied access.

The de-facto siege and humanitarian blockade gave the Tigrayan forces the justification to reject the government-declared unilateral ceasefire and to launch offensives into Amhara and Afar regions “to break the siege.” Accordingly, the Tigrayan leadership mobilised its forces on the region’s southwestern and southern fronts. The short-term goals of the operation were to neutralize the bulk of the ENDF
and Amhara forces that were allegedly planning to re-invade Tigray, and to set up a buffer zone to prevent future offensives.

The Tigrayans’ southwestern offensive was probably aimed at capturing the historic town of Gondar, once the capital of the Ethiopian Empire. By achieving this, the TDF hoped to sever the supply route for the bulk of the ENDF entrenched in western Tigray and force its capitulation without resistance. The TDF’s southwestern offensive succeeded in pushing deep into northern Amhara as far as Dabat, 53
kilometres from Gondar. The southern offensive succeeded in capturing the strategic town of Kobo and its surroundings, cutting off the A2, the main north-south highway between Addis Ababa and the Tigrayan capital, Mekelle. This inflicted a major blow to the ENDF.

Meanwhile, another TDF detachment had quickly deployed to the southeast into the Afar region and after a number of brutal battles, took control of Yalo, Golina and Aura woredas and advanced halfway into Chifra. The TDF’s offensive into Afar was ultimately aimed at capturing Mille – a town along the Addis Ababa-Djibouti highway that serves as the main commercial artery for the federal government, linking the
capital with the Red Sea. By capturing Mille, the Tigrayan command appeared to have intended to force the central government to open negotiations. However, the TDF’s repeated attempts to capture Mille failed; a serious blow for the Tigrayan forces. They were held up by the combined ENDF and Afari Special Forces (ASF) at Chifra, and later at Garsa Gita, and were forced to abandon the Mille operation entirely.

Similarly, fierce resistance and counterattacks forced the TDF to retreat from the vicinity of Dabat to Zarima.

With the TDF advance on both the Gondar and Afar fronts grinding to a halt, Tigrayan forces then resorted to another offensive directly southwards along the B22 highway aimed at capturing Wereta. The objective appeared to have been to facilitate the TDF advance on Gondar by cutting off the supply route from Bahir Dar to Gondar, while simultaneously forcing the redeployment of some of the Ethiopian and Amhara forces from the heavily-manned Debarik frontline, in north of Gondar. The TDF southern offensive along the Weldia-Wereta highway progressed as far as Debre Tabor.

The TDF’s rapid advance left its forces exposed with lengthy supply routes. The Ethiopian forces took advantage of this weakness. A major ENDF-ASF counteroffensive was launched at Gashina, aimed at cutting off the bulk of Tigrayan forces that had been concentrated around Debre Tabor. It forced a rapid TDF withdrawal, and they eventually abandoned their objective to capture Wereta, which would have cut off the road to Gondar. The mass mobilisation and deployment by the Ethiopians of highly-motivated but poorly-armed civilians in unprecedented human waves of battlefield attacks appears to have forced the TDF to abandon its operations on the southwestern front. A public statement by the TDF military command confirmed the complete withdrawal of the Tigrayans from Afar and a major pullback from Debre Tabor and Debarik.

The TDF claimed these withdrawals and pullbacks were no more than a strategic re deployment to consolidate their territory. However, Federal and Amhara forces presented it as a major triumph. Soon rumours of an inevitable demise of the TDF and the subsequent recapture of Tigrayan held territories started to circulate. Indeed, after a period of latency when both sides made extensive preparations, the ENDF, Amhara Fano, and Amhara Special Forces launched a series of massive offensives from three directions aimed at capturing Weldia and progressing to Mekelle.

However, Tigrayan forces, who had been well prepared for the anticipated offensives, weathered the storm. Subsequent counterattacks saw the TDF quickly advance to take over Dessie and Kombolcha. The capture of these two strategic cities of South Wollo opened the gateway to Shoa and, with the ENDF seriously weakened, for the first time since the war began, the federal government’s hold on power was threatened.

Tigrayan forces then linked up with Oromo Liberation Front (OLA) to launch offensives on Mille and north Shoa. The attacks on the Mille front, however, proved futile and were repulsed by the ENDF and Afar Special Forces who were provided with aerial cover by drones. To the south, the TDF, joined by OLA, quickly captured areas along the A2 highway and managed to advance as far as Debre Sina.

Nevertheless, coordinated drone attacks on the TDF’s supply lines, the mass mobilisation of Amhara civilians, and concerted diplomatic pressure eventually forced Tigrayan forces to pull back to Tigray’s constitutionally-defined territory.

Ethiopian coalition forces quickly recaptured territories vacated by the TDF and marched all the way to Alamata.

Contrary to high expectations among Abiy loyalists of an imminent ENDF march to Mekelle, as 2021 ended the federal government announced its decision not to advance into Tigray. However, frequent, yet intense fighting continues to be reported on the Tigray/Amhara border.

Below are details of the main operations in the six months of bitter warfare.

14.2 Operation Alula Abanega

Operation Alula Abanega was the first major Tigrayan offensive that succeeded in reversing the course of the war.

By the beginning of June 2021 there was a huge build-up of ENDF presence in central Tigray. Some sources claimed more than seven divisions of the ENDF were mobilised¹²⁶³. There were widespread rumours of a major Ethio-Eritrean offensive to conclusively defeat the Tigrayan forces before the Ethiopian winter set in. Moreover, it was the week of a national election and there were indications that the federal government was seeking a major battlefield triumph up north to bolster its prospects of an election victory.

The ENDF plan appears to have involved undertaking a huge area in central Tigray, which had hitherto remained a TDF stronghold, and to gradually tighten the chokehold while simultaneously deploying specialised assault units on search-and destroy missions. It was apparent that the Ethiopian government was determined to “cleanse” every square inch of central Tigray of Tigrayan militants. This, however, required a massive deployment of ground forces as well as accompanying mechanised units on unfamiliar and indefensible terrain, making them susceptible to TDF attack.

The Tigray forces for their part were well aware of ENDF’s impending all-out offensive and were making preparations of their own. By this time, their numbers had grown considerably, reportedly with a huge force organised at corps and army levels. Sources close to the Tigrayan resistance indicated that the TDF had as many as four separate armies at its disposal.

Yet, despite the growing impatience of the Tigrayan public, who were eager for news of a significant victory to lift their spirits, the military command of Tigrayan forces had so far resisted the urge to engage in full-frontal battles, preferring instead to pursue strategies of asymmetrical warfare. Since shifting to the insurgency in December 2020, the TDF’s strategy was to target ENDF weak spots while avoiding direct confrontations. The catchword “attack them at the place and time of our choosing,” often repeated in the central command’s public statements and chanted during army meetings, reaffirmed that the TDF was not about to abandon insurgency any time soon.

This gave crucial time for the TDF command to work on building the army’s capability while wearing down its more formidable enemies. TDF commanders gave interviews during which they highlighted the recent growth in manpower and capability of Tigrayan forces but insisted that it still lacked some essentials for conventional warfare – presumably a reference to the absence of motorised and mechanized units.

The ENDF operation was fundamentally at a disadvantage from the outset as it had very little information regarding its unconventional opponents, and whatever information it had regarding TDF positions and military strength was largely inaccurate. By contrast, Tigrayan generals appeared to have been sufficiently aware of details of ENDF deployments and strength. Ethiopian forces had reportedly assumed the TDF to have no more than 13 inexperienced and unmotivated battalions and had thus adopted lofty plans to complete its defeat of them in a couple of weeks. Grossly underestimating the TDF’s capability had been an ENDF blind spot, but that was not the only one. The Ethiopian forces had assumed the bulk of the Tigrayan army to be concentrated in central Tigray – around Adet, Naeder, and Kola Tembien. According to one high-level TDF commander, the Tigrayans decided to play to ENDF’s expectations and deployed a handful of units around Kola Tembien as decoys to preoccupy Ethiopian forces, while the majority of Tigrayan forces were quietly withdrawn to southcentral Tigray.

On 18 June 2021, Tigrayan forces carried out sudden well-coordinated offensives against Ethiopia’s 11th division which was stretched from Yechilla to Shewate Higum. This was to be the start of “Operation Alula.’ Nearly all Tigrayan forces participated in this offensive that was simultaneously carried out from all directions. Ethiopian prisoners-of-war from the 11th division of the ENDF describe an intense but rapid series of battles during which their units were carved apart by the TDF. The 21st division of the ENDF was sent from around Mekelle to provide support for the 11th division, but faced a well-positioned TDF ambush around Addi Eshir, about 10 km from Yechilla. Similarly, the 31st Division which was deployed around Kola Tembien was mobilised to the rescue but was intercepted by a TDF detachment around Agbe.

The ENDF divisions were prevented from coming to each other’s aid by well orchestrated and successful TDF offensives. Moreover, the sudden, multi-pronged nature of the TDF attacks, beyond their disorienting effects, over-extended the ENDF frontline causing splits between their units along several nodes. Eyewitnesses described chaotic scenes, with the chain of command completely collapsing, leaving soldiers to fend for themselves.

On 21 June 2021, three and a half days after the start of the offensive, the 11th division was completely neutralised. Many of its heavy artillery weapons, as well as its stores of food and ammunition, fell into the hands of Tigrayan forces. The commander of the division, Colonel Hussain, was captured. The 21st and 31st divisions were also more or less decimated.

Tigrayan forces, which until then lacked mechanised units, were now in possession of scores of heavy artilleries as well as transport vehicles. These were rapidly serviced and put back into service by ex-ENDF operatives, who were protected from harm by the Tigrayan leadership for precisely this purpose.

Not willing to concede defeat, and probably hoping to recover or neutralise the weapons and vehicles they had lost to the TDF, the Ethiopian military leadership apparently decided to overwhelm the area with yet more forces. Accordingly, the 20th, 23rd, 24th, and 25th divisions were reportedly mobilised in quick succession to recapture the area. However, the Tigrayan forces had already familiarised themselves with the terrain, adequately fortified the area, and had further reinforced themselves with their newly acquired weapons and ammunition. The ENDF divisions were walking into a near-certain defeat.

Over three days of fierce fighting, the additional ENDF divisions were routed. In the heat of battle, the TDF anti-aircraft unit shot down a Lockheed C-130 Hercules of the Ethiopian Air Force, further boosting the spirits of the Tigrayans. During the 10-day battle Tigrayan sources claimed around 30,000 Ethiopian forces were neutralised, of whom around 6,000 were taken prisoner.

As the tides were turning in TDF’s favour at Yechilla and Shewate Higum, other Tigrayan forces started to swiftly mobilise to take control of several towns in central and southwestern Tigray. Correspondingly the ENDF began to withdraw from many of these towns, and to concentrate around Mekelle. Consequently, the towns of Hiwane, Mekoni, Hawzen, Freweyni, Sinkata, and Edaga Hamus quickly fell into the hands of Tigrayan forces, largely without fighting. A TDF detachment cut the A2 highway and captured Wukro which reportedly left a brigade-sized ENDF unit isolated and surrounded near Negash.

The reaction of the Eritrean army to the ENDF losses was unexpected, to say the least. Eritrean Defence Force (EDF) units situated around Shire were initially included in the ENDF plans and were supposed to complete the encirclement of Tigray between Zana and Adet, as well as to carry out offensives towards central Tigray. But since the Tigrayans had withdrawn most of their forces to participate in the fighting further south, the Eritreans did not participate in the Ethiopian planned encirclement of central Tigray.

What is more significant is the apparent reluctance of the EDF to provide the Ethiopian army with a crucial lifeline when it was facing devastating losses around Yechila. Some Tigrayan sources have claimed that a few brigades of the EDF were indeed mobilised to come to the rescue of their allies but were intercepted by TDF detachments placed at key junctions, forcing them to abandon their plans. The EDF’s lack of determination to come to ENDF’s rescue was probably caused by fear of sustaining defeat similar to that inflicted on their Ethiopian allies. Self-preservation had kicked in.

The crunch came on 28 June 2021. As Tigrayan forces, who had already taken control of much of the surrounding area, approached Mekelle from several directions, the Tigrayan political leadership which had been put in place by Prime Minister Abiy, were airlifted out of the regional capital to the midlands. Ethiopian forces garrisoned inside the city withdrew, amidst visible chaos, taking everything, they could carry with them.

Tigrayan forces entered Mekelle to a rapturous welcome. As most of the A2 highway, both to the north and south of Mekelle, had fallen into the hands of Tigrayan forces, the ENDF hastily retreated to the east heading for the Afar region through the border town of Abala. However, Tigrayan forces claimed to have caught up with them near Amentilla and allegedly inflicted significant losses.

The ENDF and EDF withdrawal from much of central and southern Tigray accelerated after the fall of Mekelle. The very next day, Tigray forces quickly entered Adwa, Axum, and Shire to the northwest. To the south, the TDF’s advance continued as far as Mehoni and Mai Chew.

The federal government said its unexpected withdrawal was due to its decision to declare an immediate and unilateral ceasefire, in response to a request from the Tigrayan interim administration that it had installed, and to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid. The ceasefire, it claimed, was to last until the farming season ended. The Tigray forces however rebuffed the federal government’s claims and insisted that major battlefield defeats had forced Ethio-Eritrean forces to flee.

The Eritrean army also withdrew its forces without major clashes from most of central Tigray and established defensive fortifications around the border. However, it retained several areas in the northeast, including large towns such as Rama and Zalambessa, as well as Badme.

Similarly, Amhara forces, which had established a presence in central Tigray around Debre Abay and Adi Gebru, retreated to the other side of Tekeze river, what the Amharas consider their traditional boundary with Tigray. Moreover, they established defensive positions near Amba Madre and destroyed the Tekeze bridge connecting Amba Madre with Adi Gebru, probably to prevent the pursuit of Tigrayan forces. All territory to the west and south of the Tekeze remained firmly under the control of ENDF and Amhara forces.

In rapidly withdrawing from much of central and southern Tigray and establishing defensive lines in areas claimed by the Amhara regional state, Ethiopian forces made their intentions clear. Having failed to root out the TDF from central Tigray, and after sustaining one of the biggest battlefield losses in recent Horn of Africa history, the ENDF’s plan B was containment. It would make its stand among the people Abiy Ahmed identified as ENDF-friendly, in contrast to the people of Tigray who were deemed “hostile.”

Consequently, Ethiopian, and Eritrean forces rapidly vacated most of the territories of Tigray except for the contested areas. They established a wide envelopment around central and southern Tigray in an attempt to strangle the resistance into submission. Banking, telecommunications, and electricity, were among the services that were discontinued soon after the ENDF withdrawal. Humanitarian aid delivery became increasingly scanty and politicized. The Prime Minister, in his public statement after the ENDF’s withdrawal, explained the reason behind the federal government’s decision as a determination not to repeat the Derg’s mistake¹²⁶⁴.

“The main reason why Woyane [the Tigrayans] defeated the Derg during the war of ‘Ethiopia first’ was by using the Derg’s weapon and food. So, given the current situation, if we stay there for long, we are going to provide them with many weapons. When it comes to food [aid], if one family has five children, they register that they have 7, 8, or 10 children. Then they receive the rations of ten. They use five of it themselves and give the remaining five to the Junta… So, we discussed this issue for a week and decided not to accept this any longer.

Abiy made it clear in no uncertain terms his intentions to politicise the delivery of humanitarian aid into Tigray. A senior UN official later conceded that starvation was being used as a weapon while OCHA, a UN humanitarian agency, described the situation in Tigray as a ‘de facto aid blockade’¹²⁶⁵.

The TPLF, for its part, quickly re-established its administrative structure after re entering Mekelle. Key political figures, such as Debretsion Gebremichael, who had remained hidden since the start of the insurgency, made a triumphal entry to the city. The regional House of Representatives resumed its sessions.

The newly re-established TPLF-led Tigray administration soon made its rejection of the federal government’s ‘unilateral ceasefire’ public. It claimed that the Addis Ababa regime was in fact, under guise of a ceasefire, enforcing a siege on the people of Tigray, and announced its determination to break the siege through force if necessary.

14.3 Operation Tigray Mothers

Operation Tigray Mothers consisted of phased offensives which took the battle to protect Tigray into surrounding areas, some of them annexed in previous conflicts.

Phase 1: TDF offensive to retake annexed territories

It became increasingly clear that the ceasefire wasn’t going to hold, and the Tigray forces were going to launch an offensive. The question was in which direction? Western Tigray was obviously the big prize as it would open up the crucial corridor to Sudan that would be vital for supplies. But the Ethio-Eritrean alliance was fully aware of its importance and was determined to prevent TDF penetration into western Tigray at all costs. Consequently, large detachments of the EDF and ENDF were deployed in the area along with several lines of trenches and minefields. Moreover, tens of thousands of Fano and Amhara militia, mainly from Gondar, were mobilised into the area and entrenched there to provide reinforcements. The flat terrain of western Tigray favoured the Ethio-Eritrean forces with superior firepower. The ENDF’s in depth defence along with extensive artillery support would spell disaster for TDF operations in the area. Consequently, although there were unofficial reports of skirmishes, probably involving TDF reconnaissance units, around Adi Remets, the anticipated large-scale TDF operation to western Tigray did not materialise.

There was also a brief anticipation that the TDF might take advantage of its winning momentum, as well as the EDF’s disorganised retreat, to go north. But any plans the Tigrayans might have had to confront the Eritrean army were shelved, at least temporarily, probably for the same reason as the decision to abort a military operation into western Tigray.

Contrary to expectations, TDF offensives focused on regaining lost territories on the southwestern and southern fronts. Preparations were relatively quick for operations of such a magnitude. It seemed the Tigrayan military command didn’t want to lose momentum. The Tigrayans had acquired significant quantities of heavy artillery during their successes in central Tigray and had been able to form multiple mechanised units that could support conventional offensives, which were rapidly launched.

On 12 July 2021, a massive series of offensives, dubbed ‘operation Tigray Mothers’, were launched on both fronts. On the southern front, the TDF’s immediate objective was to capture Korem and Alamata. The Ethio-Amhara defensive line was on and around Grat-Kahsu, a strategic mountain range near Korem, which made a southward offensive along the A2 highway nearly impossible.

Tigrayan combat forces, instead of going straight for Korem, which would have put them at a disadvantage, made their primary direction of attack to the east, mobilising from areas around Chercher to take Bala and Ger Jala towns, before arcing around to launch an offensive on Korem from the rear. Fighting in the vicinity of Korem was very intense and lasted an entire day. Both sides were said to have suffered heavy losses. Amhara sources reported that Tigrayan forces encountered strong resistance from the ASF and that the initial offensive was repulsed. The relatively unexpected direction of the TDF attack had threatened to cut off large sections of the defending force. Consequently, faced with the inevitable fall of Korem, the ENDF command ordered their remaining forces to withdraw past Alamata and set up a new fortification near the more defensible Kobo.

The capture of Grat Kahsu meant the TDF had artillery control over Alamata and surrounding areas, which in turn forced the ENDF and its allies to give up the capital of southern Tigray without a fight. The TDF entered Alamata on 13 July 2021, and then quickly retook areas as far as Waja. This meant that after several months under occupation of Amhara forces, the contested territories of southern Tigray were back under the control of Tigrayan troops.

On the southwestern front, TDF offensives were aimed at capturing Amba Madre and Mai Tsemri towns. Even prior to the start of operation Tigray Mothers, Amhara sources had claimed that a small-scale TDF attack was repulsed around Amba Madre. This meant Tigrayan reconnaissance units had already crossed the Tekeze river and secured safe zones on the southern bank. On 12 July 2021, Tigrayan infantry units swam through Tekeze river at several places. To the east the TDF offensive focused on driving out Amhara forces from Fiyelwiha and the surrounding Dima district. Similarly, a well-coordinated TDF attack from several directions succeeded in breaking through ASF and ENDF defensive lines near Amba Madre. The next day, Amba Madre, Mai Tsemri, and Fiyelwiha were captured. Tigray’s southwestern territories were now back under Tigrayan control.

Phase 2: Expansion of the war into Amhara and Afar regions

Southern Front: TDF operation on Kobo

The TDF’s victory in the first series of conventional battles sent shockwaves through the Ethiopian and Amhara leadership. A day after Tigrayan forces captured Alamata and Mai Tsebri, PM Abiy Ahmed released a statement that basically revoked the declaration of unilateral ceasefire and called on Ethiopians to support the national army¹²⁶⁶. Regional administrations responded with ceremonies mobilising their special forces and sending them off to the battlefront. Footage of these was carried on national television, emphasising the federal government’s backing from all of Ethiopia’s regional states, as well as the public. The war against the TPLF was portrayed as a national, patriotic endeavour.

Tigray’s leadership, on the other hand, made it clear that it didn’t have any intention of stopping its offensives as long as the de facto siege of the region remained in effect and Amhara forces and ENDF occupied western Tigray.

Fighting along the Tigray-Amhara border intensified from 16 July 2021. The TDF deployed several infantry and mechanised divisions in an attempt to penetrate the eastern border and take control of the Zobil heights. Located along the border between Amhara and Afar regions, Zobil mountains, with an estimated elevation of over 2000 metres, separates the broad fertile plains of Raya Kobo from the lowlands of the Afar region.

The ENDF and Amhara forces primarily concentrated their defence around Chube Ber, a few kilometres north of Kobo. Moreover, heavy artillery batteries of the ENDF were established around Gira’amba Lancha, Mendefera, and Chube Ber from where they conducted a relentless bombardment of the mountainous terrain north of Zobil. According to a TDF commander, this was followed by a series of counter-offensives by the ENDF to cut off and neutralize the bulk of TDF units that had concentrated near Zobil heights. TDF detachments which had been well placed in strategic areas in anticipation of such attacks managed to halt the ENDF counterattacks. An ensuing TDF offensive eventually breached the defensive lines of Amhara forces on the Zobil\ heights and took control of the strategic mountain range. Subsequently, the Tigrayan forces quickly moved around Mendefera district and severed the Kobo-Woldiya Road around Aradum, thereby blocking off a means of retreat for several battalions of the ENDF that were left stranded at Chube Ber. An attempt by the now isolated
Ethiopian forces to withdraw to Lalibela through Ayub was also blocked and eventually neutralised by another TDF detachment which was positioned for that purpose resulting in a massive loss for the ENDF. On 23 July 2021, Tigrayan forces took control of Kobo town. In the meantime, another detachment advanced further south and took control of Kobo Robit and Gobiye, with minimum resistance from retreating Ethiopian forces.

Southwestern front: the TDF advance towards Gondar

After initially being forced to retreat from Mai Tsebri by determined resistance from Amhara forces, the TDF launched a successful counteroffensive enabling it to penetrate into North Gondar Zone of the Amhara region and capture Addi Arkay on 23 July 2021. General Tadesse Worede, commander of the TDF, claimed that the terrain had made their advance very challenging. Indeed, the presence of several easily defensible commanding heights on one of the most mountainous areas of northern Ethiopia put the advancing force at a distinct disadvantage. However, rugged and mountainous terrain also prevented large-scale battles and reduced the impact of the ENDF’s superior firepower.

In addition, the TDF’s general strategy of mobilising smaller units and launchingcoordinated attacks from several fronts, enabled it to isolate and overcome pockets of Amhara resistance. Consequently, Tigrayan forces advanced rapidly deeper into the area north of Gondar and within the space of three days, seized Beremariam, Chew Ber, and Zarima towns.

Afar front: TDF push towards Chifra

At about the same time as Tigrayan forces were locked in fighting to capture Kobo, another army-sized TDF detachment crossed into Yalo woreda of Afar region and waged a major offensive against the ENDF and Afar Forces. There was already a heavy build-up of federal and regional forces in the area, which, in the eyes of the Tigrayan leadership, was in preparation for a renewed invasion of Tigray. The flat landscape of the Afar region meant that the TDF had to deploy a sizeable percentage of its infantry against ENDF defensive lines on open ground, making it vulnerable to the opponent’s superiority in firepower and numbers.

This also meant that the TDF infantry risked sustaining much higher casualties inflicted by ENDF heavy artillery batteries, which were superior to anything the Tigrayans had at their disposal. The absence of rugged terrain meant that Tigray forces were not able to deploy their favoured strategy of carving up enemy forces piecemeal and compelled them to face the massively entrenched infantry of ENDF in a full-frontal battle, where numerical superiority counted. The ENDF’s extensive use of air raids also compounded the challenge.

However, an attack on the right flank, coordinated with a massive frontal assault, reportedly destabilised ENDF lines and ended up in another TDF victory. By 23 July, the TDF had captured Yalo, Golina and Awra Woredas of Zone 4 penetrating deeper south, to within a few kilometres of Chifra. In the course of their advance Tigrayan forces claimed to have completely destroyed the 23rd division of the ENDF and seized large quantities of heavy and medium-sized weapons.

The TDF’s successes in the Afar region were deemed so significant by the Tigrayan leadership that the next day General Tsadkan Gebretensae, a member of the central command, reportedly said, “The TDF can move swiftly to control the Addis Ababa Djibouti Road and will be in a position to accept humanitarian assistance directly.”¹²⁶⁷

On 26 July 2021, General Tadesse Worede, TDG commander, announced the successful conclusion of “Operation Tigray Mothers.”¹²⁶⁸ It was apparent that, though the fighting was still ongoing, the Tigray military leadership believed it had inflicted enough damage on its adversary to achieve the primary objective of the operation – containing the ENDF’s threat of re-invasion.

It had set out to nullify what it saw as an impending ENDF offensive from Gondar, Wollo and Afar. The TDF’s official statement claimed to have neutralised over 30,000 Ethiopian forces¹²⁶⁹. Political analysts, who closely followed the progress of the war, agreed that the ENDF capability had been seriously compromised due to its major losses, especially in Tembien and Kobo.

Moreover, a staggering quantity of heavy and light weaponry fell into the hands of the Tigrayans. This was enough to transform it into a well-equipped army with a greatly enhanced combat capability. The spoils of war, combined with its highly experienced military leadership at all levels, and the ex-ENDF weapons operators it had at its disposal, had turned the TDF into a formidable military force that was now a real threat to both Addis Ababa and Asmara.

The response from the Ethiopian side also reflected just how seriously the national army had been affected. Agegnehu Teshager, vice president of Amhara Regional State, made an unprecedented call to “all young people, militia, non-militia in the region, armed with any government or personal weapons, to join the war against TPLF”¹²⁷⁰.

14.4 Operation Sunrise

Tigray forces maintained their offensives on all fronts but now with a new operational title “Operation Sunrise.” By August 2021, the Tigrayan central command appears to have believed that it had sufficiently degraded the military capabilities of its adversaries to have a go at the capital. The name “Sunrise” hinted that the TDF’s objectives had evolved to include possible regime change.

Southern front: Gobye to Meket

The TDF continued its advance down the A2 highway relatively unchallenged, until it reached the gates of Woldiya. Much to the indignation of the town’s residents, ENDF detachments were ordered to withdraw from Woldiya without a fight, choosing instead to retreat to the hills to the south, between Woldiya and Sirinka, to try to halt the TDF’s advance.

In the vicinity of Woldiya, Tigrayan forces encountered determined resistance from local militia and Amhara Fano militia, led by the town’s mayor, who called upon every able-bodied person to fight, and the residents appeared determined not to let their hometown fall into the hands of the Tigrayans. After several days of skirmishes outside the town, during which both sides were reported to have used artillery, the
TDF finally took control of Woldiya on 9 August 2021.

Woldiya’s popular resistance was widely promoted by the Amhara government and political activists as a model of urban resistance, to be replicated by other towns of Amhara region that faced the threat of TDF occupation. The residents of Debre Tabor and Debarik organised similar urban resistance, which played no small part in staving off an TDF advance.

The battle of Woldiya-Sirinka was the biggest engagement along the A2 highway since Kobo. According to Tigrayan sources it involved two ENDF divisions, more than 11,000 Oromo Special Forces (OSF), Amhara Fano, ENDF special Commando battalions, and mechanized divisions. TDF also reportedly deployed, among others, its ‘Remets’ and ‘Maebel’ divisions. After a fierce encounter, Tigrayan forces emerged victorious, amassing large quantities of heavy and medium weapons. Video footage of the aftermath, aired on Tigray TV, showed scores of ENDF vehicles and weapons destroyed or captured.

By the end of August, after facing sporadic resistance around Mersa, Tigrayan forces had penetrated as far as the rural areas around Hayik, a town 28 km from Dessie.

Opening a new front

Towards the end of July, another battlefront had already opened up to the west of Kobo. Several TDF divisions had advanced to the southwest, probably via a byway through Ayub, encountering only Amhara forces along the way. By the beginning of August, Tigrayan forces had advanced rapidly and were already in control of Muja and Kulmesk towns. From there they rapidly advanced northwest and, after a period of sporadic fighting with Amhara forces, took control of the historic town of Lalibela. Capturing Lalibela denied the Ethiopian Air Force decisive access to Lalibela’s strategic airport, which it had been using extensively to support the ENDF’s ground assault around North Wollo and Wag Himra.

Part of this TDF detachment then moved from Muja southeast to Dilb, where it sought to sever the Woldiya-Woreta Road. After reportedly sweeping away the massive ENDF detachment entrenched around Dilb it advanced in the direction of Woldiya, as far as Sanka. To the east of Dilb, TDF forces made a rapid advance along the B22 highway and captured the strategic towns of Gashina and Geregera, as well as all the towns in between. It appears that at least part of the detachment that captured Lalibela was re-routed via Dubko, a small town along a secondary road connecting the Lalibela to Muja route with the B22 highway, to take part in the capture of the strategic town of Gashina. Hence, by mid-August, the TDF had already taken control of most areas of North Wollo and was advancing along the B22 towards neighbouring Lay Gayint woreda of South Gondar Zone.

By this time, it was apparent that the objective of TDF operations along the B22 highway was to sever the Bahir Dar-Gondar Road at the strategic town of Woreta which, if successful, would choke off the supply line to the northwest, putting the entire Ethiopian western command in jeopardy. Determined not to let this happen, the Ethiopian coalition deployed a huge force, including several divisions of the standard army and Amhara Special Force, in the highly mountainous area between Nifas Mewcha and Kimir Dingay. A two-day brutal battle that started on 15 August 2021 culminated in a major defeat for the Ethiopian side and enabled the TDF to establish control all the way to Kimir Dingay. Moreover, Mount Guna, the most strategic high ground located a few kilometres from Kimir Dingay, came under the control of Tigrayan forces. This crippled ENDF chances of mounting a meaningful resistance as far as Debere Tabor.

Meanwhile, a new front opened up to the northwest, as Tigrayan forces, in alliance with a few battalions of the newly formed Agaw Liberation Army (ALA) (which drew its support from ethnic Agaw populations in Wag Himra and Agew Awi Zones of Amhara region) attempted to wrestle control of Sekota from the hands of Amhara SF. The TDF-ALA offensive reportedly took place around mid-August as a joint TDF ALA detachment advancing from Korem, was joined by another TDF detachment from Lalibela. By 17 August 2021, Sekota, the capital of Wag Himra zone came under the control of TDF-ALA troops.

14.5 The Federal Government Coalition strikes back

However, it wasn’t long before the coalition of ENDF and their allies struck back in offensives with fluctuating results until the end of 2021.

Firstly, from mid-August, they launched well-planned, massive counteroffensives on several fronts in an attempt to reverse TDF gains. On the 19 August 2021, as the TDF was making preparations to take Debre Tabor, Ethiopian coalition forces launched a major counteroffensive that aimed to slice through and surround the bulk of TDF detachments in Lay Gayint and South Wollo. One Ethiopian counteroffensive involved a sizable detachment of ENDF and Amhara forces which were mobilised from Wegeltena to capture Gashina and thus cut off the supply route of the huge Tigrayan detachment that was heading for Wereta. Another ENDF counteroffensive sought to break through at Sirinka, to destroy a large proportion of the TDF that had gathered around Mersa. Tigrayan sources claimed that on the Gashena front alone, as many as five divisions of the ENDF and more than 10,000 Amhara forces, took part in the counteroffensive. The encirclement of the TDF detachment encamped around Mersa involved several brigades of the elite Republican Guard, Special Commando, Federal Police forces as well as the militia of South Wollo. The plan was for specialised assault units to surround and neutralize the enemy.

It appears that the ENDF plan initially worked. Gashina was captured and the B22 highway was severed leaving the bulk of Tigrayan forces in Gayint and Debre Tabor with no way out. Similarly, the Woldiya-Mersa road was severed at Sirinka leaving TDF’s southern detachment stranded.

However, TDF detachments soon converged on the Ethiopian forces occupying Gashina from three sides: from Arbit [Debre Tabor], Dubko [Lalibela], and Istayish [Woldiya]. After at least two days of intense and brutal fighting in which both sides suffered immense losses, the Ethiopian forces retreated towards Kon. Similarly, Tigrayan forces were also able to repel the Ethiopian forces from Sirinka and reconnect with their units in Mersa.

Towards the end of August, ENDF and Amhara forces began a series of counter offensives on the southwestern front that intensified through the early days of September. By this time, the TDF had reached Dib Bahir, near the great escarpment of Limalimo. Moreover, TDF reconnaissance units had penetrated the rural areas of North Gondar as far as Dabat. However, numerous “human wave” attacks, involving large, mobilised units of local militia and barely-armed farmers, became a formidable challenge to the TDF’s advance. At least one counter offensive on Tabla, between Dib Bahir and Zarima, involving several brigades of ENDF units attempted, but allegedly failed, to cut off TDF forces deployed south of Dib Bahir. The Chenna massacre, where more than 100 civilians were allegedly massacred by TDF units in retribution for guerrilla attacks, was also reported at this time¹²⁷¹. It was increasingly apparent that the TDF was finding it ever harder to sustain its advance on Gondar.

All in all, even though the Tigray’s army command was able to save most of its forces, which had become stranded and faced annihilation, it was nevertheless forced it to relinquish significant parts of the hard-fought territorial gains on Woreta Woldiya and Gondar fronts. Subsequently, Tigrayan forces under sustained offensives by local militia and ENDF units rapidly withdrew from Debre Tabor and Lay Gayint. They retreated all the way to the edge of North Wollo and concentrated around Filakit and Gashena. Eventually, the TDF operation to take Wereta and sever the Bahir Dar – Gondar highway was abandoned. Similarly, the TDF’s rapid advance towards Gondar came to a grinding halt around Dib Bahir and Tigrayan forces were eventually forced to retreat to Zarima.

14.6 TDF “Territorial Adjustment” and “Recalibration”

On 9 September 2021, the TDF released a statement announcing that it has decided “to make limited territorial adjustments temporarily from areas it had been in control of”¹²⁷². It was apparent that the Tigrayans were finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their control of some of the less defensible areas of Amhara and Afar. The TDF gave two main reasons for its decision: Amhara region’s mass mobilisation of barely trained civilians “in hundreds of thousands,” who were then used in human wave attacks, and the deployment of Eritrean forces “to rescue Amhara forces”¹²⁷³.

The former implied that the Amhara region’s mass mobilisation strategy had borne fruit. Moreover, there were unofficial reports of local insurgencies around Kobo and north Gondar emerging from rural areas that had been largely left unoccupied by the Tigrayans. These were obviously causing problems for TDF supply lines, making further advances difficult. In addition, there were unofficial reports from Tigrayan sources of a significant level of EDF deployment in Gondar and Dessie aimed at protecting the two important cities from falling into TDF hands. Nevertheless, the EDF’s involvement in Amhara region has so far not been independently verified.

Following the announcement, Tigrayan forces made further withdrawals including a complete pull-out from Afar. Moreover, Ethiopian sources confirmed TDF retreats from Flakit and Gashina on the Woldiya-Woreta front; from Hayik on the Dessie front; from Sekota and its surrounding on the Wag front; as well as from Zarima and Chew Ber on the north Gondar front.

The failure of ENDF’s ‘irreversible offensive’ and TDF’s advance to Dessie

By the beginning of October, reports started to emerge that Ethiopian forces had planned a massive offensive across the Amhara region. Abiy’s government had just been formally inaugurated following his election victory and was apparently determined to assert its power with some solid gains on the battlefield. An Amhara regional official spoke of an impending “irreversible operation” to be carried out “on all fronts”¹²⁷⁴.

On 8 October 2021, major air and ground offensives were launched by the combined ENDF and Amhara forces around Geregera, Wegeltena, Wurgessa, and Haro. The main objective of the operation seemed to be to capture Woldiya and Kobo with a possible advance further north. From the Haro front, an ENDF detachment was mobilised from Arerit probably aiming to enter Woldiya from the northeast. Similarly, a major offensive was launched at Geregera intended to advance along the B22 highway all the way to Dilb and then descend to Woldiya. In the meantime, another ENDF and Amara detachment was carrying out a comprehensive offensive in Wegeltena, ultimately aiming to cut off the Woldiya-Gashena Road at Dilb by advancing across the high hills of the Ambasel range to the northwest. This would cut the TDF’s supply route to Gashina and isolate the Tigrayan forces at Geregera and Gashena. On the Wurgessa front, ENDF and Amhara coalition forces attempted a major penetration and assault along the A2 highway in an attempt to break through TDF fortifications around Mersa and advance to Woldiya.

After several days of intense and brutal fighting on all fronts, it was becoming increasingly clear that the ENDF offensives were not achieving their objectives. By 12 October 2021, after four days of fighting, no appreciable progress had been made by coalition forces, apart from a few gains around Arbit of Gashena front. Around this time, Getachew Reda, spokesperson for the Tigray government, claimed that the ENDF had suffered “staggering losses” and General Tsadkan, a member of TDF’s central command, predicted: “I don’t think this will be a protracted fight – a matter of days, most probably weeks. The ramifications will be military, political and diplomatic”¹²⁷⁵. It was apparent that the Tigrayan side was confident that it had inflicted significant damage on its adversary and that the ENDF’s offensives had all but failed.

On 12 October 2021, after absorbing waves of ENDF’s offensives for several days, the TDF launched its counterattacks. Emboldened by the ‘staggering losses’ the Ethiopian forces suffered during its offensives, the objectives of TDF counterattacks were predictably ambitious: capturing of the strategic cities of Dessie and Kombolcha.

Brigadir General Haileselassie Girmay, one of the commanders in charge of Tigray’s forces on the southern front revealed¹²⁷⁶ that the TDF had executed an attack from four directions to take Dessie. One TDF detachment moved from around Faji and Kul Bayine toward Tis Abalima and by following the hills to the east of the A2 highway took a turn to the right of Haiq lake and advanced on Tita. Another detachment mobilised from the TDF stronghold around Mersa and kept a course to the west of the A2 highway all the way to Marye heights and then turned to Kutaber. Another “piercer” detachment moved down the middle, along the A2 highway, between the two adjacent TDF offensive units. It sought to destroy the ENDF’s multi-layered and dense entrenchments at Sudan Sefer, Wuchale and Wurgessa and then to progress towards Borumeda. To the far west, another TDF detachment, which had neutralised Ethiopia’s forces around Wegeltena, advanced to the southeast and converged with the TDF detachment from Marye. The two then co-ordinated their assault with the piercer division to mount an attack on the ENDF’s base at Borumeda. The triad then headed straight for Dessie.

Yet another TDF detachment was making steady advances into the Afar region through Habru and on 18 October 2021, was in the vicinity of Chifra.

The Tigray military command claimed to have destroyed 27 of the 34 ENDF divisions that took part in the ‘irreversible offensive’. The major battles that decided the fate of Dessie were carried out near Borumeda, Tita and around Mount Tosa and ended with the TDF’s victory.

The TDF was left in control of such strategically significant towns as Wegeltena, Wuchale and Chifra. Two days later, with the fall of Bistima, Haiq and the strategic heights of Marye, Dessie and Kombolcha were reportedly within the TDF’s artillery range.

When it was evident that Dessie and Kombolcha would fall, the Ethiopian side responded with a series of air raids on Tigray, starting on 18 October and lasted until 28 October. Mekelle was bombed more than five times during this period while other towns like Adwa, Agbe and Mai Tsemri towns also sustained significant damage from air raids.

By the end of October, the TDF was on the outskirts of Dessie. After sporadic fighting against Amhara forces, they slowly took control of several parts of the city, starting from Wollo University. However, after taking control of most of the city, a quick ENDF counteroffensive on 30 October momentarily forced them to withdraw to the surrounding hills. In the meantime, another TDF detachment, which probably advanced from Tita, took control of Kombolcha town.

By 3 November, despite widespread fears that Dessie would become the scene of prolonged urban fighting, the TDF was back in control of the city after minimal urban combat. With the fall of Dessie and Kombolcha, the next defensible terrain was 177 kms further which implied the road to Shoa was suddenly wide open. The fall of the federal government appeared inevitable. Many recalled that Mengistu Hailemariam, former leader of Ethiopia during the Derg regime, had fled the country after the TPLF had captured Dessie. The eerily similar situation caused them to feel that a re enactment of 1991 was unfolding.

The federal government was becoming desperate. The Prime Minister called on all citizens to “March with any weapon and resources they have to defend, repulse and bury the terrorist TPLF”¹²⁷⁷.

The OLA, meanwhile, took control of Kemisse town, cutting off the A2 highway from Addis Ababa to Dessie.

4.7 The TDF-OLA link up and the march on Addis Ababa

After consolidating their control of Dessie and Kombolcha, the TDF launched offensives in three directions along the B11, A2, and B21 highways. The TDF advance along B11 highway was intended to capture the town of Mille and sever the Addis Ababa – Djibouti highway, the main economic artery of the federal government. The latter two offensives were intended to advance to Addis Ababa, the country’s capital, and unseat Abiy’s government.

By early August, the TDF and OLA had announced that they had struck a military alliance to bring down the incumbent federal government. They had since been synchronising their offensives to maximise the impact on the federal forces. After the fall of Dessie, reports indicated that the TDF and OLA had made a physical link-up around Bati and Habru, areas dominated by ethnic Oromos who had strong sympathies with the OLA.

On 1 November 2021, a joint TDF-OLA operation captured the towns Gerba and Bati. No information has been disclosed regarding how their alliance translated into action on the battlefield. However, since the OLA lacked combat experience, the involvement of its units in conventional battles was likely limited to reinforcing gains and conducting ambushes to distract the adversary.

Along the A2 highway, Tigrayan forces advanced unimpeded all the way to Kemisse where they joined the OLA forces which had secured the town a couple of days previously. The TDF-OLA alliance significantly facilitated TDF relations with the locals of Oromo Special Zone. Consequently, the TDF-OLA advance along the A2 highway to Gerbe and Senbete, border towns of Oromo zone, was swift and unobstructed by any local resistance.

On 5 November 2021, the TDF and OLA jointly announced the formation of a new coalition, the United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederal Forces, to include seven other military organisations representing Afar, Gambella, Agaw, Sidama, Benishangul, Somali and Qimant nationalities. The coalition was intended to take over federal power, after the removal of the incumbent, and pave the way for a
transitional government

By this time the international consensus was that with the collapse of a number of ENDF units, the federal army was no longer in the position to protect the capital and the central government from the TDF-OLA offensives. Consequently, several countries, including the USA, UK, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, began calling on their citizens to leave the country, and evacuated non-essential embassy personnel. With TDF-OLA advance into Addis Ababa becoming increasingly likely, the federal government declared a state of eme1rgency and again called on “Its citizens to pick up arms and prepare to defend the capital.”¹²⁷⁸

While one arm of the TDF was on the verge of capturing Shewa Robit, after a bitter fight with determined ENDF and Amhara resistance, another detachment moved south of the B21 highway into the rural area of South Wollo, capturing the towns in its path. Consequently, Were-Ilu and Degolo fell into the hands of Tigrayan forces. One arm then proceeded towards Merhabete, likely in order to cut into the A3 highway at Fiche and advance on the capital from this side. Another arm made a sharp turn southwards from Degolo and penetrated into North Shoa, seizing Mehal Meda, Molale, and Mezezo.

Just 20 days after the capture of Dessie, Tigrayan forces had advanced an astonishing 209 km and were in the vicinity of Debre Sina. Debre Sina is located at the very high altitude of 2,700 m, even higher than Dessie, and combined with its rough terrain, was the most suitable spot for the ENDF and allies to make their last stand. There were fears that if Debre Sina were to fall, nothing was likely to prevent the TDF from advancing to Addis Ababa.

14.8 TDF experiences a major setback on the Afar front

As early as mid-July, Tigrayan forces had been repeatedly attempting to penetrate the Afar region and sever the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Road. During the first round of operations, an army-sized detachment of the TDF had taken control of Yalo, Golina, and Ewa woredas and tried to advance to the Chifra-Mille road. However, successive TDF offensives were repulsed by the determined resistance of the Afar nSpecial Forces and ENDF. This eventually prompted a complete pull-out of Tigrayan forces from Afar.

After the failure of the ENDF’s October offensives, however, the TDF carried out aseries of counteroffensives, one of which managed to advance through Habruworeda of Amhara region and capture Chifra. Nevertheless, despite Tigrayan claims of inflicting heavy losses on the ENDF’s defending units, TDF attempts to further advance to the strategic junction at Mille faced dogged resistance. The Tigrayans
failed to move beyond Chifra.

Following the fall of Kombolcha, Tigrayan forces, in alliance with the OLA, made yet another attempt to progress towards Mille, this time through Bati. Again, after advancing as far as Elli Wuha of Afar, they encountered another round of determined resistance forcing them to retreat to Garsa Gita. Unofficial reports claimed that Tigrayan forces suffered heavy losses, much greater than on other fronts, during last-ditch effort to break ENDF defensive lines and progress to Mille.

The TDF’s repeated failure to advance to Mille was perhaps the consistently odd note in an otherwise predominantly successful campaign. The main reasons for the TDF’s setbacks in Afar are likely very similar to their reluctance to attempt to retake western Tigray: determined resistance from local militants, artillery-friendly terrain and the ENDF’s efficient use of combat drones. Of the three, the drone factor was by far the most potent and significantly contributed to the TDF’s eventual pullback from the other fronts.

14.9 Ethiopia’s use of combat drones and the ENDF’s resurgence

The use of combat drones by the Ethiopian Air Force intensified after August 2021. At that time, Ethiopia was alleged to be in possession of only a handful of mainly Iranian-made Mohajer-6 armed drones, which had a limited operating radius of less than 200km. Consequently, since the frontlines of the war had been significantly farther away from the base of drone operations, at Semera and Bishoftu, the impact of drones on the progress of the war, especially on the Dessie front, was minimal. The frontlines at Chifra and surrounding areas, however, were much closer to Semera. Hence it appears that drones, along with other aerial strikes and heavy artillery support, contributed significantly to impeding the TDF’s advance on Mille. Coincidentally, there were several reports of drone activity in Semera during the same period, which strengthen the claim that drones made the difference in Afar.

As the frontlines moved towards the Addis Ababa, drone attacks became far more effective and lethal against the TDF advances. By mid-October, when it was becoming apparent that the Ethiopian defence of the strategic cities of Dessie and Kombolcha was not going to hold, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a major weapons deal with Turkey which reportedly included at least half a dozen Turkish Bayraktar TB2 armed drones^{1279 1280}. Despite their limited range capability, TB2 drones had a track record of being more effective when they are operated in areas closer to their base.

Ethiopia’s drone capability was further enhanced following UAE’s active involvement in support of the Abiy’s government. Credible sources reported that by early November 2021, the United Arab Emirates had deployed at least six Chinese Wing Loong I UCAVs, along with Emirati operators, from Harar Meda air base at Bishoftu. This enabled the Ethiopian Air Force to carry out UAV surveillance and bombing operations over very long distances, which were previously beyond their reach.

Consequently, drone bombings in Tigray and northern Wollo intensified around the same time.

At this pivotal time, when on one hand, the seemingly unstoppable advances of the TDF towards the capital had created an ominous feeling that the fall of Addis was imminent, and on the other hand, when the purchase of sophisticated weapons had sparked hopes among the regime’s loyalists that all was not yet lost, PM Abiy announced he would be joining the army to lead from the front lines¹²⁸¹. The PM’s announcement invoked a great deal of public sentiment and mobilisation in support of the government’s war effort.

By this time, the TDF were strung out along the A2 highway, which runs south to north connecting Addis Ababa to Mekelle. The TDF had advanced southwards on five fronts and – rather like the fingers of a glove – were highly vulnerable to an attack from either east or west. Prime Minister Abiy chose to launch his most powerful remaining forces against the TDF from the Afar region, attempting to cut off the Tigrayan supply lines.

At the end of November 2021, news of major counteroffensives by the Ethiopian coalition started to emerge. ASF and Fano attempted a major offensive through Dubko to capture Lalibela. Though it momentarily succeeded in cutting off the Lalibela-Muja Road, a TDF counteroffensive quickly reversed the territorial gains. On the Afar front, the ENDF and Afar forces re-captured Chifra. This was another major victory for the Ethiopian coalition after Garsa Gita and made it clear that TDF ambitions of capturing Mille had been irreversibly foiled.

On 1 December 2021, reports emerged of an ongoing set of major offensives by the Ethiopian coalition forces on several fronts. Quite surprisingly, it was claimed that within a single day, Amhara forces and the ENDF recaptured Gashena, Arbit, Dubko, Molale, Mezezo, Degolo, Were Ilu, Aketsa, and Shewa Robit. In the midst of this, eyewitnesses reported that Tigrayan forces in Kombolcha, Dessie and Lalibela had started packing up and withdrawing without “a single bullet fired”.

In less than a week, the ENDF and regional forces were able to recapture Dessie, Kombolcha, the A2 highway to the south as well as the entirety of the B11 highway from Bati. Few actual battles took place during the clearance operations beyond a rather fierce exchange of artillery fire. Several videos showing destroyed TDF vehicles and heavy weapons appeared on social media and revealed how targeted drone strikes on TDF supply routes had succeeded in constraining its capability. Though both sides claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on their adversaries, neutral observers saw little evidence to suggest major battles took place during this period.

The Ethiopian government claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on the Tigrayan forces. The Prime Minster, when announcing the recapture of Garsa Gita and Chifra on state media asserted, “The enemy has been defeated. We scored an unthinkable victory with the eastern command in one day… Now in the west, we will repeat this victory”¹²⁸².

14.10 TDF “Territorial Adjustment” and “Recalibration” II

The Tigrayans, on the other hand, claimed that they were withdrawing their forces for strategic purposes and not because they suffered a defeat. The military command of the TDF said: “we are making territorial adjustments on our own terms and so as to pave the way for strategic offensives…”¹²⁸³

Though it rejects the Ethiopian government’s notion that the TDF faced military defeat, it nonetheless mentioned its intention to “quickly deal with the obstacles posed by Amhara expansionists” as among its reasons for the pullback, thereby affirming that the mass mobilisations, combat drones and multi-fronted offensives spearheaded by Amhara forces had been a significant factor in the decision.

In early December, with only a partial withdrawal in place, the Tigrayan leadership had maintained that the ‘pullback’ was merely “a limited territorial and strategic adjustment”¹²⁸⁴. This had caused the anticipation, among observers, that the TDF would not pull out of Amhara region completely, but would retain strategic areas of northern Wollo, mainly territories beyond Woldiya, and mount its defence from there.

However, on 10 December 2021, an Ethiopian offensive was able to advance from Afar through Boren and cut off the Mekelle-Woldiya road. This left the bulk of TDF forces to the south of Kobo in a precarious situation. They faced imminent encirclement in hostile territory.

Two days later, the Tigrayan forces launched a massive set of offensives to the west and southwest, as the result of which they were able to recapture, after heavy fighting, the areas around Lalibela and Gashena. Pro TDF sources claimed that Ethiopian coalition forces suffered huge losses, but this was not independently verified. The objective of the TDF offensives appears to have been to secure the Lalibela-Sekota road for the withdrawal of its forces in and around Woldiya. The TDF units around Gashena held off attacks from the direction of the B22 highway while the bulk of Tigrayan forces undertook an orderly withdrawal into Tigray.

Over the next week, Ethiopian forces rapidly advanced north through the A2 highway quickly recapturing Mersa, Woldiya, Gobiye, Hara Gebeya, Kobo Robit and Kobo.

Around the same time, drone bombing of Alamata began and intensified over the next couple of days. This was followed by a fairly strong aerial and ground offensive through Timuga which enabled the ENDF and their allies to quickly capture Alamata. An attempt to advance further and capture Korem, however, faced stiff resistance from Tigrayan forces from well-fortified positions.

The ENDF’s determined offensives and advance on the southern border appeared to have caused a stir among the Tigrayan leadership which released a statement claiming that the TDF’s withdrawal was in order to give “priority for peace” and called on the International Community to take firm measures to force the Ethiopian government to desist its assault.¹²⁸⁵ However, over the next few days, fighting intensified and expanded onto Abergelle [bordering Wag Himra] and Abala [bordering Afar].

After repeated calls by international bodies as well as concerned citizens for a ceasefire, on 24 December 2021, the federal government announced that it has ordered its forces “to maintain the areas it has controlled” meaning any plans to advance to Mekelle had been aborted¹²⁸⁶. After 13 months of continuous fighting, this was the first time both sides officially announced a ceasefire. At the end of December 2021, however, unofficial reports indicate fierce fighting is still continuing on the southwestern front around Addi Arkay as well as on the Afar front.

14.11 Conclusion

The Tigray war is one of the most devastating conflict Ethiopia has faced in its recent history. It started out as a small-scale policing operation that would be concluded in “a couple of weeks.” However, even after more than a year, it is showing no signs of ending any time soon. Tens of thousands of civilians and combatants have been killed and wounded^{1287 1288}. Millions have been displaced, have seen their homes destroyed and are now completely reliant on humanitarian aid. Thousands of children in the conflict zone are facing acute malnutrition and hundreds are dying of hunger every day. Starvation is being used as a weapon of war. The Tigray conflict has become a medieval siege warfare in its ferocity and characteristics.

It is now abundantly clear the war has been internationalised with involvement of a number of foreign actors. Besides the Eritrean army, which has directly involved the bulk of its forces in an ongoing fighting, there is solid evidence that many international actors are providing technical expertise, financial and military support to the Ethiopian federal government in its war effort in Tigray.

On the Tigrayan side, the resistance has evolved into a truly popular movement. The TDF now boasts among its ranks fighters from all sections of Tigrayan society: opposition leaders, scholars, farmers, and urban dwellers. It enjoys near unanimous support from the masses. Vocal supporters of the armed resistance include religious leaders, the elderly, human rights advocates, and international personalities. Backing for the resistance, and the corresponding rejection of pro-government voices, has been so intense that even avowedly anti-TPLF parties like Arena have preferred to remain silent.

The federal government, for its part, has relentlessly worked at gaining the support of the non-Tigrayan population for its ongoing operations against what it has labelled a ‘terrorist organisation.’ Its war propaganda has increasingly resorted to rhetoric that not only doesn’t differentiate between the people of Tigray and the armed resistance of the TDF, but blatantly accuses the entire people of treason. As a result, deeply engrained hostility has emerged between Tigrayan and Amhara society, which threatens to have an enduring impact on the entire region.

Both sides to the conflict have shown remarkable efficiency in utilising their strengths to shift the tide of the war in their favour. The TDF drew upon Tigray’s rich military tradition, the remarkable solidarity which characterises Tigrayan society, and its experienced military leadership. This allowed them to chart a course that saw the Tigrayan resistance re-fashioned from an apparently defeated force after its
withdrawal from Mekelle in November 2020. Then it was forced to withdraw into the mountains of central Tigray to be refashioned until it was ready to re-emerge. Today it is a highly capable army that could not only wrestle most of Tigray from the grip of two of the largest and most experienced armies of East Africa, but also rapidly advance towards the gates of Addis Ababa.

The Ethiopian government, on the other hand, appears to have recognised from early on that its greatest strength lay in the huge human and material resources of the country. Consequently, it invested heavily in propaganda and in the purchase of advanced weapons that enabled it to survive despite the near destruction of its national army. By the end of 2021 it had managed to reverse the TDF’s gains and drive its enemy from Shoa, all the way to Tigray’s borders. It achieved a remarkable success in the sustained mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of militia forces and barely-trained civilians from all over the country, and delivering them to the battlefields, where they fought with bravery and determination. At the same time, the Ethiopian authorities were adept at making the best use of their geopolitical
opportunities to acquire game-changing drones and other advanced weaponry. Combining mass (if poorly-trained) armies with sophisticated weaponry, maintained by foreign technicians, has allowed the Ethiopian government to turn the tide of this war once again in its favour.

In terms of military strategies, the TDF appears to have recalibrated its engagements by choosing techniques and environments conducive to their military capability. Acutely aware that it has a very limited population from which to recruit combatants, it has avoided large-scale full-frontal battles and flat, open landscapes where superiority in manpower and artillery would be decisive. Even in conventional battles, its forces performed manoeuvres that followed principles similar to those adopted in a guerrilla warfare. Unless the TDF was forced by geography, as they were when attempting to cut off the vital Addis-Djibouti Road, they sought to use strategies that

took advantage of their expert knowledge of operating in mountainous terrain, as well as the flexibility and mobility of their forces to destabilise and sometimes defeat, the numerically superior and extensively armed ENDF.

Although it has required the sacrifice of almost its entire professional army and resulted in disastrous economic consequences, the Ethiopian leadership, with the assistance of Eritrea, has managed to foil TDF’s primary objectives: liberating western Tigray and attempting to cut off the Addis-Djibouti Road. The former would have given the Tigrayan resistance a crucial supply line to Sudan. However, the EDF’s heavy deployment in western Tigray and large mobilisation of Amharamilitants, meant that the corridor to Sudan remained sealed. The TDF’s operation to sever the Addis-Djibouti Road was an attempt to gain a strong bargaining chip to force Abiy into negotiations. The federal government successfully countered the TDF’s repeated offensives into Afar by securing the allegiance of locals, deploying the bulk of its forces on this front, and employing advanced weaponry, especially drones.

Ultimately, diplomatic leverage and successful utilisation of combat drones played a
disproportionate role in reversing what had appeared to be the TDF’s near-certain
victory.

There is now a military stalemate. The Ethiopian coalition forces appear incapable of advancing further into Tigray without risking another military catastrophe. Tigrayan forces, too, are unlikely to attempt another offensive into Amhara or Afar unless they find an antidote to the drone problem. Yet, as long as Tigray remains in a de facto siege, and its disputes with the neighbouring Amhara region are not resolved, the prospect looms of another round of even more brutal warfare.

The Humanitarian Situation: Aid, Food Security and Famine

By Felicia Mulford¹²⁸⁹

15.1 Famine in Tigray

Since November 2020, Tigray, once a bustling region in northeastern Ethiopia, has been gripped in a brutal conflict. However, the horrors are ongoing. For those living in Tigray, the improvement in food security and standard of living seen over the past decades now feels like a distant memory. Despite avoidable predictions and early warnings,¹²⁹⁰ Tigray is facing a human-made famine.¹²⁹¹

Volume 1 outlined events from November 2020 – June 2021, a period which was characterised by widespread and systematic starvation crimes, seen through the destruction of food systems, attacks on healthcare and economic viability. When information dripped out from the behind the communications blackout, it was rarely good news. Towns were pillaged, civilians massacred, and markets bombed. Shops and businesses were looted and destroyed. Crops were burned, seeds stolen, farmers threatened, and livestock slaughtered. Women and girls have been subjected to pervasive sexual violence. Both parties to the conflict have been accused of recruiting child soldiers. This inexhaustive list of atrocities has devastated a previously food secure region.

This Volume is marked by a different wave of events. Since the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) retreat from Mekelle in June 2020, the violations seen in Volume 1 have largely stopped within Tigray. However, as the Tigrayan forces advanced into neighbouring Afar and Amhara, claims of similar atrocities have been levied against their forces.¹²⁹² The crimes are the same, but the perpetrators and victims are different. During this next phase of the war, the Tigray region has faced a government imposed, de-facto blockade, which many commentators have labelled as a siege.¹²⁹³ Starvation crimes, although different, have continued unabated since Volume 1 of this report. Humanitarian access has been restricted and aid obstructed. Humanitarian workers have been harassed and assaulted and, by December 2021, at least 24 brutally murdered.

Despite the deteriorating situation on the ground, no official famine declaration has been made. Famine is a term used to reflect a state of extreme widespread food insecurity. The lack of verifiable information coming out of Tigray is providing a smokescreen for Abiy’s Government, as famine cannot be officially denied or confirmed. For a famine to be declared, the ‘Integrated Food Security Phase Classification’ (IPC) outlines that the following three conditions must be met:

1. Two in 10,000 people
   die each day from
   malnutrition
2. More than 30% of
   children under five
   are acutely
   malnourished
3. At least 20% of the
   population has highly
   inadequate food
   consumption or near
   exhaustion of
   livelihoods¹²⁹⁴

The IPC Classification System¹²⁹⁵

In June, the IPC updated its analysis to indicate that 350,000 people were already facing ‘catastrophic’ levels of hunger (IPC Level 5).¹²⁹⁶ By July the United Nations (UN) estimate rose to more than 400,000 people.¹²⁹⁷ By September USAID reported 90% of the Tigrayan population – 5.2 million of the 6 million inhabitants – were facing critical food insecurity, and that up to 900,000 people were facing famine-like conditions.¹²⁹⁸ Even if the lowest of these estimates is correct, more people are suffering from catastrophic food insecurity in Tigray than in the rest of the world combined. ¹²⁹⁹ It is hard to believe that there is not famine in Tigray.

Despite the IPC’s analysis, the lack of access to the region and verifiable data meant that it has been impossible to determine whether all three criteria had been met for a famine to be declared. While the definition of famine does not place legal obligations on states, the political designation would increase attention on the conflict. Abiy Ahmed, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, has masterfully kept this information out of the reach of those who could have made this declaration. Without this data, no official declaration of famine can occur.

For fear of losing access to the region, the ability to deliver life-saving aid and to ensure the safety of their staff, aid agencies have not used the word ‘famine’ for fear of alienating the Ethiopian government.¹³⁰⁰ However, experts have suggested that arguments over the peculiarities of this technical definition are counter productive.¹³⁰¹ By further politicising widespread and systematic starvation, these
discussions obscure the action and attention needed on the ground. For example, in June, Mark Lowcock, – Former Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)¹³⁰² – highlighted the devastating situation: “There is famine now… there is famine now in Tigray. The number of people in famine conditions, in IPC 5 conditions, is higher than anywhere in the world, at any moment since one quarter of
one million Somali’s lost their lives in 2011.”¹³⁰³

Since June, food security in the region has deteriorated. While the Ethiopian Government has actively denied the presence of famine in Tigray throughout the conflict,¹³⁰⁴ the mounting evidence is stark. The current food crisis has hit all levels of

Tigrayan society as bank closures have made savings inaccessible. With little cash in circulation, reduction of local markets and little aid entering the region due to the Government blockade, inflation has skyrocketed, making household items and food out of the reach of many. In August, the TPLF reported that “It is now common to witness middle income families with sufficient savings struggling to feed their children and cover medical and other expenses. Stock of merchandise is depleted, quadrupling the price of basic items and sentencing the absolute majority of Tigrayans to await humanitarian aid.”¹³⁰⁵

After already writing many warnings, reports and op-eds, sounding exasperated Alex de Waal, a prominent academic on famines wrote: “If this isn’t a famine then the word has no meaning.”¹³⁰⁶ By tracing the deterioration in the food security within the region, it is clear the famine is intentional, systematic, and widespread – all indicators that starvation as a weapon of war, or starvation as a crime against humanity, is occurring in Tigray. This chapter will outline how the conflict’s development has impacted the delivery of humanitarian aid, restricted humanitarian operations and limited access to those in need of life-saving relief.

15.2 Pre 28 June-Ceasefire

In June, when asked if parties to the conflict were preventing aid from reaching over 1 million people in areas controlled by the TPLF, the UN’s former senior aid co ordinator Mark Lowcock answered, “Food is definitely being used as a weapon of war.” He continued to say that the Eritrean forces were “trying to deal with the Tigrayan population by starving them.” ¹³⁰⁷ Unfortunately, the pattern of using food to subjugate the Tigrayan people has continued. By mid-June more than 60% of the population of Tigray was facing high levels of food insecurity.¹³⁰⁸

With communications down and information hard to obtain, many regions were silent prior to the ceasefire on 28 June. The extent of the suffering was largely unknown. A harrowing cry for help arrived in Mekelle on 16 June. It was a letter from Mai Kinetal, a district which had been cut off from humanitarian relief due to the fighting. It reported that people were “falling like leaves” with more than 125 people having already starved to death.¹³⁰⁹ Only one aid delivery had made it to Mai Kinetal; an aid delivery which was based on an outdated census, resulting in many inhabitants receiving no relief. To make matters worse, the aid was subsequently looted by Eritrean troops.¹³¹⁰

Letter from Mai Kinetal

Despite such reports, in an interview with the BBC just days before the ceasefire, Abiy Ahmed told the BBC: “There is no hunger in Tigray, there is a problem in Tigray, and the Government is capable of fixing that”.¹³¹¹ Similarly, the head of the Ethiopian National Disaster Risk Management Commission told reporters in June 2021 that there was no food shortage, and 90% of the Tigrayan population had received food aid.¹³¹²These statements directly contradict reports from the region by humanitarians and UN agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP) who reported that by this time 91% of the Tigrayan population was in need of emergency food.¹³¹³

The notion that the Ethiopian government is knowingly using hunger within its campaign against the Tigrayans was supported by Abiy Ahmed’s own remarks during an interview. He told a journalist that in 1984-85 the continuation of aid flows into the region supported the TPLF’s rise to take down the Derg regime. He noted that this mistake would not be made again.¹³¹⁴ This sinister message has permeated his war strategies and culminated in a policy of starvation. Aid has been obstructed at all levels, leaving millions of innocent people to starve.

Prior to the ceasefire on 28 June, OCHA had recorded over 130 incidents of humanitarians being turned away at checkpoints, as well as harassment and assault

of humanitarian staff. According to internal UN reports, throughout June, Amhara forces, ENDF and EDF were turning away aid vehicles and detaining aid workers across northern, central, and southeastern zones of Tigray.¹³¹⁵ Only one of these access violations was attributed to the Tigrayans.¹³¹⁶ The international community was made aware of these violations of international humanitarian law and condemned the actions. Following an EU-US roundtable on the humanitarian emergency in Tigray, the following statement was released: “Deliberate and repeated hindrances by the military and armed groups, the regular looting of humanitarian assistance is driving the population towards mass starvation.” EU-US Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Emergency in Tigray, 10 June¹³¹⁷

During mid-June, as the ENDF and EDF troops were facing significant military defeats and retreating from the Tigray region, families rushed to their fields to try to salvage what was left of the planting season. Markets were reportedly extremely busy across Tigray as people hastened to acquire seeds to plant. ¹³¹⁸ For many families, markets underpin the ability of Tigray to support its own food security. On 22 June, the Government of Ethiopia bombed a market in Togoga, where civilians were buying and exchanging much needed seeds. Not only was this attack on a Tuesday (market day), but the bombing came on a significant day in Tigray. The day marked the 33rd ‘martyrs’ day’, when Tigrayans commemorate the loss of 1000 Tigrayans during the Hazwen Massacre at the end of the Ethiopian Civil war.¹³¹⁹ One woman, whose husband and young daughter were injured by the airstrike, told Reuters, “We didn’t see the plane, but we heard it… When the explosion happened, everyone ran out – after a time we came back and were trying to pick up the injured.”¹³²⁰

Although the Government claims it targeted TDF leaders, the attack killed between 50 and 80 civilians and injured many more.¹³²¹ Birhan Gebrehiwet, a 20-year-old Tigrayan whose house was destroyed in the strike, told Agence France-Presse (AFP), “There were lots of injured people and dead people… We were stepping on them and in their blood.”¹³²² At the same time, a bomb hit a school 20km away in the market town of Addilal. Commentators have suggested that the target was likely the market.¹³²³

At this point in June, although the Government forces were retreating and facing significant military losses, they had not entirely left the region. It was reported that ENDF troops at checkpoints near the town of Togoga prevented ambulance services from accessing the site for more than 24 hours, sending at least six ambulances and more than 20 health workers back to Mekelle.¹³²⁴ One medical worker told Sky News, “They told us we couldn’t go to Togoga. We stayed more than one hour at the checkpoint trying to negotiate, we had a letter from the health bureau – we showed them. But they said it was an order.”¹³²⁵ Similarly, after being shot at by ENDF soldiers, a Red Cross team was held for 45 minutes before being ordered to turn back.¹³²⁶ One of the doctors in the Red Cross vehicle said that the ENDF warned them that “whoever goes, they are helping the troops of the TPLF”.¹³²⁷ The wounded were denied timely medical access by Ethiopian Government forces.¹³²⁸ It is unclear how many people died of their injuries at the scene, who could have been saved had medical access been granted. Blocking ambulances from providing medical attention to wounded civilians is a grave violation of international Humanitarian law.

Tigray provides an example of the incredible bravery that humanitarians must have to work in areas of live conflict. Despite international law protecting humanitarian actors, and resolutions to affirm their protected status,¹³²⁹ throughout this conflict the security of humanitarian actors within the region has been precarious. On 25 June, just three days before the ceasefire, three Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) staff were brutally murdered while moving between locations.¹³³⁰ On 26 June, MSF released a statement stating, “Maria Hernandez, our emergency coordinator, Yohannes Halefom Reda, our assistant coordinator and Tedros Gebremariam Gebremichael our driver was travelling yesterday afternoon when we lost contact with them. This morning the vehicle was found empty and a few metres away, their lifeless bodies.”¹³³¹ The loss of three personnel led to MSF momentarily halting its response in the region. At this point, it was believed that these deaths raised the death toll of humanitarians working in the region to 12. It was later revealed that this number was actually far higher.

In response to these brutal murders, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres released a statement, stating “I am deeply shocked by the murder of three Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) humanitarian workers in Tigray, Ethiopia. This is totally unacceptable and an appalling violation of international humanitarian law. The perpetrators must be found and severely punished… I stand in solidarity with our

humanitarian partners who are risking their lives to provide protection and relief to
people in Tigray.”¹³³²

Other brutal murders of humanitarians also emerged. For example, on 20 May, the
US Embassy released a statement saying that an employee of the Relief Society of
Tigray, a partner of USAID in the region, had been shot by the ENDF and EDF on 28
April. The statement said, “According to eyewitnesses, he clearly identified himself
as a humanitarian worker and pleaded for his life before he was killed”.¹³³³ At the
United Nations Security Council meeting on 15 June, Mark Lowcock told the Security
Council that “Aid workers have been killed, interrogated, beaten, blocked from taking
aid to the starving and suffering and told not to come back.”

Journalists reporting on the conflict have also been targeted. By March, at least five
people working for international media outlets had been arrested, including two
translators and a reporter for the BBC’s Tigrinya service.¹³³⁴ Despite statements
condemning the spate of arrests in February and March, the intimidation of
journalists continued.¹³³⁵ In late June, 12 journalists from two independent media
companies were arrested,¹³³⁶ including Abebe Bayu, a journalist for Ethio Forum,
who was forced into a car by armed men. Abebe Bayu and his colleague Yayesew
Shimelis were both charged with spreading fake news. On the 30 June, 10
journalists were arrested during raids on the office of Awlo Media Centre. While at
first no charge was given, later the police stated that these journalists were arrested
for their affiliation with a terrorist organisation.¹³³⁷ Even international journalists have
been threatened; Simon Marks an American Journalist who wrote for the New York
Times and Voice of America had his accreditation revoked in May, accused of
spreading false information.¹³³⁸ The attacks on humanitarians and journalists reflects
a worrying trend. This provides evidence that the Abiy Government seeks to control
the narrative on the conflict and curtail access to the region.

15.3 July: The Ceasefire and Blockade (Day 0 – 33)

The ceasefire

On 28 June 2021, the TDF retook Mekelle, the capital of Tigray.¹³³⁹ The retreat of
federal forces out of the region was met with celebrations across Tigray. However,
the celebrations in Tigray were short-lived. As the federal forces retreated, the
Ethiopian Government declared a unilateral ceasefire.¹³⁴⁰ With the ceasefire came a
de facto blockade on the region. Since early July, electricity, internet, banking
services and communications have been down. Access by road or air is controlled
by the Ethiopian Government. The delivery of aid into the region is reliant upon a
bureaucratic game with multiple hurdles.

The Government of Ethiopia claimed to be calling a ceasefire for humanitarian
reasons, withdrawing troops to allow farmers to tend to their fields. They declared
that the ceasefire would end once the planting season in Tigray was over
(September).¹³⁴¹ While preventing the loss of the next harvest within a region with
intense conflict-induced food insecurity is important, it is unlikely that this was Abiy
Ahmed’s priority.¹³⁴² Commentators following the conflict have questioned the
sincerity of the ‘humanitarian ceasefire’, indicating that this was more likely to cover
up their military defeat while keeping up their façade.¹³⁴³

If the ceasefire was truly for humanitarian reasons, then it came too late.
Gebremariam Hadush, a farmer and father of five, told the Associated Press, “We
should be tilling this land for the second or third time… But we couldn’t till at all until
now because we haven’t had peace. So now all we can do is just scrape the
surface.”¹³⁴⁴ For the best harvests, the land should have already been tilled. The
timing of the ceasefire left a very narrow window for farmers.

To make matters worse, as the ENDF and EDF forces retreated, they removed cash
from the banks, destroyed bridges and roads into the region and dismantled
communications equipment. On 28 June, the same day as Mekelle was taken back
under TPLF control, ENDF soldiers dismantled the satellite equipment in the Mekelle
office of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),¹³⁴⁵ an important centre for
coordinating the relief effort within Tigray. According to the World Peace Foundation,
“These acts amount to clear violations of the Geneva Conventions and its Additional

Protocols, which prohibit attacks on humanitarian personnel, equipment, and
materials in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”¹³⁴⁶

The Tekezé river forms a natural boundary separating western Tigray from the rest
of the region. As the Amhara militia and Federal forces retreated on 1 July, two key
bridges over the Tekezé were destroyed.¹³⁴⁷ These routes were essential for the
delivery of aid. The World Food Programme (WFP) reported that “While WFP is
adjusting its supply lines and exploring alternative routes into Tigray, the destruction
of the bridges had an immediate impact on moving food into the region from
Gondar.”¹³⁴⁸ The attacks on infrastructure essential for the humanitarian response
provided further evidence of the desire to hamper the aid effort.

In this instance, calling a ceasefire for ‘humanitarian’ reasons is a fallacy. The
Ethiopian Government has an obligation to protect civilians during armed conflict.
For example, international humanitarian law requires warring parties to ensure that
the civilian population and objects indispensable to their survival are protected and
that they can access humanitarian assistance.

In a statement, the Tigray government outlined their fears about the ceasefire: “the
so-called unilateral ceasefire was simply a coverup for misleading the Ethiopian
people and the international community into believing that it was not militarily
defeated while also buying time to prepare for the reinvasion of Tigray. Furthermore,
it aimed at triggering international pressure on Tigray to reciprocate the ‘unilateral
ceasefire’ it declared as it prepares for its counter offensive.”¹³⁴⁹ This view was
mirrored by academics who claim that the unilateral ceasefire was no more than a
pause in fighting to allow the Governments forces to regroup and rearm.¹³⁵⁰

At the UN Security Council Meeting on 2 July, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres
said: “It is essential to have a real ceasefire paving the way for a dialogue able to
bring a political solution to Tigray”. He continued to say that “The presence of foreign
troops is an aggravating factor of confrontation. At the same time, full humanitarian
access, unrestricted humanitarian access must be guaranteed to the whole territory.
The destruction of civilian infrastructure is totally unacceptable.”¹³⁵¹ While some UN
Officials were optimistic, for example the Russian Ambassador to the UN Vassily
Nebenzia said that “unilateral cease-fire that the Ethiopian government announced
gives us a light glimmer of hope”,¹³⁵² others were more direct, outlining the high risks

of future confrontations.¹³⁵³ These fears proved justified as evidence emerged during
July as officers from Oromia, Sidama and the Southern Nations Nationalities and
People’s region all acknowledged that their special forces were moving north to
reinforce the national army despite the ceasefire.¹³⁵⁴ Internationally, fears were
mounting that the conflict would no longer be contained to the Tigray region but
engulf neighbouring regional states in an ethnically motivated war.

The blockade

Since the ceasefire, conditions have continued to deteriorate for those living within
Tigray. While fighting was less of a concern due to the partial retreat of the ENDF
and EDF, according to UN officials, food security in the region continued to
deteriorate. In early July, 400,000 people were already living in famine conditions,
while 1.8 million were on the brink. At a UN Security Council meeting on 2 July, the
UN’s Under Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo told the Council that, “Basic
services to support humanitarian delivery are absent. Mekelle has no electrical
power or internet. Key infrastructure has been destroyed, and there are no flights
entering or leaving the area.”¹³⁵⁵ Ramesh Rajasingham (Acting Under-Secretary
General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator) warned the
Council that since the ceasefire declaration they had not been able to move any aid
into the region. He stated that within Tigray there was only enough aid for a 1-month
supply for 1 million people, out of the 5.2 million food insecure people in Tigray. He
continued to stress that “over 2.5 million people in rural Tigray have not had access
to essential services over the last six months, including those facing famine.”¹³⁵⁶

The Ethiopian government has continually rejected the claim that they are imposing
a blockade, despite overwhelming evidence from organisations on the ground. In a
statement by the US Ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, she reflected
the rising concerns felt by the international community: “Humanitarian workers are
reporting that it is more difficult to reach desperate people in Tigray now than it was
just a week ago. Such acts, if verified, are not an indication of a humanitarian
ceasefire, but of a siege. The Ethiopian government can and should prove this
analysis wrong by providing unhindered movement of humanitarian supplies,
commodities, and personnel into, and throughout Tigray. If they do not, we believe
hundreds of thousands of people could starve to death.”¹³⁵⁷

On 8 July, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and Abiy Ahmed discussed
the situation. Abiy Ahmed gave assurances that there would be immediate access
for humanitarian staff and the resumption of essential services, including power and
communications.¹³⁵⁸ These promises were not kept. The blockade on electricity,

communications, fuel, and humanitarian assistance has had an immeasurable
impact on the region.

Without electricity, banks cannot function, homes have no light or power, medical
facilities cannot use essential machinery. Without communications, families do not
know if their loved ones are alive, or where they are. Aid workers cannot coordinate
their efforts, collect data necessary for the relief effort or monitor the situation.¹³⁵⁹
The media is restricted, as if information is able to leave the region, it cannot be
corroborated. Without fuel, flour mills, water pumps and vehicles for the humanitarian
response cannot run. This means that areas far from main cities become
increasingly inaccessible. By July, most petrol stations had either run out of fuel or
had extensive lines of people waiting to purchase fuel.¹³⁶⁰

Spread of conflict

If Abiy’s plan was to starve Tigray into submission, or worse, from existence, then
this plan backfired. While the conflict had been contained to the Tigray region, since
July, the fighting spread to neighbouring Amhara and Afar.¹³⁶¹ The TDF advanced
into neighbouring regions, marching towards strategic points. Although
commentators have argued that this offensive was to capitalise on military gains, or
disrupt trade,¹³⁶² the TDF claimed this advance was to gain leverage over the
Government of Ethiopia, to force a negotiated ceasefire (rather than a unilateral one)
and peace negotiations. Had the TDF remained within Tigray, then they would have
had to rely upon the Ethiopian Government allowing aid to enter the region, an
assurance which they did not have.¹³⁶³ This push to reopen and control the supply
lines into Tigray and end the siege, included a push for North Wollo Zone, Lalibela
and Gondar – sites of significance and roads which go to Sudan and Eritrea.¹³⁶⁴ To
the TDF, each territorial gain may represent a bargaining chip with the Ethiopian
Government to ensure aid supplies and negotiations, or perhaps one step closer to
Addis Ababa.

However, as the conflict has spread, so have the increasing humanitarian needs.
Rising insecurity has created new dilemmas for aid workers and new obstacles for
relief operations. By 23 July, more than 54,000 people in the adjoining Afar region
was thought to have been displaced due to clashes with TDF.

Impact on farming

Although the ceasefire was apparently put in place to support farming within Tigray,
farmers faced significant challenges as they raced against the seasonal weather.

Before the ceasefire, farming was a dangerous act of resistance, performed mostly
at night, out of sight of the EDF or ENDF. Research has found that farming was
interrupted by several factors, including fear. Farming equipment had been looted,
seeds were destroyed or stolen, fertilisers were inaccessible, and oxen for ploughing
had been slaughtered.¹³⁶⁵ “All our farm tools, including ploughs, were looted and
taken away on trucks,” Birhau Tsegay, a young Tigrayan farmer told AP news, “they
left nothing.”¹³⁶⁶

In June, as Government forces retreated and the TDF took control of large swathes
of Tigray, there was a surge in agricultural activity, as farmers were rushing to plant
crops before they missed the planting window ahead of seasonal rains. If crops were
sewn prior to August, there would be something to harvest in November. This was
corroborated by research using satellite imagery, which showed that much farmland
was tilled at least once, except for western Tigray where it seems last year’s
sorghum harvest remained unharvested.¹³⁶⁷ However, despite the unilateral
ceasefire, there were still challenges for farmers. Abebe Gebrehiwot (deputy head of
the Tigray interim Government) told Reuters that Eritrean soldiers were still
preventing farmers from planting crops, while Amhara regional forces were blocking
routes into Tigray, preventing seeds and agricultural supplies reaching farmers.¹³⁶⁸

By July, it was clear that shortages of seeds and fertiliser meant that many farmers
missed the peak planting month of June.¹³⁶⁹ While driving through the region, aid
agencies reported a high number of deserted villages and large areas of untilled and
abandoned land.¹³⁷⁰ In many areas, local food production had been brought to a
standstill according to the FAO.¹³⁷¹ With over two million IDPs now living in camps
away from their homes and lands and unable to return, it was likely that food security
would get worse before it got better.

Road Access

Although access within the Tigray region has improved greatly since the ceasefire
(see section on access maps), entry to the region was severely restricted. Roads
through Amhara were blocked, and bridges destroyed, leaving just one functioning
route from Afar, via Semera.¹³⁷² With the escalation of conflict in Afar, the safe
passage of trucks and humanitarian actors was of great concern. Several
checkpoints were set up on the main routes into Tigray. At these checkpoints,

humanitarians have faced bureaucratic delays, ongoing insecurity, rigorous checks,
and searches, as well as demands for additional approvals.¹³⁷³ Further restrictions
on journalists were imposed by the Ethiopian Government, including warnings that
“measures” would be taken if international journalists refer to the TDF within
reporting. However, what these measures would be remained unclear.

In early July, a 29-truck aid convoy was forced to turn back to the depot, while a
further convoy of 200 trucks was pending government clearance.¹³⁷⁴ Another UN
convoy in early July was obstructed, with Tigrayan drivers detained overnight in Afar,
and western aid workers extensively searched. The trucks were impounded and
released after two days, however the convoy was made to turn back around.¹³⁷⁵
Critical food aid has been delayed from entering the region, while embargoes on
healthcare, cash and fuel have left trucks sitting pending approval. Tommy
Thompson, WFP’s Emergency Coordinator in Mekelle, said in a statement: “We
have the teams on ground, trucks loaded and ready to go to meet the catastrophic
food needs in the region. What we need now is free, unfettered access and secure
passage guaranteed by all parties to the conflict so we can deliver food safely”.¹³⁷⁶
He continued: “The fact is that people have died, people are dying, and more people
will die if we are not allowed the ability to prevent it from happening and provide
assistance.”¹³⁷⁷

In early July, nine WFP branded lorries were prevented from reaching Tigray by local
militia in Amhara.¹³⁷⁸ Local youth refused the trucks passage, claiming that the food
should instead be going to IDPs in Amhara. The trucks were held at a Police Station
for three days before being forced to return. While there was disagreement over
whether an order to hold these trucks came from the North Wollo Peace and
Security bureau, this action is an example of rising tension and the obstruction of
lifesaving aid reaching Tigray. Similarly, on 18 July, a 10-truck convoy came under
fire in Afar. Gunmen open fired at the trucks, stopping the convoy. One truck was
looted, and a truck driver harassed and robbed of his personal belongings.¹³⁷⁹ While
Abiy blamed the TPLF, the aid workers thought it was more likely that they were pro
Government militia. This led to the suspension of aid deliveries over this route until
security could be guaranteed.

Air Access

On 5 July, the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) received approval from the
Ethiopian Government to resume flights to Tigray.¹³⁸⁰ Perhaps too optimistically, on
12 July, the EU Commission’s Vice President Josep Borell announced plans to open
an air bridge to the region: “The Tigray region is in a serious humanitarian crisis, with
almost 1, 850,000 at risk of famine…The Tigray region is being cut from the rest of
the world by destroying critical infrastructure and transportation. This could bring the
region to a mass famine. We at the European Union, the Commission, will organise
an air-bridge to try to bring support to the region.”¹³⁸¹ Two days later, this plan was
rejected by Abiy Ahmed’s National Disaster Risk Management Commission which
ruled that “activities to deliver humanitarian assistance to Tigray Region through
direct flight or any other means that violates the sovereignty of the country is not
permitted.”¹³⁸² This statement has raised concern, as delivering life-saving aid
should not represent a violation of sovereignty.¹³⁸³ In fact, according to the
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) – an international principle which was unanimously
endorsed within the World Summit Outcome Document in 2005¹³⁸⁴ – sovereignty is
inherently conditional and reliant upon the upholding of human rights.¹³⁸⁵ Destroying
entire food systems and depriving a whole region of objects indispensable for their
survival represent War Crimes which fall under the remit of the R2P norm. The
international community should be considering whether the delivery of life-saving aid
without approval from the Ethiopian Government could be achieved under R2P.

Interestingly, in 1984-85, the Ethiopian Government allowed the British Royal Air
Force to drop food parcels to those starving in Tigray, in ‘Operation Bushel’.¹³⁸⁶ The
present-day prohibition directly contrasts action taken in 1984-85, and reaffirms Abiy
Ahmed’s statement that this time, they will not make the same mistakes that were
made before, by allowing aid to reach the region.

The first UNHAS flight touched down in Tigray on 22 July, carrying more than 30
employees from multiple humanitarian organisations.¹³⁸⁷ However those on the flight
were extensively searched in Addis Ababa. OCHA reported that “essential
medicines, including anti-malaria, pain killers, heart and diabetes drugs were not
allowed on the plane, leading two passengers who depend on them to stay
behind.”¹³⁸⁸ Humanitarian staff told the New York Times that they faced harassment

and intimidation at the airport with six hour delays due to the intensive searches.¹³⁸⁹
As the New York Times reports, the flights “confirmed fears among aid workers that
the Ethiopian authorities were pursuing a strategy of officially permitting
humanitarian access while in practice working to frustrate it”.¹³⁹⁰ Heavy restrictions
on the amount of cash allowed to enter the region and the closure of banks has also
hampered the aid effort. The Ethiopian Government restricted the amount of cash
per aid worker to US$250, and per plane to a maximum of US$432,000. This is far
below the US$6.5mn that the UN estimated is needed every week to carry out the
humanitarian response. Many organisations were already having to work in credit or
had to scale back their response. The Government of Tigray stated that this
restriction on cash “is primarily motivated by a pedantic desire to interrupt the
circulation of monies within the Tigrayan economy.”¹³⁹¹

Michael Dunford, WFP’s Regional Director for Eastern Africa, welcomed the bi
weekly flights which would transport humanitarian personnel in/out of the region, he
said that “WFP and our fellow emergency responders on the ground in Mekelle are
all enormously relieved to see this UNHAS flight arrive today, bringing in colleagues
who are all essential in our collective efforts to scale up the humanitarian response
and for WFP to reach 2.1 million people with life-saving food assistance”.¹³⁹² The
statement did not reflect on the delays or the harassment of staff, indicating the fine
line that the UN and its agencies were treading in order to keep access to the region
and the 5.2 million food insecure inhabitants.

25 days after the ceasefire (23 July)

By the end of July, there were growing concerns over the rising hate speech in the
country and the deteriorating humanitarian situation within Tigray. The war on the
ground was increasingly coupled with a war over competing narratives. As well as
designating the TPLF and its forces the TDF, a ‘terrorist’ group – a political
designation which signals his refusal to negotiate with the TPLF – statements made
by Abiy Ahmed and his close advisors have raised concerns of genocidal intent. On
18 July, Abiy called for all able-bodied men across Ethiopia to come together to fight
the ‘cancer’, exorcise the ‘demon’ and uproot the ‘weeds’.¹³⁹³ In a public address,
similarly dangerous rhetoric was used by Daniel Kibret, his close aide. It stated that
the TDF “should be erased and disappeared from historical records” and that those
who wish to study the TDF should only find evidence of them by “digging the
ground.”¹³⁹⁴ Calls to action by Amhara officials have outlined Tigrayans as the
“enemy” of Ethiopia, and the President of Amhara has asked Amharas to leave their
work and education and head to the frontlines, where they should be “determined to
destroy the TPLF” and “eliminate the terrorist TPLF”.¹³⁹⁵ The international community

has condemned the rise in dangerous language and has even drawn parallels with
the rhetoric used before the Rwandan Genocide.¹³⁹⁶ In a statement on the 30 July,
the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Alice Wairimu Nderitu,
warned about the use of “inflammatory statements” and “pejorative and
dehumanising language”.¹³⁹⁷

While both sides to the conflict became more vocal, the situation within Tigray
remained dire. Only one convoy of 54 trucks had reached Tigray since the ceasefire,
carrying food, fuel, medical supplies and other vital items.¹³⁹⁸ To respond to the
growing needs on the ground, the UN estimated that 200,000 litres of fuel needed to
enter Tigray weekly and over 100 trucks of food and non-food items daily.¹³⁹⁹ To
avert catastrophic famine, twice as much food as arrived during the whole of July is
needed each day..

As well as limited aid, the challenges humanitarians were facing within the region
were mounting. By the end of July, only five out of OCHA’s 20 nutrition partners were
able to reach communities due to a lack of fuel, food and cash. By scaling down the
response, vital data could not be collected, and humanitarians lacked the information
they needed for scaling up of response.¹⁴⁰⁰ Due to restrictions and banking closures,
most people had not been paid for month, including aid workers and civil
servants.¹⁴⁰¹

The frustrations felt by humanitarians in the country and internationally were becoming more vocalised. On 27 July, David Beasley, WFP Chief tweeted the
following:

After significant pressure on 28 July a convoy 44 trucks, the first since 12 July, was given permission to head towards Tigray.¹⁴⁰² The convoy delivered less than half the daily requirement for aid, while 200 additional trucks remained on standby in Semera, pending Government authorisation to cross into Tigray.¹⁴⁰³ In the daily noon-briefing, the UN Secretary General’s Spokesperson warned that without a drastic and sustained change in the

procedures regulating the movement of aid, humanitarian efforts would have to end
by mid-August. ¹⁴⁰⁴ Lack of humanitarian supplies, fuel and communications
equipment were cited as priority needs.

Tigray once boasted one of the most effective healthcare systems in Ethiopia prior to
this conflict; however, attacks on healthcare services have been rife throughout this
conflict.¹⁴⁰⁵ Prior to the ceasefire, previously functioning hospitals had been
converted into military bases, housing weapons, personnel and prisoners.¹⁴⁰⁶ Back
in March, MSF reported that 1/5 of the health facilities that they visited were used by
soldiers, some even housed women kept in sexual slavery.¹⁴⁰⁷ Following the
ceasefire, assessments found that 9/10 health facilities were looted, with equipment
vandalised and destroyed. These facilities needed to be restocked and restored, and
supply chains to be restored.¹⁴⁰⁸

By the end of July, the systematic damage to services which children rely upon,
including “food, health, nutrition, water and sanitation systems” was causing a
significant rise in the number of malnourished children.¹⁴⁰⁹ UNICEF predicted a ten
fold increase in the number of children who would face life-threatening Severe Acute
Malnutrition (SAM) within the next 12 months.¹⁴¹⁰ This is more than 100,000 children.
Reports from doctors in Mekelle were increasingly alarming: “Though there is no
killing in the street by bullet, people are dying in other ways. They’re dying of lack of
medication and also food … People in Tigray are now in the complete dark, with no
access to electricity, no phone, with no medical access, with no food supply.
Everything is depleted. If this siege continues for a week or two weeks more, you will
see that people will die in just the whole [place] – especially those in IDP [camps] will
die. I think, the international community, it’s time now to intervene, at the moment.
Otherwise, we’ll see the catastrophe, which is coming in the next month,
probably.”¹⁴¹¹

The high level of internal displacement within Tigray places an additional pressure
on the healthcare services. Reports began emerging of overcrowded IDP camps with
unsanitary conditions, including lack of latrines or no functioning water pumps. These
conditions dramatically increase the risk of disease outbreak, making restoring
hospitals a huge priority in the humanitarian response. In a statement to the UN
Security Council, Ramesh Rakasingham an UN OCHA official, stressed the
importance of a comprehensive humanitarian response: “Food alone does not avert a

famine. Water, sanitation, and nutrition supplies are essential in such a response.
We also desperately need to prevent a cholera outbreak or people dying from other
communicable diseases.”¹⁴¹²

15.4 August: The Blockade (Day 34 – 64)

The already dangerous position humanitarians were facing within Ethiopia was made
even worse in early August when Abiy Ahmed’s Government accused humanitarians
of supporting the TPLF.¹⁴¹³ The UN SG Antonio Guterres, condemned these
accusations, saying they were “dangerous.” Similar calls were made in a press
conference by Martin Griffiths – Mark Lowcock’s successor as the UN’s senior aid co
ordinator – following this first mission to Ethiopia. Martin Griffiths said, “Blanket
accusations of humanitarian aid workers need to stop,” he continued “They are
unfair, they are unconstructive, they need to be backed up by evidence if there is any
and, frankly, it’s dangerous.”¹⁴¹⁴ On the perilous journey through inhospitable terrain
from Semera to Mekelle, humanitarians have been “interrogated, intimidated and in
some instances detained” reported the UN.¹⁴¹⁵

During the first week of August more than 175 trucks arrived in Mekelle, a drastic
increase on the previous month. These trucks had been held in Semera for weeks,
and two trucks were attacked and looted by civilians at a checkpoint in Afar.¹⁴¹⁶
While the delivery of aid was welcomed by the international community, it was still
nowhere near the 100 trucks a day required. To many, this was considered too little
and too late. On 4 August, Samantha Power, USAID’s Administrator, told the press,
“I visited a local staging centre for USAID’s food aid not far from the capital.
Warehouses were full of wheat and lentils and split peas and trucks lay idle in the
mud because deliveries had been backed up for weeks due to ongoing blockades. In
my conversation with the Minister of Peace just now, I stressed these values, called
yet again for a cessation of hostilities and unfettered humanitarian access, and
reiterated the United States’ care and concern for the people of Ethiopia, no matter
their identity or affiliation.”¹⁴¹⁷

Despite calls for unfettered access and increased international attention, the
situation for humanitarians and those they were trying to support continued to
deteriorate. On 4 August, the Dutch branch of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and
the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) were expelled for three months.¹⁴¹⁸ The Ethiopian

Government released a statement saying that both MSF and NRC were “disseminating misinformation in social media and other platforms outside of the mandate and purpose for which the organisations were permitted to operate.”¹⁴¹⁹ Jan Egeland , NRC’s chief had been vocal on twitter, warning about thedire situation within Tigray. A tweet in February stated: “No more whitewashing: Aid is still NOT reaching civilians in desperate need in Ethiopia’s Tigray”. The Ethiopian Government later accused MSF of illegally importing communications equipment and both companies [organisations] of not gaining the correct work permits.¹⁴²⁰

The expulsion of humanitarians from the region draws startling parallels to the 1984
famine, when MSF was also expelled for revealing that conflict was the key driver of
the famine.¹⁴²¹ The MSF clinic in Sheraro closed on 8 August. The clinic had been
treating 70 emergency cases per day.¹⁴²² Despite this reduction in services, the UN
reported that 29 mobile health teams continued to work tirelessly to reach over
50,000 people at 72 health facilities and 47 of the IDP camps.¹⁴²³ While this was not
enough to tackle the growing needs, it was an impressive feat considering the
mounting challenges and risks the humanitarian actors were facing in the region.
The Government of Ethiopia has made other worrying claims which place
humanitarians at greater risk. For example, the unsubstantiated claim that
humanitarians were arming the TDF,¹⁴²⁴ and that WFP trucks were being used to
transport both fighters and arms.

On 9 August, the WFP stated that “severe shortages of food, cash, fuel and
functioning telecommunications equipment mean that WFP has only reached half of
the people it planned to assist, including communities on the verge of famine”.¹⁴²⁵
Due to a lack of cash several humanitarian partners within Tigray were operating in
debt and facing a halt in services if cash is not allowed to be brought into the
region.¹⁴²⁶

A review of regional food production predicted that the upcoming harvest
(September-November) may do little to improve food security in Tigray. Only 25-50%

of land in surveyed areas has been planted.¹⁴²⁷ Considering that more than 80% of
the 2020 harvest was destroyed, and that 80% of the population relies on local food
production for their main source of food, the UN warned that a small harvest could
have catastrophic effects. Despite the threats associated with farming within a region
with sporadic violence, research has shown the resilience of Tigrayan farmers, who
have come together to plant crops across Tigray.¹⁴²⁸ Where planting was possible,
this was mainly short cycle crops, rather than high yielding long cycle crops, as the
planting season was missed for the latter.¹⁴²⁹ Using community knowledge, farmers
planted fast-growing cereals which require minimal management – with less
management, there is less need to be tending to the farms and encountering
soldiers. While Maize is often grown in years with high food insecurity because it is
lean and directly consumable, research by Mekelle University and the University of
Ghent found that little Maize was grown, as the window for planting it had been
missed. They also reiterated claims by aid agencies that a large amount of
agricultural land has been left fallow.¹⁴³⁰ With no food stocks from the previous
harvest to tie families over, only a trickle of food aid entering the region due to the
blockade, and banking closures preventing families accessing savings or
remittances, the outlook for food security was looking bleak. The Famine Early
Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) have predicted that there will be need for
critical food aid will last well into the next year.¹⁴³¹ The discovery of desert locusts in
at least 14 woredas within Tigray threatens the harvest further.¹⁴³²

It’s clear that the humanitarian response is a painstaking task. From 15 July – 15
August, only 318 trucks with humanitarian supplies entered Tigray.¹⁴³³ This is only
7% of the aid needed since the ceasefire began. There is nowhere near enough
humanitarian aid for those in need. Humanitarian reports speak of the difficult
“prioritisation exercise;” they are having to decide where to prioritise with the
lifesaving aid.¹⁴³⁴

Even those who previously were financially secure are struggling. With no
commercial supplies entering the region, banking closures and limited aid, prices at
markets rose considerably during July.¹⁴³⁵ Many employees have not been paid
since the beginning of the war, including 27,516 displaced civil servants from
western and southern Tigray.¹⁴³⁶ According to the TPLF, since June, over 709,000
people who work at federal institutions and universities, civil servants and private
sector employees as well as retirees were not paid their salaries or pensions.¹⁴³⁷ By
August, purchasing power was significantly reduced. This was coupled with inflation
of household goods and food items. For example, the price of vegetable oil in
markets had increased 5 times compared to the price at the end of June, from 300
birr per litre (US$6.5) to 1,500 birr (US$32.5).¹⁴³⁸

50 days after the ceasefire (17 August)

Although the ceasefire was said to be in place till the end of the planting season, it
became evident that not all the troops had withdrawn. Fano militia and Amhara
regional forces remained in control of much of western Tigray, with increasing
reports of ethnic cleansing, concentration camp style detention centres, and mass
executions on the banks of the Tekezé river.¹⁴³⁹ Despite assurances from the
Ethiopian Government, UN officials were adamant that neither the UN, nor its
agencies had seen proof of the withdrawal of Eritrean troops. Instead, Mark Lowcock
told the UN Security Council that they had received reports that the Eritrean soldiers
were caught swapping into ENDF uniforms. While some claim that Eritrean soldiers
never properly left, by the end of August internal EU memorandums and US
statements outlined that there were signs that Eritrean forces were re-entering
Tigray, taking up defensive positions in the contested region of western Tigray.¹⁴⁴⁰

By mid-August, the conflict continued to widen. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)
had come out in support of the TPLF, forming an alliance with them.¹⁴⁴¹ The spread
of the conflict into neighbouring regions of Amhara and Afar continued to increase
humanitarian needs on the ground and create new grievances. The Government of
Ethiopia have said that the insecurity caused by the TDF advance into neighbouring
regions was causing the delays in aid entering Tigray. Although the Ethiopian

Government claimed to be assisting with the relief effort, the Tigrayans reported that
66% of aid delivery was carried out by USAID, 25% by WFP and the remaining 9%
by non-Governmental Organisations.¹⁴⁴² Both parties to the conflict blame the other
for the severe access delays. Humanitarians have reported that the “primary
obstacle is the Government.” A senior USAID official told the Associated Press,
“what we are seeing is (aid) convoys being turned around at checkpoints manned by
Ethiopian soldiers or their proxies.”¹⁴⁴³

On the only viable route into the region via Semera, under the Ethiopian
Government’s procedures, officials only had the capacity to scan 30 trucks a day.
This is less than 1/3 of the aid that was needed, daily. To frustrate the issue further,
from 13 – 17 August the scanner at the Silsa checkpoint broke, halting the movement
of aid and leaving 102 trucks without the authorisation to move.¹⁴⁴⁴ During a time
critical period, the delay of trucks due to scanners malfunctioning seems wholly
unacceptable. On 19 August, Samantha Power, the Administrator of USAID, stated
that there is a shortage of food “not because food is unavailable, but because the
Ethiopian government is obstructing humanitarian aid and personnel, including land
convoys and air access”.¹⁴⁴⁵

As well as logistical and bureaucratic delays, trucks have faced attacks from local
groups on routes from warehouses into Tigray.¹⁴⁴⁶ While all parties to the conflict
have been accused of looting aid since the start of the conflict, on 31 August,
USAID’s mission director Sean Jones told EBC that “several of our warehouses have
been looted and completely emptied in the areas, particularly in Amhara, where
TPLF soldiers have gone into.”¹⁴⁴⁷ At the same time there were reports of TDF
stealing food from neighbouring regions to send back to Tigray. For the first time
since the start of the conflict, humanitarian providers within Tigray had depleted their
food stocks entirely.¹⁴⁴⁸ Warehouses in Mekelle stood empty. Food distributions
halted.

Unfortunately, the toll of over 50 days of living under an aid blockade was becoming
more evident. Malnutrition in pregnant and breastfeeding women had reached
77%,¹⁴⁴⁹ while the number of children under 5-years old with Severe Acute
Malnutrition (SAM) had risen from 33,000 to 160,000 in just three months.¹⁴⁵⁰ To

make matters worse, these restrictions on humanitarian actors due to the lack of fuel
and cash means that many children and women would not have been screened;
thus, these figures likely reflected the tip of the iceberg. Between February and
August 2021, 18,600 children under five were admitted for treatment for SAM,
compared to 8,900 the previous year, reflecting an 100% increase in SAM.¹⁴⁵¹

By mid-August there were 458 UN staff from 10 UN Agencies operating in Tigray, as
well as 35 NGOs.¹⁴⁵² For example, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
has coordinated 33 national and international NGOs, including two UN Agencies to
provide shelter and non-food items, including blankets, to the 2.1 million IDPs within
Tigray, who are spread across 116 IDP sites.¹⁴⁵³ On the 26 August, WHO managed
to get emergency health kits into Tigray to 14 hospitals, enough for 300,000 people
for three months as well as 136 cholera investigation kits for 116 hotspots to
strengthen Cholera management.¹⁴⁵⁴ This was a small breakthrough considering the
Government has prevented medical supplies from entering the region.

By the end of August, the precarious situation for humanitarians was yet again made
clear when reports of additional atrocities surfaced. Between January and June, 11
aid workers from the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) were murdered while delivering
aid. This took the total known number of humanitarian deaths in the field to 23.¹⁴⁵⁵

15.5 September: The Blockade Continues (Day 65 – 94)

Although conflict had continued throughout the ceasefire, with the planting season
drawing to a close, the fears of mounting violence were increasing. The Tigrayan
authorities had rejected the ceasefire from the start, outlining its unilateral nature and
providing their own demands for a negotiated ceasefire. A key objection was the
continued presence of Amhara forces within western Tigray.¹⁴⁵⁶ In September the
Tigray government warned of the existential nature of this conflict. The conflict had
become about more than the survival of a political group. In a statement, Debretsion
Gebremichael, former President of Tigray said, “We also would like to underscore
that our military engagement in areas outside Tigray is not an act of aggression but a
last-ditch attempt at breaking the aforementioned siege, which has caused
catastrophic famine, as well as to stave off another round of brutal invasions once
our adversaries have regrouped and rearmed themselves.”¹⁴⁵⁷

By September, less than 10% of the required humanitarian aid, 2.2% of the cash,
and 28% of the fuel had reached Tigray.¹⁴⁵⁸ From 12 July – 1 September, only
282,000 litres of fuel had entered Tigray.¹⁴⁵⁹ However the UN needed 200,000 litres
every week to maintain its relief effort within the country. Without fuel, humanitarian
vehicles cannot move around, essential information cannot be collected, water
pumps cannot work, generators in hospitals have to be turned off, medical teams
cannot reach those outside the cities. The price of the remaining fuel within Tigray
had increased by 185% compared to the end of June.¹⁴⁶⁰ The repeated denial of
permissions to move fuel into the region and prohibition of telecommunication
equipment and generators has hampered the aid effort, leaving people without food,
water, healthcare, or sanitation.¹⁴⁶¹

Food supplies within Tigray ran out on 20 August, despite over 172 trucks sitting idle
in Semera, and more trucks held up in Djibouti, Adama and Kombolcha due to
administration delays.¹⁴⁶² Aid agencies had to significantly scale back their response
or cease operations altogether. By the start of September, it was estimated that 90%
of the population of Tigray urgently needed humanitarian assistance.¹⁴⁶³ Fears were
mounting over the low agricultural yields and the sustained impact on food security.
Although earlier predictions said that 25-50% of the harvest would be available, a
more pessimistic review found that of the 1.3 million hectares of farmland, only
320,000 hectares had been cultivated.¹⁴⁶⁴ This would produce a maximum of 13% of
the normal harvest. To make matters worse, sightings of desert locusts had been
seen in at least 19 woredas across Tigray, as well as parts of Afar and Amhara.¹⁴⁶⁵

Starvation deaths were being reported in every district of Tigray.¹⁴⁶⁶ One aid group
told the Associated Press that without an urgent solution, many lives will be lost to
hunger. They had run out of fuel and food. The same aid group wrote to donors back
in April, noting that “People’s skin colour was beginning to change due to hunger;
they looked emaciated with protruding skeletal bones.” Using data from the World
Food Programme, the IPC, USAID, and population statistics, a group of researchers
from the University of Ghent estimated that between 425 and 1201 people could be
dying per day from starvation, or starvation related deaths.¹⁴⁶⁷ Although these deaths
may not be from bullets or battlefields, they are directly related to this conflict. This
famine is human made.

In a rare video clip from the region, a videographer speaks to women in Woreda
Slowa, Dela City.¹⁴⁶⁸ The deprivation of food is evident. An elderly mother tells the
videographer: “I spend my days sleeping. Even to speak to you now I am so tired.
Those who used to help us are no longer here. Farmers have nothing, they are also
in distress, so I have nothing, I have nothing. There is no breakfast, no dinner. Come
into the house and see, there is nothing to eat in the house.” Another woman says,
“We have nothing, nothing. There is nothing. We just pray that the government and
God may bring some kind of solution. I don’t know.” The narrator sounds
exasperated, he continues to say that, “Extraordinarily, people are competing with
animals to consume the vegetation in the area to sustain their life. Now, that is also
quickly dwindling.”¹⁴⁶⁹

On 7 September, 147 trucks arrived in Tigray, bringing the total to 482 trucks since
the 12 July. While the World Food Programme welcomed this arrival, Michael
Dunford, Regional Director for Eastern Africa, said “But much more is needed, and
this momentum must be sustained otherwise we cannot hope to deliver enough food
to save millions from falling deeper into hunger”.¹⁴⁷⁰ Scholars have calculated that
based on the amount of aid that has entered the region, people within Tigray are
surviving on 40g of food per person daily.¹⁴⁷¹ This is an estimated 17.2% of their
caloric needs,¹⁴⁷² and the equivalent to a small handful of rice. However, this figure
might be optimistic for some, as the food aid has not been equally distributed across
the region due to access restrictions, the fluid security situation and fuel shortages.

Healthcare

According to doctors working in the region, the situation in hospitals was critical.
Responding to the needs on the ground was being obstructed by the lack of fuel for
ambulances, essential medicines, vaccines and hospital equipment, electricity for
medical machinery and food to feed patients. One Doctor told reporters that
Surgeons were having to use one medical glove during operations, due to low
stocks.¹⁴⁷³ After a visit to Tigray, Martin Griffith warned of the lack of medical
supplies.¹⁴⁷⁴ He described the bare hospital and medical facilities, which had been
looted, vandalised and destroyed during the first phase of the war.¹⁴⁷⁵ In an interview
with Al Jazeera, Dr Sentayhu said, “We don’t know how many people are dying
across the region from malnutrition. We are disconnected with the health centres due

to the telecommunications blackout. We could only know about patients who
managed to arrive here. Only a few can make it.”¹⁴⁷⁶ Dr Abrha noted that with no
change, nutritional treatment would soon have to be suspended as “The stock of
therapeutic milk [for children] will run out in three weeks.”¹⁴⁷⁷

In other hospitals, the food had already run out. Dr Hayelom Kebede at Ayder
Hospital in Mekelle told AFP that, “We used to supply nutrients for these children, but
now we have run out of medicine, and we have run out of any food stock, so we
couldn’t support them.” He continued, “It’s a silent killing. People are just dying…
With starvation, the bad thing is you will see people in the throes of death, but they
will not die immediately… It takes time, after their body is weakened and weakened
and weakened. It’s more horrific than bullet deaths.”¹⁴⁷⁸ Even doctors and Nurses
who have worked throughout the conflict are surviving on a handful of roasted barley
each day, as they have been unable to access their salaries due to the suspension
of banking services. Their own children are malnourished.

While medical supplies were continually denied entry overland,¹⁴⁷⁹ in rare, good
news on 10 September, the largest shipment of medical equipment was airlifted to
Ethiopia from WHO’s logistics hub in Dubai. This included 83 metric tons of life
saving medical supplies including “essential medicines, trauma and emergency
surgery kits, infusions, consumables, equipment, and cholera kits” the UN said. This
shipment would be enough to support 150,000 people’s urgent needs.¹⁴⁸⁰ While a
major step forward for medical aid deliveries, the WHO estimated that 2.5 million
people were in need of health assistance. This shipment was enough to support just
16% of those in need. WHO’s Representative in Ethiopia Dr Boureima Hama Sambo
welcomed the delivery stating that, “This delivery will help bolster our efforts to
provide relief to hundreds of thousands of families who are grappling with a difficult
humanitarian situation”.¹⁴⁸¹ At the same time, OCHA reported that lack of fuel and
medical supplies meant that 2.3 million people could no longer receive medical
support, while 1.5 million people were not vaccinated against diseases such as
measles, polio and COVID-19.¹⁴⁸²

The risk of disease outbreak was particularly acute in IDP camps, where Water
Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) facilities could not be constructed or maintained due
to resource shortages.¹⁴⁸³ An aid worker told the Associated Press that “toilets in the
crowded camps are overflowing because there’s no cash to pay for their cleaning,

leaving thousands of people vulnerable to outbreaks of disease”.¹⁴⁸⁴ Life for IDPs
was getting drastically worse, as shortages in resources, cash, firewood, cooking
energy and water, as well as food and sanitation were being reported from IDP
camps.¹⁴⁸⁵ Unfortunately, this was leading to some worrying stories of people using
‘negative coping strategies’, including a rise in the number of children begging and
recruitment of child labour, as well as reports of survival sex – where sex is traded for
commodities.¹⁴⁸⁶

75 days since the ceasefire (11 September)

The humanitarian community began voicing increasing concerns over the
militarisation of the key aid supply routes into Tigray. On 11 September, 75 days
after the ceasefire and de facto blockade began, Michelle Bachelet updated the UN
Human Rights Council on the situation in Tigray, she reported on “multiple and
severe reports of alleged gross violations of human rights, humanitarian and refugee
law”.¹⁴⁸⁷ While the full findings of the investigation were still being analysed, she
confirmed that “incitement to hatred and discrimination were also documented
targeting people of Tigrayan ethnicity, as well as attacks on journalists and the
suspension of media outlets’ licenses and shutdowns of Internet and
telecommunications in Tigray.”¹⁴⁸⁸

The Ethiopian Penal Code (2004), notably article 270(i) “War Crimes Against the
Civilian Population” declares enforced starvation a crime. It makes illegal: “the
confiscation, destruction, removal, rendering useless or appropriation of property
such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops,
livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, health
centres, schools.”¹⁴⁸⁹ Yet the joint investigation made no reference to starvation
crimes, or the War Crime of Starvation. At present, starvation might be the most
prolific, widespread and systematic of the crimes committed during this year-long
conflict. Interestingly, neither Michelle Bachelet or Mr Daniel Bekele, head of the
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), referred to starvation crimes, or
mentioned the inclusion of starvation crimes within the remit of the investigation
during their addresses to the Human Rights Council. For those concerned with the
deliberate destruction of food systems within Tigray, and accountability for the War
Crime of Starvation, this was greatly concerning.¹⁴⁹⁰

Over 75 days after the ceasefire was announced for ‘humanitarian’ grounds, the flow
of humanitarian aid into the region continued to be obstructed and delayed. By 16
September, 10 new checkpoints had been set up on the route between Kombolcha,
where the humanitarian cargo hub is located, and Semera.¹⁴⁹¹ In direct contradiction
to reports from the ground, Abiy Ahmed’s spokesperson Billene Seyoum released a
statement stating that the Government had “opened access to aid routes by cutting
the number of checkpoints from seven to two and creating air bridges for
humanitarian flights”.¹⁴⁹² By 15 September, 12 UNHAS flights had operated and one
EU Humanitarian Air Bridge flight.¹⁴⁹³ However, they also faced significant
bureaucratic challenges and rigorous checks on both departure and arrival. A
number of the flights were delayed by days and humanitarians provided with an
ever-expanding list of contraband items. Medical supplies were removed from the
EU’s plane during inspections in Addis Ababa.¹⁴⁹⁴ Personnel could not take a range
of items, from personal medicines or multivitamins, flash drives and hard drives, to
items including can openers and dental floss.¹⁴⁹⁵ Aid workers phones are checked
on the way in and out of the region to ensure that there are no pictures on them
when they leave. This high level of control over the information coming in and out of
the region is a sign that Abiy does not want the world to see what is happening. This
paralleled the prohibition on independent journalists (local and international) visiting
and reporting from the war zone. As a result, there has been a reduction in the
number of photos and videos on social media since June, as aid workers are
concerned that authorities will catch them with images on their devices.¹⁴⁹⁶ Abiy’s
Government is working hard to silence Tigray. On 30 September UNHAS flight, more
than half of the humanitarian staff were refused to board the plane due to the
requirement of new documentation from the Ministry of Peace.¹⁴⁹⁷ This echoed
earlier claims that the Ethiopian Government was obstructing the relief effort.

There has been further evidence that rather than facilitating aid delivery, the
Ethiopian Government seeks to frustrate the relief effort. While one of the bridges
over the Tekezé river that was destroyed during the ENDF retreat remained largely
inoperable, after the TDF re-gained control of May Tsebri, they had been repairing
the Imbamadre bridge. On 21 September it became operational for vehicles.
Although this gave humanitarians an extra route into the region, it has remained
largely unused due to access restrictions imposed by the Government.¹⁴⁹⁸ With the
needs on the ground not only increasingly daily, but exceeding the daily approved
caseloads into the region, the lack of movement of trucks cannot be viewed as
anything other than an attempt to starve the region.

Shortages in fuel, trucks and cash

On 17 September, the final WFP fuel tanker in Mekelle was totally depleted. This
tanker was supporting a range of humanitarian organisations within Tigray, making
those outside the cities more isolated and the growing needs immeasurable. Lack of
fuel at the airport has impacted the running of the UNHAS flights, and hospitals have
had to turn off generators. Since the TDF took back Tigray, some of the larger towns
have had intermittent electricity, provided by the Hydropower Dam on the
Tekezé.¹⁴⁹⁹ However intermittent electricity in hospitals has meant that even simple
procedures can be life-threatening. The shortage of fuel has prevented the creation,
renovation, and repair of IDP camps within Tigray.¹⁵⁰⁰ At the same time, nine tankers
of fuel sat idle in Semera, pending Government authorisation for them to move into
Tigray.¹⁵⁰¹

From 12 July – 23 September, of the 445 trucks which entered the region, only 38 returned.¹⁵⁰² All sides to the conflict agree that the shortage of trucks is hampering the flow of aid; however, the narrative differs. The Government of Ethiopia claimed that the TDF have requisitioned the trucks and are using them to transport fighters (unconfirmed claims). UN officials on the ground have clearly cited the lack of fuel and harassment of drivers as reasons for the trucks non-return. Multiple aid convoys have been targeted by pro Government militias before reaching Tigray, their contents looted and drivers
assaulted.¹⁵⁰³ In some cases, drivers were held hostage for several days. However, the Ethiopian Government’s National Disaster Risk Management
Commissioner, Mitiku Kassa, rejects claims that the lack of fuel is responsible for increasing hardship. Ethiopia’s mission to the UN in New York said that, “any claim on the existence of blockade is baseless,” suggesting instead that aid agencies “faced shortage in trucks as a result of the non-return of almost all trucks that travelled to Tigray to deliver aid.”¹⁵⁰⁴

The situation remains critical. The shortage of trucks is limiting the amount of aid
which can enter the region, while the fuel blockade is preventing the aid that has

made it into Tigray from being distributed. In a statement the Tigrayan authorities
voiced their frustration, “truck drivers are provided with fuel that’s only [enough] for a
one-way trip to Tigray. They are not provided [with] reserve fuel [to return] that is
customary on such trips.”¹⁵⁰⁵ This claim was reiterated in meetings with UN and aid
personnel within Tigray, who confirmed that truck drivers were only given enough
fuel for a one-way trip and banned from carrying cash. This prevented drivers from
purchasing more fuel for the return trip. The agencies reported that due to “the
limitation of cash and the added difficulties in finding fuel… it is highly challenging for
the trucks to return from Mekelle.”¹⁵⁰⁶

Those with the fuel to return risk intimidation, harassment, and detention. The UN
reported that drivers, many of which are ethnic Tigrayans, cited a number of reasons
for non-return, including, “fear for their security as they were subjected to beating,
harassment, intimidation and theft on the route from Semera to Mekelle.”¹⁵⁰⁷ Even
UN officials had reported been harassment and abuse by Afar armed police. In
September at least two separate convoys were shot at, with the Tigrayan drivers
arrested.¹⁵⁰⁸ Whether trucks are not returning due to security concerns or lack of
fuel, these are man-made reasons, and they are preventing life-saving aid reaching
those in Tigray.

OCHA estimates to sustain humanitarian operations, the relief effort requires
US$6.5mn every week. This could be achieved if more cash was permitted to enter
the region, or by resuming banking services.¹⁵⁰⁹ However, by 23 September, less
than 5% of the required weekly money had entered the region. In Mekelle, residents
are only allowed to withdraw 1,000 birr per month. This is the equivalent of US$22.
However, with the inflation of food and household commodities, this is not
sustainable. “Economic activities are stuck,” Micheal Gebreyesus, a 36-year-old
resident of Mekelle, told Al Jazeera. “Teff (essential grain to bake injera) is 6,000 birr
(US$130.43) per quintal (220 pounds). Cooking oil is 700 (US$15) birr and that is if
you are lucky to get it in the market. Essential vegetables like tomato and onion are
100 birr (US$2.17) per kilo.”¹⁵¹⁰ This has had a severe impact on the ability for
Tigrayans to support each other. Tesfay Gebretsadik, who had fled to Mekelle from
Humera in western Tigray, told Al Jazeera that “Up until the siege, we were in a
relatively better condition because the residents of Mekelle used to bring us food,” he
continued, “After the siege, all donations stopped. The inflation, and everything gets
heavy. Residents are focused on saving their own life.”¹⁵¹¹ By the end of September
the prices in Mekelle and Shire had continued to soar, with cooking oil price

increased by 433%, salt by 567%, rice by 167%, teff by 90%,¹⁵¹² and fuel fluctuating
between 200%-2,300%.¹⁵¹³

OCHA¹⁵¹⁴

Sanctions

By September, the US had only placed sanctions on one Eritrean military leader,
General Filipos Woldeyohannes (Filipos), under their Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act, in August.¹⁵¹⁵ However, on 17 September President Biden
signed an Executive Order allowing the US Government to sanction those preventing
the delivery of aid, in a bid to get the parties to the conflict to the negotiating
table.¹⁵¹⁶ While no names were officially added, the US Government indicated that it
is monitoring the situation closely.¹⁵¹⁷ The US Government said that sanctions could
be avoided if parties to the conflict took clear and concrete steps towards a ceasefire
and ensuring the delivery of aid. The White House indicated that this could
include: “accepting African Union-led mediation efforts, designating a negotiations
team, agreeing to negotiations without preconditions, and accepting an invitation to
initial talks.” Steps towards ensuring humanitarian access could involve: “authorizing

daily convoys of trucks carrying humanitarian supplies to travel overland to reach at
risk populations; reducing delays for humanitarian convoys; and restoring basic
services such as electricity, telecommunications, and financial services.”¹⁵¹⁸ While
the TDF spokesperson Getachew Reda supported Biden’s attempts to start a
negotiation process,¹⁵¹⁹ President Abiy Ahmed responded through an open
letter published on Twitter.¹⁵²⁰ His anger at the latest development was visible, as he
compared the Tigray conflict to the US’ War on Terror and criticised the international
community for misrepresenting the situation on the ground.¹⁵²¹

As the month of September progressed, the rise in dehumanising language and
patriotic rhetoric had become increasingly worrying. The zero-sum language leaves
little room for grievance resolution or negotiations. Another statement by the former
President of Tigray, Debrestion Gebremichael reinforced earlier beliefs that they are
fighting for their existence: “This can be resolved peacefully. The political issue too
can be dealt with politically. But this is not like that. It is genocide. Since it is
genocide, unless we are exterminated it won’t be resolved. But this won’t happen.
That’s why we have to be strong and destroy their forces. We have to make him
yield. If it gets to that point, then it means it has ended. When we get near [to that
point] he may accept peace and negotiation. If so, that’s good too. We won’t insist on
destroying them all. It is genocide that they want; we have to show them that
[carrying out] genocide is not possible.”¹⁵²²

On 23 September, The House of Representatives in the USA passed a bill that
would require Secretary of State Antony Blinken to determine whether the
humanitarian crisis in Tigray amounts to genocide, but the senior administration
official indicated that the State Department has already initiated the review, which
had not been published as 2021 drew to a close.¹⁵²³

The deterioration in food security

According to USAID, the reality in June was far worse than the IPC predictions.
USAID suggests that almost 1 million people were facing famine conditions (IPC
Level 5) and 5 million were suffering from ‘emergency’ levels of food security (IPC
Level 4).¹⁵²⁴ USAID’s findings are corroborated by reports within the region, which
paint a grim picture of life in Tigray. A group from Mekelle University wrote to the UN
on 27 September, warning that the situation was a “man-made form of famine that

belittles the 1984 famine in its severity”.¹⁵²⁵ In late September, Martin Griffiths raised
fears that the situation “is likely to get far worse before it gets better” noting that
desert locusts, low yielding harvests, lack of humanitarian aid and spreading conflict,
posed a threat to food security in the north of Ethiopia.¹⁵²⁶

By 30 September, just 606 trucks had arrived since 12 July, 11% of the required
aid.¹⁵²⁷ Within these deliveries, there was one week’s supply of fuel, no medical
supplies, and enough food to feed 360,000 people for one month, just 6% of the
population. For many, food baskets which are meant to last six weeks were delivered
once in five months.¹⁵²⁸ At least 38% of the population had received food aid just
once since the conflict began. This is much lower than the caloric needs.¹⁵²⁹ To feed
the 5.2 million people in need of food assistance, in a 6-week food cycle, 870,000
people must be reached each week. However, between 23-29 September, due to
lack of food, fuel, and cash, only 260,000 people received food aid.¹⁵³⁰ Considering
the challenges that the aid agencies face, this should be hailed as a success.
Considering that the challenges are man-made and can be removed by an act of
government, this should also be seen as a tragedy.

As a result, by the end of September, Tigray was facing unprecedented levels of
malnutrition, exceeding the global emergency threshold of 15% Moderate Acute
Malnutrition (MAM) and 2% SAM for children under five.¹⁵³¹ Of those screened, 30%
of children under 5-years and 80% of pregnant and breastfeeding women were
malnourished.¹⁵³² Aid agencies fear that this is just the tip of iceberg, as not all areas
were accessible to aid agencies due to fuel shortages. Girmanesh Meles, a 30-year
old mother, told Al Jazeera that since food ran out in August, she has gone days
without eating. She was unable to breastfeed Haftom, her 18-month-old child. ¹⁵³³
Even medical staff in hospitals in Mekelle have been skipping meals, while patients
are dying from preventable deaths. “No matter what we do, their wounds don’t heal.
They get infected. In the end, you see patients dying. In the past, these were
patients one took for granted. Their operations were simple, of course they would
survive,” Dr Sinatayehu explained to the Associated Press. He continued, “Now we
are doomed to fail in whatever we do. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of Mekelle are
lucky. In the villages, the situation is far worse.”¹⁵³⁴

With convoys of trucks pending authorisation, fuel tankers poised and enough aid in
the country to prevent famine, the frustration among humanitarians and UN Officials
was mounting. In an interview with Reuters on 28 September, the UN’s senior aid
co-ordinator, Martin Griffiths warned of impending famine should aid not get through
the blockade, stating that Tigray would become a “stain on our conscience”.¹⁵³⁵
When asked what was needed, he replied “Get those trucks moving”. He continued,
“This is man-made, this can be remedied by the act of government”.¹⁵³⁶ His words
were clear… people are starving to death under the de-facto Government blockade
on food, medical supplies and fuel.¹⁵³⁷ In a similar interview with the Associated
Press, Martin Griffiths also mentioned the unacceptable allegations made against
humanitarians, calling for the Ethiopian Government to provide evidence of
misconduct so that a proper investigation by the UN could occur. However, on this
he noted that “so far as I’m aware, we haven’t had such cases put to us.”¹⁵³⁸ The
Ethiopian Government rejected his claims, stating that there was no blockade and
instead repeated their stance that the lack of trucks returning from Tigray was
holding up the aid effort.¹⁵³⁹

On 30 September, seven high-level UN humanitarian officials were given 72 hours to
leave the country.¹⁵⁴⁰ Amongst those expelled were officials leading the
humanitarian response and documenting ongoing human rights abuses. The
Ethiopian Government accused them of “meddling in the internal affairs of the
country” and claimed to have warned the UN previously of their misdemeanours.¹⁵⁴¹
The Ethiopian Government stated their belief this would not impact the aid effort and
accused the international community of downplaying the TPLF’s violent advance.¹⁵⁴²
Among the complaints, the Ethiopian Government accused the individuals of several
violations of the professional code of conduct, including:

• Diversion of humanitarian assistance to the TPLF;
• Violating agreed-upon security arrangements;
• Transferring communication equipment to be used by the TPLF;
• Continued reticence in demanding the return of more than 400 trucks
  commandeered by the TPLF for military mobilisation and for the transportation of
  its forces since July 2021; and
• Dissemination of misinformation and politicisation of humanitarian assistance.¹⁵⁴³

Many have speculated that this action was a reaction to Martin Griffiths remarks just
days earlier.¹⁵⁴⁴ This led to an emergency UN Security Council meeting on 1October.

15.6 October: The Blockade Tightens (Day 65 – 94)

On 1 October, following the expulsion of UN humanitarian officials, an emergency
meeting was held at the UNSC. This was the ninth time the UNSC has met to
discuss the crisis in Ethiopia. This led to an interesting interaction between the
Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and Ethiopia’s Ambassador to the UN. The
Secretary-General outlined how ‘persona non grata’ does not apply to UN staff and
that this act was a breach of Ethiopia’s commitment to the UN Charter.¹⁵⁴⁵ He
continued to state that Ethiopia had no legal right to expel the seven UN officials and
that this act breached the UN’s grievance mechanisms. When the Ambassador for
Ethiopia outlined how they had warned the UN many times about these individuals,
Secretary-General Guterres responded that he had not been made aware of the
issues and demanded that evidence be provided of the individuals’
transgressions.¹⁵⁴⁶ The Secretary-General reaffirmed his “full confidence” that these
UN officials had acted with the core UN principles of “humanity, impartiality,
neutrality and independence.” ¹⁵⁴⁷ This bold dismissal of the Ethiopian Government’s
claim was a political statement by the UN Secretary-General.

The international community came out in support of the UN Secretary-General’s
position, including Human Rights Watch which said, “The expulsions reflect a
broader trend of government hostility toward aid agencies and obstruction of
humanitarian assistance in violation of international humanitarian law.”¹⁵⁴⁸
Additionally, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki conveyed that the US
Government “condemns in the strongest possible terms the government of Ethiopia’s
unprecedented action” and called upon the Security Council to consider placing
sanctions on Ethiopia and “to take urgent action to make clear to the government of
Ethiopia that impeding humanitarian operations and depriving your own citizens of
the basic means of survival is unacceptable.”¹⁵⁴⁹ These expulsions provide further
evidence that the Ethiopian Government does not want the international
humanitarian community operating in the region, or the crimes it is committing to be
seen.

Retirement has allowed Mark Lowcock, to be more candid with his views on the
conflict, and in an opinion piece he wrote: “Abiy has two objectives in Tigray. The
first is to starve the population either into subjugation or out of existence. The second
is to do that without attracting the global opprobrium that would still, even in today’s

fractured geopolitical environment, arise from deliberately causing a massive famine
taking millions of lives. It is also clear that the second objective is less important than
the first. That is the message to be taken from the threatened expulsion last week of
UN humanitarian leaders from Ethiopia. Abiy would rather take the criticism for that
than allow them to see what he is trying to do.”¹⁵⁵⁰ In an interview with PBS he was
equally direct, telling the reporter that “There is not just an attempt to starve six
million people but an attempt to cover up what’s going on.”¹⁵⁵¹

Escalation of conflict

Despite attempts to bring the Ethiopian Federal Government and the TPLF to the
negotiating table – including through the withholding of budgetary aid,¹⁵⁵² and the
threat and preparation of sanctions by the US¹⁵⁵³ and EU¹⁵⁵⁴ – reports were
mounting of recent airstrikes,¹⁵⁵⁵ more clashes,¹⁵⁵⁶ new arms deals,¹⁵⁵⁷ and a surge
in recruitment.¹⁵⁵⁸ President Biden’s sanctions threat was bolstered by similar
cautions from the European Union. The European Parliament voted overwhelmingly
for a resolution in early October which would request sanctions to be placed on
those prolonging the conflict and contributing to humanitarian suffering if conditions
had not improved by the end of the month.¹⁵⁵⁹ Yet, during October the conflict
escalated further.¹⁵⁶⁰ The Government of Ethiopia had begun airstrikes on Mekelle,
supposedly targeting TPLF strategic sites, however in reality killing civilians including
children, while hitting close to hospitals, the university, crop fields, residential areas
and industrial complexes, including a tyre warehouse, which went up in flames.¹⁵⁶¹ It
appears civilians from across Ethiopia are heeding the calls of the leaders. Reporters
have witnessed new government-allied militias armed not with guns, but with hoes,
axes, and machetes, walking towards the front lines.¹⁵⁶²

As the TDF and allied OLA forces gained ground, taking control of Dessie and
Kombolcha, strategic sites in Amhara, there was increasing concern that the TPLF
would take over the capital. The march towards Addis has been reminiscent of the
TPLF advance a few decades earlier.¹⁵⁶³ According to sources within Ethiopia, the
TDF had enough firepower to take over the capital but were instead pushing for a
negotiated end.¹⁵⁶⁴ The TPLF spokesperson, Getachew Reda told Reuters that they
pledged to minimise causalities on their route to Addis Ababa, “We don’t intend to
shoot at civilians and we don’t want bloodshed. If possible, we would like the process
to be peaceful.”¹⁵⁶⁵ With the TPLF drawing nearer to Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian
Government began a new co-ordinated ground and air offensive.¹⁵⁶⁶ Abiy Ahmed’s
supporters have even been quoted calling this new wave of violence their “final
offensive”¹⁵⁶⁷ indicating the severity of the next wave of attack.

The TPLF remained adamant that their advance was to remove the chokehold on
the region, and to re-establish control over humanitarian supply lines. However, in
early October, ENDF and allied forces were positioned along the main routes into
Sudan and Djibouti which could have offered the TDF with cross-border supply
routes.¹⁵⁶⁸ Additionally the heavy presence of Eritrean soldiers along the Ethiopian
Sudanese border and along the Tekezé river has prevented additional humanitarian
corridors from being possible.¹⁵⁶⁹

During the TDF’s offensive, they too have been accused of atrocities, increasing the
complexity, humanitarian needs and the grievances within this war. The Tigrayans
deny targeting civilians. Instead, they blame Amhara officials “for mobilising people
on mass to fight against them”.¹⁵⁷⁰ However, looting of property, food and livestock,
the killing of civilians, rape and looting of humanitarian warehouses has been
reported in Afar and Amhara during their advance.¹⁵⁷¹ A father of five, Baye Girme,
told reporters that his family had been surviving on just potatoes after the TDF’s
invasion of their village. The TPLF “took the chicken, the goats, even the sheep,” he
said.¹⁵⁷² A lecturer in Amhara said that universities were destroyed, health centres
looted, and livestock slaughtered. “Why destroy the student record files? Why do

they kill animals?” He told the New Humanitarian, “Their plan is to create poverty in
Amhara.”¹⁵⁷³

While aid is available within Amhara and Afar, transporting this aid to those in need
has been hampered by continued insecurity.¹⁵⁷⁴ The TDF’s advance has widened
the relief response to most of northern Ethiopia. While some have criticised the TPLF
for their advance and its widening of the conflict to neighbouring regions, others have
outlined how if they had not, Tigray would have been starved to death, reflecting the
existential nature of this conflict.

100 days after the ceasefire

Sixth October marked 100 days since the start of the government blockade on the
region. In the week leading up to then, only 146,000 of the 870,000 people targeted
for food aid were reached, and due to lack of stocks, many households received
reduced rations.¹⁵⁷⁵ The spread of the conflict within Amhara and Afar has also
impacted local resilience, according to Michael Dunford, WFP’s Regional Director for
Eastern Africa, who reported that in all three regions “food insecurity is rising as
families flee from their homes and have their livelihoods destroyed”.¹⁵⁷⁶

The second EU Humanitarian Airbridge flight touched down on the 6 October,
carrying 10.6 metric tons of humanitarian supplies and 4.4 metric tons of ready-to
use therapeutic food for children.¹⁵⁷⁷ UNICEF distributed the nutritional supplements
to hospitals, but stressed that this was not enough to deal with the demand.¹⁵⁷⁸ In
early October, reports from hospitals were increasingly severe. The remaining
oxygen machine in Mekelle hospital broke, with no spare parts available to repair it.
There was a rise in preventable deaths from the lack of haemodialysis catheters and
an increase in women dying during childbirth from post-partum haemorrhages.¹⁵⁷⁹
Outside of Mekelle, hospitals had run out of therapeutic supplies for children with
SAM.¹⁵⁸⁰ Nearly 200,000 children had missed critical vaccinations¹⁵⁸¹ – something of
even more importance during a food crisis, when the immune system is less able to
fight off diseases. Nutrition partners were working at 20% capacity, unable to reach

many SAM and MAM children and mothers.¹⁵⁸² NGOs working to support the
healthcare services in the region had to scale back their operations due to no fuel,
supplies or cash, only reaching 13 health facilities in October compared to 125
health facilities in September.¹⁵⁸³

On 14 October, following significant pressure from the international community, fuel
tankers were authorised to enter the region. However, the celebrations were short
lived. The tankers were denied entry at the border checkpoint as they did not have a
specific letter from the Federal Police Commissioner in Addis Ababa.¹⁵⁸⁴ The trucks
returned to Semera, where 16 tankers of fuel sat idle.¹⁵⁸⁵ At the same time, 3/7 UN
food partners had ceased all distributions outside of Mekelle due to a lack of fuel.
The remaining 4 partners had only one week of fuel supply remaining. ¹⁵⁸⁶ Similarly,
UN Agencies delivering water had to temporarily suspend operations in Abi Adi,
Adigrat, Axum and Sheraro, while partner agencies reduced their response in Adwa,
Shire and Mekelle.¹⁵⁸⁷

While the UN repeatedly warns that 100 trucks of food, non-food items and fuel are
needed per day to prevent the monumental loss of life from hunger, between July –
18 October, only 15% of the humanitarian aid required within Tigray was allowed
through.¹⁵⁸⁸ Since 18 October, the Secretary-General’s office has reported no
movement of convoys with humanitarian supplies into the region.¹⁵⁸⁹ Worryingly,
OCHA calculated that between April and October 2021, the food aid that was
delivered comprised only 29% of the minimum calorific needs of the population.¹⁵⁹⁰
This shocking statistic paints a picture of the real situation on the ground.

OCHA, 18 October¹⁵⁹¹

Flights and Money

During October, new Government regulations meant that on average, each UNHAS
flight had 10-15 humanitarian workers refused to board because they did not
possess correct documentation from the Ministry of Peace.¹⁵⁹² New requirements
insisted that international staff working for international agencies held a resident ID
issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while those working for NGOs needed a
resident ID issued by the Immigration Authorities, temporary staff need different
documentation again, requiring approval and supporting letters from the Ministry of
Peace.¹⁵⁹³ The bureaucratic hoops get even more elaborate at each change in
policy. However, things took a turn for the worse on 22 October, when an UNHAS
flight was unable to land in Mekelle due to ongoing Government airstrikes.¹⁵⁹⁴ The
subsequent flights (intended to be bi-weekly) were suspended until further notice.¹⁵⁹⁵

The suspension of UNHAS flights is critical for the supply of cash to region. Between
16 October and the end of the month, no cash entered the region.¹⁵⁹⁶ The lack of
food entering the region and minimal harvests has led to market dependency and
inflation. In October in Mekelle, the price of sorghum was 70% higher than

average.¹⁵⁹⁷ However, financial difficulties were no longer restricted to Tigray. The
spread of conflict to neighbouring Afar and Amhara has also had impact on food
security by interrupting the harvest and farming. In Amhara, at Dessie market, the
price of maize and sorghum increased by 60-80% between July and late
September.¹⁵⁹⁸

Economic decline can be seen across the country, as the grip of war takes its toll on
neighbouring regions and the capital. The Ethiopian Government appealed for debt
cancellation from the G20 Common Framework for debt restructuring. This appeal
was rejected, and Moody’s credit agency downgraded Ethiopia’s rating to signal the
increased financial risk.¹⁵⁹⁹ The whole country is facing inflation, impacting ordinary
Ethiopians’ purchasing power and food security, even in areas where conflict is not
raging. This is increasingly concerning against the backdrop of new arms deals with
the UAE, Turkey, and Iran.¹⁶⁰⁰ Money that could be spent on development and food
security within the country is being directed to arms for the ongoing conflict.¹⁶⁰¹

As the threat of sanctions hadn’t brought the parties to the conflict to the negotiating
table, the US has tried to increase financial pressure. The US halted Ethiopia’s
membership of the African Growth and Opportunity Act in January 2022. This would
end its access to duty free imports, trade preferences and financial support which
would impact up to 100,000 Ethiopians working in the textile industry.¹⁶⁰² The AGOA
is linked to human rights compliance. For the US to revoke this decision, the
Ethiopian Government would need to end human rights abuses across the country.
The US followed through with this threat on the 23 December.¹⁶⁰³

The deterioration in food security

The blockade has prevented the reporting of timely and accurate data. As a result,
humanitarian operations are working with predictions. According to FEWSNET, by
14 October, most households were likely facing a minimum of ‘Emergency’ (IPC
Phase 4), or worse.¹⁶⁰⁴ By stifling information gathering and reporting, Abiy’s
Government have ensured that the real extent of malnutrition is unknown. This has
also meant that an official declaration of famine has not been made. Despite the lack
of designation, there is no doubt that Tigray is facing a human-made famine.

The reports which had emerged were not promising. Organisations working on
malnutrition in the region were reporting levels of SAM in children consistently above
the emergency threshold, while malnutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding
women has exceeded 60% over the past months, and sometimes reached 90%.¹⁶⁰⁵
For those that survive, malnutrition at this level will have repercussions including
physical and mental stunting in children, higher risks for mothers during childbirth
and more risks of children being born with complications. By the end of October,
doctors had reported at least 186 children under five had died in hospitals from
SAM.¹⁶⁰⁶ They reminded reporters that these children were just the tip of the iceberg,
as many children did not make it to the hospitals. The doctors condemned the
Ethiopian Government’s blockade on the region, calling it “collective punishment.”¹⁶⁰⁷

According to doctors, the blockade on medicines, lack of electricity and fuel, as well
as the damage to the healthcare facilities, had increased deaths from treatable
illnesses, including pneumonia and diarrhoea. In most places, treatments for HIV,
Cancer and Diabetes have been put on hold.¹⁶⁰⁸ Since the beginning of August, nine
trucks with medicines have been waiting for approval in Semera. Within the stranded
cargo are vital Polio and Measles vaccines. The lack of authorisation is increasing
the risk of the spread of preventable, treatable, and communicable diseases.¹⁶⁰⁹
More than 900,000 children needed urgent Polio vaccines and 800,000 children
need measles vaccines. Without this protection, an outbreak could occur.

At the same time as Abiy Ahmed hosted extravagant parties in Addis Ababa to
celebrate his inauguration – after a contentious election victory during a year of civil
unrest – at least two people were dying every minute from starvation in Tigray.¹⁶¹⁰

15.7 November: The Blockade and Famine (Day 126 – 155)

With the TPLF and OLA forces nearing Addis Ababa, Prime Minister Abiy’s
discontent and fear was increasingly evident. On the 2 November, the Ethiopian
Government declared a nationwide state of emergency.¹⁶¹¹ The state of emergency
grants more power to the Ethiopian Government, including restricting free assembly,
movement, and the media.¹⁶¹² It also grants the Ethiopia Government the power to
force citizens to undergo military training and accept military duty.¹⁶¹³ The Ethiopian
Human Rights Commission (EHRC) expressed its concern that these new measures

were being used to arrest people of Tigrayan ethnicity, following a wave of new
arrests across Addis Ababa.¹⁶¹⁴ This was denied by the Police Spokesperson,
Fasika Fante, who said that those detained were either directly or indirectly
supporting the TPLF.¹⁶¹⁵ Despite this, reports have emerged of the detention of
mothers with young children and the elderly, without a court order.¹⁶¹⁶

By 3 November, the TPLF and OLA announced that they had reached the town of
Kemise, just 325km from Addis Ababa. Ordinary citizens as well as old military
veterans were encouraged to buy and register weapons to help defend their
neighbourhoods.¹⁶¹⁷ In a Facebook post, Abiy stated that, “Our people should
march… with any weapon and resources they have to defend, repulse and bury the
terrorist TPLF.” The post was later removed from Facebook, as a spokesperson for
Meta said, “We were made aware of a post by Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and
removed this for violating our policies against inciting and supporting violence.”¹⁶¹⁸
He used similar rhetoric in a speech at the Ethiopian Military headquarters, where he
told forces that, “The pit which is dug will be very deep, it will be where the enemy is
buried, not where Ethiopia disintegrates… with our blood and bones and make the
glory of Ethiopia high again.”¹⁶¹⁹ The Ethiopian conflict looked set to expand into a
civil war, with ordinary citizens and other regional forces drawn into the fray. On 5
November, this was realised when the TPLF and OLA alliance was enlarged to nine
anti-government groups from across Ethiopia. Its aim is to remove Abiy’s
Government by either force or negotiation.¹⁶²⁰

The OHCHR-EHRC Investigation

On 25 March 2021, the UN Human Rights Council announced a joint investigation
between the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the
Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC).¹⁶²¹ Despite challenges and
criticisms,¹⁶²² on 3 November it released its report.

Many people within Tigray and the international community are concerned about the
independence of the investigation. In June, the former President of Tigray rejected

the announcement of the joint investigation, outlining fears of impartiality.¹⁶²³ The
EHRC is funded by the Ethiopian Government and has close ties to the Government
in Addis Ababa. The EHRC is accountable to the Ethiopian Government’s House of
People’s Representatives, from which the Tigrayan representatives have been
excluded.¹⁶²⁴ Additional claims have been made that the EHRC does not have the
institutional capacity, ¹⁶²⁵ nor the trust from Tigrayans,¹⁶²⁶ to carry out an
independent investigation. Further reports have emerged that the EHRC has cleared
some its findings with the Government of Ethiopia,¹⁶²⁷ questioning their
independence. Additionally, one staff member representing the OHCHR within the
investigative team was among those expelled by the Ethiopian government at the
end of September for ‘meddling in internal affairs.’¹⁶²⁸

The investigative team were unable to reach many of the sites of the most violent
massacres, including Axum.¹⁶²⁹ The reasons for these access restrictions were not
clearly explained within the report or publicly leading commentators to criticise the
Ethiopian Government for curating the investigation and limiting its scope.¹⁶³⁰
Although there were credible reports of the systematic and widespread use of
starvation crimes within the conflict,¹⁶³¹ as aforementioned, the report’s mandate did
not cover Starvation Crimes. One of the most prolific and ongoing atrocities in the
region was not investigated.

While the report did not look at starvation crimes per se, the report did make findings
which relate to the ‘elements’ of the War Crime of Starvation.¹⁶³² Global Rights
Compliance, a group of international lawyers who work on accountability for
starvation crimes, identified the following findings as relevant to starvation crimes:

• The Eritrean Defence Force (EDF) looted public and private property, including
  objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population in southern Tigray,
  including Keih Emba, Samre, Adi Gibai, Adi Awsa, Bora, and Wukro in eastern
  Tigray.
• The systematic looting by the EDF was accompanied by large scale appropriation
  of crops and livestock.
• Between 6-9 November 2020, Tigray forces attacked farms belonging to non
  Tigrayans in nearby areas to Mai Kadra. The attackers burnt the harvest of 5,000
  quintals of sesame.
• Serious access restrictions, including multiple checkpoints by the EDF and ENDF,
  impeded or delayed delivery of humanitarian assistance to parts of Tigray and
  Amhara region impacting food security.¹⁶³³

As a result of the OHCHR-EHRC report, Abiy Ahmed claimed he was cleared of
using Starvation as a Weapon of War.¹⁶³⁴ By not investigating ‘starvation crimes’ as
their own distinct category the OHCHR-EHRC has given Abiy the impression that his
inhumane use of food as a weapon throughout this conflict can continue. Deaths
from bullets, bombs or on the battlefields are given more priority for accountability
than those who die from starvation. This only serves to reinforce a hierarchy of
atrocity victims.¹⁶³⁵ For example, Starvation deaths are often referred to as ‘indirect’
deaths. However, there is nothing indirect or natural about starvation in this case. As
the academic Jenny Edkins wrote, “Starvation is no more ‘natural’ than suffocation;
the former is no more a shortage of food than the latter is a shortage of air.”¹⁶³⁶

Starvation is being used as a weapon. Alex de Waal, a leading academic on
famines, stated Abiy’s “hunger plan is an international crime to be exposed,
sanctioned and punished, not appeased.” He continued, “The aid should flow now,
no matter what. That is the law, and the UN should uphold it.”¹⁶³⁷ The term ‘hunger
plan’ was no doubt intentionally used by Alex De Waal to compare the use of hunger
by Abiy Ahmed, to the Nazi Hunger Plan during World War Two, where many
millions were killed using the cruel tool of starvation.¹⁶³⁸ Nuremberg has left a legal
legacy which downplays the role starvation within atrocities, contributing to a dearth
of prosecutions on starvation grounds. However, one of the few countries to
prosecute on the grounds of starvation was Ethiopia in 2006, which pleaded
starvation as distinct crime. We have seen a previous ruler of Ethiopia on trial for
similar crimes. Perhaps Abiy should bare this in mind.

The Security Council

The conflict is the first major test for the UN Security Council Resolution 2417
(UNSC 2417) on Conflict and Hunger.¹⁶³⁹ However, more than one year into this
conflict and the resolution has not been implemented effectively. Through UNSC

2417, the Security Council requests the Secretary-General to “report swiftly to the
Council when the risk of conflict-induced famine and wide-spread food insecurity in
armed conflict contexts occurs” and outlines the need to “give its full attention to
such information provided by the Secretary-General when those situations are
brought to its attention”.¹⁶⁴⁰ Although UNSC 2417 was created to provide a
mechanism for Security Council action,¹⁶⁴¹ little action has occurred.

By November, the Security Council had met eight times to discuss the situation, only
twice publicly. There has been no decisive action at the UN Security Council, and
only one non-binding Presidential Statement has been issued.¹⁶⁴² OCHA has
provided at least one confidential white paper to the Security Council in May, linking
the situation to UNSC 2417.¹⁶⁴³ The Security Council report revealed that OCHA
estimated “that 20% of the population in the Tigray region is in a state of emergency
food insecurity and establishes a link between the levels of food insecurity and the
ongoing hostilities. It notes that Ethiopian authorities estimate that over 90% of the
harvest for 2020 was lost due to looting, burning or other forms of conflict-related
destruction, while some 80% of livestock was looted or slaughtered. The paper also
lists other drivers of food shortage in the area, such as recent below-average
rainfalls, locust infestation, and the adverse economic impacts of the COVID-19
pandemic.”¹⁶⁴⁴ Additionally it reported that “humanitarian operations continue to face
attacks, obstruction, seizure of cargo and delays. Military movements, fighting and
non-cooperation of armed elements have also been impeding aid delivery.”¹⁶⁴⁵ To
date, Abiy’s Government has rejected international pressure to abide by international
norms (including UNSC 2417 on hunger and UNSC 2286 on humanitarians).

The Security Council remains deeply divided. Some states – including the USA, UK,
and Ireland – have sought to link the discussions with UNSC 2417
and referenced the resolution within their remarks.¹⁶⁴⁶ Russia, China and the A3 plus
one (Kenya, Niger, Tunisia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) sought to keep
discussions to a minimum. While Russia and China have argued that the conflict is a
domestic matter and sovereignty must be upheld, the A3 plus one have suggested
that there must be African solutions to African problems.

In an act which has raised further concern about the Ethiopian Government’s aims to
disregard international law and international norms, in November, Ethiopia expelled
four of the six Irish diplomats based in Addis Ababa. Ireland has held the ‘penholder’
position on the Ethiopian case, a role which is responsible for the initiating and
drafting of resolutions.¹⁶⁴⁷ This has led some to suggest that this was retribution for
Ireland’s role in putting Ethiopia on the agenda at the Security Council.¹⁶⁴⁸

The deterioration in food security

From 18 October = 24 November, no UN-organised humanitarian supplies entered
Tigray.¹⁶⁴⁹ Humanitarian workers, over 360 trucks with relief and sixteen fuel tankers,
each with a capacity of 45,000 litres of fuel,¹⁶⁵⁰ were stranded in Semera waiting for
Government authorisation to enter the region.¹⁶⁵¹ With just 10,000 metric tons of
food stocks available within Tigray, and fuel and cash shortages limiting its
distribution, the imminent threat of a total depletion was rising.¹⁶⁵² Another of the
UN’s food partners had to cease food distributions, leaving just three operating.
Malnutrition rates continued to soar, with OCHA estimating that 1.6 million children
under five and pregnant and breastfeeding women needed nutritional
interventions.¹⁶⁵³ As the situation got even more desperate and demonstrating a sign
of both resilience and solidarity, local transporters who still had fuel came to the aide
of the relief effort, distributing aid where possible.¹⁶⁵⁴

By this point, it was estimated that that 80% of essential medication had run out at most health facilities across the region.¹⁶⁵⁵ Only 16/47 Mobile Health and Nutrition Teams were still operating. Vaccination campaigns were suspended.¹⁶⁵⁶ Disease surveillance teams were reporting high levels of Malaria, Dysentery and Scabies. With little choice left, medical teams resorted to using out of date scabies medicines to treat cases within IDP camps in Shire.¹⁶⁵⁷ More than 500 cancer patients could no longer access treatment.¹⁶⁵⁸ Doctors at Ayder hospital in Mekelle, reported the deaths of 47 patients from kidney failure. Shortages of dialysis equipment meant they could not be treated.¹⁶⁵⁹

Without fuel, access to safe drinking water was disrupted. Water trucking was suspended, rehabilitation of permanent water sources mostly stalled, and many generators for water pumps had been turned off. An estimated 2.3 million people do not have access to safe drinking water.¹⁶⁶⁰ To reach the 1.2 million IDPs targeted by the UNs water response, the UN would need 4,873 litres of fuel per day.¹⁶⁶¹ By the end of November, only 11/46 WASH partners were operational, in a reduced number of Woredas. This meant that many received no WASH support.¹⁶⁶² In Adi Hagerary, sustainable water supplies had totally run out, leading people to walk 20km to fetch water. Many people were relying on untreated water sources, greatly increasing their risk of getting waterborne illnesses, a factor which ultimately contributes to higher levels of malnutrition.

In early November, at least 16 UN staff and their dependents were detained in the capital Addis Ababa, within widespread arrests under the new emergency measures.¹⁶⁶³ Additionally, at least 70 UN-contracted truck drivers were detained in Semera.¹⁶⁶⁴ The UN Secretary-General called for their immediate release, and his spokesperson said, “As far as the SecretaryGeneral- is aware, the staff members are being held without charge, and no specific information has been provided regarding the reasons for their arrest. United Nations personnel carry out critical and impartial work in Ethiopia. The Secretary-General stresses the obligation of respecting the privileges and immunities of United Nations personnel, both international and Ethiopian, as well as protecting United Nations personnel and other humanitarian workers in Ethiopia, including from arbitrary detention.”¹⁶⁶⁵A few days later, on 12 December, six of those detained in Addis were released, while 34 of the truck drivers were also released.¹⁶⁶⁶ According to the UN, the detention drivers was a primary obstacle in the delivery of aid during this time, as without drivers the convoys were stranded in Semera.¹⁶⁶⁷ On 18 November, six more UN personnel in Addis Ababa were released as well as the remaining drivers in Semera.¹⁶⁶⁸

By mid-November, the spread of conflict and increased instability had displaced 840,000 people and left a further million 1.8 million people food insecure in Amhara and Afar.¹⁶⁶⁹ The WFP reported that humanitarian warehouses in Kombolcha (Amhara) had been looted, equipment destroyed, and storage facilities vandalised, however they did not attribute these crimes to a specific party to the conflict.¹⁶⁷⁰ Despite this, humanitarians scaled up operations to respond to increased demands within Amhara and Afar. The humanitarian response now was targeting 8 million people with food aid across northern Ethiopia (Tigray, Amhara and Afar).¹⁶⁷¹

150 days after the ceasefire

In rare, good news, following a month-long suspension due to security concerns, the UNHAS flights resumed on 24 November, bringing humanitarian staff and small supplies of much needed cash into the region.¹⁶⁷² Additionally, almost 40 trucks started to head towards Tigray, the first convoy since 18 October.¹⁶⁷³ Although a great relief, this would not be enough to stop catastrophic suffering. To frustrate matters further, on 25 November, OCHA reported that the warehouse capacity in Semera was 100% full of humanitarian relief.¹⁶⁷⁴ The UN was searching for more warehouses to store incoming cargo. While there was more aid in Semera than space to store it, there were thousands of people dying of starvation within Tigray, just 488km away.

15.8 December

As December set in, the whole country was caught in the crossfire. With more people heading to the frontlines, from doctors, to professors, Olympians, and even the President [Prime Minister] himself (if you believe him…);¹⁶⁷⁵ a negotiated solution felt far away. For many the scenes were reminiscent of a not-too-distant past. A diplomat in Addis summed up the situation well: “Addis appears to believe that if a couple of hundred thousand Tigrayans die from famine, that the TDF will give up. Mengistu tried the same tactic in attempting to drain the sea to catch the fish of the guerrilla. This never worked, and the fish came to Addis in flip-flops.”¹⁶⁷⁶ As the TDF advanced closer to Addis, it felt like history was repeating itself and lessons had not been learnt from the past.

On 17 December, defying the concerns of the Ethiopian government, the UN Human Rights Council voted in favour of an independent investigation into the human rights abuses within Ethiopia.¹⁶⁷⁷ While the Ethiopian government has expressed its outrage and intentions not to cooperate with the investigation, the announcement provides hope for future accountability. All sides to the conflict have engaged in serious human rights abuses and continue to do so.

By mid-December, the situation on the ground had changed again. Tigrayan forces announced that they were retreating to Tigray, in an attempt to foster peace talks and a ceasefire. “We trust that our bold act of withdrawal will be a decisive opening for peace,” Debrestion Gebremichael told the UN in a letter on the 19 December.¹⁶⁷⁸ He also called for a no-fly zone over Tigray (excluding humanitarian or civil flights) and an arms embargo on both the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments. He continued to say that they were not interested in controlling Afar or Addis Ababa, but instead “[w]e are only interested in ensuring that the siege that was ruthlessly imposed on our people is broken.” However, the Ethiopian Government have claimed that the retreat was merely to cover up weeks of military defeats. Reports concur that the ENDF and Amhara forces have gained considerable ground, aided by foreign drones.¹⁶⁷⁹ While this change of events could provide a rare opportunity for peace, since the Tigrayan withdrawal, airstrikes on Tigray have increased.¹⁶⁸⁰

Targets included electric power stations and towns, leading to power disruption and “mass civilian casualties.”¹⁶⁸¹

The Ethiopian Government announced that they had taken back the strategic towns of Dessie and Kombolcha.¹⁶⁸² With the Tigrayan forces no longer in control of the key aid supply lines or humanitarian distribution sites, questions remain over how the next phase of this conflict will unfold. Even when they had control of these locations, aid flows into Tigray were heavily restricted. However, from 14 December to the time of writing¹⁶⁸³ no humanitarian aid has entered Tigray. After more than a year of fighting and seven months of a de-facto blockade, the situation on the ground is no doubt agonising.

15.9 Humanitarian Access Tracking in Pictures

The following UN OCHA maps depict the changes in humanitarian access over the
course of the conflict. The map for May 2021 indicates that most of Tigray was either
partially accessible or hard to reach for the humanitarian response. By July, access
has significantly changed, making a large proportion of Tigray accessible, except
from western Tigray where Amhara militia were still holding ground and the borders
with Eritrea where EDF forces remained. After the de-facto blockade, the access
maps shift again. Tigray becomes totally encircled.

MAY – JUNE
Prior to the ceasefire, access within Tigray was hard for humanitarians, with almost all areas partially accessible or hard to reach. Only the main cities including Mekelle were easily navigable for humanitarians, however even these had risks.

This was the only map available up until the Ceasefire for humanitarian access on OCHA’s website. Following the ceasefire, humanitarian staff were allowed to leave, but only a few were allowed to enter the region.

 

 

Early JULY

In early July, following the ceasefire and with the withdrawal of ENDF and EDF troops to the region’s borders, the humanitarian access situations shifted. Most areas within Tigray became accessible to humanitarians and 75% of the population was now in areas where relief operations could occur, compared to 30% in May.¹⁶⁸⁴

Although access within the area had improved, stocks were depleting within the region¹⁶⁸⁵ as access into the region was being severely restricted. The banning of commercial flights,¹⁶⁸⁶ new checkpoints, heavy controls on the only functioning road into the region (Semera-Mekelle),¹⁶⁸⁷ supposedly to check for illegal weaponry, and the destroyed bridges across the Tekezé river, all were hampering the relief effort. ¹⁶⁸⁸ Additionally, the lack of fuel, cash, banking services, telecommunications and electricity was hampering aid delivery.¹⁶⁸⁹

JULY-AUGUST

By August, over 75% of the population remained in the reach of humanitarian relief, however the embargo on fuel and lack of aid reaching the region due to the strict border checks meant that humanitarian response was being scaled down.¹⁶⁹⁰ While more areas in the north of Tigray were accessible to humanitarians than the previous month, there was still a fluid security situation along the border with Eritrea.¹⁶⁹¹ Northwestern Tigray, including Mai Tsebri Town, Tselemeti and Dimma Woredas, remained inaccessible to relief staff as the Tekezé bridges had not yet been repaired due to high water levels and Amhara militia were still occupying the area.¹⁶⁹² The Semera-Mekelle road remained the only route into the region and was only partially open during this period due to insecurity, thorough searches and extended delays.¹⁶⁹³ In positive news, the UNHAS flights operating twice weekly during this period, rotating staff in/out of the region, while UN Staff were able to enter the road via the Semera-Mekelle road at least twice in early August.¹⁶⁹⁴

AUGUST – SEPTEMBER
By September, humanitarian supplies within Tigray were all but depleted. During September, the situation in Tigray remained similar to the previous month, with areas now accessible however aid supplies into the region severely restricted by the Ethiopian Government’s de facto blockade. Areas in western Tigray remained inaccessible to humanitarian staff due to the physical access challenges as well as the presence of Amhara militia.¹⁶⁹⁵ UNHAS flights and the first EU Air Bridge were given access.¹⁶⁹⁶ However, the expansion of the TDF into neighbouring Afar and Amhara, widening the areas in need of humanitarian response. By mid-September 140,000 people in Afar and 233,000 people in Amhara were displaced.¹⁶⁹⁷

SEPTEMBER – OCTOBER
During October, the Semera-Mekelle road remained the only viable route into the region. However, from 18 October, no aid entered via this route due to Government restrictions. No fuel had entered since August.¹⁶⁹⁸

Flights were cancelled during this month after a UNHAS flight was unable to land due to airstrikes on Mekelle in early October. The flight was forced to return to Addis Ababa mid-flight and UNHAS flights were suspended.¹⁶⁹⁹ Hostilities within Afar and Amhara was contributing to increasing aid needs within these regions, while insecurity was preventing safe delivery of aid.¹⁷⁰⁰

OCTOBER – NOVEMBER
The situation within Tigray remained similar to the previous month. Areas in western Tigray remained inaccessible to humanitarian staff due to the physical access challenges as well as the presence of Amhara militia. From 18 October – 18 November, no aid entered the region as the Semera-Mekelle road due to restrictions imposed by the regional and federal authorities.¹⁷⁰¹

By the end of November, access in Amhara was challenging for humanitarians. With more than 500 medical facilities damaged in Amhara due to recent fighting during the TDF’s advance, the situation was becoming particularly acute. In Afar, ongoing fighting was impacting the relief services reaching displaced people in need of food aid and non-food relief items.¹⁷⁰²

15.10 Conclusion

With hostilities ongoing, Tigray is being subjected to a brutal human-made famine. From the attacks on food systems, the obstruction of aid, the denial of access, the detention and expulsion of humanitarians, the harassment of delivery drivers, to the expulsions of UN officials and brutal murders of humanitarian staff. At every stage of this conflict the Starvation Crimes have been both widespread and systematic. Will the world continue to sit back and allow the Ethiopian Government to starve Tigray in the darkness, till there is nothing but dust to prove the crimes?

While warehouses are overflowing with aid in Semera, across the border in Tigray 6 million people’s lives are at risk. Since the blockade began, only 13% of the necessary humanitarian aid for survival has reached Tigray. Despite officials avoiding labelling the situation a famine due to fears of retribution, a famine of catastrophic proportions is taking place. Although information has not been free flowing, this chapter provides ample evidence of the grim situation. How many people will starve before this famine is ended? This famine is human-made. It can also be resolved by humans. While it is too late for the thousands who have already died of starvation or starvation-related deaths, and some may be permanently impacted by mental and physical stunting from prolonged lack of food, if the obstructions on aid are lifted, many lives could still be saved.

The conflict in Ethiopia demonstrates several things. Not only does this highlight the fractures in our international systems and mechanisms for maintaining international peace and security, but without political will to act, the world will do nothing much more than watch. International pressure is doing little to change the course of events. However, as the international community does a diplomatic dance with the faminogenic¹⁷⁰³ Nobel Peace Prize laureate, 6 million people in Tigray could die from starvation. Many could also die in Amhara and Afar.

The international community has tools at its disposal which it must exhaust, including the Responsibility to Protect. Over the past year the international community has done little more than condemn the Governments actions. In October, the European Parliament gave the Ethiopian Government one month before sanctions would be placed. This time is up. The AU has reiterated its desire for African solutions to African problems. The AU’s statute boasts the most comprehensive provisions for atrocity prevention than any other regional organisation.¹⁷⁰⁴ However, with the AU’s headquarters in Addis Ababa, the AU appears unwilling or unable to act and their responses have been both slow and inadequate.

When this ends, will the international community regretfully use the oft-repeated mantra of ‘never again’? For many, patience is wearing thin. In September, Martin Griffiths’ warned the international community. Now his warning is a reality. This will be a lasting “stain on our conscience.”¹⁷⁰⁵

16. Survivors of sexual violence
By Sally Keeble¹⁷⁰⁶

Behind the humanitarian and communications blockade of Tigray, survivors of the vicious sexual violence during the 14-month war are putting their trauma on hold to confront the immediate challenge of survival: 90% of people in the region are at risk of famine. Meanwhile the sexual violence has spilled out beyond the borders of Tigray with reports of attacks on women in the Amhara and Afar regions. Relief for survivors of the tsunami of human rights atrocities is finally in prospect with plans from the UN Human Rights Council for a special investigative commission. Whether it will come in time for the starving people of Tigray and other parts of the country remains to be seen.

While the number of attacks on women in Tigray has declined, the plight of the survivors appears to have grown worse in the past six months. The trauma of survivors has been exacerbated by the lack of medical and psycho-social services, the impact of births of children as a result of the rapes, and the all-pervasive problem of famine. Meanwhile there is also evidence of the widening of the problem of conflict-related sexual violence in Ethiopia with serious allegations of Tigrayan forces abusing women in Afar and Amhara. All this despite the body of international law, conventions, and resolutions by which the international community has made clear its opposition to the use of sexual violence in conflict. While global voices have raised in horror at the scale of the abuses unleashed in Ethiopia, the lack of enforcement to date has enabled impunity.

16.1 The spread of conflict-related sexual violenc

Sexual violence against women in Tigray

A timeline setting out the growing number of sexual assaults on women in Tigray during the first six months of the war was set out in volume one of this report.¹⁷⁰⁷ Incidents were reported of kidnap and detention of women repeatedly raped over a period of time, gang rapes by groups of soldiers, rapes of girls as young as eight years old, extreme violence including mutilation of women’s genitals, men being forced to rape family members, sexual violence being linked to attacks on Tigrayan men attempting to protect women from assault, and rape being used to “purify” or “cleanse women.” There were reports of soldiers threatening their victims with further violence if they should seek help, thereby adding to the reluctance of women to access medical care. It was denounced across the international community as the worst sexual violence deployed in conflict in many decades.¹⁷⁰⁸ Women who have spoken out about the attacks on them and their subsequent hardship have had to overcome their own fear, suffering and stigma, and their courage is respected.

Numbers of attacks have been hard to establish. In June 2021 the UN’s population fund, the UNFPA estimated there were 26,000 women aged 15 to 26 in Tigray who were expected to seek services for sexual violence arising from the conflict.¹⁷⁰⁹ Whilst it appears that the numbers of sexual assaults in Tigray have declined since the departure of the Ethiopian, Eritrean and Amharan soldiers in June 2021, new cases have come to light of women who had initially been afraid to report their experiences.¹⁷¹⁰ These included 70 assaults on women at the Adigrat camp for internally displaced people (IDPs).

Most notably inside Tigray have been the reports of the decimation of services for survivors of the sexual violence and the brutal impact of the de facto blockade imposed by the Ethiopian government. A recent report from Tigray set out the scale of the hardship being experienced. Some details have been removed to protect the identity of the author:

“Medical care has been difficult, medication and resources not being able to come into Tigray, medical facilities have been destroyed, transport is basically not there, and the few transports are so expensive it’s beyond the capacity of the women. Banks being closed they don’t even have access to their own saving and are suffering in isolation.

The community cannot help due to the fact that the community itself is under stress and cannot provide resources or emotional support, making it very hard for sick people to ask for help.

The entire population is also suffering from hunger.

The enclosure caused desperation and two survivors we know (who had faced very complex gender-based violence atrocities) have now committed suicide.

Fistula cases are so many due to the destruction of health facilities and the rape injuries. The only specialised hospital has not been able to handle the cases that have come (they have been only able to handle 34 cases this year and have been forced to turn away many survivors).

The number of survivors reporting (after sexual violence) has been decreasing and the reasons are:

➢ Cultural stigma,
➢ Economic, fuel, transportation challenges
➢ Clients are not coming back for follow-up
➢ We are running out of medication
➢ Air strikes are also creating a fear to travel to Mekelle as Mekelle is considered as
a target.

Some women have reported that girls and women are being thrown out of their homes due to rape pregnancies and these pregnant mothers are being forced to give birth in unsafe conditions at neighbours or out in the open. These mothers and babies come sick and malnourished to the hospitals. With the siege and lack of communication it is hard to give you a picture of the whole of Tigray, but within Mekelle itself there were four babies abandoned at one hospital alone, and 12 babies have been given to social services. There may be isolated cases of abandoned babies in bushes, but as there are legal consequences and follow up from the communities, it is not easy for the mothers to do that. It is far easier for them to go to churches and social services. Overall though we need to create awareness and do sensitization works on the ground, which is being hampered by the siege.

Child survivors – we do not have recovery plans for work done with very young survivors and we do not have trained child counsellors. We do not have any male safe houses, and child friendly spaces and safe houses for children.

Factors specific to sexual assault survivors:

• (At one centre) Half of the survivors on post exposure prophylaxis (PEP) missed their follow up and two thirds not on PEP have missed their follow up schedule. Due to the fact that they did not come back for follow up, the survivors are missing important evaluations such as pregnancy testing, evaluation for sexually transmitted infection (STI) and medication use. The main reason for the lack of follow up is probably the financial issue; as a minimum they can’t afford the transportation cost to the health facility as they need to travel far to come.
• Lack of treatment for rape-lead comorbidities. A significant number of patients are suffering from consequences of rape/gang rape. There are patients suffering from kidney failure, cardiac problems, and unstoppable vaginal bleeding following oophorectomy. They require services like dialyses, medications for cardiac patients and surgical corrections. However, none of the mentioned services are available, due to the lack of medication and supplies. Even patients who can afford to pay are dying from similar problems as medication and supplies are totally not available in the whole of Tigray.
• STI Treatment. Services for treatment of syphilis and other sexually transmitted illness stopped early in November. It has been impossible to treat STI patients for the past 28 days.
• Post exposure prophylaxis and Hepatitis B vaccine. For the past three months, we were providing these services intermittently by requesting medication from lower-level health facilities, which still had some in stock. But this month the service has completely stopped since every facility and pharmacy is out of stock for these medications.
• Shortage of materials for fistula patients. We have survivors suffering from fistula and excessive vaginal discharge for unknown reasons. It has not been possible to support them by supplying adult-diaper and other sanitation materials that could help them protect their hygiene. Even the simplest things have now become scarce and impossible to find.”¹⁷¹¹

Sexual violence against women in Amhara and Afar

The new phase of the war, with the Tigrayan forces moving back into Mekelle and then extending into Amhara and Afar, was followed by reports of serious sexual violence by the Tigrayans. One report, by Amnesty International, is discussed further below. The other, published in the Canadian newspaper the Globe and Mail, was by respected journalist Lucy Kassa, one of the journalists responsible for the extensive coverage of sexual violence against Tigrayan women, and Geoffrey York, the paper’s Africa Bureau Chief. It documented attacks on women and girls, one a 12- year-old who was gang-raped by Tigrayan troops after they captured the village of Geregera, 100 km from Lalibela, in late August. “They ordered me to take off my clothes,” The Globe reported the girl as saying: “When I refused, one of them slapped me in the face and stripped off my clothes. My father tried to defend me, but they beat him and threatened to kill us all. …They raped me in front of my father,” the girl said. “They would get angry and beat me when I tried to fight back, so I stopped. I was so scared they would kill me and my father.” The girl’s mother was present for the interview and consented to her daughter’s participation.

Other survivors described some Tigrayan soldiers going from village to village raping women and girls, including kidnaping and gang-raping them with extreme violence. The Globe reported that none were able to get access to services. The rapes ended when the forces left the area. ¹⁷¹²

Although the Tigrayan regional government did not provide a response to the Globe, it later released a statement which gave a lengthy critique of the article and the methodologies used, committed to bringing any perpetrators to justice and called for an independent investigation by an impartial body of all allegations of atrocities.¹⁷¹³ Lucy Kassa appeared on the BBC World Service Newshour defending her article and the investigations that underpinned it.¹⁷¹⁴ There have also been reports – as yet unverified – of Tigrayan women being subject to sexual violence in western Tigray, where Humera has been the focus for a number of reports of atrocities committed against Tigrayan people.

There have also been reports – as yet unverified – of Tigrayan women being subject to sexual violence in western Tigray, where Humera has been the focus for a number of reports of atrocities committed against Tigrayan people.

16.2 Six months of institutional reporting on sexual violence

If the first six months of the conflict was marked by sexual violence, the last six months has been marked by a series of reports and meetings that have highlighted the need for justice for the women – but so far not resulted in substantial action. There are four key reports to consider. The joint report from the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, two reports published by Amnesty International produced specifically on conflict-related sexual violence one in August 2021¹⁷¹⁵, the other, a much shorter report, in November 2021¹⁷¹⁶, and a report published by Human Rights Watch on the health impacts of sexual violence, also in November 2021.

6.2.1 Report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC)/Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

The long-awaited landmark report of the joint investigation by the UN and Ethiopian Human Rights Commission¹⁷¹⁷ includes an important section on sexual violence. The report was already the subject of controversy before its publication on 3 November 2021. There were questions about the impartiality of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, and further doubts cast on the investigation’s validity when it was disclosed that the investigators had been unable to visit sites of some of the most notable atrocities, in particular Axum¹⁷¹⁸. Despite its limitations, the report gives a clear description of the legal framework that applies to sexual violence in conflict, provides graphic descriptions of some of the most serious cases of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and provides conclusions and recommendations for further action. Importantly it pointed to the possibility of an independent international mechanism, which could complement action taken by national mechanisms. “Building on the work of the JIT, an international, independent investigative mechanism can also be established to collect evidence on the most serious violations committed during the conflict and prepare files for criminal prosecution by either a national or international tribunal. The investigative mechanism can build on the work of the JIT. Such initiatives have been undertaken in various configurations in Syria, Iraq and Myanmar.”¹⁷¹⁹

The report said that the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) found “harrowing” evidence of, “Various acts of SGBV including physical violence and assault; attempted rape; rape including gang rape, oral and anal rape; insertion of foreign objects into the vagina; intentional transmission of HIV; verbal abuse including ethnical slurs; abduction; and other violations have been committed. Some of the reported accounts of rape were characterized by appalling levels of brutality. Acts of rape were frequently intended to degrade and dehumanize an entire ethnic group.”¹⁷²⁰

Its findings confirmed previous reports of

• Gang-rapes, with nearly half the women survivors interviewed reporting such attacks.
• Violence against women and girls associated with fighters of parties to the conflict
• Violence against women and girls fleeing conflict
• Rape in detention with reports from women who were abducted, detained, and raped for a period ranging from three days to three months
• Violence against older women and women with disability
• Women and girls made vulnerable to sexual assault due to lack of basic services ¹⁷²¹

It also reported that there had been sexual violence against men and boys. “One male survivor was raped by an Eritrean Defence Force (EDF) soldier and another by a civilian. The two were later provided assistance in Mekelle. The JIT was told that a 16-year-old boy was raped by nine EDF soldiers in Humera but did not receive any support. The victim later committed suicide.”¹⁷²² There were reports of men being humiliated by being publicly stripped naked.

All parties to the conflict were identified as perpetrators of sexual violence against women. The JIT found that the Ethiopian National Defence Force ENDF) committed acts of sexual violence in Mekelle, Wukro, Bora, Mekoni, Shire, and Bizet; the Eritrean Defence Force committed acts of sexual violence in Ahferom Samre, WerieLeke (in Edega Hamus), Shire, Tembien, Adet, Humera; the TSF (Tigray Special Forces) committed acts of sexual violence in Adi Hageray, Mai Laha (in Shimelba), and Mekelle. It identified the Eritrean forces as being associated with sexual attacks marked with extreme brutality, and also reported that the Amhara Special Forces (ASF) were implicated in acts of sexual violence.¹⁷²³ In her news conference in Geneva to mark the release of the report, Michelle Bachelet, the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, said that the Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers were the main perpetrators of the sexual violence in the early stages of the conflict.¹⁷²⁴

The report found that physical and mental health impacts of sexual violence on the women were profound, especially for those subjected to gang rapes, and included depression, sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV, and physical disabilities as well as unwanted pregnancies. The lack of relevant support services was compounded by poor living conditions and lack basic supplies of food and water.¹⁷²⁵

The joint report concluded that: “Based on the information available to it, there are reasonable grounds to believe that violations of international human rights and humanitarian law related to sexual violence, including rape, have been committed by all parties to the conflict and require further investigation. Some of these may further constitute war crimes and, in view of their widespread and systematic nature, crimes against humanity.”¹⁷²⁶

Sections of the report on refugees¹⁷²⁷, children¹⁷²⁸, older persons and people with disabilities¹⁷²⁹ also concluded there had been sexual violence against these groups of people.

16.2.2 Amnesty International report August 2021 “I Don’t Know If They Realised, I Was a Person,”

This meticulously researched and written report by Amnesty International identified Ethiopian and Eritrean national force, Amhara Regional Police Special Forces and Fano militia of being the prime perpetrators of the brutal levels of sexual violence that characterised the first six months of the Tigray conflict.¹⁷³⁰ It was based on interviews with 63 women and girl survivors, 15 of the interviews at refugee camps in eastern Sudan, and 48 interviews over secure channels with survivors in Shire, Axum and Mekelle, as well as interviews with doctors, nurses, midwives and humanitarian workers who treated or assisted survivors of sexual violence in Shire and Adigrat, and refugee camps in eastern Sudan. Supplementing this was data from humanitarian organisations operating in Tigray relating to sexual violence and health services.¹⁷³¹ The report documented in painstaking detail the impact of the destruction of health services, and the unfolding mental health crisis among survivors.

“There are limited, if any, protection, rehabilitation, and livelihood services available to survivors of sexual violence in Tigray, because health facilities have been damaged and looted in the conflict and medical personnel have fled. Post-rape care, in particular, has been limited or non-existent. Recovery for survivors of sexual violence is thus elusive as many are dislocated from core support systems — family and friends — because of the active conflict in Tigray and fear of stigmatisation and reprisals. The conflict has also dismantled other support and response systems that were previously available, such as health facilities, protection, and local police. The conflict has displaced survivors of sexual violence together with other Tigrayan residents from their homes and localities.”

The report identified gang rapes, extreme, sadistic brutality, rapes in front of family members and mutilation of women’s genitals. Some of the rapes were motivated by a desire to generate births of Amharic rather than Tigrayan children. “They said if you were male we would kill you, but girls can make Amhara babies.”¹⁷³² In addition to the well-documented damage to health services by Eritrean and Ethiopian soldiers during the early months of the conflict, the report also sets out the very limited access to psycho-social services for survivors of rape. “According to the WHO health services monitoring platform, as of July 2021 there were only five health facilities providing mental health services in all of Tigray. There were no psychological first aid services in Shire town, where Amnesty International interviewed 46 survivors of sexual violence.” ¹⁷³³

It noted the reluctance of some women to access psychological services for cultural reasons, or because of their focus on other needs, and recorded a woman in a refugee camp in Sudan saying, “I lost my husband, my home and my livelihood and I was violated, and nothing can wipe that away or make me feel better. The conditions here for me and my children are miserable, and I try to put all my energy into looking after my children and providing for them because they don’t have anyone else. Even if I talk to psychologists about what happened to me, they cannot solve my problems. I hope we can go back home soon and find my husband and rebuild our lives. That is what we need.”¹⁷³⁴

Amnesty made 33 recommendations for action to provide services and justice to survivors of sexual violence and prevent further attacks, and for a full investigation of events to the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the African Union, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and the United Nations. The report concludes with an important point about command responsibility. “In addition to those who directly perpetrated the acts, military commanders knew or should have known about the conduct of their forces, notably patterns of widespread rape and other sexual violence, given that by January 2021 reports of such abuses were widely circulating in the media. As documented in chapter 4 of this report, military commanders not only failed to take reasonable steps to prevent and repress the conduct but tolerated it. These military commanders may therefore be criminally responsible for the crimes against humanity of rape, sexual slavery, torture and persecution.”

6.2.3 Amnesty International report November 2021

Amnesty produced a second, very much shorter, report on sexual violence related to the Tigray conflict in November 2021¹⁷³⁵ in which it found that Tigrayan forces had raped Amharan women after attacking the town of Nifas Mewcha. The report was based on interviews over secure channels with 16 survivors, the head of the local hospital, and local and regional officials. A local government desk officer for Women, Children and Youth Affairs put the number of attacks at 71, while a Federal Ministry of Justice official said a total of 73 women were assaulted. All the attacks took place in August 2021. The survivors reported gang-rapes, rapes in front of children, and robbery and looting by the soldiers of items including food, jewellery, and mobile phones.

Among the sexual assaults described in the report was one of a 30-year-old food seller who told Amnesty:

“It is not easy to tell you what they did to me. They raped me. Three of them raped me while my children were crying. My elder son is 10 and the other is nine years, they were crying when [the TPLF fighters] raped me. [The fighters] did whatever they wanted and left. They also assaulted me physically and took shiro and berbere [local food items]. They slapped me [and] kicked me. They were cocking their guns as if they are going to shoot me.”

Another described the ethnic slurs used by the for soldiers who raped her. “The one who raped me first is their superior. He was saying ‘Amhara is a donkey, Amhara has massacred our people (Tigrayans), the Federal Defence forces have raped my wife, now we can rape you as we want’.”

All but one of the women interviewed by Amnesty reported physical and mental health problems after the attacks including back pain, bloody urine, difficulty walking, anxiety, and depression. Two had sought basic private medical treatment. But none had been able to get emergency contraception, post emergency prophylaxis for HIV and sexually transmitted infections, treatment for injuries or psychological services. They said this was due to damage to the town’s health facilities by the Tigrayan soldiers. A humanitarian organisation that normally provides such services said it couldn’t access the area because of security concerns prompted by the Ethiopian government’s hostile statements about international NGOs.

Amharan regional government officials told Amnesty that they had already provided 54 of the survivors with livelihood support, would provide them with psychosocial services, and would also restock and re-equip the looted medical facilities. Amnesty called for a speeding up of support for the survivors and other victims of the conflict, provision of humanitarian access to all parts of northern Ethiopia, and prosecution of perpetrators.

6.2.4 Human Rights Watch report published November 2021 “I Always Remember That Day”

Published at the same time as the Amnesty report, Human Rights Watch provided a
detailed and searing critique of the health impacts on survivors of sexual violence in
Tigray. It identified the Ethiopian Government as bearing a prime responsibility for
the hardship due to its blocking of aid to health facilities damaged or destroyed
during the occupation of Mekelle by Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.¹⁷³⁶ Most critical
was survivors’ lack of access to time-sensitive services for HIV and pregnancy
testing post rape.

The report was based on interviews over secure channels between June and November 2021 with 21 local and international healthcare workers, service providers, humanitarian aid workers, members of community organisations, and government donor agencies. The organisation also conducted desk reviews of 43 individual cases of sexual violence and drew from interviews it had conducted between January and June 2021 with two Eritrean refugee sexual violence survivors and five health workers, service providers, and witnesses. It interviewed members of the Tigray Regional Health Bureau, and the Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Assessment and Rehabilitation Committee of the Tigray Women’s Affairs Bureau and sought, but did not receive, information from the Ethiopian Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Peace, the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs, and the National Disaster Risk Management Commission.¹⁷³⁷

The report set out graphic, detailed descriptions of the impact of sexual violence on the women and reached some stark conclusions. Women who survived ferocious conflict-related sexual violence were unable to get access to healthcare and other support due to the destruction of services, stigma and, in the first six months of the conflict, the presence of armed personnel in healthcare facilities and the wider community. It noted: “Human Rights Watch shared several instances of harassment and intimidation by Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers and Amhara fighters over the first six months of 2021. These included their presence at checkpoints and health facilities, and because they took targeted actions against rape survivors, health workers, and other service providers. The presence of soldiers at health facilities also deterred survivors from seeking health services, as their presence was frightening and retraumatizing.”¹⁷³⁸

Since Tigrayan forces retook Mekelle in June 2021, Human Rights Watch noted that the Ethiopian government had “tightened their effective siege of the Tigray region, including shutting down essential services such as banking, telecommunications, and electricity. They are severely restricting the entry of food, fuel, cash, and medical supplies, hobbling the humanitarian aid effort in Tigray, including the rehabilitation of the health sector.”¹⁷³⁹ This, it noted, has had a devastating impact on the provision of services to survivors of sexual violence, with a lack of medicines and other medical supplies, lack of payment for health workers, lack of resources for the one-stop centres, lack of fuel to reach survivors in outlying areas, lack of communications, lack of trained staff, and lack of visas for trainers to enter Ethiopia and travel to Tigray.

The report ends with 61 recommendations to the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, international donors humanitarian providers, the African Union, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary General, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, to All of Ethiopia’s International Partners including Canada, the European Union and its Member States, United Kingdom, and United States and to Humanitarian Agencies, including the UN’s population fund (UNFPA) ), the UN’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN’s Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).¹⁷⁴⁰

16.3 Discussion

Much of the evidence in these four reports is deeply contested. The Joint Investigation Team conducting investigations for the UN/EHRC report said some witnesses alleged evidence was fabricated for lobbying purposes. The Ethiopian Attorney General said some reports of rape should be taken “with a pinch of salt.”¹⁷⁴¹ The Tigray External Affairs Office criticised Amnesty International’s report of Tigrayan forces assaults on women, and said that if there were any, they were theactions of “bad apples.”¹⁷⁴² The Eritrean government said the Joint UN/EHRC report was the product of “visceral disdain and enmity towards Eritrea.”¹⁷⁴³ However, there is a consistency to the depiction of what has happened to women in the conflict in Tigray and beyond.

Sexual violence was used as a weapon of war

The reports all present sexual violence as being used as a weapon of war, targeting women identified as coming from the ethnic group as the opposition forces, and designed to humiliate and degrade them on the basis of their ethnicity as well as their gender. This is evidenced by the language used, terms such junta or woyane or donkey used derogatively, and also by explicit statements such as: “We were sent here to clean out Tigrayans, they will be replaced by real Ethiopians; we are cleansing this country of people like you.”¹⁷⁴⁴

Extreme brutality deployed against women

All the reports describe in explicit terms extreme brutality used, resulting in severe injuries to the women. The joint UN/EHRC report points to the most extreme violence being deployed by soldiers from Eritrea,¹⁷⁴⁵ a country with a record of sexual violence within its armed forces.¹⁷⁴⁶

Lack of access for survivors to medical and other support services

All the reports identify a lack of services and describe the additional hardship this has caused to the survivors of sexual violence. All but the lesser of the Amnesty International reports, pins most of the blame for this on the Ethiopian Government blockade of Tigray and give priority to the lifting of the blockade and provision of humanitarian access to the region. The de facto blockade itself has been described as “likely to constitute a war crime” by UK Africa minister Vicky Ford MP.¹⁷⁴⁷

Calls for further investigations

All the reports call, to a greater or lesser extent, for further investigation of atrocities during the conflict. The three most substantial reports cite the international laws and conventions that prohibit sexual violence in conflict and open up the possibility of the sexual violence constituting war crimes or crimes against humanity. In her press conference marking the release of the joint report Michelle Bachelet picked up on the proposal that if national governments were unable to take forward their own investigations and actions, then an international mechanism should be developed.¹⁷⁴⁸

16.4 International inertia

In the face of the stream of eye-witness accounts and media coverage of sexual violence during the first six months of the war, and substantial institutional reports during the latter part of the year, the international community has expressed consistent concerns about events in Ethiopia. There have been repeated calls for a ceasefire, efforts to broker negotiations, or at least a halt to the atrocities, with the use of sexual violence featuring among the roll call of human rights violations. Key among the international actors have been:

Africa

African institutions and leaders have made repeated efforts to find a way through the crisis. The initial peace initiative of the African Union in the form of a three- person delegation of the former presidents of Liberia, Mozambique and South Africa in November 2020 was rebuffed.¹⁷⁴⁹ In June 2021 a commission of inquiry into the alleged human rights violations was set up under the auspices of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.¹⁷⁵⁰ It began its work in Banjul, the capital of Gambia, with a mandate to investigate allegations and determine whether there had been violations of human rights. The Ethiopian government called on the AU to scrap the commission and proposed a joint probe instead.¹⁷⁵¹ Two months later, the AU took a further initiative under Olusegun Obasanjo, the former Nigerian President, to persuade the Tigrayan regional and Ethiopian federal governments to end hostilities and come to the negotiating table. He held constructive meetings during his visit to Ethiopia with the Ethiopian President, Sahle-Work Zewde and Tigrayan leader Debretsion Gebremichael.¹⁷⁵² In the same month Kenyan Prime Minister, Uhuru Kenyatta made high profile visits to Addis Ababa to meet his Ethiopian counterpart and call on all parties to cease hostilities¹⁷⁵³ .

United Nations

After repeated statements by the UN on Ethiopia, including on the scale and nature of the sexual violence, and the detention and expulsion from Addis Ababa of UN officials, the most senior group of human rights experts issued a call for action in early December.¹⁷⁵⁴ Building on the joint UN and Ethiopian Human Rights Council report, they called on authorities in Ethiopia, Eritrea and beyond to ensure that victims of sexual violence were offered full support and redress, and that perpetrators were brought to justice.

“We would like to remind State and non-State actors parties to the conflict of their duty to respect and protect human rights, and to prevent violations in any territory under their jurisdiction or effective control, whether by State or non-State actors.

“In particular, we reiterate the recommendations made by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Joint Investigation report to end all forms of sexual violence, and to issue clear, public and unequivocal instructions to all armed forces and groups to forbid sexual and other gender-based violence and render these acts punishable on the basis of direct and command responsibility.
“We also reiterate the need for Ethiopia and Eritrea to implement the report’s recommendations – to take immediate measures to protect women and girls from rape and other forms of gender-based violence; provide redress to victims; facilitate immediate access to adequate health care, including the full range of sexual and reproductive health services, and psychosocial support; ensure proper documentation and investigation of all incidences of sexual violence by independent and impartial bodies and hold perpetrators to account.”

United Kingdom

The UK’s claim to global leadership of the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative was described in Volume I of this report. Whilst the action at that stage was limited, the initiative has continued to be a focus for repeated calls to the UK government to act over the sexual violence in the Tigray conflict. Parliamentarians Lord Alton in the House of Lords and MPs Helen Hayes and Sarah Champion in the House of Commons have pressed the UK government to prioritise support and services for survivors. The appointment of Rt Hon Liz Truss MP as the new foreign secretary gave a fresh impetus to the PSVI work with her announcement in November 2021 of £20mn to tackle violence against women, and a Preventing Sexual Violence Against Women Summit to be hosted by the UK in 2022.¹⁷⁵⁵

“We’re going to tackle the abhorrent practice of the use of sexual violence in war. It is grotesque that sexual violence and rape is used as a weapon of war, and it’s used to exercise power over women. It’s wrong that it’s treated less seriously than chemical warfare or landmines,” she said, declaring there had to be an end to impunity for perpetrators.

Further, she said that she would consider a new international convention on the use of sexual violence in conflict, a move which is currently being promoted by a body of international lawyers and which would give a focus to the gender dimension of atrocities and genocide.¹⁷⁵⁶

In response to a question from Lord Ray Collins in the House of Lords, the UK government announced it would be taking forward its PSVI work in Ethiopia through the appointment of a specialist role based at the Embassy in Addis Ababa starting in January 2022. ¹⁷⁵⁷

European Union

The European Union has continued its diplomatic pressures with suspension of aid to Ethiopia, the threat of sanctions and two missions by special envoy Finnish foreign minister Pekka Haavisto, to press for peace talks and humanitarian access. EU crisis-management commissioner Janez Lenarčič told European Parliament in July: “Atrocities”, such as systematic rape and extra-judicial killings, were also being seen in the conflict,” in what “may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.” ¹⁷⁵⁸ Haavisto’s comments were described by the Ethiopian foreign ministry as a “hallucination of sorts or a lapse in memory of some kind.”¹⁷⁵⁹

Frustrations in the EU over the lack of progress boiled over on 13 December 13when the block’s top diplomat Josep Borrell criticised member states for failing to agree on sanctions against those suspected of war crimes in Ethiopia’s civil war and complained about Europe’s failure to give an effective policy response to “large scale human rights violations,” or to stop “mass rapes using sexual violence as a war aim.”¹⁷⁶⁰

However, despite its internal challenges, Europe led the calls for a special session on Ethiopia of the UN Human Rights Council which was held on Friday 17 December.

16.5 Future action – an international commission

Finally, at the tail end of 2021, came action from the UN. More than 50 countries, members and observers of the UN Human Rights Council, supported moves initially proposed by Slovenia, in its capacity as head of the EU’s Council, to set up an international commission of human rights experts. Its mandate included investigating and collecting evidence of human rights violations, with a “gender perspective and survivor-centred approach” throughout its work. The proposal was consistent with that set out in the joint UN/EHRC report and referred to by Michelle Bachelet in her news conference.

A resolution setting up another investigation might seem too little too late for women waiting for medical treatment for life-changing injuries or justice for the horrific abuses inflicted on them. However, it drew an immediate and angry response from the Ethiopian government which slammed it as an “unjust and counterproductive attempt by some to exert political pressure,”¹⁷⁶¹ unsupported by African council members. In the event, a number of African nations abstained in the vote on the motion which was carried by 21 votes for with 15 against and 11 abstentions.

Sharp divisions were expressed at the meeting. Those who supported the Ethiopian government in opposing the motion, spoke largely, sometimes vituperatively, of concerns about interference in Ethiopian national sovereignty, politicisation of human rights and neo-colonialism by western powers. Those who supported the proposal, recognised the importance of the African Union peace initiative and of Ethiopian measures to implement the joint report recommendations, but argued that the progress made was too slow. Meanwhile, they said, there had been mass detentions of Tigrayans, including of UN Staff, and the continuing blockade of Tigray.

Nada Al-Nashif, Deputy human rights commissioner told the meeting that the impact of the conflict on civilians was “increasingly dramatic” with 9.4 million people in northern Ethiopia affected by “acute food insecurity,” including 5.2 million people in Tigray – 90% of the population. In July there were 400,000 people in Tigray living in conditions of famine. No recent estimates were possible because of the lack of access, but she noted that the situation was likely to be even worse, with the blockade compounded by widespread anti-humanitarian rhetoric.¹⁷⁶² She warned all parties against the use of hate speech which she said risked further violence.

Three speakers in particular highlighted the gender dimension to the investigations and the appalling toll of sexual violence in the conflict.

Victor Madrigal-Borloz, Chair of the Co-ordination Committee of Special Procedures, said all parties to the conflict had engaged in sexual violence which constituted “egregious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.” These appeared to be part of a deliberate strategy to terrorise, degrade and humiliate” the victims on the basis of their ethnicity, and were carried out with the “acquiescence of state and nonstate actors.” The sexual violence especially affected internally displaced women and girls and those in refugee camps for Eritreans, and also young women, with one treatment centre reporting that 90% of the survivors it treated were underage.¹⁷⁶³

The widespread use of sexual violence was condemned by Simon Manley, the UK’s permanent representative to the UN in Geneva, who said, “We have heard the most horrific accounts of the widespread use of rape and sexual and gender-based violence as a weapon of war. Most recently, we have seen the mass detention of people based on their ethnic origin, alongside inflammatory and hateful rhetoric from public figures. No one, I repeat no one, can seriously argue that this situation does not deserve the urgent attention of this Council…. A sustainable peace requires respect for human rights.”

Finally, a call for a stronger focus on gender-based violence came from Dr Ewelina Ochab. Speaking for the Human Rights Institute of the International Bar Association she said: “The use of sexual violence as a weapon of war in Ethiopia is a fact reported by the UN on several occasions and not a claim yet to be proven. The new mechanism may only elaborate on the true scale of the issue. The omission of the issue from the resolution is a significant failure that must be addressed.

“We appreciate the reference to integrating a gender perspective, however, we consider that this is not enough and explicit language on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is crucial. The issues surrounding SGBV are omnipresent in Ethiopia. A breakdown of traditional accountability mechanisms, increased exposure to and normalisation of SGBV, lack of economic opportunities, under-prioritisation of SGBV, lack of SGBV reporting mechanisms and inadequately-trained healthcare workers are highlighted as contributing factors to widespread SGBV. As such, the response to SGVB must be comprehensive and must be fully incorporated by the new mechanism.”¹⁷⁶⁴

The establishment of a mechanism was clearly foreshadowed in the joint report, which was generally welcomed on all sides of the debate. Yet Ethiopia and others expressed visceral opposition. Zenebe Kebede Korcho. the Ethiopian ambassador to Geneva, said the country would not “co-operate with any mechanism imposed on it,” as a result of the UN special session, and that the country was being targeted and singled out at the Human Rights Council. “Multilateralism, after all these years, is once again being hijacked by a neocolonialist mentality.”¹⁷⁶⁵

Meanwhile the Tigray administration welcomed the meeting and the resolution, said it was establishing a high-level task force with full authority to manage its cooperation with the commission and “reiterates its resolve to assure Human Rights Council members and Observer States of its highest regard and sustained constructive engagement on this matter.”¹⁷⁶⁶

16.6 Conclusion

“Only justice can break the cycles of violence,” EU Ambassador Lotte Knudsen told the UN Human Rights council’s special meeting¹⁷⁶⁷. After a conflict marked by some of the most egregious sexual violence witnessed for many years, there is a prospect that the curtain might be lifted on events in Tigray during the blockade. It is possible that the sexual violence that has taken place in Tigray, Amhara and Afar, might finally be properly evidenced and prosecuted, and that the commanders responsible by order or oversight might be held to account. That will rely on many circumstances, above all the survival of those affected, the women, girls, and boys attacked and their families, and the health workers who have treated the brutal physical and mental injuries inflicted. For survival they need the medical and psychosocial services set out at the start of this report and protection. They also need food. All of these rely on the lifting of the Ethiopian government’s humanitarian blockade. If all these circumstances are met, and they are many difficult ifs, then there might yet be justice for the survivors in Tigray and beyond. And proof of the international community’s determination to make good on its commitment to stop sexual violence being used as a weapon of war.

17. Sanction Regimes and Eritrea
By Habte Hagos¹⁷⁶⁸

Other chapters in this volume discuss detailed aspects of the war in Tigray, including
Eritrean involvement. Some provide an update to Volume 1 covering the period July – December 2021; others cover fresh topics. This chapter will focus on sanctions, both unilateral and multilateral, which could potentially be imposed on Eritrea – a country that has subjected its own people to gross human rights abuses for three decades and is a catalyst for the horrific war currently unfolding in Ethiopia.

17.1 Eritrea and its economy

a) The President and the Eritrean Constitution
The Eritrean post-independence constitution was ratified by the National Assembly
on 23 May 1997 as the fundamental law of the country after active popular
participation by the people. Article 16 enshrines the inalienable human rights of its
citizens stating that; (a) the dignity of all persons shall be inviolable [unbreakable],
(b) no person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, and (c) no person shall be held in slavery or servitude nor
shall any person be required to perform forced labour not authorised by law.” Article
19 further underpins these fundamental human rights, adding “every person shall
have freedom of conscience, religion, expression of opinion, movement, assembly
and organisation.”

Under Article 41 the term of office of the President shall be five years, limited to no
more than to two terms. The President shall execute the authority vested in him in
consultation with the Cabinet, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Following the independence referendum in 1993, the National Assembly appointed
Isaias Afeworki as the Interim President of Eritrea until such time a new constitution
could be drawn up and elections held.

The Interim President has refused to implement the constitution, despite the fact that
it was ratified by the National Assembly and formally presented to him for his
signature. He has in effect proceeded to nullify it. No elections have ever been held;
the National Assembly has not met since 2001. Isaias Afwerki has effectively
appointed himself President for life. He has ruled the country with an iron fist for
almost three decades, accountable to no one else but himself. Even the ruling party
– the PFDJ – has held no conference to which he might report.

When asked by Al Jazeera on 23 May 2008, when elections will be held in Eritrea,
the President replied rhetorically: “What elections?”¹⁷⁶⁹ He then added “we will see
what the elections in the United States will bring and then wait for about three to four
decades for a genuine, natural situations [to] emerge in Eritrea.” In short, he said the
people of Eritrea will have to wait between 30 and 40 years before they can elect
their own President.

In December 2010, the then US ambassador to Eritrea, Ronald McMullen, wrote a
secret diplomatic cable¹⁷⁷⁰ explaining how awful the situation in Eritrea really was;
“Weird, dysfunctional Asmara, reminiscent of an Evelyn Waugh novel, is notorious
among western diplomats as a hardship posting. Young Eritreans are fleeing their
country in droves, the economy appears to be in a death spiral, Eritrea’s prisons are
overflowing, and the country’s unhinged dictator remains cruel and defiant. Eritreans’
strong sense of nationalism and their capacity to withstand great suffering and
deprivation allows Isaias to cling to power.” The situation Ambassador McMullen
witnessed in 2010 has worsened exponentially since then. No diplomat can
adequately describe how horrific life has become for the Eritrean people. Eritrea is a
prison state.

b) Economy
The World Bank, the IMF, the African Development Bank amongst others, have
struggled to come up with reliable economic data on Eritrea since the country gained
its independence in 1993. The country has never published an annual budget, official
statistics and data are scanty and notoriously unreliable. Some of the information in
this report cannot, therefore, be sourced. The author, who is of Eritrean extraction,
has always remained informed of the situation in his homeland. Some of the
information has been obtained over many years by working with and speaking to
Eritreans, and others, who are well informed, some of whom have previously been
part of the government or civil service.
In March 2018, in its 1999 -2016 report to the African Commission on Human and
People’s Rights, the Eritrean government revealed that the country has a population
of 3.65 million¹⁷⁷¹. This is considerably smaller than the UN estimate figure of
4,954,645 (2016) or CIA estimate of 5,918,919 (2017)¹⁷⁷². Anecdotally, the
government has deliberately understated the population size to improve GDP per
capita which is one of the lowest in the world but inadvertently this has made its
national debt per capita look a lot worse.

Eritrea has a command economy that is under the absolutely control of the President
and a handful of his inner circle. There are three key components to the Eritrean
economy; (i) Agriculture, (ii) Extractive Industries, and (iii) Remittances and Diaspora
Tax. Manufacturing, once the envy of the region, has been in steep decline due to
manpower, material and power/electricity shortages. Hardly any private sector
construction takes place in the country since the necessary but scarce material and
manpower are requestioned by the government and party autocrats. The vast
majority of the population are enlisted in the open-ended and inaptly called “national
service” where they work in slave-like conditions for meagre pay, unable to support
their parents or start a family of their own.¹⁷⁷³

i.Agriculture
According to the FAO (2019)¹⁷⁷⁴, the country’s agricultural sector employs 60 – 80%
of the population but contributes less than 20% of the national GDP. Production is
hampered by harsh climatic conditions, erratic and inadequate rainfall, soil erosion,
recurrent locust swarm and lack of modern farming equipment. This is exacerbated
by frequent wars with neighbouring counties which sucks huge numbers of people
away from productive activities, to fight in destructive conflicts. For example, the
border conflict with Ethiopia in 1998-2000, and the current tragic war in Tigray where
the people of Eritrea have been forced at gunpoint to fight and die en mass in
another country’s civil war.

According to the World Bank (2018)¹⁷⁷⁵, the agriculture sector meets between 60
and 70% of the food needs of the people even in years of good rainfall. The food
shortfall is largely met through food aid from the international community, making the
regime’s self-reliance ideology a myth.

ii.Extractive Industries

Eritrea’s vast and largely untapped mineral reserves have been the key sector that
has attracted foreign direct investment which peaked at US$74mn in 2020¹⁷⁷⁶, a
fraction of its huge revenue stream potential. The country’s geology hosts a variety
of precious metals, base metals, and industrial minerals, most notably gold, copper,
nickel, chromite, potash, sulphur, marble, and granite. Gold is said to be present in
many parts of Eritrea. A major belt of sulphide deposits with gold and base metal
mineralization extends over a length of 250 kms from north of Asmara, the capital, to
the Eritrean border to the south. This belt includes the Bisha high-grade zinc-coppergold deposit1777. There are indications of similar base metal deposits further north of
Kerkebet and Harabsuit and a belt of copper mineralization in Raba-Semait area,
sulphide-rich gossanous rock in Mt Tullului (Bedeho) in the north and in Mt Seccar
and Sheib areas in the eastern Lowlands¹⁷⁷⁸.

In spite of the economic and investment climate, there are still a number of
international companies from Canada, UK, Australia and China doing business in
Eritrea, almost exclusively in the extractive sector. The sector is increasingly
dominated by Chinese companies, who own approximately 75% of all operations. In
January 2020, Nevsun Resources Ltd of Canada was acquired by a Chinese
company – Zijin Mining Group Co Ltd – for US$1.86bn in a friendly takeover¹⁷⁷⁹.

The Eritrean regime largely maintains itself through mining revenues. Much of
Eritrea’s foreign exchange income comes from foreign gold/copper mining company
projects, in which the Eritrean Government holds at least a 40% stake.¹⁷⁸⁰Nevsun’s
2016 financial statement states the company has contributed US$1bn to the Eritrean
government in various forms of taxation, dividends, and other payments¹⁷⁸¹ and that
the contents of Bisha mine alone are worth a combined total of US$2.7bn¹⁷⁸².

Western financial institutions and companies listed in stock exchanges in London,
Toronto, New York, and Australia have major stakes in mining companies operating
in Eritrea. These institutions and companies are complicit in the horrific and
sustained human rights abuses in Eritrea. They are also helping finance the current
appalling war in Ethiopia that has brought the country to the brink of fragmentation.

iii.Remittances and Diaspora Tax

In 2019, the Eritrean People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) in exile, estimated the
number of Eritreans in the diaspora at “at least 2 million” scattered around the globe
including; 850,000 in Sudan, over 500,000 in Ethiopia, 200,000 in North America,
125,000 in Italy, 80,000 in Germany, 50,000 in Sweden, 40,000 in the UK, 39,000 in
Switzerland, 25,000 in Sweden, 20,000 in Norway, 6,000 in Australia, 4,000 each in
Denmark and Finland and 3,000 each in France and Belgium¹⁷⁸³. These numbers
have increased significantly since 2019. Going into exile is the only option to
preserve life for a large segment of the Eritrean population¹⁷⁸⁴. And for the children
of Eritrea “refugee status” in the west is now seen as a “profession” to aspire to.

Remittances

Remittances to family and friends from the diaspora are one of the main drivers of
the Eritrean economy and are said to contribute, together with the diaspora tax,
around a third¹⁷⁸⁵ of GDP. Approximately a third of the population in Eritrea rely on
remittances for their basic daily needs such as food and housing¹⁷⁸⁶. This inflow of
cash also generates a substantial amount of hard currency for the government and is
likely to increase as the number of refugees, especially those of productive age
(under 40 years of age) accelerates year-on-year.

Apart from remittances to support family and friends, there is no direct investment by
the Eritrean diaspora in their homeland due to a lack of confidence in the
government. This is in contrast to other African countries e.g., Ethiopia where
diasporas invest large sums of money in their country, and are actively encouraged,
and indeed incentivized, to do so by the government. The lack of diaspora inward
investment in Eritrea, to some extent stems, from the “Eritrean Bond Scheme” issued
in the 1990s. Eritreans, in good faith, invested their hard currencies in government
bonds, only to find the government “default”¹⁷⁸⁷.

In the early stage after independence, the Eritrean diaspora’s “social remittance” in
terms of a transfer of ideas, skills and expertise, technology and research were
significant. Some high skilled Eritreans in diaspora abandoned well paid jobs and
comfortable lives in the west to return to their country to help build its economy pro
bono. This was not well received nor welcomed by the government, which saw it as
a threat to its monopolistic control. Over time the “social remittance” simply fizzled
away, and even those who relocated to the country were gradually forced to return to
exile and rebuild their lives all over again.

Diaspora Tax

On 10 December 1991, the Transitional Administration of Eritrea issued
Proclamation No. 17/1991 for the Collection of Rehabilitation Tax. This was
subsequently amended by Proclamation No. 67/1995 to include the Collection of Tax
from Eritreans who “Earn Income while Living Abroad”. The main purpose of the tax,
as stated in Proclamation No. 17/1991, was “Social Security” such as supporting
families of martyrs, war disabled and victims of natural disaster.

Proclamation No. 67/1995 identifies a taxable person as “any person [Eritrean] who
lives outside the country and who earns income from employment, rental of
moveable or immovable property, or any other commercial, professional or service
rendering activity, shall pay a 2% tax on net income on a monthly or yearly basis.”
The tax is therefore levied to the members of diaspora although the original
Proclamation does not specifically refer to diaspora tax and the constitution ratified in
1997 states “only the National Assembly has the authority to impose taxes”, in effect
repealing Proclamations No. 67/1995. This raises the question of the legality of the
diaspora tax under Eritrean law. Similarly, western countries have increasingly
questioned the legality of the taxes over the last decade.

The Eritrean government 2% Diaspora Tax rate has remained unchanged since it
was first enacted. It is difficult to know the total diaspora tax the government collects
each year. But it is thought to be one of the main sources of hard currency earner for
the country and contributes, along with remittances, about 33%t to GDP¹⁷⁸⁸.

According to Proclamation 67/1997, responsibility for the diaspora tax lies with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the tax is payable to the Ministry of Finance through
diplomatic missions. The transactions take place outside the formal channels of the
Inland Revenue and Treasury Departments of the Ministry of Finance and are
believed to be used to finance covert activities by the President.

The diaspora tax is collected by coercion, extortion, and threats of violence by
members of Embassy staff and government agents sometimes going house to house
in an attempt to persuade or intimidate members of the diaspora to pay the levy.
Taxes collected this way are then transferred to various Eritrean embassy bank
accounts or to privately held offshore accounts. Some of the tax is repatriated to
Eritrea in diplomatic bags, or by couriers. Increasingly the levy is paid in hard
currency on arrival in Asmara.

In July 2011, the UN Security Council noted “that Oakland, California, and the
Washington, D.C., area host some of the largest Eritrean communities in the United
States, and therefore provide major sources of funding for PFDJ. Some of this cash
is deposited in Eritrean embassy bank accounts, but much of it is moved through
increasingly opaque financial networks, employing money transfer companies and
individual couriers. According to Eritrean sources, Tesfay (or Adey) Mariam is
suspected of being one such financial facilitator. While working as a taxi driver in
Arlington, Virginia, Tesfay Mariam – an Eritrean citizen with dual United States
nationality – has organised the transfer of hundreds of thousands of dollars to
Eritrean individuals and PFDJ-linked businesses in Dubai.” Tesfay is on the list of 95
Eritrean individuals with significant real estate interest in Dubai that the author
anonymously received in January 2022.

In December 2011, the UN in accordance with the international law S/RES/2023
(2011) 4 11-62278, declared “that Eritrea shall cease using extortion, threats of
violence, fraud and other illicit means to collect taxes outside of Eritrea from its
nationals or other individuals of Eritrean descent. It added that States [host
countries] shall undertake appropriate measures to hold accountable individuals on
their territory who are acting, officially or unofficially, on behalf of the Eritrean
government or the PFDJ. It called upon States to take such action as may be
appropriate consistent with their domestic law and international relevant instruments,
including the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, to prevent such individuals from facilitating
further violations; (UN Security Council, 2011b).”

The UN Commission of Inquiry reported the 2% Tax was a tool used by the
government of Eritrea to carry out surveillance and control over the diaspora
communities. Some countries including Canada and the Netherlands have expelled
Eritrean envoys over diaspora tax. However, the regime continues to flagrantly
abuses its own and international law to collect diaspora tax through its embassies
and agents across the world.

Failure to pay the diaspora tax can result in the denial of consular services, access
to services in Eritrea for self or family members (including food vouchers), property
rights (including home repairs), remittances and gift packages to family members. At
worst it could result in social exclusion, vilification or even imprisonment.
Proponents of the Eritrean diaspora tax argue the tax is the same as that levied by
western governments on their own citizens living and working abroad. This could not
be further from the truth. To begin with, western governments do not coerce or
threaten violence against their citizens to force them to pay tax anywhere in the
world in the way Eritrea does. Moreover, western citizens living and working abroad
in most cases pay tax to their home governments, usually under Double Taxation
Treaties.

Double Taxation Treaties are agreements between two states which are designed to:
protect against the risk of double taxation where the same income is taxable in two
states. For example, the US and the UK governments signed on 24 July 2001 [last
updated 9 August 2021] a Double Taxation Relief Treaty which entitles their
taxpayers to pay tax in only one country¹⁷⁸⁹. Similarly, Italy and the UK have a
Double Taxation Treaty for the avoidance of double taxation between their two
countries which was signed in 1988 that came into effect at the start of 1990¹⁷⁹⁰.

Eritrea currently has no Double Taxation Treaty with any other country in the world;
hence it cannot legally levy tax on its diaspora. This assertation by the author is
supported by Michael Rubin, an Enterprise scholar, who states “the American
[western] analogy is simply inaccurate. The US negotiates double taxation treaties
with various governments. That the Eritrean regime will threaten the family members
of its nationals abroad to compel diaspora tax payments likewise places it firmly in
the camp not of the US but rather of North Korea, Turkmenistan, or, in the past,
Moammar Gadhafi’s Libya or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.”¹⁷⁹¹

No other viable economic sector in Eritrea

Apart from the three economic sectors noted above, Eritrea has minuscule fishery
activities despite its 1,200 km Red Sea Coast and a number of populous landlocked
neighbouring countries to which it could market its fish produce. Eritrean ports stand
idle and decaying. There are almost no tourists and diaspora visits have declined
steadily due to lack of amenities, restrictions, and human rights abuses at the hands
of the security services.

Manufacturing is virtually non-existent in today’s Eritrea, which has been
systematically and deliberately destroyed or neglected into state of disrepair by the
regime. The once vibrant private sector, which was the envy of neighbouring
counties, has been decimated by the President. The “private sector” now comprises
of the self-employed workers in village farms, market stalls, bars/restaurants or
corner shops dotted in towns and cities around the country. It is next to impossible
for the self-employed to access hard currency and the transactions are carried out
almost exclusively in Nakfa, which are rigidly controlled by the regime.

The overall state of Eritrea’s finances

Eritrea struggles to attract inward investment due to corruption, excessive foreign
and local currency controls, low-skilled workforce drained by mass migration and
delipidated infrastructure. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2020 was a meagre
US$74mn (2019: US$67mn)¹⁷⁹². There is also an endemic and systematic human
rights abuses and indefinite slave-like national service in the country. As a result,
Eritrea remains one of the world’s most difficult places to do business, ranking
second last (before Somalia) out of 190 countries in the 2020 Doing Business report
published by the World Bank (same ranking as in 2019)¹⁷⁹³.

According to the FCDO factsheet dataset published in October 2021¹⁷⁹⁴ show the
following stats:

✓ GDP US$2.1bn
✓ GDP per capita US$587.70
✓ Inflation 4.8%
✓ Current account balance 10.9% of GDP
✓ Debt 184.9% of GDP
✓ Govt revenue 31.4% of GDP
✓ Govt spend 36.4% of GDP
✓ Deficit 5% of GDP
✓ Forex Reserves US$200mn [approx. 1.25 months cover]

In 2020 Eritrea was affected by locust swarms and the COVID–19 pandemic which
hampered economic activities. As a result, GDP declined by 0.6% compared to prior
year. COVID affected supply chains working hours and travel. The fiscal deficit
widened by 5% of GDP in 2020, compared with a deficit of 1.6% in 2019.

The amount of debt Eritrea owes is significant in relation to its small economy: US$
3.9bn1795 in 2020. This equates to 184.9% of the national GDP, making the country
one of the most debt-ridden nations in the world. This is likely to worsen as the
country borrows even more money (mostly from the Chinese) to finance its war
efforts in Tigray.

Today, Eritrea is almost always near the bottom of international social and economic
indicators. The Human Development Index (HDI) for 2019¹⁷⁹⁶ ranked Eritrea in
0.434, which is below the average of 0.504 for countries in the low human
development group and below the average for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In
2019, Eritrea was ranked at 182 out of 189 countries in terms of HDI. Poverty
remained high at 69% in 2019 with the majority of the population facing significant
challenges in food security.

In the early post-independence years, President Isaias promised to transform
Eritrea’s economy into the “Singapore of Africa” or “Switzerland of Africa” depending
on his erratic and at times childlike mood. Instead, the country today is widely
labelled as the “North Korea of Africa.” The Eritrean economy is on its knees and the
country is one of the fastest emptying nations, producing one of the largest number
of refugees per capita in the world year-on-year over the last decade.¹⁷⁹⁷

In a televised interview¹⁷⁹⁸ President Isaias gave to the nation in February 2021,
which was subsequently translated by the author from Tigrinya into English¹⁷⁹⁹, he
said “there is no economic or trade problem in this country but the way we think has
been the root cause of our difficulties. Nobody can say our economy is an economy.
What economy? It is a hand to mouth economy.” On COVID-19, he adds “to say
COVID has had a negative impact on our economy is an exaggeration because we
had no economy in the first place. This is why I say there has not been any business
in Eritrea that has been interrupted or closed down because of COVID. Which ones?

None, because they did not exist in the first place. Our economic capability currently
is zero, but we have big ideas and policies for a sustainable solution.”

The President further reiterated these economic calamities in a speech he
apparently gave to a selected group of army officers and cadres in a town south of
Asmara (on the road from the capital to Massawa) in September 2020. He said “the
country had to accept that it has a small and not very viable economy and a long
Red Sea coast, which Eritrea cannot patrol on its own. Hence it is imperative to think
of some sort of union with Ethiopia, at least in terms of economic co-operation and
maritime security.”¹⁸⁰⁰

The President is delusional and shameless. He fails to accept that the Eritrean
economic calamity happened in his 30-year watch, which he has transformed a
relatively prosperous, developing country into an economic wasteland. It’s no wonder
a neighbouring country foreign minister said, “this man is a lunatic” and another
added “all of Africa is fed up with him.”¹⁸⁰¹

17.2 Corruption

Eritrea’s economic woes are the direct result of endemic, systematic and rampant
corruption as will be explained in the paragraphs that follow. Corruption is at the
heart of the regime in Asmara, which in turn deters foreign direct investments from
international entities and Eritrean diasporas alike.

The government and its proponents claim Eritrea has zero tolerance for the crime¹⁸⁰²
and experiences little corruption¹⁸⁰³. However, international data such as the
Corruption Index paints a different picture. According to the Corruption Perceptions
Index, Eritrea score ranged between 18/100 and 25/100, averaging 21/100 in the
period from 2012 to 2020¹⁸⁰⁴, where the average score for the least corrupt country
(Denmark) is 89/100. The corruption trend in Eritrea over the period has worsened
rather than improve.

In 2011, the UN Somalia/Eritrea Monitoring Group (SMEG)¹⁸⁰⁵ reported that
“Essentially, Eritrea manages two parallel economies: a formal economic sphere
ostensibly managed by the State, and an opaque, largely offshore financial system
controlled by elements of the ruling party and their supporters.”¹⁸⁰⁶ The first part of
the economy managed by the State is almost exclusively a “cash economy” which is
used by the population and government departments to run services. In 2015, the
government issued new Nakfa (ERN)¹⁸⁰⁷ notes pegged at a fixed US$1 to ERN15 ,
and restricted the amount its citizens can withdraw from the bank to ERN 5000
(US$330) per month¹⁸⁰⁸. There are no ATMs (automated cash withdrawal machines)
in Eritrea¹⁸⁰⁹, a facility that has become increasingly common in the region, including
across the border in Tigray, Ethiopia. There are no card transactions in the country,
be they credit or debit cards. Carrying hard currency, unless a member of the ruling
elite or a visiting member of the diaspora, is not permissible. The cash economy is
rigidly controlled by the regime and any breach can result in an indefinite
imprisonment, without the due process of the law, or worse.

The second sphere i.e., the opaque economy, is conducted almost exclusively in
hard currency and largely through offshore bank accounts to carry out the
government’s illicit activities or to procure essential commodities such as fuel. This
“off balance sheet” economy is under the absolute control of the President.
There are about three dozen party-owned enterprises in the country that are involved
in all sectors of the economy; ranging from construction to import and export,
agriculture, manufacturing, transport, communication and financial services. These
entities are organised under the Hidri Trust Fund and run by Hagos Ghebrehiwet,
aka ‘Kisha’ [moneybags], PFDJ’s head of economic affairs who is also the de facto
finance minister and a close confidant of the President. As reported by the UN
Commission of Inquiry (2016) “Only the President and three members of his inner
circle, alone and with no [other] oversight, run state finances¹⁸¹⁰. One important and
undisputed source of revenue is proceeds from mining operations owned jointly by
the Eritrean state and a transnational corporation.”¹⁸¹¹ Despite this closed network,
some specific and damaging details of corruption by the inner circle and their
associates have emerged over the years.

i.UN Security Council Somalia/Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG)

In 2011, the SEMG identified Eritrean businessman in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda,
Burundi and South Sudan linked with millions of dollars collected by the Eritrean
embassy in Nairobi. These illicit funds being used to support the Eritrean
government’s activities, including human rights violations. The SEMG recommended
travel restrictions against those involved as deterrent and thereby removing this
lucrative financial stream for the Eritrean government.

ii.South Sudan (The Sentry Report)¹⁸¹²

In October 2019, The Sentry investigators reported Eritrean businessmen own
hundreds of companies in South Sudan. Eritrean traders in South Sudan have been
awarded contracts between 2012 and the present worth hundreds of millions of
dollars. Besides being involved in import and export, Eritreans own several hotels in
Juba, as well as power and construction companies.
For example, “The Sentry reports that out of the US$922mn letter of credit
programme in South Sudan, US$57mn was contracted to companies registered to a
certain Ghebremeskel Tesfamariam Ghidey (Gebre) [a major property investor in
Dubai]¹⁸¹³. The money borrowed mainly from the National Bank of Qatar was meant
for emergency food and other essential consumables. There is no evidence that any
of the contracted companies delivered the promised goods. Reportedly, Gebre is
affiliated with Eritrea’s ruling party and has been mentioned in the UN Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea as one of the recipients of “illicit funds” originating
from the USA¹⁸¹⁴.

Sources in Eritrea indicate that following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
between northern and southern Sudanese, contract deals were made between the
Government of South Sudan under John Garang and the Eritrean Government for
PFDJ construction companies to take part in infrastructure construction in the new
country. The contracts estimated at US$1.3bn were cancelled by Salva Kiir’s new
administration following the accidental death of John Garang. By then Eritrea had
already invested US$33mn in machinery and other materials and had some
construction companies (e.g., the party-owned Segen) and personnel on the ground,
which became a major issue of contention between the two governments and
personally between Isaias and Kiir”.

iii.Human Trafficking

The UN Human Rights Inquiry on Eritrea (2017)¹⁸¹⁵ reported that Eritrean army
officials were involved in human trafficking. One of these is General Tekle Kiflai
(Manjus) who then controlled the smuggling across the western border with Sudan.
Manjus is reported to be one of richest army officers in the country, second only to
General Filipos Woldeyohannes, the army Chief of Staff and a member of the
President’s inner circle. According to Eritrea’s former Deputy Minister of Finance,
Kubrom Dafla Hasabay “[all of] the money doesn’t stop with Manjus, but it goes all
the way up to the President.”

General Filipos was sanctioned by the US government in November 2021.

iv.World Bank – Aid money misappropriated by corrupt government official

According to the World Bank (February 2020), Eritrea is one of the top corrupt
countries in the world where foreign aid is diverted to individual offshore accounts in
large amounts, especially when compared to GDP. The report was prepared by the
World Bank Policy Research and is contained in Working Paper 9150.¹⁸¹⁶
This report examined whether there is a visible and verifiable correlation between
receipt of foreign aid from the World Bank by certain countries, and money flows
from these countries to foreign banks. A correlation means corrupt elites are
capturing the aid and pocketing it rather than using it to develop their nation. This
research found that in a quarter when a country received aid equivalent to 1% of
GDP, its deposits in havens/offshore accounts increase by 3.4% relative to a country
receiving no aid. In Eritrea, World Bank aid flows account for 3.2%t of the annual
GDP, the nation has eight known deposit accounts in foreign bank ‘havens,’ and it
showed a 2.29% quarterly growth rate in deposits to foreign accounts when aid is
paid by the World Bank.¹⁸¹⁷

The World Bank report demonstrates aid money given for the development of the
country (Eritrea) and the wellbeing of the people is being siphoned off to offshore
bank accounts by corrupt Eritrean government officials for their own personal gain
and/or to prop-up the authoritarian regime.

It is unfathomable why the World Bank cannot stipulate mandatory monitoring and
reporting mechanisms to ensure its foreign aid is used for its intended purposes. In
this regard and following the publication of its February 2020 report, Eritrea Focus in
partnership with other organisations submitted such a proposal to the World Bank
but received no reply¹⁸¹⁸.

v.HSBC

When the whistle-blower, Hervé Falciani, exposed the secret accounts in HSBC’s
Swiss private banking arm in 2015, Eritrea was among the top four African countries
with the largest dollar deposits, US$699mn¹⁸¹⁹. In addition, a single Eritrean client
appeared to have US$695.2mn deposited, making it HSBC’s biggest single client in
Africa, (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 2015). The dollar
accounts appeared to be under the names of individuals domiciled in Asmara. Given
the level of control the Eritrean Government has on all aspects of economic life in the
country, it is widely assumed that the deposit is related to party-controlled funds. The
government has not made any official attempts to identify the account holder and the
source of the money or deny the report¹⁸²⁰.

President Afwerki and his inner circle maintain accounts separate from the official
government bank account. Ghebreselassi Kidane Habte [then aged 37]¹⁸²¹ deposited
more than US$106mn in the bank while Hassan Abdalla Bashir, the “Banker” [then
aged 24] deposited more than US$209mn. Their collective secret deposit at the
HSBC exceeds US$315mn¹⁸²². There has been no attempt to explain their
extraordinary wealth.

vi.Qatar’s National Bank

In August 2021, Qatar National Bank asked a Washington, D.C. court to order
Eritrea to pay about US$300mn of debt after the country refused to respond to two
lawsuits¹⁸²³. Eritrea borrowed US$200mn from Qatar in 2009/2010 and only returned
US$45mn of the amount in May 2012. In 2018, the Qatar bank took legal action in
the UK and in 2019 a judged ordered Eritrea to pay its lender, Qatar Bank,
US$254mn, including interest accrued. Eritrea stopped responding to lawyers. This
prompted Qatar Bank to request a judgement from a US Federal court.

Qatar Bank said in its court filing that staff at the Eritrean embassy in London even
locked one of the Bank’s lawyers in the diplomatic [Embassy] building until he
agreed to leave without handing the court documents to officials. Another
representative was apparently “physically assaulted” by a receptionist who threw the
court papers onto the pavement outside the Embassy’s building. A British judge
[perhaps fearing the worst] subsequently allowed the documents to be sent via email
or post.

In August 2021, the US Federal court ordered Eritrea to pay the debt and the court’s
decision enables Qatar Bank to identify and seize Eritrea’s overseas assets. The
whole Qatar Bank episode would be laughable, if it was not true. It demonstrates the
typical characteristics of the regime in Asmara.

It is no wonder Eritrea has been consistently identified as highly corrupt by
Transparency International, and was ranked the 21st most corrupt nation in the world
in 2020¹⁸²⁴ (the same ranking as 2019).¹⁸²⁵ Furthermore, the 2017 Natural Resource
Governance Index, which measures the governance standards of developing
countries’ extractive industries, ranks Eritrea in 89th place- last- and the country’s
state-owned mining company is categorised as the worst governed state
enterprise.¹⁸²⁶

The above are some of many examples that unequivocally demonstrate Eritrea,
under its self-appointed President for life, is one of the most fraudulent and corrupt
nations¹⁸²⁷ on earth. The Eritrean people have been denied their human rights to live
under the rule of law and enjoy the democracy they fought so hard to establish. They
have also been denied their economic and social development rights under Article 8
of the constitution: “The State shall strive to create opportunities to ensure the
fulfilment of citizens’ rights to social justice and economic development and to fulfil
their material and spiritual needs”.

There is no question about it: Eritrea is and has become a mafia state¹⁸²⁸ under the
dictatorial and brutal regime of President Isaias.

17.3 United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI)

In 2014, the United Nations established a Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in
Eritrea (COI), with a mission “to investigate systematic, widespread and gross
violations of human rights in Eritrea with a view to ensuring full accountability”.

Eritrea has been under the one-man rule of President Isaias since its independence.
According to a World Bank report (2020) Eritrea “is one of, if not the most, repressive
nations on the African continent, and is a repetitive perpetrator of human rights
violations”¹⁸²⁹. The Asmara regime commits grotesque human rights violations on its
own citizens. Some of these inhumane violations include:

➢ Absence of freedom of speech and expression, and targeting of journalists;
➢ Harassment and mass imprisonment of religious groups, and closures of houses
of worship;
➢ Banned opposition parties and civic societies;
➢ Enforced disappearance, torture, other inhumane acts, including extrajudicial
executions;
➢ Arbitrary and indefinite detention in overcrowded prisons with no access to legal
representation;
➢ Enslavement in an open-ended mandatory national service at the age of 17, and
sometimes 15, where conscripts are paid meagre wages and endure unbearable
working conditions;
➢ Endemic and systemic rape and other sexual abuses by army officers and
others;
➢ Forced to fight in foreign wars, including in the Tigray conflict

The COI has had three Special Rapporteur since its inception; Ms. Sheila B.
Keetharuth (2014 – 2017), Ms. Daniela Kravetz (2018 – 2019) and the current
Special Rapporteur, Dr. Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker, who was appointed in 2020.
All three Special Rapporteurs were denied access to the country by the Eritrean
government although Ms Keetharuth was able to meet the Eritrean Ambassador to
the UK and Republic of Ireland in London in January 2017. Accordingly, all the COI
reports were based on testimonials gathered outside the country and information
collated from human right groups, experts, diplomats, media reports, members of the
Eritrean diaspora and others.

To date, and since June 2015, the COI Special Rapporteurs have submitted annual
reports¹⁸³⁰ to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneve and their mandate routinely
extended for an additional 12 months, with the next report due in June 2022. Each of
these reports contain common themes of gross human rights abuses in Eritrea and
the reports have become predictable in their contents by the international community
and human rights activists. The findings of the seven COI reports so far can be
summarised as follows:

• The constitution of 1997 has never been implemented, and that the judiciary is not
  independent;
• Systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations have been and are
  being committed by the government of Eritrea and that there is no accountability
  for them (A/HRC/29/42, paragraph 66);
• The violations in the areas of extrajudicial executions, torture (including sexual
  torture), national service and forced labour may constitute crimes against
  humanity (A/HRC/29/42, paragraph 66);
• The PFDJ, the ruling party in Eritrea, has held on to power by progressively
  dismantling or refraining from implementing reforms aimed at establishing
  democracy and the rule of law” (A/HRC/29/42, paragraph 67);
• The PFDJ has established a system by which an extraordinary number of
  individuals have the power to spy on Eritreans and conduct investigations and
  arrests often without observing the law (A/HRC/29/42, paragraph 67);
• Eritreans are unable to move at will, to express themselves freely, to practice their
  religion without undue influence, to enjoy unrestricted access to information or to
  have the liberty to assemble and associate (A/HRC/29/42, paragraph 71). It notes
  the government’s use of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions to
  prevent the rise of any opposing views;
• Arbitrary detention is ubiquitous in Eritrea, and raised explicit concern about the
  number of officials misusing the power of arrest (A/HRC/29/42, paragraph 73);
• The practice of keeping detainees in incommunicado detention or in isolation with
  total disregard for international standards is widespread (A/HRC/29/42, paragraph
  73) – and are routinely subject to forms of ill-treatment that, in many cases,
  amount to torture (A/HRC/29/42, paragraph 74); and
• The duration of national service is indefinite; its conditions violate international
  standards and conscripts are severely underpaid. As such, it is an institution
  where slavery-like practices take place, COI (A/HRC/29/42, paragraph 77).
• The use of forced labour is so prevalent in Eritrea that all sectors of the economy
  rely on it, and all Eritreans are likely to be subject to it at some stage in their lives,
  from which the government profits (A/HRC/29/42, paragraph 78).
  In June 2016 and subsequent reports, the COI reported it had “reasonable grounds
  to believe that crimes against humanity, namely: enslavement, imprisonment,
  enforced disappearance, torture, other inhumane acts, persecution, rape, and
  murder, have been committed in Eritrea since 1991 (A/HRC/32/47, paragraph 59).

In his June 2021 report¹⁸³¹ to the UN Human Rights Council, Dr Babiker, asked, in
addition to highlighting the above findings, for accountability for the alleged serious
human rights violations committed by Eritrean army in Tigray, including abduction
and forced return of Eritrean refugees. The Special Rapporteur urged international
organisations and business enterprises to avoid financing projects in Eritrea “that
may potentially violate or have an adverse impact on human rights.” Page 7, para
26.

There is always, without exception, an outcry from the international community,
including the UN, each year these COI reports are released repeating the same
human rights abuses year after year, and the mandate extended by the UN for
another year. No concert action has ever been taken against Eritrea for flagrantly
ignoring the COI recommendations and its international obligations. It makes a
mockery of the COI and impossible to fathom the purpose of the COI for human
rights groups and the Eritrean people.

The UN and the international communities’ inaction encourages the regime in
Asmara to carry out even more grotesque atrocities on its own people and now in the
region with impunity, setting a bad precedent to other bad actors in the continent and
beyond.

17.4 The Eritrea/Ethiopia War Pact

When asked by Reuters in May 2008 about Eritrea normalisation relations with
Ethiopia, President Isaias incoherently remarked “It’s too late. It could have been
mended a long time ago without going and resorting to this unnecessary war … If
you can be an angel or someone like Christ, maybe.”

In September 2018, over two years before the start of the Tigray war in November
2020, President Isaias and PM Abiy met with the then President of Tigray,
Debretsion. President Isaias asked Debretsion: “why are you preparing for war?”
Debretsion apparently replied “it won’t happen.” Isaias follows up this engagement in
a televised interview¹⁸³² he gave in February 2021 in which he says, after listening
what Debretsion had to say, “we started to carefully study the situation and to make
our own preparations [for war].” Adding “the TPLF seemed concerned about
potential attacks from the south and Eritrea in the north.”
President Isaias and PM Abiy were therefore preparing for war just over two months

after signing the agreement and over two years before the start of the Tigray war,
thus making the agreement a war pact against the Tigrayans rather than a peace
agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

The genesis of the war pact

It must be recalled that the Eritrean government unashamedly blamed Ethiopia and
the international community for all its problems and refused to take any responsibility
for the economic collapse and international isolation of the country. In its African
Commission on Human and People’s Rights report (2017)¹⁸³³, the Eritrean
government blamed its failures on “the border war with Ethiopia and the subsequent
ongoing existential threat against Eritrea”. This threat was used as an excuse to
subject the Eritrean people to grotesque human rights abuses for almost two
decades leading up to the agreement between the two countries in 2018.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was elected on 2 April 2018. Within 64 days of his
election, on 5 June, he waved an olive branch to the Eritrean government declaring
Ethiopia’s full acceptance of the 2002 Ethiopia–Eritrea Boundary Commission ruling,
without preconditions¹⁸³⁴. The two countries had fought an all-out war around the
border town of Badame between 1998 and 2000 in which approximately 100,000
lives were lost, no one knows the exact numbers.

The announcement caught the Eritrean Authorities off-guard. When contacted
by Reuters on the day of the announcement, Eritrea’s Information Minister Yemane
Gebremeskel said he had not yet seen the Ethiopian government’s statement, so
could not immediately comment. A day later, he tweeted “Our position is crystal clear
and has been so for 16 years”. Nevertheless, the agreement was signed on 9 July 2018.
Following the signing of the agreement, PM Abiy Ahmed said “Now there is no
border between Ethiopia and Eritrea.¹⁸³⁵ That borderline has gone today…love is
greater than modern weapons. War is not an option for the people of Eritrea and
Ethiopia. What we need now is love.”¹⁸³⁶ He was loudly applauded by the audience
for his remarks, including President Isaias who stood next to him.

The so called “peace agreement” welcomed around the world

UNSC¹⁸³⁷: The Security Council in a statement said, “this represents a historic and
significant development with far-reaching positive consequences for the Horn of
Africa and beyond.” It added that members “stand ready to support Eritrea and
Ethiopia in their implementation of the Joint Declaration.”

African Union¹⁸³⁸: The chairperson of the AU praised the two leaders for “choosing
the courageous path of reconciliation, in the interest of their people, the region and
Africa as a whole.” He further remarked the agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia
is “a milestone in Africa’s efforts to silence the guns by 2020”.

European Union¹⁸³⁹: “The signing of the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship
represents an historic and courageous move by Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki
and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and paves the way for enhanced regional
cooperation and stability in the Horn of Africa.” It added, the EU stands ready to
mobilise the support needed ….”.

United States¹⁸⁴⁰: Said “We commend Prime Minister Abiy of Ethiopia and President
Isaias of Eritrea for courageously leading their citizens towards peace, prosperity,
and political reform. The normalization of relations and the adoption of the Joint
Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Eritrea and Ethiopia will provide their
peoples with the opportunity to focus on shared aspirations for closer political,economic, and social ties. The United States stands ready to support this process
….”

United Kingdom¹⁸⁴¹: Said “Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias have taken a
momentous step towards building a lasting peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea”

The exact contents of the “peace agreement” remain a mystery for both the Eritrean
and Ethiopian peoples. Nevertheless, the announcement was welcomed by a
significant majority of the Eritrean people both in the country and in diaspora with
minor opposition from the residents of the border town of Tsorena and Irobs. In
Asmara thousands danced on the street in jubilation and Eritreans in diaspora
celebrated to welcome the start of the new relation between the two countries.
In Ethiopia, various events were held to celebrate the mystery peace accord in which
the two leaders held hands and blew kisses to the crowds. At one such event
President Isaias and PM Abiy even exchanged rings in what has been subsequently
dubbed as the “first gay marriage in Africa.” The border between Ethiopia and Eritrea
opened and flights between Addis and Asmara resumed enabling citizens of both
countries to see their loved ones for the first time in two decades.

At country level, the UN sanctions imposed as a result of Eritrea’s dealings with
Djibouti and its support for Al Shabaab (extremists’ group) in Somalia, were declared
“likely to become obsolete”¹⁸⁴² by the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres. The
UN sanctions were formally lifted in November 2018, President Isaias’ achieving one
of his objectives, hence removing his isolation from the international community
which he so desperately desired for many years despite his outwardly denial.

PM Abiy Nobel Peace Prize Award

On 10 December 2019 (exactly 11 months before he declared war on Tigray), PM
Abiy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize by the Norwegian Nobel Committee
apparently to “embolden him to make further reforms in his country”.¹⁸⁴³ The award
looked premature then, undeserved now and akin to awarding full marks to students
before they actually sit their examinations.
In his award ceremony in Oslo, PM Abiy roared to the delight of his hosts making
comments that have since transpired hollow and deceitful. He said, “War is the
epitome of hell for all involved and I know because I was there.”¹⁸⁴⁴ This while he
was in the middle of planning a catastrophic war in Tigray. Furthermore, he said “he
accepts the award on behalf of Africans and citizens of the world for whom the
dream of peace has often turned into a nightmare of war.” This was the time when
the AU was proactively campaigning to “silence guns in Africa by 2020”.

PM Abiy declared war on Tigray in November 2020 causing the death of tens of
thousands of civilians and displacement of millions of people.

On 1 December 2020, Eritrea Focus wrote to the Nobel Committee¹⁸⁴⁵ asking them
to rescind the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize from Prime Minister Abiy because of his
“failure to secure a comprehensive peace with Eritrea and to bring peace to his own
country—the promise of which was the explicit reason the Nobel Committee gave for
the award.” Eritrea Focus received no reply.

In July 2021, Ms Hebret Berhe, a prominent former Eritrean Ambassador to
Scandinavia and a brave woman who fought courageously for the independence of
her country for a quarter of a century, wrote to the Nobel Committee¹⁸⁴⁶ asking them
to withdraw the prize awarded to PM Abiy. That request, along with many others,
failed on the deaf ears of the Norwegian Noble Committee.

The most the Norwegian Nobel Committee has done so far is to call on all parties “to
end the escalating violence and to solve disagreements and conflicts by peaceful
means”¹⁸⁴⁷. The Committee has refused to revoke PM Abiy’s award. This leaves a
lasting and ugly stain on the Nobel Committee, especially since November 2021
when PM Abiy said, “he was going to the warfront to lead his troops”. A peace
laureate turned a warlord.

The peace agreement that transpired to be a war pact

Within months of the peace agreement the borders between Eritrea and Ethiopia
closed once again without any explanation from either government. The actual
reason (s) remain unknown to this day, as are the terms of the peace arrangement.
The people of Ethiopia and Eritrea have not seen any tangible benefits from the
peace agreement – there is no trade and the border between the two countries
remains unmarked. The only link between the two countries is by intermittent flights
that are out of bounds and unaffordable for most of the peoples.

The ending of the “no peace, no war” between Ethiopia and Eritrea that seemed to
bring the 20-year-old stalemate was welcomed by the people. However, the peace
negotiations between the two countries did not involve the key stakeholder, the
Tigrayans (TPLF), whose territory borders the disputed area. The TPLF were rightly
concerned by PM Abiy’s insistence to resolve the border dispute with Eritrea without
involving them. PM Abiy could not involve the TPLF even if he wanted to (although
there is no evidence of that) because President Isaias had repeatedly called for the
destruction of the TPLF. And he blamed the TPLF for the 1998-2000 border war,
which Eritrea lost, the sanctions imposed on Eritrea by the UN leading to its 20-year
isolation from the international community.

The TPLF concerns and suspicions were real and based on numerous statements
President Isaias made before and after the peace agreement. In May 2018, a few
weeks before the Joint declaration of Peace and Friendship between Eritrea and
Ethiopia, he declared, “It was Game Over” and that ‘the junta’ [TPLF] was “dead”.
This wish to annihilate the Tigrayans is further supported in President Isaias’
February 2021 televised interview¹⁸⁴⁸ in which he says, “we were monitoring the
situation in Tigray and preparing ourselves [for war] since 2018, and now supporting
Ethiopia in its efforts.”

The above assertions by President Isaias and PM Abiy’s decision to exclude the
TPLF from the peace negotiations, clearly demonstrate the agreement the two
leaders signed was not for peace but rather a pact for the destruction of their
common enemy, the TPLF. It was a war pact and a catalyst for the horrific Tigray
war.

2018.  

17.5 Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray War

Eritrea under the rule of President Isaias is known as a trouble-maker country worldwide. In 2003, the then Prime Minister of Ethiopia remarked “It is a fact that Eritrea
has problems with all its neighbours”¹⁸⁴⁹ and the then President of Yemen Ali
Abdullah Saleh echoed his comments adding “Eritrea has problems with
neighbouring countries, and the only way out is for it to have dialogue and not
confrontation.” Alas, the lesson has not been learned and Eritrea continues to cause
mayhem in the region and beyond unabated.

Since independence in 1993, after 30-year war with Ethiopia, Eritrea has fought wars
with¹⁸⁵⁰; Sudan (1995), Yemen over the Hanish Islands (1995), the Republic of
Congo (1997), the border war with Ethiopia (1998 – 2000), border war with Djibouti
(2008 -), support for al-Shabaab in Somali (2011) and its alleged involvement in the
Civil War in Yemen between the Houthi and Sunni (2014 -) and of course the current
Tigray war (2020 -). A total of eight wars over a 27-year period. This means Eritrea
gets involved in one war on another almost every three years under the warmonger
and trigger-happy ruler, President Isaias.

Following the signing of the peace accord between Eritrea and Ethiopia, President
Isaias declared it was “game over” and that the TPLF, whom he repeatedly promised
to destroy and had a long-held grudge, was “dead.” He went further in his February
2021 televised interview and said “In the last two to three years, as corrective
measures were taken in Ethiopia, we had an obligation, not a choice, to support the
country and to help bring peace and stability. We have been monitoring the situation
in Tigray and preparing ourselves [for war] since 2018, and now supporting Ethiopia
in its efforts”. The President made these remarks despite repeated denial at that time
of Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray war. For example, when the US Embassy
tweeted on 5 February 2021 saying “The United States has asked the Eritrean
government to withdraw its forces from Tigray immediately and adding, we continue
to call for independent and transparent investigations into reports of looting, sexual
violence, assaults on refugee camps and other human rights abuses and
accountability for those responsible.”¹⁸⁵¹ Predictably, the Ministry of Information in
Eritrea tweeted “Eritrea rejects the unwarranted statement posted on Facebook
today by the US Embassy in Asmara and the false and presumptive allegations that
it floats.” This denial by the Eritrean Ministry of Information was contradicted by
Prime Minister Abiy’s statement a few weeks later, 26 March 2021, saying that
“Eritrea had agreed to withdraw its forces from the Tigray region.”¹⁸⁵²

On 17 April 2021, Eritrea acknowledged for the first time its forces were taking part in
the Tigray conflict and “promised to pull them out” in a letter written by its
Ambassador to the UN and addressed to the Security Council, which was posted
online by the country’s Information Minister¹⁸⁵³
. On 4 June 2021, Ethiopia announced
that “the Eritrean forces had begun their withdrawal from the northern region of
Tigray”. Most recently, following the imposition of sanctions on Eritrea by the United
States on 12 November 2021, the Ethiopian government¹⁸⁵⁴ said “The Government
of Eritrea has evacuated its military forces from Ethiopia following the declaration of
the Unilateral Humanitarian Ceasefire by the Government of Ethiopia at the end of
June 2021.”

In the initial stages of the conflict, Eritrea had reportedly deployed as many as threequarters of its armed forces reaching Tigray from many fronts making it impossible
for the Tigrayans to maintain their defensive lines. Eritrean forces active engagement
in the conflict has somewhat declined over the last six months. However, it is evident
Eritrean troops remain in large numbers in the west and north of Tigray. There are
also reports of Eritrean troops and security services operating alongside Amhara
forces and the federal army on the Ethiopia-Sudan border as well as in the Oromia
region, including Addis Ababa.

To those who closely follow political developments in the Horn of Africa, Eritrea’s
involvement in the Tigray war did not come as a surprise. Isaias will continue to
destabilise the region unless he sees sense and accepts diplomacy (which is
unlikely) or through the use of force. In 1998, Isaias rejected a peace proposal
negotiated by the United States, Rwanda, and the African Union. It was the use of
force that finally got him to sign the “Cessation of hostilities agreement in Algiers in
2000.”¹⁸⁵⁵ It is unlikely it will be any different this time too.

17.6 About Sanctions
Introduction

Sanctions programmes, as we know them today are a 20th century phenomenon.
The first sanctions were imposed in 1935 by the League of Nations, precursor to the
UN, against Italy for the invasion of Abyssinia (now Ethiopia). The sanctions failed to
force change in Italy because France and Britain refused to implement them¹⁸⁵⁶.

Types of sanctions: There are several types of sanctions, including:

Diplomatic sanctions – political measures taken to express disapproval of the target
country’s action. They include limitations or cancellations of high-level government
visits and/or expelling or withdrawing diplomatic missions or staff.
Economic sanctions – commercial and financial restrictions applied by one or more
countries against a state, entities or individuals, and may include trade barriers, such
as tariffs. Food and medicine are exempt.

Military sanctions – can range from carefully targeted military strikes to arms
embargo and threats of military action.

Sport sanctions – prevent or disqualify of one country’s people/teams from
competing in international events.

Environmental sanctions – preserving the environment and the safeguarding of
natural resources.

Travel sanctions – restrictions on travel for all or some nationals of a country, a ban
on travel to rebel-held territory within a country, an aviation ban on all flights into or
out of a country, etc.

UN Sanctions Regime

After the UN was founded in October 1945, sanctions were added to its Charter (VII),
“giving the UNSC responsibility for imposing and monitoring sanctions”. In the initial
stages of the Charter, sanctions were rarely used. Only two sanctions were imposed
in the first 45 years to 1990 both in Africa; Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) and apartheid,
South Africa¹⁸⁵⁷
.
The UN has the authority and responsibility to respond to global threats by
implementing sanctions according to its Charter (VII)¹⁸⁵⁸
, to prevent “a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.” The sanctions must pass the UNSC
with a majority vote and without a veto. This i.e., veto has hampered sanctions efforts
with notoriously human rights abuser countries such as China and Russia vetoing
proposals largely for their own self-interest. Opponents of sanctions argue the veto
power is undemocratic and a tool for the permanent members to advance to advance
their international sphere of influence.

UN sanctions are currently imposed on a number of countries, including Afghanistan,
North Korea, Iran, and Yemen. At least six African countries are under UN sanctions,
The Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo), GuineaBissau, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan. According to a 2015 UN study on sanctions,
68%t of sanctions imposed between 1991 and 2013 were on African states.

The UN sanctions must be complied with by all UN member states (Article 2.2) and,
as a result they are the most powerful sanction tools. The EU adopts all UN sanctions,
and also has the ability to impose its own sanctions in line with the stated objectives
of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy i.e., promoting EU
interest, international peace, and security.¹⁸⁵⁹

US, EU and UK Sanctions Regimes

Along with the UN sanctions regime, which is applicable to all UN members states,
the US, the EU, UK operate additional sanctions regimes, alongside, in some limited
cases, the African Union. They deal with a specific area, often referred to as
“thematic” sanctions regimes, for example, human rights and corruption, and
“country” sanctions regimes that focus on one specific country, although the
underlying reasons for the sanctions’ designations are often similar, including human
rights and rule of law. Since the three key tools the UN and the international
community have to get bad actors to change behaviour is through; (a) diplomacy
engagement, (b) sanctions and (c) as a last resort a threat and/or use of a military
action. Sanctions are therefore seen to be “doing something” to avoid a conflict
where there is lack of diplomatic progress, or it has failed. As such and according to
Wikipedia, international sanctions are “political and economic tools that are part of
diplomatic efforts against countries, entities and individuals that are applied
unilaterally or multilaterally to protect international law, end conflicts and deter
human right abuses [including corruption]”¹⁸⁶⁰. Sanctions can; name and shame,
isolate perpetrates from the international community, draw attention to expected
norms and reduce revenue streams that can be used to finance conflicts/wars and
human rights abuses.

Sanctions are often referred to as either “targeted” or “comprehensive” in nature.
Targeted sanctions are applied against individuals and entities, and are generally
considered to be more effective in combating bad actors than comprehensive
sanctions that target an entire state which can have unintended consequences and
Potentially harm the people rather than the perpetrators and are also perceived to
hamper humanitarian aid.

European Union Sanctions

Given that all EU member states are UN members, the EU automatically adopts UN
sanctions. In addition to its obligations under the UN sanctions regime, the EU also
operates a number of additional sanctions regimes, including both country and
thematic regimes. In December 2020, the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime
or the European Magnitsky Act came into effect. Whilst the EU has for decadesimposed sanctions on individuals and entities for human rights abuses under country
sanctions regimes, this is the first time the EU had a thematic regime specifically
designed to target human rights abusers, wherever they are in the worlds. The Act
makes provisions for targeted sanctions against any individual involved in gross
human rights violations outside the EU borders ¹⁸⁶¹. As with the US Global Magnitsky
Act, the EU Act permits the EU to maintain a list of human rights violators around the
globe, imposing on them various sanctions, such as visa bans or asset freezes, on
behalf of the entire bloc.¹⁸⁶²

The EU adopts all UN sanctions, and also has the ability to impose its own sanctions
in line with the stated objectives of the European Union’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy i.e., promoting EU interest, international peace and security.¹⁸⁶³

According to its sanctions policy, the EU imposes sanctions “to uphold respect for
human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance.” The EU currently
has sanctions regimes with regards to 26 countries around the world, including arms
embargoes, trade restrictions, financial restrictions, and travel and visa bans. EU
member states must unanimously agree on sanctions. In Africa, the EU country
regime include; Burundi, CAR, Congo, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali,
Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

EU member states may also impose their own individual sanctions programs without
EU approval.

United States Sanctions

The United States maintains several tools to deter and hold accountable human
rights abusers and corrupt officials across the globe. The Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability (The Magnitsky) Act ¹⁸⁶⁴ was signed into law in December 2016
with initial jurisdiction on Russia only. In December 2017, the Magnitsky Act scope
was expanded into the “Global Magnitsky sanctions program” and relevant human
rights and anti-corruption guidelines.

The Global Magnitsky Act gives power to the US Treasury (Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC)) to “block or revoke US visas and to freeze all US-based property
and interests in property of foreign persons (both individuals and entities)” who have
engaged in; (a) serious human rights abuse and (b) acts of corruption including the
transfer or the facilitation of the transfer of the proceeds of corruption.¹⁸⁶⁵
The US has used this tool extensively. As of November 2020, 215 individuals and
entities, from 28 countries, had been designated under the Global Magnitsky
Program; 128 persons have been designated for corruption only, 72 for human rights
abuses only, and 15 on both grounds.¹⁸⁶⁶

Examples of US sanctions on grounds of Human Rights abuses are:

Gambia (December 2017) – 14 persons were sanctioned for killing and torturing
political opponents and journalists as well as for abuses and mistreatment of
detainees.

Myanmar (July 2021) – 11 persons affiliated with Burmese military forces were
sanctioned for their involvement in the “Rohingya Genocide, specifically ethnic
cleansing in Rakhine State and other widespread human rights abuses in Kachin
Examples of US sanctions on grounds of Human Rights abuses are:

Gambia (December 2017) – 14 persons were sanctioned for killing and torturing
political opponents and journalists as well as for abuses and mistreatment of
detainees.

Myanmar (July 2021) – 11 persons affiliated with Burmese military forces were
sanctioned for their involvement in the “Rohingya Genocide, specifically ethnic
cleansing in Rakhine State and other widespread human rights abuses in Kachin
and Shan States, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary
arrests, sexual violence and torture against civilians ¹⁸⁶⁷.”

China (July 2020) – 6 high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials, for their
involvement in human rights abuses committed against Uyghers and other minorities
in Xinjiang Province.

The United States has used both comprehensive and targeted sanctions. However,
after the failure in Iraq, the United States has enacted more targeted rather than
comprehensive sanctions to mitigate unintended consequences of harming innocent
civilians and/or hinder humanitarian aid.

United Kingdom

In July 2020, the UK enacted its own Magnitsky-style sanctions regime, the Global
Human Rights Sanctions regime (GHR)¹⁸⁶⁸ which allows the UK to freeze the assets
of and impose travel bans on any individual or entity determined to have seriously
violated: (a) right to life, (b) right to not be subjected to torture or cruel, unusual, or
degrading treatment; or (c) right to be free from slavery, to not be held in servitude,
or not be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. Whilst the number of
human rights currently covered by the GHR is relatively limited, the conduct that is
covered, often referred to as the “involved person test” is wide and allows for
sanctions designation not only on those who commit violations within the scope of
GHR but also, inter alia, those who facilitate, incite, promote, provide support or
profit from such violations.

According to UK government guidance, “A range of activity could potentially result in
designation, including:

• Rape and other forms of sexual violence, including sexual slavery, forced
  prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, and enforced sterilisation;
• Enforced disappearances;
• Extrajudicial killings;
• Human trafficking, in so far as it constitutes slavery or practices similar to slavery,
  servitude or forced and compulsory labour; and
• Killings of or violence against human rights defenders, media workers, journalists,
  as well as violence or killings motivated on the grounds of an individual’s religion
  or belief.
  
  Sanctions may also be imposed on entities that are owned or controlled by those
  involved in violations. There is no requirement to demonstrate that violations were
  perpetrated by or on behalf of a state. As of December 2020, a total of 65 individuals
  and three entities had been sanctioned under the UK regulations ¹⁸⁶⁹.
  Do sanctions work?

There is no sanctions effectiveness metric or measure given the number of sanctions
and how their impact may be influenced by other factors. Therefore, the
effectiveness, both pros and cons, have been hotly debated for many years ¹⁸⁷⁰.

In 2019, The Sentry examined seven African countries for which sanctions are or
were imposed by the UN, EU, and US to assess their effectiveness to achieve the
desired outcome. The result of the study was published in a report: “Beyond Carrot,
Better Sticks” in October 2019 ¹⁸⁷¹. The author, with the permission of The Sentry,
has tabulated below a summary of the purpose/reason and indicative outcome of the
sanctions programme for each of the seven countries analysed by The Sentry. This
is to help inform what the potential implications might be if similar sanctions were to
be imposed on Eritrea for its gross human rights abuses on its own people for a
generation, and its involvement in the horrific Tigray war currently unfolding in
Ethiopia.

The summary tables below, extracted from “beyond Carrots, Better Sticks, report
shows the different types of sanctions imposed by the EU, UN, and US against the
seven countries, the intended purpose and outcome. Any error in the tabulation and
misinterpretation are that of the authors, hence the summary must be read in
conjunction with The Sentry’s full report.

Some of the key messages/recommendations from the study ¹⁸⁷² into the seven
sanctioned African countries were; (a) the need for improved sanctions strategies,
(b) effective coordination between governments and regional organisations,
enhanced monitoring and (c) enforcement of sanctions. Targeted networks rather
comprehensive sanctions were found to be more effective. Networks use local and
international facilitators to track down illicit finances by bad actors e.g., money
laundering to offshore bank accounts and disguised ownership of overseas assets to
avoid sanctions.

In some African countries that are “cash based” – informal economies – the majority
of the population have no bank accounts and it is generally the elite who have bank
accounts. The termination of US dollar clearing as a result of sanctions would
therefore hurt the elite more than the general public.

To improve sanctions programme, the study concluded; (i) multilateral sanctions
were most effective, (ii) the intended gaol must be clear, (iii) a pre-defined exit
strategy will be needed, and (iv) sanctions must be enforced, reviewed and updated
as necessary to remain effective.

Unintended consequences:

In formulating a sanctions programme, it is important that a careful assessment is
made to ensure the disadvantages do not outweigh the advantages. As with most
medicine, sanctions have their own “side effects,” but it would be foolish to argue
they must not be imposed on bad actors provided the risks are properly evaluated
and assessed. Some of the key areas that need proper risk-assessments before
sanctions are imposed include:

➢ Bank de-risking – to mitigate the regulatory requirements that comes with
sanctions, de-risking by banks can cause humanitarian crises because NGOs and
others rely on the international financial system. Without access to this system at
the local and international levels, it can be very difficult to distribute aid. Diaspora
remittances may encounter difficulties leading to extortionate black markets or
people carrying large quantities of cash to move to the intended destination,
risking themselves in the process. In Somalia (2011), bank de-risking became one
of the catalysts that is reportedly to have caused a fully blown famine that claimed
the lives of 0.25 million people ¹⁸⁷³. In some Horn of Africa countries, including
Somalia, remittances represent about 1/3 of GDP.

➢ Sanctions may hurt the people they are meant to help – to mitigate against this
risk, timely messaging to the population is critical and targeted network sanctions
will be necessary. Even then, sanctions, especially in vibrant economies e.g.
Ethiopia, may hurt some people. However, in countries where there are egregious
violations, sanctions may be the necessary price to pay to bring conflicts and
human rights abuses to an end.

➢ Sanctions fatigue – sanctions are less impactful if they go on for too long.
Neighbouring countries will be unwilling to support sanctions. South Africa, for
example, is said to have never supported the sanctions on Zimbabwe because of
its impact on its own economy and the risk of refugees’ influx.

Although the above three concerns largely apply to comprehensive sanctions rather than
targeted sanctions on specific individuals and entities, in the case of Eritrea the distinction
between the two (i.e. targeted v comprehensive) is non-existent. Eritrea is unique in that
there is no private sector, and the economy is entirely in the hands of the government elite
and the entities that they control. Thus, the impact of sanctions falls squarely on them rather
than harming the general public who have no purchasing power and largely live on
subsistence farming.

On banks de-risking specifically, international NGOs are not allowed to operate in Eritrea,
hence there should be nil impact on humanitarian assistance because it does not exist.
However, careful consideration will be needed with regards to diaspora remittances to family
and friends that could be adversely affected by de-risking.

Conclusion

Sanctions have long been the subject of controversy and debate on their impact on citizens
and effectiveness, particularly in the guise of “comprehensive” type regimes. Opponents
claim sanctions imposed by a single country or by an intergovernmental body like the United
Nations are “illegal” or “criminal” due to, in the case of economic sanctions, the right to
development ¹⁸⁷⁴ or in the case of military sanctions, the right to self-defence ¹⁸⁷⁵. In its 1996
report, the International Progress Organisation, criticised sanctions as “an illegitimate form of
collective punishment of the weakest and poorest members of society, the infants, the
children, the chronically ill, and the elderly”¹⁸⁷⁶.

Proponents of sanctions, say when designed well, imposed multilaterally (by the UN, US,
EU, and others in unison), implemented and enforced effectively, they can bring conflicts to
an end and deter human rights violations. Sanctions should always be used along with other
tools, such as diplomacy, aid, effective messaging, military signalling and if necessary actual
force, in order to achieve the desired goals.

It is important however to draw a distinction between “comprehensive” sanctions regimes,
which have tended to be used in previous decades, and newer “targeted” sanctions that
sanction individuals and entities not entire countries. The ultimate objective of sanctions is
behavioural change. To achieve this, targeted network of sanctions, anti-money laundering
measures, prosecutions, and enhanced travel bans must be applied in a multilateral manner.
The UN sanctions can be highly effective because they are multilateral in nature and the
member nations have the legal powers to enforce them.

Supporters of sanctions further argue that, regardless of sanctions’ effects on people, those
citizens are already being oppressed by their government. Thus, they argue, sanctions are
the best alternative international tool, as opposed to taking no action or military action. In the
absence of sanctions, oppressive regimes have no incentive to reform. In terms of
effectiveness of the sanctions, supporters concede that multilateral sanctions have been
found to work 33% of the time.¹⁸⁷⁷ Even this low achievement level, saves 33 out of 100
people’s lives from the worst kind of atrocities, genocide and extrajudicial killings.

Morally, it would be a sad world where preparators of rape of women and girls, extrajudicial
killings, theft, corruption, and other heinous human rights abuses were to go scot-free.
Sanctions may therefore be the best tool, short of military action, available to the
international community to uphold the rule of law wherever it may be breached.

17.7 Eritrea and Sanctions

Overview

President Isaias is the chief architect of the current conflict in Ethiopia and has been
a destabilising force in the Horn of Africa since Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia
in 1993. The regime in Asmara has subjected its own people to grotesque human
rights abuses year-in and-year-out for 30 years.

On the other hand, and despite their problems and diversity, the Ethiopian people
have not had internal wars for the last 30 years, until President Isaias got involved in
their country’s internal affairs in the name of a “peace agreement”. The 2020 war in
Tigray may not in fact have started by the Federal government in Addis Ababa, or
the TPLF in Mekelle. Arguably, the war started by President Isaias in Asmara who
had been planning it for well over two decades and started to execute it in 2018 by
seizing the opportunity provided by the election of the inexperienced Prime Minister
in Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed. Until then, Ethiopia was the envy of Africa and beyond, with
one of the fastest growing economies in the world for at least a decade ¹⁸⁷⁸. All this
was sadly destroyed by Prime Minister Abiy as the result of his unholy alliance with
the notoriously destructive, President Isaias. In the end, Prime Minister Abiy’s
Prosperity Party has in effect become the “Poverty Party” with a large segment of the
population unable to meet their basic needs and the country on the brink of
fragmentation.

It is in the light of the above and other additional information in the Tigray War and
Regional Implications Report, Volumes 1 and 2, the author advocates for strong,
multilateral sanctions to be imposed on Eritrea, even before any measures are
considered against Ethiopia. This is so for the simple reason that the root cause of
the human rights abuses and destabilisation in the Horn Africa is none other than
President Isaias. There cannot be peace in the region unless his wings are
drastically clipped, and he is tamed once and for all.

UN Security Council Resolution 1907

In 2009, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1907 ¹⁸⁷⁹ which imposed on
Eritrea an arms embargo and targeted sanctions, including travel restrictions and
asset freezes on a small number of senior government officials. The sanctions were
imposed on Eritrea for its role in arming and training rebel movements across the
Horn of Africa, from Somalia to Ethiopia, including attempts to bomb the African
Union summit in Addis Ababa in January 2011. The resolution noted that Eritrea had
“provided political, financial and logistical support to armed groups engaged in
undermining peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia and regional stability” and
had “failed to withdraw its forces following border confrontations with Djibouti.”¹⁸⁸⁰
The UN resolution was instigated to a large extent by the AU summit in Sirte,
Libya ¹⁸⁸¹ after which the UN issued a warning, stating that: “The Security Council
takes note of the decision of the African Union summit in Sirte, calling on the Council
to impose sanctions against those, including Eritrea, providing support to the armed
groups engaged in undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia and regional
stability. The Security Council is deeply concerned in this regard and will consider
expeditiously what action to take against any party undermining the Djibouti Peace
Process, based on all available evidence including that submitted to the Monitoring
Group and the Committee established pursuant to SCR 751 (1992).”

Eritrea continued to flout the UN resolution making its territory available for “the
launching of attacks on Djibouti and Ethiopia, in addition to military recruitment and
provisioning campaigns,” supplying weapons and ammunition, and other military
materiel (uniform elements, radios), logistics (transport and vehicles) and other
support (food rations, medical care).” As late as April 2017 ¹⁸⁸² and January 2018 ¹⁸⁸³
,
Eritrea was importing weapons from North Korea in breach of the UN resolution.
Following the peace accord between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the UN General Secretary
declared, during his visit to Adds Ababa in July 2018, that the sanctions against
Eritrea were “obsolete” ¹⁸⁸⁴ despite the numerous flagrant and frequent breach of the
UN sanctions programme. Nothing had changed on the ground and the tension with
Djibouti remained unresolved. On 6 November 2018, a British draft proposed lifting
the resolution 1907 was leaked ¹⁸⁸⁵. On 14 November 2018, the UNSC unanimously
agreed to lift ¹⁸⁸⁶ the sanctions nine years after they were imposed with no tangible
evidence that they had achieved their intended purpose. The lifting of the sanctions
of course helped President Isaias to procure more arms in preparation for another
war.

In hindsight, the so-called peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, not only
duped the Nobel Committee in Norway into awarding the Peace Prize to Prime
Minister Abiy, but also deluded the UN Security Council, which should have known
better. It may be unfair to say both organisations have blood in their hands for the
heinous crimes and killings that have taken place in Ethiopia over the last year, but
they certainly have a lot to answer for.

The UN Security Council has had umpteen opportunities to redeem itself since the
outbreak of the Tigray war by imposing sanctions against Eritrea to force it to pull its
troops out of Ethiopian territory. But it has consistently failed to use its authority due
to the vetoing power of the Chinese and the Russians, who are notoriously reluctant
to accept sanctions, since they are human rights abusers themselves. This is not the
first time the Eritrean people have been abandoned by the UN.

European Union

In December 2018, the EU implemented the lifting of UN sanction on Eritrea by
adopting Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1944 and Council Regulation (EU)
2018/1932, adding another nail to the resolution’s 1907 coffin.

The EU’s 2012 strategic framework on human rights and democracy ¹⁸⁸⁷ commits the
EU to “step up its efforts to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law
across all aspects of external action,” and states that when faced with human rights
violations, it will “make use of the full range of instruments at its disposal, including
sanctions or condemnation” (Council of the European Union, Outcome of
Proceedings 25 June 2012, 11855/12). It adds that “the role the EU takes to oppose
activities that result in human rights abuses should be encouraged by all member
states.”

In March 2021, the EU used its Global Human Rights sanctions regime to impose
sanctions ¹⁸⁸⁸ for human rights violations, including killings and enforced
disappearances on the National Security Office, including its leader, Maj. Gen.
Abraha Kassa. The National Security Office, including its leader, Maj. Gen. Abraha
Kassa were sanctioned. This is believed to be the first EU sanction against the
Eritrean leadership and government based on human rights abuses in spite of the
horrific human rights abuses that have taken place in the country for 30 years.
Despite his title, General Kassa ¹⁸⁸⁹ is a simple messenger who does what he is told
to keep himself safe and hardly ever travels outside the country, let alone have
offshore bank accounts and/or properties. Nevertheless, the action rightly puts a
stigma on Eritrea, which is to be welcomed.

For the last couple of months, the EU has been saying that it is prepared to use
sanctions over the Tigray war and the humanitarian crisis there. In early November
2021, the EU Chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, said “The EU remains ready to use all its
foreign policy tools, including restrictive measures, to promote peace, adherence to
international humanitarian and human rights law, and help end conflict.”¹⁸⁹⁰ The EU,
has been, however, unable to impose any sanctions against the warring factions in
Ethiopia due to an apparent disagreement among EU member states. On 13
December 2021, Mr Borell expressed regrets over the EU’s failure to impose
sanctions saying, “one of my biggest frustrations” of the year, he said was that “the
EU had not been able to stop mass rapes using sexual violence as a war aim,
killings and concentration camps based on ethnic belonging,” pointing to the lack of
unanimity among EU governments.

Mr Borrell acknowledged that while sanctions would not have halted the conflict, they
“would have, in my view, influenced the behaviour of the actors.” In the meantime,
the EU continued to supply humanitarian aid, despite difficulties in aid reaching those
in need.

United Kingdom

The UK Parliament, through the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Eritrea
and others, has been kept abreast of the situation in Tigray and Eritrea’s
unwarranted involvement. The APPG for Eritrea encouraged MPs to raise numerous
Parliamentary Questions (PQ) as well as publish Early Day Motions (EDMs) ¹⁸⁹¹ and
engage in various official debates and participated in a variety of Zoom discussions
and webinars. Their engagement along with the media has kept the Tigray war, and
Eritrea’s atrocities therein, in the spotlight.

The UK government, as reported by Reuters in November 2018, was at the forefront
and proactively advocated the lifting of UN Resolution 1907 that imposed sanctions
on Eritrea for its destabilising role in the Horn Africa. However, in terms of the Tigray
conflict, the British government has had very little engagement compared with the
US and EU. While President Biden has spoken openly about the conflicts on several
occasions, the British Prime Minster, Boris Johnson, has said very little (if anything at
all) on what is currently the largest and bloodiest war in the world. This is regrettable,
especially in the light of the UK Global Human Rights Sanctions ¹⁸⁹² regime and its
ability to sanction individuals and entities involved in serious human rights violations
which have been regularly reported on as occurring in Eritrea for decades.

In March 2021, when asked about the massacre at Axum allegedly by Eritrea forces, which
may constitute crimes against humanity, the British government said ¹⁸⁹³ it “will consider the
full range of policy tools at our disposal, adding “We are keeping the provision of aid to
Ethiopia under constant review.”

In September 2021, the Government was asked in a PQ (53252) about its plans to
make an assessment of the potential merits of sanctioning; (a) the Chief of Staff of
the Eritrean Defence Forces, Filipos Woldeyohannes, and (b) individuals responsible
for human rights violations in Ethiopia. The Minister replied that: “The UK continues
to consider the full range of policy tools at our disposal to protect human rights and
deter violations of international humanitarian law. It is longstanding practice not to
speculate on future sanctions designations as to do so could reduce the impact of
the designations ¹⁸⁹⁴.” This is followed by yet another promise following the US
sanctions on Eritrean officials and entities. This time the UK Government said: “We
note the statement on 12 November by the US Treasury that they have sanctioned
four entities and two individuals. Sanctions are most effective when countries act
together. International cooperation is at the heart of UK sanctions policy, and the UK
will continue to work with the US and other international partners to tackle shared
global challenges ¹⁸⁹⁵.”

The British government has rightly expressed its “deep concerns about Eritrean
involvement in the Tigray conflict” on many occasions but sadly it has, so far, done
very little tangible.

United States

Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray war and the atrocities that followed, although
horrific in the extreme, should not come as a surprise to the international community.

As noted elsewhere in this chapter, Eritrea, under President Isaias, has been
involved in eight separate wars over a period of 27 years. It has consistently and
systematically abused its citizens, including; rape, enslavement, torture, extrajudicial
killings, and other despicable acts behind closed doors. The UN COI has repeatedly
said over a 7-year period that the Asmara regime “may have committed crimes
against humanity”. In spite these damming reports, no action has been taken by the
UN to bring the preparators of these heinous crimes to the ICC.

What the Eritrean regime has done since November 2020 is in effect to export, in an
industrial scale, the atrocities that it meticulously refined on its own citizens, to Tigray
and increasingly to the rest of Ethiopia. To its credit, the US government has been
engaged proactively to halt the atrocities and the conflict in Tigray from the outset,
ably supported by its Chargé d’Affaires, Steven Walker, in Asmara for which peaceloving Eritreans and Ethiopians have expressed their admiration and gratitude to the US government.

The Tigray war continues to rage unabated, with the active involvement of Eritrean
forces, despite diplomacy efforts by the AU, US, and the EU to find a peaceful
solution to the conflict. The US introduced visa restrictions on Ethiopian and Eritrean
officials ¹⁸⁹⁶ who it considers “responsible for, or complicit in, undermining resolution
of the crisis in Tigray” but to very little effect.

On 23 August 2021, the US Treasury sanctioned the Chief of Staff of the Eritrean
Defence Forces, Filipos Woldeyohannes, for “being a leader or official of an entity
that is engaged in serious human rights abuse”¹⁸⁹⁷ committed during the Tigray
conflict. The sanction was imposed under Executive Order 13818, which targets
perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption. Thus, all of his property
in the US or in control of US individuals are blocked. This is to be welcomed,
although the likelihood that Filipos will have any asset and/or offshore bank account
in his name or any entity under his control is nil.

In November 2021, the US government went even further and imposed sanctions on
four Eritrean entities and two individuals in connection with the conflict in Tigray ¹⁸⁹⁸.
The entities sanctioned are; the EDF (the military, led by the Chief of Staff, Filipos
Woldeyohannes who was sanctioned by the US in August 2021) and the PFDJ (the
only political party in the country and under the absolute control of President Isaias).
In addition, two commercial entities were sanctioned; Hidri Trust, and Red Sea
Trading ¹⁸⁹⁹ Corporation (RSTC). Hidri Trust is a holding company that controls all of
the PFDJ’s business interests and RSTC funds and provides business assistance to
the party.

The two individuals sanctioned are ¹⁹⁰⁰; Abraha Kassa Nemariam (aka Abraha Kassa
– sanctioned by the EU in March 2021) – the head of the Eritrean National SecurityOffice, and Hagos Ghebrehiwet W Kidan (aka “Kisha” or moneybags), economic
advisor to the PFDJ and CEO of RSTC, who is in effect the finance minister.
Through the above actions, the US has taken bold and exemplary initiatives to help
bring the conflict in Tigray and the presence of Eritrean forces there to an end. In a
statement the US government said, “Eritrean forces in Ethiopia are an impediment to
ending conflict and increasing humanitarian access.”¹⁹⁰¹

The US government’s actions against the Asmara regime are to be applauded by all
peace-loving people around the world. In spite of this, however, the US could have
gone further to include the following revenue streams, which are financing repression
in Eritrea and fuelling the Tigray conflict, and two more bad actors:

1. Eritrean National Mining Corporation (ENAMCO) – establishment Proclamation
   (No. 157/2006 ¹⁹⁰²). ENAMCO is an autonomous corporate legal entity and
   engages in all mining operations, including prospecting, exploration and
   exploitation of mineral resources and marketing of the same. The corporation
   holds stakes of 40% – 60% of all mining operations in the country. ENAMCO
   works in partnership with companies and businesses based in the UK, Australia,
   US, and Canada that raise their finances through the stock exchanges in London,
   Toronto, New York, and Australia. It is difficult to accurately assess the amount of
   revenue raised from the extractive sector, but it is said to represent a significant
   proportion of the country’s GDP. Almost all of this hard currency revenue
   apparently goes to offshore bank accounts under disguised ownership to finance
   the Asmara regime’s illicit activities.
2. The 2%t diaspora tax (excluding remittances which are in most cases sent to
   support family and friends i.e., humanitarian in nature) is illicitly collected from
   members of the diasporas by Eritrean Embassy staff and government agents.
   Given the number of Eritrean diasporas in the US, a significant amount of this
   revenue stream comes from the US. There is evidence to indicate that members
   of the diaspora are coerced and intimidate in to paying the 2% (backdated to their
   time of arrival in the US) as recently as September/October 2021 ¹⁹⁰³.
3. The two bad actors – the Eritrean finances are managed and controlled by;
   President Isaias, his Presidential Advisor, Yemane Gebreab, the
   Economic/Finance Advisor, Hagos (Kisha) and the army Chief of Staff, Filipos
   Woldeyohannes. While both Hagos and Filipos have been rightly sanctioned by
   the recent US Executive Order, President Isaias and his Advisor, Yemane
   Gebreab, do not appear to have been sanctioned.
   
   Adding the above to the US targeted network sanctions for orchestrating untold
   human rights abuses in Eritrea and mass atrocities in Tigray will not only stigmatise
   the country even more, which it should rightly do, but also drain their revenue
   streams so they can no longer finances their destabilising activities in the region.

17.8 Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

Sanction, as with most economic and political issues, has been a divisive topic
amongst the Eritrean diaspora ever since the UN enacted Resolution 1907, imposing
restrictive measures on their country for its covert destabilising activities in the Horn
of Africa. However, an increasing number of Eritreans are now in favour for
sanctions designations under current regimes, for example, the UK Global Human
Rights Sanctions regime.

Today a majority are in favour of a sanctions programme against the Eritrean
government because of its relentless and grotesque human rights abuses on its
citizens over decades, and more recently for its unwarranted involvement in the
Tigray conflict as documented elsewhere in this report.

Opponents of sanctions on Eritrea, some of whom were prominent freedom fighters,
until recently in the civil service e.g., former bank governors and some who represent
the country at ambassadorial levels, argue sanctions will hurt the nation’s economy
and innocent people. These people forget that freedom comes at a price. The
Eritrean people lost tens of thousands of their brothers and sisters in the 30-year
armed struggle to free their homeland from Ethiopian occupation and oppression.
Some families were wiped out completely and villages burnt to the ground by the
enemy. The author lost his only brother (Haderyes, aged 26) and almost every single
household in the country lost loved ones to free the country from Ethiopian brutality.
Despite these losses, however, almost every single Eritrean accepts that those
sacrifices were worth paying, to free the people from subjection and servitude at the
hands of Amhara militias and Ethiopians in general. Nevertheless, the opponents
cite the examples of Iraq and Libya for failed sanctions programmes and foreign
interventions, in order to frighten the diasporas, without themselves fully
understanding the reasons for the failure of those programmes. In the case of Iraq’s
sanctions imposed in 1991 after it invaded Kuwait, to a large extent, failed because
they were not properly planned nor executed. As a result, the comprehensive
sanctions imposed on Iraq, had a significant unintended adverse impact on the
people and they suffered economic hardship. The international military action on Iraq
was, however (and arguably), successful in getting Iraq out of Kuwait. What followed
afterwards, in terms of religious and tribal conflicts, was an utter disaster and
inexcusable on the part of the international community. The same could be argued in
the case of Libya.

Proponents of sanctions, on the other hand, argue that it would be immoral and
indeed inhuman to idly sit by while people are abused, huge numbers slaughtered by
their own governments, and unaccountable leaders destabilising entire regions
causing war after war, as is the case with Eritrea. They rightly cite the case of the
former Yugoslavia where in the 1990s, the country was tearing itself apart causing
misery for its people. The war ended, when in 1995 NATO bombed Bosnian Serbs
and the Croats gained grounds. As a result, the warring factions came to the
negotiating table. In December 1995, they signed the Dayton Agreement dividing
Bosnia into two self-governing bodies and the perpetrators of the atrocities were
brought to the ICC ¹⁹⁰⁴. In the case of Liberia (see page 139 above), the international
community action brought the conflict to an end and the former president sentenced
to 50 years in prison by the ICC. Apartheid in South Africa, to a large extent, ended
because of economic sanctions. Some of the South Africans, unfortunately, suffered
economically as a result of the sanctions but they were eventually freed from the
evils of apartheid. The African National Congress knew that sanctions would cost
jobs and incomes but accepted that this was part of the struggle against minority
rule. The Darfur conflict and the human rights abuses in Sudan under Bashir ended
at least in part because of sanctions. There are many other examples that
demonstrate targeted sanctions work and have brought the desired goals.

Inaction by the international community to deal with conflicts and human rights
abuses is perhaps the worst scenario that can happen as exemplified in the case of
Rwanda. In 1994, the world looked the other way while 1.1 million ¹⁹⁰⁵ people were
genocidally murdered in an insane period of three months (7 April -15 July 1994 i.e.,
in about 100 days), leaving a lasting stain on humanity. The scale and brutality of the
genocide caused shock waves around the world, but no country intervened to
forcefully stop the killings. The ICC subsequently convicted 85 individuals for the
genocide in Rwanda and the world vowed “never again” in yet another hollow outcry.
In November 2021, when the US government imposed long overdue sanctions on
Eritrea, they were widely applauded by members of the diaspora. The Eritrean
Global Yiakl grassroot movement along with civic societies wrote to President Biden
expressing a “wholehearted support” for the action he and his government took,
calling it “exemplary” that other countries ought to emulate ¹⁹⁰⁶. Eritrea Focus1907
issued its own statement expressing gratitude to President Biden and the American
people for standing squarely with the Eritrean people in their hour of need, adding
“President Isaias and the elite that surround him in the military and the PFDJ are
responsible for taking our country into this war and for the death of many of our
people. It is not for the first time he has dragged our people into a senseless conflict
since 1991.”

Recommendations

In his televised interview ¹⁹⁰⁸ in February 2021, President Isaias unashamedly said
Eritrea has “no economy” as a pretext for his plans of a “union or federation” with
Ethiopia. He then went on to blame the chronic economic crisis in the country,
caused by corruption and mismanagement in his 30-year watch, on others. On
sanctions he said “Look how they [the west] imposed sanctions on Eritrea in the
past. They are looking to destroy and weaken us through sanctions. To this end;
they lie, bribe, threaten witnesses and then become a judge and jury to impose
sanctions on us. If we look back at the last nine years of sanctions [resolution ¹⁹⁰⁷]
and the manner they were imposed, those patterns have been identical over the last
three months [i.e., since the start of the Tigray war].”

President Isaias clearly made these remarks because sanctions hurt him and his
inner circle, not because he cared for the people of Eritrea in the slightest. The
Eritrean people have already lost everything under his leadership; they have nothing
left to lose. Approximately 80% of the population live on subsistence farming. Some
relied on NGOs humanitarian aid until they were expelled from the country in what
can only be described in a state of deprived mind on the part of President Isaias. It is
in the light of these facts that the recommendations below should be considered and
hopefully adopted by the international community:

1. Further expand US sanctions programme – the November US sanctions on
   Eritrean individuals and entities do target some of the key economic organs and
   bad actors in the country. However, the Eritrean National Mining Corporation
   (ENAMCO) and the diaspora tax that between them are said to generate at least
   50% of the GDP are not covered. Some of the key ENAMCO partners are; Alpha
   Exploration Ltd, a Canadian Company listed in the Toronto Stock Exchange ¹⁹⁰⁹,
   Danakali Ltd, an Australian company listed in the Australian stock exchange and
   until recently in the LSE ¹⁹¹⁰, Aggreko Plc, power plant provider for Danakali Ltd,
   based in Glasgow, Scotland and listed on the LSE ¹⁹¹¹, and a number of US
   finances house such as JP Morgan and Blackrock.
   
   Furthermore, the current US sanctions does not include all of the bad actors in the
   country. Two of the 4 individuals that control the nation’s illicit finances and
   offshore accounts, namely the President and his advisor (Yemane Gebreab), are
   not included in the US sanctions. These anomalies need to be addressed for the
   sanctions to achieve the desired goal.
   
   Finally, the regime in Asmara used diaspora tax to circumvent sanctions in the
   past and continued to raise significant sums in hard currency to continue to
   destabilise the region ¹⁹¹². This revenue stream needs to be controlled and
   stopped, not least because it breaks host countries laws of collecting money
   through harassments and intimidations.
2. The UN, EU, UK, Canada, and others – should impose their own unilateral or
   preferably multilateral sanctions on Eritrean individuals and entities. As Laetitia
   Bader, Human Rights Watch said “For sanctions to work, other countries must
   join.”¹⁹¹³
3. Formulate Eritrean international assets tracker mechanism – sanctions can only
   freeze assets that are known to exist, but Eritrea maintains an opaque finances to
   manage its offshore accounts and its assets overseas in disguised ownership. For
   example, a recent extensive search of “the State of Eritrea” owned assets in the
   UK ¹⁹¹⁴ revealed only one asset with an estimated value of less than US$2.5mn.

The World Bank in its March 2020 report (see above) identified only eight
overseas bank accounts. Concerted efforts by civic societies and others are
needed to trace and track Eritrean assets around the world, not least to monitor
the funds use but also to stop the regime from fuelling instability in the Horn of
Africa and beyond. This information should then be fed into global law
enforcement agencies to freeze and ultimately seize those assets.

The world has a moral, and perhaps legal obligations too, to protect the weak and
the poor from those who exploit and abuse them with impunity. Short of military
action, well planned multilateral targeted sanctions are perhaps the key tools at the
disposal of the international community to save innocent lives, prevent wars and
genocide.

Eritrea is a hermit; an isolated pariah state. Stigma, “shaming and naming,” will not
work – a leopard cannot change its spots. Multilateral sanctions on Eritrea that are
effectively enforced will bring the regime to its knees, herald a new era of hope,
peace and prosperity for the people of Eritrea, Ethiopia and the region at large.

18. Diplomatic attempts to end the war
By Martin Plaut

18.1 Introduction

18.  

Since Tigray Volume 1 was published in June 2021 the conflict in Tigray, the
accompanying famine has only intensified in severity. The diplomatic community has
attempted to find an adequate respond to the deepening crisis, but to little avail.
While the west, led by the United States and the European Union, have offered aid,
sent delegations, appointed special representatives, cajoled, threatened, and even
imposed sanctions they have next to nothing to show for their efforts. The drumbeat
of war only intensifies, ratcheted up by xenophobic propaganda encouraged by the
Ethiopian government.

In response to the pressure Prime Minister Abiy has looked for other allies. The UAE
has been a solid supporter of the axis that was forged by President Isaias and Prime
Minister Abiy in 2018 which planned this conflict, with the Arabs underpinning their
support with substantial financial flows. As the war has unfolded, so too has the
supply of armaments and munitions.¹⁹¹⁵ Ties with Turkey, Iran, China, and Russia
have been strengthened as the Ethiopian leader reached out to friends who will
supply weaponry without asking awkward questions about human rights. In return,
China and Russia have used their veto at the UN Security Council to prevent the
world body from holding the actors in the Tigray conflict to account.

These events have taken place at a time when international attention was
elsewhere: focussing on the coup in neighbouring Sudan but also the evacuation of
Afghanistan and crises in Ukraine, the South China sea and Iran. The Tigray war has
therefore only had limited attention from foreign ministries. Yet the war has had
appalling consequences, which extend well beyond the battlefield. By the end of
September 2021, the UN was warning that the blockade of Tigray has resulted in
“unprecedented” malnutrition among pregnant and lactating women.¹⁹¹⁶ Malnutrition
among children had reached “alarming” levels and fears of mass starvation were
growing. The need for action had never been more pressing, yet there was little sign
of effective pressure or persuasion being applied to end the crisis. Even the most
egregious of crimes have resulted in only muted responses. As Human Rights Watch
observed on 8 December 2021:¹⁹¹⁷

“A full year has passed since Eritrean government forces massacred Tigrayan
civilians in Ethiopia’s historical town of Axum. But survivors of the massacre and of
other atrocities in Tigray are still no closer to accessing justice and redress – an
accountability shortfall that is fuelling further abuses as conflict spreads…Concrete
measures to pave the way for accountability – such as the establishment of a robust
international investigative mechanism – are key. Yet international bodies still seem
unwilling to take concrete measures to press warring parties to prevent further
atrocities. The Security Councils of both the UN and the African Union – bodies
mandated to ensure peace and security – have remained largely paralysed. Each
body has made only one public statement condemning abuses and the UN Security
Council has not formally included Ethiopia on its agenda.”

They reiterated this call in a 9 December report on abuses by Tigrayan forces in the
Amhara region in the days from 31 August – 9 September 2021.¹⁹¹⁸ Overall, this has
been a sorry saga: a public display of just how ineffective the international
community can be in the face of intransigence, no matter how urgent the crisis.

On 8 November, US Embassy Asmara posted on its Facebook page a lengthy statement (a) rebutting Eritrean government allegations that the US is against the Eritrean people and (b) yet again calling for Eritrea to withdraw from Tigray. The Embassy had asked the government to publish the piece, without success, and so now it has self-published.¹⁹⁵²

The Ethiopian government response to Washington’s action was a little more measured but suggested that the US should have targeted the Tigrayans and not the Eritreans.¹⁹⁵³

Somewhat akin to the sanctions, on 2 November Biden announced that on 1 January the US would remove Ethiopia from the free trade pact known as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) if Ethiopia had not mended its ways by then.1954 The looming threat of tariffs caused considerable distress within Ethiopia’s textile and apparel manufacturing and export industries. On 21 November, Power, in an address to the EU Foreign Affairs Council’s Development committee, mentioned ethnic detentions and the need for humanitarian access. She went on to call for international financial institutions to suspend debt restructuring and new loans for the Ethiopian government, saying that the IMF had taken this step.¹⁹⁵⁵

So far,US attempts to influence the conflict have had very limited success. Talks, aid, and sanctions have all been attempted, but there are – at least so far – few signs of a breakthrough. But there are some. The Americans appear to have turned to Kenya, in the hope that President Kenyatta can succeed in ending the war, where they have not. Kenyatta visited President Biden in the White House in October – the first African leader to be so received.¹⁹⁵⁶ In the following month Kenyatta visited the Ethiopian Prime Minister and is said to have been told that Abiy is willing to make compromises to stop the fighting.¹⁹⁵⁷ On 5 November, due at least in part to American efforts (including those of Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the American Ambassador to the UN), the Security Council at last called for a ceasefire.¹⁹⁵⁸ Feltman – perhaps attempting to maintain the momentum – was quoted on 23 November as saying that “nascent progress” was being made in talks to end the war, and that all that was lacking was an end to hostilities.¹⁹⁵⁹ In particular, he said that the parties had at last come to identify the key issues and to contemplate the elements of a diplomatic process.¹⁹⁶⁰ In addition, late November saw a slight opening of humanitarian access to Tigray after a total shut-down of over a month,1961 for which the US apparently took some credit.¹⁹⁶²

The prediction of progress may yet prove to be accurate, but at the beginning of December 2021 the signs appeared to be pointing in the opposite direction, as the US frankly acknowledged on 1 December.¹⁹⁶³ Abiy had been mobilising every resource at his disposal in an attempt to finally crack the Tigrayan offensives. He vowed to lead his country’s army from the battlefield. “Those who want to be among the Ethiopian children who will be hailed by history, rise up for your country today. Let’s meet at the battlefront,” the Prime Minister declared.¹⁹⁶⁴ The offensive was successful; with the Tigrayans retreating back to the borders of Tigray, but despite appeals to the international community for an end to the fighting now that the TDF was no longer outside Tigray there was only a limited response.

The United States ended 2021 by threatening to impose further sanctions against Ethiopia, but the role of Feltman, as special envoy, is coming to an end. He engaged in a final visit to the region in January 2022, but is to be replaced by David Satterfield, the outgoing US ambassador to Turkey.¹⁹⁶⁵

18.3 The European Union

The European Union (EU) has worked closely with the United States in an attempt to halt the war and the accompanying atrocities. Brussels is – of course – in a more difficult position than Washington, since it must reach agreement between all its 27 members before it can act. This has meant it is less agile than its American allies, but Europe is still an important player in the Horn of Africa. Working in unison on the Horn is essential if progress is to be made. In June 2021 there was a push by both in an attempt to try to end the war. US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield pushed for the UN Security Council to meet publicly on Ethiopia’s conflict-torn Tigray region. “What are we afraid of? What are we trying to hide? The Security Council’s failure is unacceptable. We have addressed other emergent crises with public meetings. But not with this one,” Thomas-Greenfield told a US and European Union virtual event on Tigray.¹⁹⁶⁶

The EU has been sceptical about the Ethiopian trajectory, even if one ignores the war in Tigray. When the 2021 Ethiopian election was held on 5 June, it went ahead without the presence of EU monitors. A month earlier the EU’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, announced that the bloc would also not monitor the election. “The EU regrets the refusal of the fulfilment of standard requirements for the deployment of any Electoral Observation Mission, namely the independence of the Mission and the import of mission communication systems,” Borrell said. “It is disappointing that the EU has not received the assurances necessary to extend to the Ethiopian people one of its most visible signs of support for their quest for democracy.”¹⁹⁶⁷ The decision was a blow to the credibility of the June election, which nonetheless went ahead. The result produced a “landslide” for the Prime Minister, winning 410 out of 436 contested seats.¹⁹⁶⁸ In Tigray the war prevented the election from being held in the region and several important parties (particularly from Oromia) withdrew from the vote, after their candidates had been arrested and offices vandalised. Despite this the African Union’s election observer mission endorsed the election. “Overall, the election and election day processes were conducted in an orderly, peaceful and credible manner,” former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, the head of the mission, told a news conference in Addis Ababa as authorities continued counting ballots.¹⁹⁶⁹ The former president’s stand did nothing to persuade the Tigrayans that he was anything more than a supporter of President Abiy.

Pekka Haavisto, the Finnish Foreign Minister has been actively promoting a resolution of the Tigray crisis since it began in 2020, making several trips to the region.¹⁹⁷⁰ To his evident frustration he has made little progress with Prime Minister Abiy or President Isaias. In June 2021 Haavisto briefed the European Parliament behind closed doors. What he had to say did not remain confidential for long. The Associated Press carried a lengthy report, in which he quoted remarks made in February by the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and other ministers.¹⁹⁷¹ According to Haavisto his Ethiopian counterparts had warned that “they are going to wipe out the Tigrayans for 100 years.” Haavisto said that such an aim “looks for us like ethnic cleansing.” The remarks, when published, stung Addis Ababa into action. Ethiopia’s foreign ministry dismissed Haavisto’s comments as “ludicrous” and a “hallucination of sorts or a lapse in memory of some kind.”¹⁹⁷² The Ethiopians rejected calls for talks to be initiated, describing the Tigrayan government as no more than a “terrorist cell.”¹⁹⁷³ Addis went on to say that henceforth they would find it difficult to consider the special envoy as a “credible intermediary.”

In July 2021 Annette Weber replaced Alex Rondos as new EU Special Representative on the Horn of Africa, and has since taken active part in the EU’s attempts to influence Ethiopia.¹⁹⁷⁴ She also discussed the situation in Ethiopia with other actors, such as Saudi Arabia in November 2021.¹⁹⁷⁵ In addition, the EU has sent others, such as the Commissioner for International Partnerships, Jutta Urpilainen in October 2021.¹⁹⁷⁶ Following this visit, European Foreign Ministers raised the alarm at the possible disintegration of Ethiopia.¹⁹⁷⁷ However, such rhetoric has not yet led to further concrete action by the EU, although it has threatened to “use all its foreign policy tools, including restrictive measures, to promote peace, adherence to international humanitarian and human rights law, and help end conflict”, according to Borrell.¹⁹⁷⁸ Europeans suggest that the US and the African Union need time and space to see if they can make progress with the Ethiopians. The EU explains that it continues to rely mostly on “regional and African Union mediation efforts, led by Special Representative Obasanjo, trusting that these will deliver peace.” ¹⁹⁷⁹

The Ethiopian government is not without its supporters in Europe, who have made their presence felt at demonstrations and by lobbying their communities to back Prime Minister Abiy’s stand. In August 2021, for example, the Archbishop of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Sweden wrote to his congregation urging people by letter to donate money to the Ethiopian army.¹⁹⁸⁰ In reality the Ethiopian diaspora around the world – estimated to be 2.5 million strong – is divided, just as the Eritrean diaspora is.¹⁹⁸¹ Some back the government and some do not. Both sides are eloquent, articulate and engaged. “In the 1980s, they mobilised resources and financed and supported armed groups that toppled the Soviet-affiliated Derg regime,” said Merga Yonas Bula, a doctoral student researching Ethiopia’s diaspora at the University of Leipzig in Germany. But it was the advent of social media that led to groups abroad becoming a force to be reckoned with. “Social media platforms became an alternative for them to voice their discontent. And beyond that, social media became a tool for resistance … to mobilise resources and financing, and also to share their strategies,” Bula said.¹⁹⁸²

As well as attempting to take co-ordinated measures, EU states have taken individual measures in an attempt to put pressure on the Ethiopian authorities. In August 2021, France – which had promised to back plans for the re-birth of the Ethiopian navy in the Red Sea – withdrew its support for the project.¹⁹⁸³ The agreement, reached between President Macron and Prime Minister Abiy in March 2019, would have seen US$100mn being committed by Paris to the project.¹⁹⁸⁴ The Ethiopian navy would have been based in the Eritrean ports of Assab or Massawa – as it was during the days of the Ethiopian empire.¹⁹⁸⁵ The independence of Eritrea, which effectively took place in 1991 with the fall of Asmara, put an end to the navy, even though some vessels continued operating from Yemen and then Djibouti. The re-establishment of the navy was probably one of the ‘wins’ Prime Minister Abiy would have hoped to see flowing from alliance with President Isaias in 2018, when he signed a peace deal with Eritrea. Ireland has been a key player in the war in Ethiopia at the UN Security Council since it gained a seat there. Consequently, it was one of the main drivers for a UN Security Council statement in November 2021 calling for an immediate ceasefire.¹⁹⁸⁶ Following the statement, Irish Ambassador Byrne Nason expressed his frustration at a UN Security Council briefing, stating that “[…] the Council’s voice matters on this issue, and it has the power to deliver change. We remained silent for too long.” ¹⁹⁸⁷ Ethiopia reacted by expelling four of Ireland’s six diplomats from Addis Ababa.¹⁹⁸⁸

Overall, however, the EU has contributed little to resolving ending the war, beyond lending support to American initiatives at the UN. A former Dutch diplomat, familiar with the Horn of Africa, said he could raise no interest whatsoever from his government.1989 Speaking off the record an EU diplomat complained that while the situation was deteriorating rapidly there was little sign of genuine European engagement: “The EU has so far stayed silent.”¹⁹⁹⁰ Human Rights Watch is scathing about the EU’s inaction.¹⁹⁹¹

“[As the] EU’s foreign policy is determined by unanimity, resistance from key member states risks undermining crucial efforts, including calling for a Human Rights Council special session that could establish an investigative mechanism. European and other countries initially said they wanted to first see the outcome of a joint UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) investigation opened in March. The joint report is now out,¹⁹⁹² and recommends an international investigative mechanism, but some EU member states still appear reluctant to heed that call.”

This assessment was supported by the EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, who pointed to the inability of the bloc to take concerted action as the situation in Ethiopia deteriorated.¹⁹⁹³ Borrell this was “one of my biggest frustrations” in 2021 “because we were not able to react properly to the large-scale human rights violations, mass rapes using sexual violence as a war arm, killings and concentration camps based on ethnic belonging.” He added: “We haven’t been able to stop it, and neither to take coercive measures due to the lack of unanimity in the Council.” EU foreign policy decisions, such as the imposition of sanctions, require unanimity among all 27 EU countries. Borrell did not name the nations that were blocking action.

18.4 United Kingdom

Since leaving the European Union Britain’s voice has been muted, at best. While continuing to have some influence through its seat on the UN Security Council, London has had little leverage in world affairs. Under Boris Johnson the British have concentrated on winning alternative markets for their exports and Africa has received little attention.

Despite no major steps being taken by the British government, pressure exerted in Parliament has secured some minor concessions. Sustained interest from Members of Parliament in the House of Commons, and by Peers in the House of Lords, has focused on the following areas, securing small but meaningful shifts in government behaviour and engagement:

• UK Parliamentarians were quick to highlight the presence of Eritrean troops in Ethiopia, their destabilising influence, and their alleged human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. The UK’s position is firm and resolute in demanding the withdrawal of Eritrean troops.¹⁹⁹⁴
• UK Parliamentarians expressed their alarm at the use of sexual violence and rape in the conflict. The UK is in theory a global leader on preventing sexual violence in conflict after its 2012 summit on the topic and launch of the PSVI, or Prevention Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative. In June 2021 the UK deployed an expert from their PSVI Team of Experts to conduct an initial scoping mission, but tangible outcomes are unclear at this stage. ¹⁹⁹⁵ Given the launch of a global summit hosted by the UK in 2022, it is expected that Ethiopia will be a focus.¹⁹⁹⁶
• As elsewhere, the provision of humanitarian aid has been scrutinised, with the International Development Committee in particular criticising the now combined Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office’s approach to Ethiopia, and calling the country a test of the department’s newly integrated ‘diplomacy and development’ approach.¹⁹⁹⁷ Despite scrutiny, the UK cut direct, ‘bilateral’ aid to Ethiopia from £240.5 million in 2020/2021, to £107.6 million planned for 2021/2022.¹⁹⁹⁸ This was part of a wider package of cuts rather than a halving of aid applied punitively.
• The UK seems to be considering sanctions designations targeting individuals and entities responsible for abuses in Ethiopia, including of Eritrean bodies already targeted by the US. as highlighted above. This would be an early use of the UK’s robust Magnitsky sanctions regime.¹⁹⁹⁹

18.5 Turkey, Iran, and the UAE

In Tigray War and Regional Implications Volume 1 we provided an analysis of the critical role the United Arab Emirates (UAE) played in helping Ethiopia and Eritrea sign a peace deal in 2018. The UAE had paved the way diplomatically.²⁰⁰⁰ Substantial funding was provided to both by the Arab state. It was reported that Ethiopia received an aid and funding pledge of no less than US$3bn in June 2018.²⁰⁰¹ Eritrea would have been likely to also have received promises of the UAE’s largess. There were even reports that the UAE was to fund a pipeline from the Eritrean ports to Addis Ababa, but little more of this plan has ever been heard.²⁰⁰² Indeed, exactly how much either Ethiopia or Eritrea actually received is open to question. The second element of the UAE’s relationship with the Horn was its military base in the Eritrean port of Assab. This was used as a springboard for attacks on the Houthi in Yemen, as well as somewhere to torture prisoners of war. The base was closed in February 2021, as the UAE pulled back from involvement in the civil war in Yemen.²⁰⁰³

When the war erupted between Eritrea and Ethiopia on the one hand and Tigray on the other in November 2020 the UAE was accused of supplying drones that took out much of the Tigrayan armour and military hardware.²⁰⁰⁴ Some – including Bellingcat – questioned the veracity of this evidence, suggesting that it was not proven.²⁰⁰⁵ But a year later more substantial evidence was provided, including photographs, which indicated that the UAE had indeed armed the Ethiopians.²⁰⁰⁶ As one report put it: “Although the exact drone type that forms the basis for the UCAV (unmanned combat aerial vehicles) design is as of yet unknown, they are identical in design to two UCAVs that were shot down by Houthi forces in Yemen.”²⁰⁰⁷ The drones – and other military equipment – were delivered by what was described on 8 October 2021 as a UAE “air bridge” to support Ethiopia’s war effort in Tigray.²⁰⁰⁸ They were not the only equipment supplied by Doha. Everything from guns and ammunition to 50 ambulances were flown into Ethiopia by the UAE.²⁰⁰⁹

“In 53 days, at least 51 suspicious cargo flights reached Ethiopia, most of them landing at Harar Meda air base. A total of 45 of those cargo flights originated in the UAE while six came from Iran. In the latter case, it can be presumed that the Boeing 747 and Il-76 cargo aircraft used carried Mohajer-6 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) confirmed to have been delivered to Ethiopia onboard, although the delivery of other types of Iranian weaponry to the ENDF can’t be ruled out either.”

A second source confirmed they had tracked no fewer than 45 flights had been identified from the UAE to Ethiopia.²⁰¹⁰ In a later post the source suggested that two flights a day were taking place a day between the UAE and Ethiopia.²⁰¹¹ These drone deliveries were supplemented by the Chinese manufactured Wing Loong I.²⁰¹²

The drones were delivered via the UAE from a variety of sources. This included China and Iran, but they were not the only sources of these armaments. The relationship between Addis Ababa and Ankara has been developing for some time. It is part of a drive by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyi Erdogan for influence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa that has been described as a “neo-Ottoman revival.”²⁰¹³ This has included a base in Somalia and a planned base in Sudan.²⁰¹⁴ Turkey’s relationship with Ethiopia has gradually been gathering pace. In January 2018 it was reported that the value of Turkish investments in Ethiopia had reached US$2.5bn.²⁰¹⁵ In 2005, there were just three Turkish companies in Ethiopia. By early 2021 there are 200, ranging from wire and textiles to beverages.²⁰¹⁶ Previously the Turks have been in competition for influence in the region with the UAE. In recent months, this relationship has gradually improved.²⁰¹⁷

In August 2021 Prime Minister Abiy visited Ankara. He held a meeting with President Erdogan, at which a military deal and accompanying financial arrangements were negotiated.²⁰¹⁸ As Al Jazeera put it: “Details of the deals were not immediately available.” The comments made at the press conference gave little away. Perhaps more revealing was the fact that President Erdogan held a phone conference a few days later with the UAE’s de facto ruler, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. A statement released by Erdogan’s office said: “Relations between the countries and regional issues were discussed in the talks.”²⁰¹⁹ Did this include the relationship between both countries and Ethiopia, and how both might assist Prime Minister Abiy in his war efforts? We do not know. What we do know is that Turkish drones are reported to have begun being manufactured in Ethiopia.²⁰²⁰ The weapons, which are said to be for both surveillance and tactical use, are being built at a training and intelligence centre of the Information Network Security Agency or INSA. ²⁰²¹ The director-general of INSA – Temesgen Tiruneh – is reportedly in overall charge of the programme, and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is said to visit the site frequently. The agency is said to be building a runway from which the drones can be launched, about ten kilometres from the centre of Addis.

It is probably too early to be certain what impact the drones have had on the war. However, Al Jazeera may be right when it concludes that they have been critical in tipping the conflict towards the Ethiopian government.²⁰²²

All these drones search the battlefield, guided by remote pilots back at base. Analysts, intelligence specialists, military planners and army commanders can see and share the high-resolution images being fed back giving a far clearer picture of the battlefield and the enemy’s intentions. The Tigrayan forces have no such capability and would have armoured units, air defence systems, mobile radar sites and command and control posts destroyed at a far greater rate. The Ethiopian military would also be able to use its meagre air force of 22 MiG-23 and Su-27 fighter jets and 18 Hind attack helicopters to greater effect as the intelligence of the intended target would be more detailed and up-to-date. Chinese Short Range Ballistic missiles, the DF-12, plus Multiple Rocket launcher systems bought from China can also be given far more accurate coordinates because of intelligence gathered by drones.”

The rapprochement between the UAE and Turkey has therefore been important for Prime Minister Abiy. He has been able to rely on them, and the Chinese, for support and for weapons. Together with China and Russia they have provided an alternative pole of international authority at a time when the European Union and the USA, upon whom Ethiopia has traditionally relied, have become increasingly critical.

18.6 Africa

Despite the wider Horn being affected by the Tigray war, the interventions from the region, and from Africa in general, have been remarkably muted. The exception to this is, of course, Eritrea, but it is a participant in the conflict, not an observer.

The African Union, as has been mentioned above, has been criticised for failing to be an independent arbiter in the conflict. It should not be forgotten that President Ramaphosa, as chair of the Union, did intervene swiftly in an attempt to find a negotiated end to the war when it first broke out in November 2021. He established a three-person mediation team of former African Presidents, and this was supported by the Ethiopian President, Sahle-Work Zewde.²⁰²³ But the initiative was immediately rejected by Prime Minister Abiy.²⁰²⁴ Since then the African Union has done little, apart from appointing former Nigerian President Obasanjo as mediator in August 2021.²⁰²⁵ As former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, pointed out, this has been a real failure.²⁰²⁶

Coming on top of the immense suffering and destruction this war has caused, particularly in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, one of the tragedies of this conflict is that 10 months after the war had started, the AU Peace and Security Council had not addressed it. This is despite its express mandate to intervene to ensure peace and stability in all the Member States of the AU as well as the fact that Ethiopia hosts the Headquarters of the AU.

The AU’s silence on the atrocities committed against the Tigrayans in particular has been sharply criticised.²⁰²⁷

The voice of the AU was never heard condemning the atrocities targeted against civilians in Tigray. When Tigrayans at the height of the war were being brutally murdered, raped, and cleansed from their places of origin by joint forces of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, the Eritrean Defence Forces, and assorted special police forces and militias, the Chairperson of the Commission, Moussa Faki, was heard congratulating the Ethiopian government for its “bold steps to preserve the unity, stability and respect for the constitutional order of the country; which is legitimate for all states….²⁰²⁸ The Chairperson of the AU and by extension his envoy are rightfully considered partial to its belligerent by the Tigrayan coalition fighting for the survival of its people.”

The AU’s failure to be even-handed between the combatants is perhaps unsurprising. Its headquarters is in Addis Ababa and AU chairmen have always taken a deferential attitude to their hosts. It has not made former President Obasanjo’s task any easier and has resulted in other mediators being considered – including the Kenyans.

Kenya has been a major player, if for no other reason because it would be vitally affected should Ethiopia suffer a breakup. They have therefore been engaged from the start of the Tigray war. The Kenyans, for example, have acted as hosts to UN and other international meetings, while at the same time playing a significant role at the UN itself. Nairobi has served as an important base from which the international media could operate, since their work in Ethiopia was so constrained by the government. Most of Kenya’s efforts have taken place away from the limelight. At the UN, the Kenyans have worked with other nations in the Security Council in the group as “A-3+1.” Other members of the group are Niger, Tunisia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines and are the bloc of three elected African states on the Security Council with the addition of a Caribbean state.²⁰²⁹ In July 2021 Kenya’s Permanent Representative to the UN Martin Kimani urged all parties to the Tigray war to lay down their arms.²⁰³⁰

On 26 August 2021 Martin Kimani told the Security Council that what was needed was an “Ethiopian-owned process to mediate the deep divides.” But he went on to caution against conflating political opposition with that identity.²⁰³¹ He urged parties to the Tigray war to lay down their arms. While recommending that the Council call on Eritrea to withdraw forces, he also called on Ethiopia’s Government to acknowledge the existence of legitimate grievances and urged armed actors in Tigray to withdraw from neighbouring regions. The targeting of civilians must stop immediately, he said, stressing the need for unfettered humanitarian access before famine returns to any part of Ethiopia.

The Chief of the Kenyan Defence Forces General Robert Kibochi underlined how significant the war was for his country.²⁰³² “The situation in Ethiopia is of great strategic importance to us. We have been raising this issue so that there is some kind of intervention, whether diplomatic or some other way, because Ethiopia – with its population of more than one hundred million – is hugely strategic for us,” said General Kibochi. As the Tigrayans and Oromo advanced towards Addis Ababa, Kenya recalled all its police to cope with any possible disruption that could be caused if the conflict spilled over into their country, bringing an influx of refugees and weapons into northern Kenya.²⁰³³

The Kenyan role in the war was underlined by the meeting President Biden held with Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in October 2021.²⁰³⁴ It was the American leader’s first face to face meeting with an African leader, but little was revealed about the substance of their discussions. This was followed by contacts with Blinken, who has discussed with the Kenyan leader the urgency of a ceasefire, to allow negotiations to take place.²⁰³⁵ According to the US State Department press statement: “President Kenyatta and Secretary Blinken agreed on the importance of unhindered humanitarian access for all communities affected by the conflict and reiterated their support for an inclusive political dialogue.” Despite this, by late November 2021 there were few signs of this coming to fruition.

The Somali government’s role in the tripartite alliance with Ethiopia and Eritrea was examined in Volume 1 of our Tigray report. The Somali government tried to deny sending troops to support the alliance in Tigray, but the denial held little water.²⁰³⁶ The UN’s human rights rapporteur for Eritrea, Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker, provided this summary of their role.²⁰³⁷

In addition to reports of the involvement of Eritrean troops in the Tigray conflict, the Special Rapporteur also received information and reports that Somali soldiers were moved from military training camps in Eritrea to the front line in Tigray, where they accompanied Eritrean troops as they crossed the Ethiopian border. It is also reported that Somali fighters were present around Aksum. The Government of Somalia denied the participation of Somali soldiers in the Tigray conflict. It is further reported that a Somali parliamentary committee has demanded an explanation from the President of Somalia on the whereabouts of the Somali troops sent to Eritrea. The Special Rapporteur was informed that the foreign affairs and defence committee of the Parliament had called on the head of State to dispatch a fact-finding mission to Asmara for an investigation.

Angry Somali parents demonstrated in the capital Mogadishu, demanding that their government disclose the whereabouts of their sons who were taken to Eritrea for military training.²⁰³⁸ Prime minister Roble directed that a fact-finding committee probe the allegations, with Defence Minister Hassan Hussein Haji, Interior Minister Mukhtar Hussein Afrah and Army Chief of Staff Odawa Yusuf Rageh among those selected to be on the commission, which has yet to report.

18.7 China

The role of China is among the most important and least discussed in this conflict. With Russia it has repeatedly used its position on the UN Security Council to block discussion of the situation in Tigray and to resist attempts by western powers to impose sanctions of any kind on the combatants, even when UN staff were expelled by the Ethiopian authorities.²⁰³⁹ One of the few measures the Security Council managed to agree on, with Chinese and Russian support, was issuing a press release on 22 April 2021, in which they “expressed their deep concern about allegations of human rights violations and abuses, including reports of sexual violence against women and girls in the Tigray region and called for investigations to find those responsible and bring them to justice.”²⁰⁴⁰

Any further action is resisted on the grounds of national sovereignty. As a Chinese statement put it: “China firmly supports Ethiopia’s efforts to safeguard national sovereignty and independence, believes that the Ethiopian government has the capacity and wisdom to properly handle its internal affairs, and will continue to support the Ethiopian people in realising national peace, stability, development and prosperity. China will adhere to its consistent position and oppose external forces interfering in Ethiopia’s internal affairs under the pretext of human rights.”²⁰⁴¹ This is just the tip of the iceberg of Chinese involvement in the conflict. China maintains a major base in Djibouti. It is not alone in this. Japan, the United States, France, Italy, Spain, Germany and (prospectively) India use the Red Sea state as external bases from which to project their military influence.²⁰⁴² Since 2017 Djibouti has also been central to China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” stretching from Beijing to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Ethiopia has been a major beneficiary of Chinese investment, bringing everything from a renewed railway from Djibouti to Addis to a mass transit system in the capital and factories producing a wide range of goods. Between 2000 and 2018, Chinese investment is said to have reached US$13.7bn.²⁰⁴³ In August 2021 China pledged to strengthen these ties.²⁰⁴⁴

Beijing also has important links with Eritrea, the other major actor in the Tigray war. The country has been building its relationship with Eritrea for years, with investments in the one sector that shows signs of potential growth: mining. China has taken a share of a number of mines, including Danakali Ltd, a potash mine straddling the Ethiopian border which has enough of the mineral to continue production well into the next century.²⁰⁴⁵ Links were formalised and strengthened when Eritrea joined China’s Belt and Road initiative in November 2021.²⁰⁴⁶ John Calabrese, director of the Middle East-Asia Project at the American University in Washington, suggested that Beijing was using the war in Tigray as a reason to move away from its reliance on Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa.²⁰⁴⁷ “As things have unravelled in Ethiopia, Beijing might have decided to further diversify its relations in the Horn by cementing ties with Eritrea,” Calabrese said. As for Eritrea, the recent imposition of US sanctions over its role in the year-long civil war in neighbouring northern Ethiopia, had made it useful, if not necessary for the country to reach out to other willing partners, Calabrese said. “Beijing is, as ever, opportunistic, perhaps even more so with US-China strategic rivalry having heated up,” he said.

These investments have strengthened the Ethiopian economy, enabling Prime Minister Abiy to afford to prosecute the war. The threat of a Chinese veto has blocked action in the Security Council. However, it is China’s weapons supplies that have probably made the greatest contribution to the Ethiopian war effort. Analysts point to the delivery of Chinese drones as an attempt to tip the conflict towards Prime Minister Abiy. China itself has given some indications of this relationship. Chinese media have discussed the training of Ethiopian police in the use of drones.²⁰⁴⁸ In October 2021 a report appeared suggesting that flights have been tracked between Chengdu in China, where the Wing Loong I is manufactured, to Harar Meda air base in Ethiopia.²⁰⁴⁹

The article by Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans suggests that a model of the Chinese drone was shown in an interview with the head of the Ethiopia Air Force. They go on to discuss evidence they have that the Wing Loong I military drone has arrived in Ethiopia. “After the drones’ arrival to the air base, they were hastily moved to a nearby hangar to avoid their detection by prying eyes, an effort which nonetheless evidently failed.”2050 Information about the airlift from China was corroborated by another source, who tracked a flight from Chengdu and another from Dalian.²⁰⁵¹ It is reported that Chinese have been seen over Mekelle.²⁰⁵² They quote a video showing a Wing Loong 1 over the Tigrayan city.

A third source provided satellite imagery of the Wing Loong drones at Ethiopia’s military airport of Harar Meda, south of Addis Ababa in November 2021.²⁰⁵³ The authors say that: We found a first hit on 2 November 2021, that fits with the measurements of a Wing Loong, namely a wingspan of 14 metres and a length of 9 metres, standing outside the blue hangar. Another Airbus satellite images taken on 11 November, this time a bit blurrier, shows a drone with the same size southwest of the hangar.” They continue: “Last year China joined the Arms Trade Treaty, which obliges exporting states to do a proper risk assessment of the likelihood that the receiving state could use unmanned combat aerial vehicles to violate international humanitarian and human rights law, or that it would endanger peace and security. Considering the multiple reports of airstrikes against civilian targets and other abuses, one wonders how China can justify the export of armed drones to Ethiopia in the context of the ATT.”

These are appropriate issues to raise. Whether Beijing will provide answers is quite another question.

Just how valuable the drones supplied to by Turkey, China or Iran is open to question. An article considering the utility of the Iranian Mohajer-6s suggested that they have not been as effective as had been anticipated.²⁰⁵⁴ The authors, Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, provided this assessment of its capabilities.

“Although acquired with much anticipation on the side of Ethiopia, the operational career of the Mohajer-6s in the country ended almost as soon as the drones had been delivered, with both drones acquired almost immediately grounded as problems in their control systems prevented their actual use over Ethiopia… It would take until late October 2021 when the problems with the Mohajer-6s finally appeared resolved, some two and a half months after their arrival to Ethiopia! Throughout early November 2021, both Mohajer-6s were regularly sighted on the runway and tarmac of Semera airport… However, with the Mohajer-6’s low flight ceiling the type is vulnerable to ground fire, whereas the low quality of its FLIR turret and the fact that the drone itself is largely unproven in combat could result in poor efficacy. What is more, with the low numbers known to have been produced so far it remains to be seen if the Mohajer-6s can actually make a difference in a war that has meanwhile entered its second year.”

The authors suggest that the Chinese drones also only have a limited use. “The lack of any armament for its (operational) UCAVs led the Ethiopian Air Force to use its Wing Loong Is to designate targets for Su-27 fighter aircraft instead.”

If this is accurate then the provision of high-tech equipment in an environment as rugged and vast as Ethiopia may be of limited use. It may well explain why the Kalashnikov and the machete are still so widely used: there is little that can go wrong with these tried and tested weapons.

Relations between the Chinese and Eritrea were strengthened further with the visit of China’s State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi in January 2022. He and President Isaias issued a statement in which President Isaias thanked China for its role enhancing a “balanced global order predicated on respect of international law” – code for China’s refusal to allow the Tigray war to be dealt with by the UN Security Council.²⁰⁵⁵ There was further agreement on the development of Eritrea’s ports of Massawa and Assab, as well as its mining. This – in all probability – indicated further collaboration in the China’s role in the giant phosphate deposit that straddles the Eritrean-Ethiopian border in the Danakil desert. These developments, together with the Chinese decision to appoint a “special envoy” to deal with the Horn of Africa underlines Beijing’s determination to enhance its status as a major player in the region.²⁰⁵⁶

18.8 Conclusion

Following the withdrawal of TDF within the borders of Tigray the Ethiopian military announced that it would “pause” in the positions they had captured. This was welcomed by the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres.²⁰⁵⁷ He also welcomed the message from the Tigrayan forces stating they had withdrawn from neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions back into Tigray. “The Secretary-General urges the parties to grasp this opportunity, cease hostilities in the year-long conflict, take all steps to ensure the provision of much-needed humanitarian assistance, the withdrawal of foreign fighters, and address political differences through a credible and inclusive national dialogue,” the statement said.

For its part, on 28 December the US made clear that it would continue to press for a diplomatic solution to the war, but would impose further sanctions against Ethiopia on 1 January 2022, unless there was an end to the blockade of Tigray.²⁰⁵⁸

With Tigrayan forces having withdrawn into Tigray region and the Ethiopian Government stating it does not intend to pursue those forces into Tigray, we believe this offers an opportunity for both sides to halt conflict operations and to come to the negotiating table. We’ve said repeatedly there is no military solution to this conflict. That is why we support diplomacy as the first, last, and only option to address this conflict. We reiterate our calls for the Ethiopian Government to start credible, inclusive national dialogue that includes comprehensive, transparent transitional justice measures, including accountability for those responsible for atrocities. When it comes to AGOA (the African Growth and Opportunity Act), I don’t have any update on – for that for you at the moment. As we announced in November, the AGOA eligibility criteria in US law stipulates that, among other things, a country not engage in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights and must make continual progress towards establishing the rule of law and political pluralism. We did note in the context of that announcement that the President had determined that three sub-Saharan African countries, including Ethiopia, were out of compliance with eligibility for AGOA, a revocation that would take effect 1 January 2022.

The year 2021 ended without a resolution to the conflict or the blockade. As the UN reported on 30 December, the situation in Tigray had continued to deteriorate. ²⁰⁵⁹ These extracts of the report give a clear indication of the situation.

Between 19 and 24 December, airstrikes on Tigray reportedly lead to mass civilian causalities, including dozens of people reportedly killed, making this the most intense series of air attacks and casualties reported since October. Most attacks and casualties reported in Alamata, Korem, Maychew, Mekoni, and Milazat towns in southern Tigray. Due to limited access and insecurity in the area, humanitarian partners could not verify the exact number of casualties yet…

[Fighting had held up convoys, as a result] no trucks with humanitarian aid cargo entered Tigray since 14 December… Overall, 1,338 trucks have entered the region since 12 July, which represents less than 12% of the required supplies to meet the humanitarian needs.

In Tigray, the humanitarian situation remains dire with more than 5.2 million people or 90% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance. Due to lack of supplies, including medications, fuel, and cash for the humanitarian organisations, only a fraction of the people in need are receiving assistance. The situation is expected to deteriorate further if no additional supplies enter the region immediately. The old caseload of IDPs in Shire, for instance, have not received food aid for the last six months. A partner agency halted its mobile health services in Shire from 28 sites to only six due to lack of essential drugs. Most partners have reduced water trucking operations due to lack of fuel and cash while the number of water and sanitation partners reduced from 46 few months ago to only 12 during the reporting period. The year ended with many expressions of concern from the US and EU combined with limited sanctions. The UN Security Council is – as ever – impeded from taking decisive action by the threat of a Chinese or Russian veto. Meanwhile, hopes of a diplomatic breakthrough rested with the Kenya’s President Kenyatta or former Nigerian President Obasanjo. By the end of 2021 they – together with international actors – had apparently not made substantive progress.

19. Ethiopia’s foreign relations and the Tigray war
Author’s name withheld

19.1 Introduction

On 5 February 2022, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, in his opening remarks to the 35th African Union summit in Addis Ababa stated that: “Peace and security are critical issues affecting our continent. Despite the African Union’s intensive engagement in addressing peace and security on the continent, guided by the maxim “African Solutions to African Problems,” new and complex problems that undermine our unity and sovereignty continue to emerge. In this respect the past year was particularly challenging to our continent in general and my own country Ethiopia in particular. Ethiopia’s challenge was internal in nature and a matter of maintaining law and order. But resolution of our internal matters was made exceedingly difficult by the role played by external actors.”²⁰⁶⁰

This chapter looks at what is known about the roles played by some of those external actors, and the politics behind this. It summarises conclusions and impressions which seem to be relatively clear; but it also considers external influences and patterns of material support which remain opaque, or which have been carefully obscured; as well as some of the narratives about external involvement that have been carefully spun, and systematically amplified, since the Tigray war began. The chapter considers the way in which Ethiopian regional foreign relations have evolved, and examines the roles of Ethiopia’s nearest neighbours, its regional allies and suppliers, and inter-state and continental bodies. The chapter complements Martin Plaut’s discussion of wider diplomatic and international relations in this volume, which focuses on the US, EU, and Britain, as well as Turkey and the Gulf States, Africa, and China. It focuses on the changing politics and nature of Ethiopian foreign policy-making within the Horn, with new influences and implications.

The chapter argues that the Ethiopian Prime Minister was correct to conclude that scope for resolution of the war in Ethiopia has been damaged by unprecedented external interference in its political, security and military strategies. But it sets out a different reasoning than his: this increase in interference has had little to do with western pressure or the notion that western states supported his adversaries (they did not). Rather it was the direct consequence of foreign policy decisions taken by the current Ethiopian Prime Minister and his Government since 2018. Ethiopia’s leaders since 2018 invited external actors into Ethiopia, either directly as armed and security actors, or as military facilitators, suppliers, and financiers. It is those decisions that have compromised Ethiopian sovereignty and national interests, in fundamental ways which will likely be difficult or impossible to reverse.

Under its new Prime Minister from April 2018, Ethiopia’s foreign relations were rapidly disrupted. The new Ethiopian government presented its foreign strategy as marking a “new dawn” of peaceful cooperation with its neighbours and the international community. Others saw a “crisis of foreign relations”²⁰⁶¹ that wrecked Ethiopia’s hard-won status as a contributor to peace and stability across the Horn over several decades. The chapter argues that Ethiopia’s loss of national autonomy and strategic policy coherence marked a return to the more transactional and unstable approach of the past. At the beginning of 2022, the approach looked set to continue to drive conflict domestically and to increase the risks of it regionally. It was also diametrically at variance with a publicly expressed Ethiopian Government commitment to “national dialogue.”

19.2 Claims and counter-claims: the propaganda war

Ethiopian Government allegations that the Government of Tigray and its ruling party the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) were widely supported by “the west” echoed throughout 2021.²⁰⁶² In portraying itself as a victim both of TPLF aggression and “neo-colonial interference” from the US and EU, the Ethiopian Government has simultaneously deployed the resources of incumbency to promote key elements of its narrative. Addis Ababa has maintained, for instance, that the TPLF was exclusively responsible for starting the war with its attack on the National Defence Force’s Northern Command; that its “law and order operation” to detain a small group of TPLF “terrorist leaders” would be easily concluded “in a matter of weeks”; that foreign forces from Eritrea and Somalia were not involved in an “internal matter”; that its operations were respectful of the laws of war, and careful not to target civilians; that its forces had withdrawn from Tigray at the end of June 2021 of their own volition, and to “give peace a chance”; that diplomatic concerns to see progress on peace-making would be met after elections in June 2021, or after the establishment of a newly mandated Federal Government in October 2021, or (as more recently) after the Tigrayan people “came to their senses” and gave up their leaders. None of this was true.

At the time of writing in early February 2022, the Ethiopian government narrative maintained that the military phase of the war had been effectively concluded after the TPLF’s forces had been comprehensively “defeated” in November and December 2021 (whilst at the same time quadrupling federal defence spending in January 2022²⁰⁶³); and (even more remarkably) that it was the TPLF, not the Federal Government or its allies, that was blocking the delivery of aid to civilians in Tigray.

Intended largely to shore up high levels of domestic support and acquiescence, each of these claims has also had an important impact in silencing diplomatic discussion and criticism. Each claim has been challenged or has unravelled to a greater or a lesser degree over the period from November 2020, and it is unsurprising that international and Ethiopian journalists, academics, and analysts have critiqued them, often robustly.

The TPLF’s attack on the Northern Command in November 2020 is not in doubt, but further detail about the prior extent and scope of Ethiopian and Eritrean preparations for war – including troop and armaments movements – gradually come to light.²⁰⁶⁴ The military operation was not quickly concluded; civilians were brutally slaughtered, raped and starved, and Eritrean – and Somali – armed involvement is beyond doubt. Most well-informed commentators concluded that, so far from withdrawing to allow for a unilateral “humanitarian ceasefire” ENDF forces were expelled by force from Tigray in June 2021; and it seemed to most that TPLF forces were not defeated but able to withdraw reasonably intact in November and December 2021: in the face of an escalation of intensive drone attacks and threats to their over-extended supply lines, but well ahead of Ethiopian forces.²⁰⁶⁵ Meanwhile the inability to deliver food into Tigray from any direction continued to be carefully orchestrated by the Ethiopian Government and its allies on the ground, as the public narrative continues to seek to shift the blame for a policy of deliberate starvation.

Departure from the Government’s domestically broadly popular but increasingly absurdist “law and order” narrative about the brutal war on Tigray has been met with aggressive – often abusive – counterclaims: from government officials, loyalist Ethiopian academics, and social media activists of Ethiopian and Eritrean descent. Even mildly critical or questioning commentators (analysts, journalists, and academics) have been deported, expelled, or denied access to Ethiopia.²⁰⁶⁶ Principled diplomats who have expressed concern about humanitarian access, or human rights abuses and the need for their fully independent investigation have been bullied, cold-shouldered, and accused of “supporting terrorists.” Seven senior UN staff who had expressed concern about the Ethiopian Government’s blockade on the delivery of food and medicine to civilians in Tigray were expelled without warning on 30 September 2021, in a move described by the UN Secretary General as “illegal.”²⁰⁶⁷ Meanwhile more prominent academic critics and Tigrayan social media activists have been subjected to harassment, intimidation, vilification and threats – both reputational and physical.²⁰⁶⁸

At the end of 2021, meanwhile, the Ethiopian state seemed keen to reset relations with those it has most strongly criticised, seeking a more emollient strategy vis-à-vis important humanitarian donors in the context of an initial US Dollar 2.5 billion reconstruction bill.²⁰⁶⁹ In January 2022, a 53-page Amharic document setting out a “Re-engagement Strategy” for Ethiopia’s foreign relations was leaked.²⁰⁷⁰ It was an unusual paper, remarkably political for the traditionally cautious national Foreign Affairs bureaucracy, and judged to be the work of senior politicians and career diplomats from the Ministry and a Prime Ministerial Foreign Relations Advisory Committee.²⁰⁷¹ It combines savvy (and broadly accurate) analysis of the diverse attitudes of the US and European states with a blunt acknowledgement an aggressive foreign policy approach had damaged relations, and a highly political view of how to remedy the “resistance” encountered: if we choose to fight while negotiate and negotiate while fighting, along with the winning track we are on, it will enable us to fulfil our interest. Since the course we had been proceeding in doesn’t seem to bring about an agreement, it is necessary to adopt a different engagement strategy.²⁰⁷²

How did Ethiopia get to the point where it has been forced to acknowledge the need to reset its foreign diplomatic relations, and abandon its accusations of “neo-colonial meddling,” in order to buy the time and space to continue its war in Tigray “while negotiating”?

19.3 Foreign relations before 2018

Before 1991 Ethiopia’s foreign relations were shaped by superpower and cold-war alignment. During the post-war imperial period (1944-1974), as the country emerged from British military administration, Ethiopia was broadly aligned with the US. This changed during the military Marxist Derg government (1974-1991). Ethiopia abruptly realigned with the Soviet Union in 1977 during the Ethio-Somali war in the Ogaden, with the US swinging behind Somalia. The mantra of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” also characterised relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum with each hosting and supporting armed opponents of the other. As the cold war played out in the Horn, the Ethiopian government became a pariah in the west: destabilising (US-backed) neighbours in Sudan and Somalia; fighting civil wars on several fronts with eastern bloc and Cuban allies; and presiding over conflict-induced famine during the 1980s.

Derg-era foreign policy aimed to counter the animosity of neighbouring countries and the Arab world on the one hand, and on the other to neutralise threats from western powers based on cold war ideological differences. Derg foreign policy, like its domestic approach, blended ultra-nationalism with socialism, seeing threats as both geopolitical and ideological. Heavily influenced by socialist ideology, it was preoccupied to establish robust diplomatic relations only with socialist sister countries, treating others broadly as “enemies.” Under the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) from 1991 to 2018 the Ethiopian government sought to carve out the basis for greater autonomy in its foreign relations, and new regional stability based on better cooperation and infrastructural linkages. Addis Ababa under EPRDF facilitated Eritrea’s independence (1993). This ended a 30-year war but angered domestic opponents of the country’s “dismemberment” and loss of access to the sea. The Ethiopian government was lauded for its contributions to regional peace-making (especially in Somalia, Sudan, and later also South Sudan); and to international peacekeeping (in Rwanda/UNAMIR, Liberia/UNMIL, Burundi/ONUB, Abyei/UNISFA, Darfur/UNAMID, South Sudan/UNMISS, and Somalia/AMISOM). It won praise for its consolidation of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), its support to the establishment of the African Union (AU, 2002) with its peace and security

architecture (APSA, 2004), and for its global leadership on New Partnerships for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and climate change.

Ethiopia’s key foreign policy document of the period, the 2002 Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy identified internal rather than external threats (extreme poverty, structural injustice, and discrimination) as the country’s main vulnerabilities. The policy focus was heavily inward looking, emphasising “peace, development and democracy” as pillars for regional harmony. Ethiopia gradually gained outsize influence regionally and globally, not least because of the prominence of its then-Prime Minister as a de facto continental spokesperson.

Although admired for many aspects of its 1991-2018 foreign relations strategy, Ethiopia also went to war with Eritrea in 1998 and invaded Somalia in 2006. Relations with post-independence Asmara quickly soured in the 1990s, and a costly war (1998-2000) subsided into a protracted state of no-war no-peace (2001-2018). Eritrea hosted and trained opposition groups fighting the Ethiopian government: the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Gunbot 7 (whose members now influence a number of political parties in Amhara and Addis Ababa, including Ezema, Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice). Addis Ababa actively sought to contain what it viewed as Eritrean destabilisation via proxies, and in 2006 invaded Somalia to oust the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and its Eritrean advisers. In December 2009, not least after heavy Ethiopian lobbying, the UN imposed sanctions on Eritrea (an arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze on named individuals).²⁰⁷³

Although a partner in the international “war on terror” after 2001, the Ethiopian Government trod an independent-minded path, also pursuing what it saw as its more local national interests. The influence of the US over its decision-making was regularly overstated. Addis Ababa allowed US bases to be used to launch drone strikes against targets in Somalia. It refused, meanwhile, to sign the assurances needed to facilitate the deportation of Ethiopian terror suspects from partner countries. Critics argued that the Ethiopian Government’s attitude towards groups (from Al- Itihaad in the 1990s to Al-Shabaab in the 2000s) exacerbated conflict in Somalia.²⁰⁷⁴ The support which Addis Ababa gave during the EPRDF period to Somaliland and the sub-state Somali actors that became its federal member states (FMSs) was also controversial. Some saw it as an attempt to undermine Somali irredentism and cross-border support to Darod (Ogaadeen) insurgents in the Ethiopian Somali region.

Ethiopia bolstered its foreign policy independence through its diversification of partnerships. Drawing on support from development partners in the west and international financial institutions, Ethiopia also sought to build trade and investment relations with emerging economies and markets, notably China, Korea, Japan, Turkey, Brazil, and India. The government’s strategies for state-led development were ambitious, robustly independent, and counter to the Washington Consensus, from where they drew regular criticism (for currency overvaluation, public sector dominance, etc.).

Addis Ababa sought to cement regional and continental integration and alliances with investments in infrastructure. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD, 2011) was the centrepiece of Ethiopia’s strategy to reinforce (and control) cooperation and integration in the Horn by building the road, rail, and electricity infrastructure critical to trade and economic growth. Addis Ababa secured the support of upper-riparian Nile states (including Sudan) as a counterweight to the objections of Egypt. It financed the dam from domestic sources and refused international involvement in negotiations over design, filling and operations. IGAD’s Horn of Africa Initiative provided the shared regional framework for wider infrastructure planning and investment. By 2015, Ethiopia was being described (arguably with a degree of generosity) as a “benign regional hegemon.”²⁰⁷⁵

19.4 The new Horn axis – Addis Ababa-Asmara- Mogadishu

In 2018 the quarter-century constellation of relations in the Horn of Africa suddenly reversed, as the new Ethiopian Prime Minister became part of a new triangular alliance between the three leaders in Addis Ababa-Mogadishu-Asmara. This marked an abrupt departure from Ethiopia’s strategy of containing Eritrean influence, building federalism at home, and supporting Somalia’s Foreign Ministers and Somaliland. The shift saw Ethiopia pivot to the Federal Somali Government and its President; meanwhile Eritrea and its President were “brought in from the cold” after Ethiopian lobbying to lift UN sanctions. The new triangular alliance fostered multiple geopolitical shifts. At the same time, a cadre of senior foreign relations gurus and career diplomats was side-lined or sacked, some reportedly at the request of Eritrea’s President.²⁰⁷⁶ A Foreign Relations unit at the Office of the Prime Minister took on some of the roles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A new foreign policy document based on the Prime Minister’s new philosophy of Medemer (Synergy) was reportedly drafted, and widely discussed.²⁰⁷⁷

How and why did the new constellation matter?

Eritrea. The potential human, socio-economic and logistics benefits of sustainable peace, an open border and effective trade between Ethiopia and Eritrea (and Somalia) were in principle enormous and were very widely welcomed. But those benefits required detailed negotiation, transparency, and institutionalisation in order that they be captured.²⁰⁷⁸ The announcement of the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea in July 2018 was greeted with great joy at the popular level on both sides of the border. After two decades of stalemate and separation, people flocked across the border to meet friends and relatives when it was opened in September 2018. Ethiopians made short visits, but Eritreans often stayed in Ethiopia, with 96,000 refugees in camps in Tigray by 2020. Border crossings were reclosed in December 2018 (Zalambessa/Serha) and April 2019 (Humera/OmHajer, Bure/Assab). Ethiopian moves to negotiate port access seemed to have stalled at the end of 2019, although in January 2021 the Assab road was under rehabilitation. When the Chinese Foreign Minister visited Asmara in January 2022 a rail link with Assab was announced.

The new axis is highly personalised, and tactical, and much depends on one’s view of the Eritrean President’s intentions. Closer Ethio-Eritrean relations seem to have been a critical driver of the war in Tigray which erupted in November 2020, based on a shared interest in removing the TPLF. The Eritrean President made clear his loathing for the TPLF in speeches in September 2018 (“game over TPLF”), February 2021, and January 2022.²⁰⁷⁹ The bitterness is long-standing but was reinforced by Ethiopian/EPRDF support for sanctions before 2018. Tigrayan sources had warned since the peace deal was announced that its “real motivation” was as a tactical basis for an eventual concerted “pincer” attack on Tigray from north and south. Observers have seen Eritrean influence as a central factor in hardening the positions both of the Federal Government and of the Tigray Regional Government, feeding mutual paranoia, and escalating suspicion since 2018. Whether or not one saw this as a good thing depended on one’s perspective, and many Ethiopians were supportive of the hard line.

The Eritrean role in the war began with its participation in intensive military and security preparations.²⁰⁸⁰ It then involved the presence of significant numbers of Eritrean forces on the ground in Tigray, something the Ethiopian government finally admitted in March 2021 after a lengthy period of denials.²⁰⁸¹ International sources reported a further influx of Eritrean troops into western Tigray in August 2021,²⁰⁸² and in early 2022 they were estimated to number around 30,000.²⁰⁸³ In mid-January 2022, the OLF-OLA claimed that Eritrean forces had moved into Oromia,²⁰⁸⁴ and observers saw their hand also in Afar and Amhara. It was reported that a second round of Amhara special forces or irregular Fano were being trained by Eritrean forces in western Tigray.²⁰⁸⁵ Meanwhile, social media sources had claimed that Eritrean security forces had been involved in the house-to-house searches in November 2021 which saw large numbers of Tigrayans detained.²⁰⁸⁶

Some of the rhetoric of the early rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea raised speculation about the potential for a joint future – even a confederation – of the two countries. When he first visited Addis Ababa in July 2018, the Eritrean President stated that he had “given [Prime Minister Abiy] all responsibility of leadership and power; from now on, anyone who says Eritrea and Ethiopia are two people is out of reality.”²⁰⁸⁷ The Ethiopian Prime Minister made similar remarks in January 2019, emphasising that he saw no need for Ethiopia, Eritrea or Djibouti to have separate armies or embassies.²⁰⁸⁸ As the war has progressed, many observers have seen an axis of concrete collaboration and training (beyond the influence of Addis Ababa) evolving between Eritrea and radical forces in the Amhara region. The continuing presence of Eritrean forces in areas of northern and western Tigray (and in Oromia, and in and around Addis Ababa), then, reduces prospects for a negotiated settlement and greatly complicates humanitarian access and efficacy.

Many see “revenge” for the military reverses Eritrea suffered in 2000 as a driver of extreme antipathy, and the brutality of the current conflict as driven in part by unfinished business from the earlier war. The Ethiopian Government narrative holding the TPLF/Tigray Government responsible for the ills Ethiopia faces is well entrenched and many support its determination to destroy or exclude the TPLF at all costs. In February 2021, the TPLF announced eight pre-conditions for talks. As war has dragged on, it was hard to see how an inclusive Ethiopian political settlement could emerge. Following the withdrawal north of Tigrayan forces in November/December 2021, TPLF dropped many of its pre-conditions for negotiations, and the government in Addis Ababa made conciliatory noises about peace, releasing prisoners, and halting its ground forces close to Tigray’s borders. Observers once again saw the hand of Eritrea encouraging (and training) more radical Ethiopian voices – and forces – who opposed a negotiated settlement.

Close Ethio-Eritrean relations have also had an influence on decisions about the future of federalism in Ethiopia, tilting the balance in favour of those who prefer more centralised state-building. Eritrean President Isaias has a longstanding antipathy towards decentralised or multinational federal states.²⁰⁸⁹ He first broke with the TPLF over the issue of nationalities’ self-determination (1983-1989) even during their common struggle against the Derg. In February 2021 he argued again that the federal constitution was “the root of all problems,” repeating the sentiment in January 2020. Meanwhile the 2020 Ethiopian government crackdown marginalised other ethno-nationalist opposition parties (in Oromia, Sidama, Afar and Somali region, for instance) who had in 2019 seemed likely to win significant electoral support. Eritrean influence and the presence of Eritrean operatives were seen as likely to foil attempts to broker an inclusive process of “national dialogue” which involves those who favour federalism.

The future of Ethio-Eritrean relations remains opaque and could further destabilise the balance of power in Ethiopia. If the presence of Eritrean (and Somali) forces on Ethiopian territory consolidates or expands, this has the potential further to sharpen regional tensions, in the absence of forums capable to address this issue. The sovereignty issues raised by the presence of foreign forces could in principle inflame domestic Ethiopian (and Eritrean) public opinion, although there is no evidence or indication of this to date (ironic, given much talk of sovereignty). Ethio-Eritrean reunification in one form or another is an interest shared by many stakeholders – especially but not only pan-Ethiopian nationalists. Ethiopia has a clear interest in restoring its access to the sea; Eritrea in re-establishing influence over what it has long regarded as an Ethiopian “hinterland.”

Somalia. The new post-2018 axis also emboldened the federal centre in Somalia drawing Mogadishu more closely into the orbit of Asmara (and Addis Ababa). Both states actively supported the re-election of the President Mohamed Abdillahi Mohamed ‘Farmajo,’ whose presidential term formally expired on 1 February 2021. He was seen as an ally against “regionalism,” but as his credibility waned, in practice the strategy has constrained Addis Ababa’s influence: as one influential commentator has noted “Ethiopia’s partiality in Somalia limits its ability to be a constructive player there.” ²⁰⁹⁰ Meanwhile former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire (ousted in July 2020) sought the support of Djibouti for his presidential bid, and his successor Mohamed Hussein Roble has continued to challenge President ‘Farmajo’’s authority, with mutual recriminations peaking in December 2021. Tensions surrounding delayed elections had already boiled over into gunfire at an opposition march in Mogadishu in mid-February 2021, and the crisis bubbled on unresolved throughout the year. Also, for more than a year, controversy attached to persistent reports that Somali soldiers had been trained in Eritrea and were involved in fighting in Tigray.²⁰⁹¹ New evidence to corroborate this emerged in January 2022.²⁰⁹²

Strong Ethiopian (and Eritrean) support for the Federal Somali Government shifted Ethiopian support away from Somaliland in the north and Jubaland in the south, and disappointed Nairobi which itself had strained relations with Mogadishu. From 1991 Addis Ababa supported Somaliland strongly, with Ethiopia stopping short only of formal recognition of Somaliland as a state. The local relationship was complicated (especially under former Ethiopian Somali Region President Abdi Mohammed Omar (Abdi ‘Illey’, 2010-2018, whose special police carried out abuses and killings at Gashamo in 2012 and 2016).²⁰⁹³ Nevertheless, Addis Ababa saw security cooperation as essential, both during its period of heightened counter-insurgency in the Ogaden (2007-2010), and to deter the presence of Egypt, Eritrea, and “Islamist” groups on its northern border.

Addis Ababa’s 2018 overtures to Mogadishu irritated Hargeisa, and the relationship seemed to lapse: to the surprise, chagrin, and alarm of observers there. Ethiopia’s influence in Hargeisa had earlier begun to be eclipsed by heavy Somaliland investment from the Gulf and Turkey. Somaliland’s SNM-era leadership, who had established its post-war compact, and remembered the sanctuary they had found in Ethiopia in 1988, were gradually being succeeded by a new generation with commercial and other interests focused overseas, and on the Islamic world. In this newly antagonistic atmosphere, Ethiopia further disappointed Hargeisa (and the UAE) with its surprisingly lacklustre approach to the Dubai Ports World Berbera port development through 2020 and 2021.²⁰⁹⁴ Lurid rumours of Ethiopian designs on Somaliland territory at Zeila soured things further at the beginning of 2022.²⁰⁹⁵ Within weeks Addis Ababa had hurriedly upgraded its Hargeisa consul to full Ambassador.

In the south of Somalia Ethiopia’s new relationship with the Federal Somali President saw it withdraw support to its most notable ally, Jubaland’s Ahmed Madobe (for some time a prisoner in Addis Ababa and seen as having had close connections to the EPRDF government). Before 2018, Addis Ababa saw the establishment of Jubaland as a useful “alternative” Ogaadeen/Darod homeland in the Somali constellation: a valve which reduced secessionist/irredentist pressure on the Ethiopian Ogaden. A former member of the ICU, Madobe’s Ras Kamboni Movement later became a useful ally in Addis Ababa’s pre-2018 fight against Al Shabaab. The changes sharpened when the war began in Tigray at the end of 2020. The Ethiopia crisis as one commentator noted “hurts counterinsurgency efforts against the potent jihadi terrorist group al-Shabab and exacerbates Somalia’s existing tensions between its capital and regions.”²⁰⁹⁶ Ethiopia’s withdrawal of its troops from Somalia has also damaged AMISOM.

Kenya. As a result of the tensions, it reinforced in southern Somalia, the 2018
realignment sharpened tensions between Mogadishu (and Addis Ababa) and
Nairobi, jangling nerves across the IGAD region, with repercussions (albeit publicly muted) for relationships within IGAD and the AU.²⁰⁹⁷ The reformulation of the regional constellation of power had a negative impact on Kenya’s relations with Somalia and with Ethiopia. A series of issues (trade imbalances, khat imports, visa restrictions, but also a maritime border dispute, emerging differences over Jubaland, and the activities of Kenyan peacekeepers under AMISOM) has seen tensions between Somalia and Kenya escalate.²⁰⁹⁸ Somalia briefly cut off diplomatic ties with Kenya in December 2020. Meanwhile, Kenyan relations with Somaliland have received a boost. Addis Ababa has sought to stress the positives in its relations with Kenya (the two countries have had a defence pact since 1969), in December 2020 opening the one-stop border post at Moyale on the Addis Ababa – Nairobi – Mombassa highway.²⁰⁹⁹ But irritations and differences remain: vis-à-vis Jubaland, still a key ally of Nairobi; but also on border security, and the activities of armed factions in those areas of (Oromo) Borana that straddle the border.

Also significant has been the increasingly important role that the Kenyan President has played in working with the US in support of the AU special representative, to seek to broker scope for a cessation of hostilities, humanitarian access, and negotiations between the Ethiopian Government and the Tigrayans.²¹⁰⁰ Visits by US Secretary Blinken in November 2021, and Rwanda’s President Kagame in February 2022 have kept the focus of activities on Nairobi.²¹⁰¹ US focus on Kenya seems to have encouraged the Ethiopian Prime Minister to seek direct communication with President Biden, resulting in a “candid” call in early January 2022.²¹⁰²

19.5 The dam: Egypt, Sudan, and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

2022.  

In 2018 Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister agreed to US-led mediation over the GERD, abandoning an earlier diplomatic strategy of simply asserting its rights over the Nile waters, and establishing facts on the ground. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister now engaged in a high-risk strategy of direct talks with Egyptian President Sisi, an initiative which quickly undermined the carefully nurtured consensus between Addis Ababa and Khartoum on the dam. The move, described as Abiy’s “first foreign policy blunder” ²¹⁰³ was remarkable, as the country opened itself up (unnecessarily) to a level of Egyptian diplomatic demand and international influence on the dam, which domestic public opinion would always have found intolerable. Ethiopia’s subsequent withdrawal from talks, claiming unfair treatment by US mediators, drew international diplomatic pressure and the suspension of US aid. Talks failed again in Kinshasa in April 2021. In June 2021, tensions rose as Egypt accused Ethiopia of embarking on a second filling of the dam, although the levels reached were not as targeted. In October, the UN pressed all sides to resume talks, but by January 2022 they remained stalled.

Egypt. Many Ethiopians (particularly in the Orthodox Christian north) regard Egypt as “the old enemy,” and allegations of collusion with it (as for instance levelled against Jawar Mohammed/the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and TPLF) are treated as prima facie evidence of treason. There has been little love lost between the EPRDF/TPLF and Cairo over the decades (GERD was the brainchild of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, also leader of the TPLF). Allegations after 2018 that the TPLF was working with Egypt were met with incredulity in Tigray before the outbreak of the war. The horror of the situation that has developed on the ground since November 2020 could have the potential to change this calculation. Radical Tigray diaspora voices have explicitly called for it, but a direct relation seems unlikely. The TPLF and Cairo could become indirectly linked via Khartoum.

Cairo’s long-standing alliance with Asmara seems not to have survived the establishment of the new Horn axis. Egypt has longstanding ties with Eritrean movements, notably the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) which was founded in Cairo, but also the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF, forerunner of the ruling PFDJ).

The alliance between Asmara and Cairo which persisted during the period of EthioEritrean war and cold war fragmented after 2018. Eritrea maintains its relationships with the UAE and KSA, but recent realignment could potentially undermine longstanding support from these Gulf countries.

Meanwhile, Egypt has reinserted itself into regional politics in Africa, including the Horn, and in the Gulf. Wrong-footed by Ethiopia’s rapid moves to create GERD facts on the ground during the Arab Spring a decade ago, Cairo has now been able to push for international processes which broke the tight alignment between Ethiopia and Sudan. Recent joint military exercises with Sudan are only one aspect of a multiple Egyptian initiative of diplomatic and strategic consolidation. Egyptian diplomacy has also targeted other upper riparian African states.

Sudan. A fluid, multiple and failing political transition in Sudan has also complicated Ethio-Sudanese relations. A more independent Sudanese approach on the GERD has seen Ethiopia lose what had been its relatively reliable support in tripartite negotiations. Rebuffing the Sudanese Prime Minister’s mediation efforts on Tigray in December 2020 antagonised civilian elements of Sudan’s Transitional Government. The Sudanese military, meanwhile agreed to close its border at the outbreak of the war in Tigray, but the subsequent escalation of active conflict with Amhara forces on the un-demarcated border at el-Fashaga has infuriated key actors in Sudan, exacerbating tensions and associated risks to Ethiopia.²¹⁰⁴ In early 2022, Sudanese army and Amhara militia confronted one another at close range along the border, and observers saw heightened risks of an outbreak of violence, irrespective of concerns to de-escalate at national levels.

As war in Tigray has become protracted this has also carried risks new, with longstanding networks linking the TPLF to Gedaref and Kassala Provinces of eastern Sudan, and around 60,000 Tigrayan refugees hosted there since November 2020. Over the period since late 2020, Ethiopia’s complaints about alleged Sudanese support of their Tigrayan adversaries have increased. By early 2022, there were reports of discreet training of several thousand Tigrayan fighters in Sudan, and even limited attacks on Humera from the west.²¹⁰⁵ The situation in northeastern Sudan has been complicated by alleged Eritrean activities in support of Beja groups, and against Beni Amer and Tigré (Eritrean) opposition forces. Beja forces blocked deliveries to and from Port Sudan for some months during 2021, lifting their action only after the military takeover in Khartoum towards the end of the year.²¹⁰⁶

2020.  

Sudanese or Egyptian diplomatic leverage in Abu Dhabi and other Gulf states could be expected to be mobilised to shift Gulf support from Ethiopia were that to become necessary: if so, Khartoum and Cairo’s voices could be expected to resonate more strongly in the Arab world than Addis Ababa’s.

19.6 Ethiopia on the periphery of the Middle East security arena

Countries in the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, are now seen by major Gulf players as part of a middle east security arena, with newly brutal and transactional patterns of warfare. The use of armed drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and refoulement of refugees evolved in Syria and the Iran-Iraq arena over the last decade and extended to Yemen from the end of 2014. Gulf sponsors of these conflicts became newly influential in the Horn over the same period. United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) investments in the region are civil and military: in Somaliland they include the flagship Dubai Ports World project at Berbera (as noted above) and a renovated airport and military base; the military base established at Assab in Eritrea in 2015 was being dismantled in February 2021.²¹⁰⁷

The UAE has become a particularly prominent financial and security partner of Ethiopia since 2018: sponsor of lavish refurbishment and real-estate projects²¹⁰⁸ and the Ethio-Eritrea peace deal itself.²¹⁰⁹ The potential for the Ethiopian state to seek to win investment from the Gulf in its transformation agenda has been recognised for well over a decade and was clearly articulated as part of a national renaissance agenda in the late 2000s. However, the scope, scale, and lack of transparency, as well as the more informal and transactional nature of Ethiopia’s dependence on Gulf finance has shifted very dramatically in the period from 2017/18. It began with a US$3bn injection by the UAE in response to Ethiopia’s growing foreign exchange scarcity, which was quickly announced by the incoming Prime Minister.

Since then, UAE sponsorship of the Ethio-Eritrean peace deal has developed into an important military supply of combat UAVs or drones. Whispers that drones used to devastating effect in the early months of the war on Tigray had been supplied from UAE bases in Assab were initially difficult to verify. As the military campaign turned against Addis Ababa in mid-2021, however, a much clearer pattern of continuous Emirati supply emerged.²¹¹⁰ By the end of the year, drones from Turkey, Iran and the UAE were widely thought to have “tipped the war” in Addis Ababa’s favour.²¹¹¹

The relationships with policymakers and key suppliers in Turkey and the UAE are known to be handled at a personal level, and it is noteworthy that very little it said about Ethiopia’s relationships with the UAE, Saudi, Turkey, or Qatar in the leaked Ethiopian Foreign Relations Re-Engagement Strategy document of January 2022. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister has visited both supplier states on several occasions: Ankara in August 2021 and again in December 2021 for the Turkish-Africa summit; Abu Dhabi most recently in late January 2022.²¹¹² Both capitals have become increasingly important stops also for EU and US envoys to the Horn.

It is important to note that Addis Ababa is not the only capital in the region, which has won the support of Saudi Arabia and of the UAE: Cairo and Khartoum (as noted) are also close partners. This will have increasing impact if relations were to deteriorate further between the three. Meanwhile, recent rapprochement between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and between the UAE and Israel, also has the potential to shift Ethiopia’s wider relations, given the apparently significant influence of the UAE and its security advisors.²¹¹³ A reduction of hostility between UAE and Qatar could play out also in the Somali arena. The Federal Somali President has maintained close relations with Qatar and Turkey (in early 2021 reportedly coming under pressure from both sponsors, in the context of the delayed elections), whilst the UAE has courted Somaliland and Puntland. As Somali elections approached in early 2022, patterns of patronage and influence were being closely watched.

19.7 The weakness of regional bodies: IGAD and the AU

Neither the African Union nor the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, IGAD, has proved equal to the task of managing shifting alliances or responding to conflict in the context of rapidly evolving changes. The IGAD Executive Secretary since November 2019 is a former Ethiopian Federal Police Commissioner and Foreign Minister, an appointment the Ethiopian government invested significant diplomatic and political capital to secure. As Chairman of IGAD in mid-December 2020, the Sudanese Prime Minister sought to use his influence to mediate in the Ethiopian conflict but was firmly rebuffed and cut short a two-day visit to Addis Ababa. The 38th Extraordinary IGAD Assembly later that month in Djibouti produced little other than a reaffirmation of the primacy of Ethiopian sovereignty and welcome for an agreement for “unimpeded sustained and secure access for humanitarian support” (29 November 2020).

There were reports of tension between the delegations of Ethiopia and Kenya at this meeting. The war in Tigray broke out shortly after Ethiopia took over the Chairmanship of the AU’s Peace and Security Council on 1 November 2020. The Chairman of the African Union, South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa sent a high-level delegation (Chissano, Motlanthe, Johnson Sirleaf) to Ethiopia in late November, to little avail.²¹¹⁴ The African Union convened its 14th Extraordinary Session in Addis Ababa in December 2020 under the banner “silencing the guns.” Even more extraordinary, in February 2022 as the blockade continued to tighten on Tigray, it held its 35th Summit in Addis Ababa under the theme of “food security” – without once making public mention of the crisis. The role of the AU Commission Chairperson had been under the spotlight since remarks endorsing the “bold steps” taken by Ethiopia to “preserve unity” at the beginning of the war.²¹¹⁵ On 11 November 2020, the Commission fired its Tigrayan head of Security.²¹¹⁶

Neither IGAD nor the AU seemed keen (or able) to take on a robust peace-making role vis-à-vis conflict involving powerful regional member states. The role of AU Special Representative Obasanjo, however, gradually began to evolve during 2021 into a process around which other international actors (notably US and EU) began to coalesce and invest.

19.8 Concluding remarks

Since 2018 change in Ethiopia’s foreign relations with its neighbours across the Horn and the Gulf, and with inter-governmental bodies, were significantly disrupted with the establishment of the new triangular relation between the leaders of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. Changes across the Horn and its wider regional context have been rapid and unpredictable and highly dependent on individual personalities. The upheaval does not seem yet to have stabilised into a new equilibrium, largely because of the shadowy but expanding role of Eritrea. Changes in relations with close neighbours, and also with wider international contacts, all have an impact on Ethiopian stability and cohesion.

The chapter has argued that many of these developments have contributed to the erosion of the Ethiopian state’s autonomy and efficacy. It traced the gradual expansion of external leverage over Ethiopia’s internal affairs, and suggested that the damage done to its stability, international reputation, and autonomous agency since 2018 incrementally undermined the country’s room for sovereign decision-making. The erosion of sovereignty is of course strongly exacerbated by the profound economic impact of the war, the discussion of which lies beyond the scope of this chapter. The negative consequences Ethiopia is experiencing had nothing to do with alleged “meddling” or “western support” for adversaries defined as “terrorists.” They resulted from the playing out of a newly transactional approach to regional foreign relations and internal conflict, which has been erratic, superficially informed, and cynical.

Ethiopia’s regional relations over the period from 2018 were key to many of its domestic processes, including the war in Tigray and the scope for resolving it peacefully. These external influences and relationships must be expected to continue to play out, in ways that are increasingly hard to predict. The proliferation of interests of an increasing number of external stakeholders – Eritrea, the Gulf States and Turkey foremost amongst them, but also other neighbours, and many others further afield – has not strengthened Ethiopia’s policy independence, its reputation, or its room for manoeuvre. Those Ethiopian voices who may have wished to pursue a negotiated settlement to the war in Tigray have found themselves weakened as they have had to compete with external geopolitical and commercial interests making calculations which have nothing to do with Ethiopia’s national interests – political, social, or economic.

As such, it seems likely that this proliferation of external involvement has done much to obscure the prospects for peace: encouraging processes of transactional balancing, rather than principled or sustainable peace-making. In particular, the presence of Eritrean actors within Ethiopia, often allied with local factions in Afar and Amhara actively involved in the war in Tigray, or the conflict in Oromia, has complicated the picture enormously and reduced Addis Ababa’s agency. To date it has been hard to see that external influences have been able to work in support of processes of peace or the cessation of hostilities, of national dialogue, or of diplomatic re-engagement and development cooperation. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister is right that external influences have greatly complicated matters, but this is not a matter of freeing the country of alleged external “diplomatic pressure.” The divisions that have been sown in Ethiopia, and the autonomy that the country has lost since 2018 as a result of its new foreign relations approach are now integral to is politics and operate at a much more serious and fundamental level.

20 The Tigrayan and Eritreans diasporas

20.1 General overview by Martin Plaut

The Tigray war has left many in the Horn of Africa saddened, angry, helpless, and bereft of hope as they watched their communities torn apart by the conflict. For the diasporas, the mood was even darker. Many had little or no information about the plight of their families and friends. Some felt guilt for being abroad and not being able to contribute more to try to resolve the crisis. It was a time of deep anxiety and stress. Communities that supported the governments of Ethiopia, Eritrea or Somalia could look to their governments for information and leadership. For those who opposed the regimes in power the situation was far bleaker. As this conflict has unfolded, the opposition in the diaspora has reached out to each other and created new networks. The Eritreans, some of whom have been excluded from their country’s affairs since the tragic civil war of 1972 – 1974 and 1980 – 1981, this was a continuation of an exile they had long endured.²¹¹⁷ The divisions of that period between the Eritrea Liberation Front and Eritrean People’s Liberation Front have endured to this day.

After the events of 2001, when President Isaias cracked down on critics inside his own party, as well as crushing all independent journalism, many former supporters of the EPLF joined the ELF living in exile.²¹¹⁸ Yet the divisions of the civil war period festered on. The diaspora was unable to form a united front opposing the Isaias government. Gradually, painfully, these rifts are beginning to heal. A new younger generation of Eritrean opposition activists came together in 2019 in the Yiakl (Enough!) movement.²¹¹⁹ On 18 – 20 November 2021, after months of difficult negotiations, this the Eritrean United National Front was founded, supported by many civic societies and opposition groups.²¹²⁰ The Front declared that it would “embark on armed resistance” against the “totalitarian regime of Isayas/PFDJ” with the aim of freeing Eritrea of repression, and guaranteeing the country’s sovereignty. Importantly, the Front expressed its solidarity with the Tigrayan people. “The Eritrean and Tigrayan people have common enemies in Abiy and Isaias and our two peoples shall conduct a coordinated struggle to defeat these barbaric enemies,” the Front’s political statement declared.

For Tigrayans of all political persuasions the war was a novel and possibly even more shocking experience. No-one could have found it anything but painful. As the crisis unfolded, they found new ways of uniting to express their anger and support for the people of Tigray and Eritrea. There were demonstrations across the world, from Australia to America. This is not an attempt to provide a comprehensive record of these attempts to express this solidarity. Sometimes they took novel forms, including a 24-hour global virtual link-up of the Tigrayan opposition: “24 Hours for Tigray”. Broadcast on 9 March 2021 one segment linked to the next, as the broadcast went around the world.²¹²¹ Using pre-recorded messages and live events the programme was hosted by Tigrayans supported by Eritreans who did a remarkably professional job of presenting a live programme of such complexity. Other events used novel forms of protest. Twitter was used in an attempt to pressurise western supermarkets not to sell Ethiopian flowers on Valentine’s Day 2021, whose sale provided revenues for the Ethiopian war effort. In October 2021 Tigrayans in Norway laid toys outside the Nobel Peace Prize offices and the Norwegian Parliament, symbolising the children whose lives have been lost in the war.²¹²² But most of the time and energy went into organising demonstrations, from Washington to London and beyond. As the BBC reported: “The conflict has deeply divided the Ethiopian community in Washington DC – the largest in the US. Ethiopians abroad watch with dismay.”²¹²³

As these demonstrations began to make an impact on public opinion they were matched by protests by supporters of the Ethiopian government under the slogan:
#NoMore

This demonstration in Jerusalem on 13 December 2021 was typical.

The attempts to mobilise international opinion were perhaps most intense in the United States, where the Biden administration worked hard to try to end the war. (See the chapter on Diplomacy). The protests were supplemented by professional, paid lobbying of Congress, with considerable sums being paid by both sides in the war.²¹²⁴ As a result, the battle for public opinion in the United States has been fierce, deeply dividing communities that were once united.

This is how TRT World reported on the rifts that have emerged.²¹²⁵

The violence is, however, no longer restricted to the Horn of Africa. It is slowly tearing apart the Ethiopian immigrant community and even families some 13,000 kilometres away in the US where more than 300,000 Ethiopia-born immigrants live, mostly in the capital Washington DC, and the neighbouring states of Maryland and Virginia.

For months they have held protests, both for and against the TPLF. They are divided over Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s leadership, the role of the UN, the US and its allies, and the western media. The discord has crept into churches, social gatherings and even onto breakfast tables.

“We used to meet after church prayers every week,” an Ethiopian taxi driver of Oromo ethnicity, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said of her Tigrayan friend. “Now, she doesn’t come to our church. She goes to a church where most of the worshippers are Tigrayans. We know our politics are different, but changing churches was unbelievable.”

Bereket Abay, an Ethiopian immigrant of Tigray roots, has a similar grievance against his non-Tigrayan friends.” I was always insulted and often ignored. There is no point keeping such friendships. How would you feel if you are not served in an Ethiopian restaurant because you are a Tigrayan?” Abay asked…

The war has poisoned inter-ethnic marriages too.

Mekdes Negash Ymesel, an Ethiopian-American of Tigrayan ethnicity, said the conflict has pitted her against her husband, Cherner S Beley, an ethnic Amharan and a church singer. The Ethiopians have been married for 14 years with children, nine and 10 years old. The conflict in Ethiopia, she said, has put a wedge in their relationship.

“For several months, I had no idea where my mother and siblings were. Ethiopia had cut all communications with the Tigray province,” Ymesel, who works in a cafeteria in Washington DC, told TRT World. “After seven months, I learned that they’ve moved to Addis Ababa. They are safe but my brother and brother-in-law have been arrested just because they are Tigrayans,” she alleged.

She said Beley being an Amhara is pro-PM Abiy and has gone to Ethiopia “citing church services.” “It’s been four months now. Last time he spent seven months in Ethiopia before flying back to the US,” she said. When they last met, the couple fought on the breakfast table.

“He [Beley] told our children that Tigrayans are killing Amharas when the reality is that a genocide is going on against the Tigrayans. Ethiopians are brothers, but it’s a brother killing brother. It’s fratricide,” Ymesel said. “If I hurt an Amhara, I consider I’m hitting my children. And if he hurts any Tigrayan, I consider he is hurting his own children,” Ymesel said between sobs.

The clashes have perhaps been most intense on social media, with all opinions expressed in the most intemperate – and sometimes abusive – terms. This has begun to be studied by the Shorenstein Centre’s Technology and Social Change project at the Harvard Kennedy School.²¹²⁶ The Tigrayan side focused largely on raising awareness of the conflict, while supporters of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration in Addis Ababa sought to disprove its opponent’s claims. And while both made misleading or sometimes false claims, the study found that official communications and pro-government users’ posts often sought to discredit any content contradicting the federal government’s narrative as disinformation. “It is a complex case that interacts with the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, historical trauma, activism, hate speech, misinformation, platform manipulation, and propaganda, all in the midst of an ongoing civil conflict,” according to research by The Media Manipulation Casebook. “It became a war about the narrative,” Addis Standard founder and Editor-in-Chief Tsedale Lemma told Voice of America.²¹²⁷ “They still are concerned about the narrative more than the actual effect of the war.”

To try to capture what the Eritrean and Tigrayan opposition movements have been through and how they have organised, we have asked senior members of the diaspora to spell out how they went about this task. Below are two contributions, which will hopefully spark off a wider debate on what has transpired. One looks at the mobilisation of the Eritrean diaspora, the other describes the Tigrayan diaspora in North America.

20.2 Eritrean diaspora mobilisation and the Tigray War
By Prof. Araya Debessay²¹²⁸

20.2.1 Introduction

Diaspora Eritreans are all over the world. There are significant numbers of Eritreans who have migrated to the US, Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Israel, Sudan, and other countries. It is difficult to come up with an estimate of the total number of Diaspora Eritreans in the world. Our best guestimate is around a million, although others, as can be seen in the Sanctions chapter, put it at “at least 2 million”.

Diaspora Eritreans in the western countries, particularly those residing in the US, various European countries and the Middle East played a significant role in supporting the Eritrean armed struggle for independence. During the liberation war, almost all Eritreans in Diaspora supported the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in the early stages of the struggle and then the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).

Since independence, the Eritrean diaspora have been divided into three distinct groups: (a) supporters of the Isaias government, (b) those who vehemently oppose the Isaias government, and (c) the silent majority – although this majority is gradually being eroded in favour of the opposition.

Following outbreak of the Tigray war, opponents of the Isaias regime have splintered into two camps: Pro-TPLF and Anti-TPLF. This article will endeavor to analyse these two camps:

20.2.2 Mobilisation of Eritrean diaspora since the start of the Tigray war

(a) President Isaias’ (Eritrean government) supporters

Although the number of Isaias’ support is dwindling, there are some hardcore supporters including a few highly educated individuals, former government officials and ambassadors currently in exile. It is difficult to understand the rational of those who still support the government despite the fact that the Isaias regime has literally destroyed the country in every aspect and they themselves have fled the country claiming to “save their lives”. The Eritrean regime is one of the most repressive regimes in the world today. Some in the media refer to the Eritrean government as the North Korea of Africa. The Isaias regime has obliterated the Eritrean economy to its knees which, unashamedly, Isaias boasts about in almost every interview he gives. Most Eritreans are surviving through remittances from family members and generous individuals in the Diaspora. The country is fast emptying of its youth, who have taken tremendous risks to escape from indefinite national service that subjects them to slavery-like conditions. The regime has waged wars against all the neighboring countries – in total eight separate wars over a period of 27 years.

Yet, there are some in the Diaspora who still support this repressive regime for fear of reprisals or family interest e.g.to protect their property/homes although many are in a state of decay or are unlivable for lack of water and electricity. Others support Isaias because they see him as one of them. Still others argue that Isaias is the only leader who can keep the country intact despite mounting evidence to the opposite. They fear that if Isaias is removed, there will be infightings that could put Eritrea in the league of Somalia, Libya, Iraq, and other countries that have fragmented after the fall of their respective long-term dictators. The dictator you know, no matter how ruthless, is better than the angel you do not know, they claim.

One finds it ironic that those who support Isaias do so despite the fact that he threatens the very sovereignty of the country that they strongly espouse. The peace agreement with Abiy is one such example where loose federation or some kind of economic union with Ethiopia is openly voiced by Isaias. In spite of this, this group fully backs the reckless intervention of Isaias in the Tigray war. Many in this group have been seen participating in demonstrations in the US and several European countries alongside Abiy supporter Ethiopians. These group deny Eritrean forces presence and the atrocities they have committed in Tigray as unsubstantiated allegations.

Among Isaias’ supporters are hardcore elements who by and large are ill-informed of the atrocities Eritrean forces are inflicting on their own Eritrean brothers and sisters. They admit the country is not in good shape economically and that the government is oppressive but blame it on the Badme border War and the refusal of the Meles Administration to implement the final and binding Algiers Agreement of 2002. This group of Eritrean Diaspora do not blame the Eritrean government for not implementing the ratified Constitution, which was declared dead by Isaias. They blindly accept the government’s assertion that it is not time to talk about implementing the Constitution and conducting elections when part of the country is still under Ethiopian occupation.

Isaias supporters are fully behind Eritrea’s intervention in the Tigray war, hence their participation in demonstration and social media in support of Abiy, tacitly support the atrocities committed against the people of Tigray and Eritrean refugees.

(b) Opponents of President Isaias Regime

This is an increasing majority which has been fueled by the Tigray conflict. There have been numerous and well attended demonstrations organised by Eritreans in several countries, including the US, Switzerland, UK, Germany, and several other countries including Israel, Ethiopia. This group has been actively lobbying governments and campaigning alongside humanitarian organisations to end the Tigray war. As a result of such demonstrations and petitions, the International Community is now more aware of the dire situation Eritreans are facing in their own country. Arguably, the UN decision to establish a UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights violations in Eritrea in 2014 is the result of the many demonstrations and petitions members of the Diaspora have been waging for many years. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights violations has extensively documented the human rights abuses committed by the Isaias government that amounts to crimes against humanity.

Division among the opponents of the Isaias government.

As Sara Mengistab writes in her article in December 2021 “Understanding the Complicated Relationship Between Eritrea and Tigray”²¹²⁹, the war has created some rift between Isaias opponents and split them between two camps (i) the TPLF sympathisers and (ii) The Anti-TPLF group

(i)The TPLF sympathisers – These group see Isaias’s involvement in the Tigray war as an extension to the grotesque human rights abused that he inflicted on the Eritrean people for 30 years. The crimes committed in Eritrea, including rape, slavery, extrajudicial killings and the like are now being exported to Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia in an industrial scale with impunity. The Isaias army has caused unimaginable human suffering on the people of Tigray – Countless of innocent people have been massacred, women raped, property looted, and infrastructure mindlessly destroyed brining a lasting stain and shame on our people. These heinous acts which amount to crimes against humanity has shaken the International Community and brought shame on the Eritrean diaspora. The TPLF sympathisers have rightly condemned the wanton killings of innocent civilians, the sexual violence against Tigray women, the pledging and destruction of heritage sights, factories, hospitals and universities by the Eritrean army, the Ethiopian Federal government forces and the Amharan militia.

This group of Diaspora Eritrean felt they have a duty as citizens not only of Eritrea but of the world as human beings to take a firm stand against the role the Eritrean military has taken to subject the people of Tigray to such inhumane acts. This group strongly condemn Isaias Afeworki and his close circle for causing the death of many young Eritreans, some of them children, by sending them to a war that has nothing to do with them and know nothing about. Isaias has put the lives of many Eritrean youth on harm’s way just to satisfy his personal vengeance against the TPLF. The Eritrean sympathisers of the Tigray people have appealed to the International Community and the United Nations to pressure the Eritrean government to withdraw its forces from Tigray. They have called on the international and regional organisations to pressure the Ethiopian federal government and President Isaias to end the war. They have called upon the international community to pressure the Ethiopian federal government to grant humanitarian access to the people of Tigray and Eritrean refugees in the region, who are in dire need for food and other basic necessities. The sympathisers of the TPLF understand the concern of the TPLF that the Tigray people will not be able to focus on rebuilding its shattered economy as long as Isaias is around. They also understand the TDF’s resolve to return their looted property and also to bring the perpetrators of the heinous acts to justice. These Eritrean sympathisers of the Tigray people fully share the concerns of the Tigray people and are determined to help the Tigray people achieve their rightful objectives. However, this group strongly believes it would be undesirable for the TDF to invade Eritrea to achieve its objectives not because they wish to see Isaias remain in power but the animosity such action may create between our two peoples. Invading Eritrea will mobilise the Eritrean people, including those who are opposed to the Isaias regime to defend the sovereignty of Eritrea, and thereby strengthen Isaias’ hands even more. A TDF invasion of Eritrea will be contrary to the long-term interest of both of our peoples. It will alienate the International Community who likely to oppos any aggression by Tigray. In this regard it will be important for the TPLF sympathisers to reach an understanding with the Tigray leadership – a joint approach of removing Isaias from power by all means. Unlike the other groups that mistrust the TPLF leadership, those Eritreans who sympathise with the Tigray people feel comfortable to deal with the current leadership of the TPLF. In the views of this group, the current leadership of the TPLF is friendlier to the Eritrean people and consistently advocated for the sovereignty of the Eritrean people.

This group feels that the success of the TDF means the defeat of the Isaias’s regime and his dream of a union or federation with Ethiopia. They feel confident that the TDF understands that it is in its best interest to maintain a healthy and friendly relationship with the Eritrean people. It is also confident that the TDF will not want to lose the support of the International Community in rebuilding its shattered economy by appearing to be an aggressor in Eritrea.

As Sara Mengistab clearly and unequivocally put it in her article, this group passionately believes “It is foolish to dream of building a prosperous Eritrea without first building a healthy, peaceful relationship with Tigray, Ethiopia, and all other neighbours.”

(ii) The anti-TPLF group – The Eritrea Diaspora who belong to this anti-TPLF group have deeply held animosity against the TPLF that can be traced to the role played by TPLF during the civil war between ELF and EPLF, when TPLF sided with EPLF to drive ELF out of Eritrea in the early 1980s. In addition, there are those who have deeply held grievances for the defeat of Eritrea in the border war 1998-2000 in the hands of the Ethiopian army led by former TPLF fighters and the merciless deportation of tens of thousands of Eritrean-Ethiopians following the end of the war²¹³⁰.

It is fair to say some within this group have rightly condemned the atrocities committed by Isaias forces against innocent civilians and the looting and destruction caused. Others have refrained from condemning these outrageous atrocities claiming they need to have independent investigation to verify their validity. Still others say the TPLF got what it deserved, and that the Eritrean government is within its rights to recover the Eritrean land that has been occupied by Ethiopia. Many in this group are opposed to any invasion by TDF of Eritrea, claiming that such action will be tantamount to an assault on the sovereignty of Eritrea and that they will support the Eritrean army if that was to happen.

This group is suspicious of the TDF and TPLF and fear that the success of the TDF may have grave consequences for Eritrea and are oblivious that the success of Abiy and Isaias in the Tigray war could mean the loss of Eritrean sovereignty.

According to the US Embassy in Asmara, proponents of the regime in Asmara have been manipulating Ethiopia social media²¹³¹. It said “Another key tactic of pro-government campaigners was to undermine witness credibility. The belief that the TPLF are posing as victims of violence to misinform the world became a central theme in pro-government discourse throughout the conflict. Several of the individuals behind these accounts have links to Eritrea’s ruling party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and the young wing in the diaspora. Some accounts in the Eritrean networks list shabait.com as their website in their Twitter bios, which is the website of the Eritrean Ministry of Information, and have had their work shared by the Eritrean Minister of Information. Zeleke said that the interactions with Eritrean social media campaigns are largely informal. ‘There are some issues where we have common interests and others that are not common, but there is cooperation and communication,’ he said.”

Facebook has been accused of being used to incite violence in Ethiopia²¹³² and it is a platform that is proactively used by both pro and anti-TPLF groups as well as the Ethiopian Federal government.

In concluding, the position of the pro and anti TPLF camps and as Sara rightly points out in her article, “All Eritreans except fervent Eritrea’s PFDJ supporters will agree that the Eritrean army had no business interfering in a war that had by all accounts nothing to do with Eritrea. Still, this involvement has left Eritrea vulnerable to attacks by TPLF soldiers that may seek vengeance. And judging by some TPLF soldiers singing this tune on social media, it is not a far-fetched theory.”

(c)The silent and quickly dwindling majority

A significant number of Eritrean Diaspora probably fall into this category, However, although they may not be openly critical of the regime, most of them seem to be unhappy with the Eritrea’s involvement in Tigray and are by and large sympathetic to the people of Tigray, if not the TPLF.

Some in this group remain quiet for selfish reasons to protect their property and some for understandable reason to protect family members and elderly parents who depend on their remittance that otherwise the regime would deny them. Others keep silent, so they can visit Asmara to show off the life they live in the west, making it the envy of young children who have become to see refugee status in the west as a “profession” that they need to aspire to. Unfortunately, a number among the silent group who thought they were safe to go back and forth to Eritrea have been subjected to imprisonment and torture. Some have been falsely accused to have attended meetings of opposition groups. Nevertheless, they may privately condemn the intervention of Isaias in the Tigray war and some indeed abhor the atrocities committed by Isaias’ army against innocent civilians, but they do not dare to publicly condemn the government.

20.2.3 Eritrean diaspora challenges and ineffectiveness

For years, opposition groups and pro-democracy Eritreans in Diaspora have advocated to ending the illegitimate regime in Asmara that has committed heinous crimes on its own people for a generation and is now threatening the very sovereignty of the country for which tens of thousands of our people died to liberate. Justice-seeking Eritreans unanimously agree no positive change can take place in Eritrea and that the country will continue to destabilise the region unless and until Isaias is removed from power.

Unfortunately, and it seems to be a curse of some sort, Eritreans in Diaspora remain fragmented. Eritrean opposition groups in diaspora represent the largest number of political parties per head in the world that made someone to comment “even a man and his dog has an Eritrean political party.” Disunity of opposition groups is in effect what is sustaining Isaias in power and unless and until this fragmentation ends it is difficult to see how the dictatorial regime will come to an end. Only when justice-seeking Eritreans unite or grouped into a manageable umber of two or three can they make any meaningful contribution to ending the dictatorship and transform Eritrea into a democratic country.

20.2.4 The need for a legitimate global leadership

Increasingly many in the Diaspora have come to realise that no positive changes can take place in Eritrea unless they work together to remove Isaias. The Tigray war has shone light for many Eritreans who were previously reluctant to speak out or work together the importance of doing so. There are now a significant number of opposition groups that have come together, and huge number of dialogues are taken place via zoom on almost daily basis.

All this is a step in the right direction but to be effective, Eritreans have to unite if not in one group, in no more than two or three groups, to meaningfully engage with the international community and represent the Eritrean people on world stage.

20.2.5 Initiatives to form a legitimate global leadership

Many in the opposition camp are realising that the only way they can bring about democratic changes in Eritrea is through unity. This realisation has become instrumental to initiate calls for the formation of a body that can represent them. The following are some of the initiatives that are surfacing although none have been successful so far.

a. Global Initiative to Empower Eritrean Grassroots Movement (GI)

GI was established in 2016, to facilitate the formation of legitimate global representatives, in order to end dictatorship and save the sovereignty of Eritrea. GI has been propagating the formation of local Baitos (forums) in localities with a critical number of Eritreans. The idea is to form local Baitos, then the representatives of the various Baitos in a given country to form a national Baito and the elected representatives to constitute legitimate representatives of the justice-seeking Eritreans in the given country. If this process is replicated in every country, then in the last step, a global conference would be held where the representatives of the various countries elect a legitimate global representative that can speak for all pro-democracy, justice-seeking Eritreans in the Diaspora.

Despite GI’s intensive lobbying effort for this to happen, it has not as yet successful created a legitimate global representative group. In 2018, after the secret peace deal between Isaias and Abiy Ahmed, many Eritreans felt the secret deal between Isaias and Abiy might end Eritrean sovereignty. This led to the formation of Yiakl – “enough is enough” movement. Initially, it was hoped that the Yiakl movement will implement the conceptual framework of GI and that a Global representatives will be formed through the Yiakl movement. Unfortunately, even though Global Yiakl was created that incorporated Baitos of justice-seeking Eritreans in 11 countries, there were many political parties, civic organisations and other activist groups that did not join the Yiakl movement. As a result, Global Yiakl was not able to form legitimate global representatives of all justice-seeking Eritreans in the Diaspora. Lately, GI has come up with a new proposal to form a body, which GI has tentatively called, the “Eritrean National Congress (ENC).” GI proposes that the ENC should be elected by the participation of all justice-seeking, pro-democracy Eritreans in the Diaspora. To this end, GI is proposing the need to establish a Registration and Election Commission through the participation of all the stakeholders in the opposition camp. The responsibility of this Commission is to devise an internet-based mechanism that will enable all justice-seeking, pro-democracy Diaspora.

Eritreans to register and elect the ENC. GI argues for this to be done in an expeditious manner which is transparent, all-inclusive, and democratic, using stateof-the art voting technology. Such an all-inclusive and democratic election process will enable the ENC to justifiably claim to be a legitimate body that represents the interest of all pro-democracy Eritreans world-wide. The role of the ENC will include: (a) facilitating democratic change, (b) winning the hearts and minds of the security/intelligence forces, (c) appealing to democratic forces within the army, (d) coordinating, guiding and supporting Eritrean armed forces in Tigray, Sudan and inside the country, (e) emboldening the civilian population inside the country, (f) advocacy, lobbying and diplomacy, (g) preparing for a smooth transition of governance. (h) advance planning to accelerate the development of the country, (j) fundraising and (i) helping Eritrean refugees and (l) communication, propaganda, and mobilisation.

b. The Global Yiakl Initiative.

The leaders of the Global Yiakl Movement have recently come up with a new initiative whose goal is to form a National Force that will represent the Eritrean Diaspora. To this end, they held a virtual meeting on 18 – 19 December 2021 with representatives of political parties, civic organisations, and other activist groups. It is hoped that an agreement when they reconvene at their next virtual meeting on the mechanism to form legitimate global representatives.

The Global Yiakl Movement has recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the official representative of the Government of Tigray to collaborate together to bring peace and stability to the region.

c. The Minnesota Meadi Zete, Tempo Afric, Initiative

The members of the Minnesota based Meadi Zeta (Tempo/Afric) initiated “Eritrean Reconciliation Forum for Justice – Minnesota (ERFJM)” in September 2019. The goal was to bring all the various stakeholders in the Eritrean opposition camp to agree to work together to bring about fundamental democratic changes in Eritrea. To this end, they invited representatives from Eritrean political parties, civic organisations and study groups. Although some of the civic organisations, and study group who attended the first meeting dropped out, the rest which included political parties, GI, and US Global Yiakl continued meeting every week for over a year. Unfortunately, they could not agree on a mechanism to form a legitimate global representative.

d. Alliances among political parties

Because of the number of political parties claiming to represent Eritrea, many countries that are sympathetic to the ordeal of the Eritrean people are unable to work with the opposition groups. In 2011, an attempt was made to unite the various political entities at a meeting sponsored and funded by the Ethiopian government. The meeting was held in Awasa, Ethiopia. It was reported that there were over 600 representatives of political parties and civic associations who attended the Awasa meeting. EPDP, led by Mesfin Hagos, which was a major party, and a London-based civic organisation of intellectuals, named Citizens for Democratic Rights in Eritrea (CDRiE) did not participate at the Awasa conference for fear to be seen working with the enemy (Ethiopia). The conference elected officers that were expected to represent all opposition groups. Unfortunately, that did not materialise.

More recently, the political parties are making serious attempts to work together but so far it remains work in progress.

e. The proposal to form Government in Exile.

Saleh Younis (Awet.com) and associates issued a statement in 2021 advocating the formation of a Government in Exile. Their proposal was to form a unity government in exile representing elected leaders of the former members of ELF and EPLF in partnership with other opposition parties whose roots were in the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). This group expected to “temporarily” assume power once the regime is removed. Many have found this idea perplexing. It is generally assumed that it is change agents inside the country who will play the most crucial role in removing the dictatorial regime. Thus, many have opposed the Government in Exile idea as being unrealistic, adding a provisional government that does not include those who are instrumental in removing the regime will not work.

Another major weakness with this proposal is that the notion of ELF and EPLF is a forgotten concept that has no relevance in today’s Eritrean political sphere. What Saleh Younis and his Associates are proposing ignores many Eritrean activists,

including Eritrean youth who are neither member of the EPLF or ELF but who are active members of the Global Yeakl Movement. Dr. Gebre Ghebremariam in a recent seminar he gave on Assenna TV [Part] ²¹³³: made strong arguments why Eritrean opposition parties cannot form a Government in Exile. He has provided political, philosophical, legal, conceptual, and pragmatic reasons why it is inappropriate for Eritrean opposition to have government in exile.

20.2.6 The formation of Eritrean National United Front (ENUF)

A group of nationalist Eritrean organisations announced in November 2021 the formation of the Eritrean National United Front (ENUF)²¹³⁴ to wage an armed struggle to oust the authoritarian PFDJ regime of Isaias Afeworki. This new organisation is appealing to “all justice and peace-loving people of Eritrea, both in the country and in diaspora, to give it their full and unconditional support.” ENUF has also called on “Eritrean organisations and other political and non-political entities and the Eritrean people at large to join EUNF and direct all available resources towards the struggle at this crucial moment in the country’s history.” They are also appealing to the Eritrean youth, “to free themselves from the endless PFDJ enslavement, and from becoming victims of aimless wars.” The ENUF has called on the International Community, “to take all necessary measures to put pressure on PFDJ, to impose economic and other sanctions against the regime without any fear of hurting the people.” Like all other previous initiatives, the proof is in the pudding and only time will tell if this too comes to fruition because it requires action rather than words.

20.2.7 Summary and Conclusion

Although the majority Eritreans are unhappy with the situation in their homeland and most are opposed to the dictatorial regime of Isaias Afeworki, they have not, unfortunately, been effective in their opposition to the regime due to their fragmentation. The war in Tigray has also created a rift among the just-seeking, anti-Isaias government. The pro-TPLF Eritreans are willing to work with the TDF to remove Isaias. On the other hand, there are some within the opposition group who are willing to support Isaias should the TDF invades Eritrea. Diaspora Eritreans are also divided when it comes to the sanctions imposed on Eritrea and with regard to waging an armed struggle.

Opponents of the Isaias regime are also divided between those who are proponents and those who are opposed to any armed struggle to remove the PFDJ regime. Some of the anti-TPLF group are particularly against the notion of removing Isaias with the assistance of the TDF. But the pro-TPLF and a growing number are already forming armed forces such as the ENUF to remove Isaias and his regime. To this end, attempts are being made to unify armed forces that are operating in Tigray, Sudan and inside the country.

20.3 The mobilisation of the Tigrayan diasporas in North America

By Desta, Asyehgn, Sarlo Distinguished Professor of Sustainable Development, and Engineer G. E. Gorfu

20.3.1 Introduction

Going beyond the prevalent approach of exploring the role of diasporas’ financial remittance to support relatives and social remittance (i.e., the transfer of knowledge, skills, and models of business incubators), it is worth investigating the mobilisation process the diasporas undertake when their original homelands or regional centres are faced with insurmountable internal conflicts. Stated differently, in addition to exploring the impact of financial resources, human capital resources, and social capital provided by diasporas to their original homelands, an exploration of how diasporas get mobilised to act as “long distance human rights advocates” when their original home countries or regional centres are faced with ethnic-related conflict or clad with massive atrocities that amount to crimes against humanity is indispensable (Godwin, 2021; Smith and Hazel, 2007; Koinova, 2017; Ostergaard-Nielsen; 2006, Biden, 21 September 2021).

It was with this postulate that a case study analysis was ventured. The purpose of the study is to review the various mobilisation processes and collective activities that the Tigrayan diasporas are undertaking to challenge the genocidal war that the Ethiopian government and its allied forces have inflicted on the Tigrayan civilians. In short, the study attempts to explore some of the conspicuous mobilisation processes that the Tigrayan diasporas are undertaking to counteract the brutal attacks, war, and starvation that the Ethiopian governments and its allied forces have deployed on the people of the Tigray. In addition, the study endeavours to shed light on the projects that the Tigrayan diasporas have designed to rehabilitate and reconstruct their war-torn ancestral homeland. In short, the major focal points of this study are to:

• Investigate the diverse range of mechanisms utilised by Tigrayan diaspora actors to recruit other diasporas from their original homelands.
• Identify the mobilisation processes used by the Tigrayan diaspora actors to establish the collective identity of other latent Tigrayan diasporas and to awaken them and raise their awareness of the various atrocities inflected on the Tigray people by Ethiopia’s federal government and its allied forces and, by doing so, galvanizing them to take action.
• Pinpoint the engagement strategies used by the Tigrayan diasporas activists to entice other diasporas from their homelands to be involved in the reconstruction and capacity development of their original homeland.
• Assess some of the strategic developmental pathways that have been designed by the Tigrayan diasporas to integrate the internally displaced Tigrayans back into their homeland.

To address the various mobilisation processes undertaken by the Tigrayan diaspora during the Ethio-Tigray conflict period, the study is structured in six sections. Section II briefly reviews the literature to identify the vital mobilising networking and activities that have been undertaken by the diasporas to revitalise their ancestral homelands. Section III develops the conceptual framework (network) needed for the mobilisation processes of diasporas. Section IV reviews case studies of the most effective Tigrayan diaspora-driven ventures used to foster autonomy, self-government, and self-rule in Tigray. Section V depicts a synthesis and interpretation of the mobilising initiatives ventured by the Tigrayan diasporas living in North America. The final section concludes with drawing some policy implications and identifying possible topics for further research.

20.3.2 “Diaspora” – a review of the literature

Due to its multidisciplinary nature, the term diaspora has been defined in several ways. Bostrom, Brown, and Cechvala (2016) refer to a diaspora as a “transnational community”. Using migratory patterns, Brazil (2008) classifies diasporas as “…colonial settlers, postcolonial emigres, refugees, asylum seekers, detainees, and economic migrants”. Koinova (October 2013) uses the term diaspora to designate individuals living in “locations remote from their original territory”. More specifically, Van Hear, Pieke, and Vertovec (2004) define diasporas as the migration of origin people to different host countries and also relates the various mobilisation processes and outreach programs that are used to conduct the flow and exchange of resources between the homelands and destination countries.

While settling in host countries, diasporas could use their sense of distinctiveness of common history and cultural heritage to support their ancestral homelands. That is, diaspora members, either individually or collectively, could effectively use resources (human, capital, shared identities, organisation, networks, etc.) to transform the social and political factors of their original homelands.

As related by Nedelmann (December 1987), the social mobilisation or the marshalling techniques used to activate diasporas are predominantly based on: (1) interest formation (cognitive), (2) community building (affective dimension), and (3) action-oriented (instrumental) dimension. Upon using this conceptual framework, Nedelmann (December 1987) operationalises political mobilisation of diasporas as an “…attempt to influence the existing distribution of power”. Endowed with knowledge, networks, and resources, active diasporas could spark other established groups and use canvassing activities (such as door-to-door soliciting, telephone calls, emails, dialogue, campaigns, political lobbying, and formal interest group organisation) and other forms of transnational networking to mobilise the other inactive diasporas from their homelands to take collective actions (Prasad and Savatic 2021).

More specifically, diaspora activists use ethnicity as a way to bond and mobilise when contending groups in their homelands start fighting for control of central policies, have claims for territory or geographical boundary, or are seriously struggling to secede from the existing union. However, it should be mentioned that as some diaspora’s mobilisation groups will resort to building diaspora community resilience and progressive grassroots power to support their ethnic group’s position, other groups may take the time to understand the underlying causes of the conflict and attempt to organise mediation processes to settle the arising conflict (Ostergaard-Nielsen, March 2006; Demmers, 2007; Nagel, 1994).

As stated by Sokefeld (2006), there cannot be diaspora community without consciousness or the idea of shared identity. Therefore, as conflict escalates into a protracted crisis in their homelands, some diaspora mobilisers harness the passion of the community to peacefully settle the existing ethnic-related rivalries. Other diaspora activists, on the other hand, may resort to using the community consciousness to address the economic and socio-political strategies needed to empower the victims in their homelands (Williams, R. 1994 and Ostergaard-Nielsen, March 2006).

Economic Mobilisation:

Beyond sending remittances, in peace time, diasporas transnationally act to effect change in areas such as international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and innovative businesses, or they may transfer new knowledge to spur development from the country of destination to their original homelands. For example, through international trade, diasporas could establish connections between producers and consumers in their countries of origin and introduce products to new markets in their settled countries. Furthermore, with the establishment of diaspora bonds, the diasporas could also invest directly in their countries of origin and persuade other non-diaspora investors to have confidence and invest in their ancestral homelands. In the area of foreign direct investment, diasporas could transfer back to their ancestral homes seeding businesses, boost emerging industries, pursue entrepreneurship, train and mentor native workers, and bridge their countries of origin and destination so that both benefit and are enhanced (Newland and Plaza, 2013).

More specifically, through the vehicle of economic mobilisation, diasporas could organise and marshal the optimal allocation of resources of their homeland. For instance, if a diaspora sees the people in their homeland suffering from regime violence and ethnic conflict, they may feel the obligation to recruit and galvanise other diasporas from their homelands to raise funds, procure war materials, act as lobbyists, and utilize the political structure of their host countries to spark support for war materials and logistical knowledge in order to benefit their original home countries. As a case in point, Ostergaard-Nielsen (March 2006) demonstrates how the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK in Europe voluntarily contributed and served as an important source of finance for military activities in Turkey.

Political Mobilisation

Democratic states are known for having contextual and structural mechanisms that could be used to resolve conflict (Ragab 2020). That is, through inclusion and peaceful discussions, the citizens of democratic states can influence political processes and address conflicts in other regions of the world. Using this mechanism, diasporas living in democratic host countries could utilise various forms of networks to initiate “long-distance nationalism” in order to support ethnic, nationalistic, and exclusionary movements in their countries of origin (Anderson 1992).

Stressing the concept of political plurality, Ragab (April 2020) strongly advocates that diaspora political actors living in democratic host states should use their acquired experience to act as “long distance human rights advocates”. Furthermore, Godwin (2021) and Anderson (1992) also argue that diasporas living in democratic nations should vigorously try to finance electoral campaigns within their host countries to influence the situations in their original homelands.

More specifically, diaspora activists, acting as lobbyists or members of an advocacy coalition group, could trigger the members of their diaspora living in their host country to lobby the host country’s policy making elites so that the elites see that tackling conflicts in the ancestry homelands of the diaspora can also be in the national interest of the host country (Rubenzer & Redd, 2010; Prasad and Savatic 2021; Godwin, 2021, Koinova 2011; and Haney and Vanderbush, 1999).

It needs to be mentioned that regimes in the original homelands may attempt to introduce long-distance levers, surveillance, intelligence, and intimidation measures to monitor emigrant diasporas and exert direct personal control over them. However, if effectively mobilised, active diasporas living in democratic host nations could use the intimidation process used by regimes of their homelands as a transformative process for further enlightenment. That is, as pervasively argued by Ostergaard-Nielsen, (March 2006), intimidation processes used by former regimes of diasporas can serve as legitimate vehicles to inspire the diasporas to act in solidarity by taking strong collective transformative actions related to galvanizing grassroots-based social movements, organising mass demonstrations, and being actively engaged in order to bring political transformation in the homeland of the diasporas.

Social Mobilisation Process

Social mobilisation is a vital step needed for pre-conflict and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. As the diasporas are masters of local knowledge and have a strong ability to respond quickly to situations in home counties, they could effectively use social mobilisation techniques to galvanise the grassroots to participate and intervene when their original homes are facing conflict and regime aggression. Having already been helped by various humanistic groups when they initially settled down in their host country, the diasporas have a link to these humanistic groups and other NGO advocacy networks which are necessary to strengthen human and institutional resources development and further enhance asset-building opportunities needed by their original homelands (Mukundan, K.P. 2001).

That is, as part of socialisation processes, the diaspora mobilisers could activate and motivate passive members to organise awareness-building conventions for other humanistic groups that could help the victims within their original homelands since humanitarian groups are anchored upon social capital and networking. Convincingly argued by Hassan et al. (23 February 2021), diaspora mobilisers could leverage their connections to call upon the various humanitarian groups to render developmental services and humanitarian aid needed by victims in the original homelands. Stated differently, supernational organisations working with diasporas can be expected to have access to victims and good knowledge of their situation in their ancestral homelands so that these organisations are able to provide effective means of overcoming the trauma of conflict and provide a rich set of opportunities that are related to social capital, rebuilding infrastructure, and microfinancing support activities (Ostergaard-Nielsen, March 2006).

Analytical framework

Diasporas involve the migration of members of ethnic and national communities to other host countries. Because many diaspora members have relatives, mastery of local knowledge, and connections in their homelands, they can be mobilised quickly to situations of disaster in their homelands (Bostrom, Brown and Cechvala, 2016; Ionescu’s, 2006).

More particularly, as a proxy for the affected civilian in their ancestral homeland, diasporas use informal ties and networks as a driving force to recruit, mobilise, and raise the consciousness of the passive diasporas who originated from their homelands (Ragab, 2020).

Thus, in the process of triggering economic mobilisation, diasporas organise and activate other diasporas from their homelands in order to raise funds, gather resources, procure war materials, and relay vital logistical knowledge necessary for their original home countries. While undergoing a thorough political mobilisation process, activist diasporas socialize their members to be active as an advocacy group in order to pursue the collective political actions needed to influence public opinion, be involved in demonstrations, lobby, and vigorously undertake financing of electoral campaigns in order to affect the voting power of elected officials of their host countries so that these officials can take favourable positions in regard to issues related to their homelands. Moreover, diasporas could be highly encouraged to form strong connections with humanistic groups and NGOs in order to make them pledge their assistance which would be necessary for capacity building and the revitalization of the diasporas’ ancestral homelands.

20.3.3 Tigrayan diaspora in North America

Prior to 1974, Ethiopians hardly ventured outside their country to reside permanently in other host countries. The sudden explosion of Ethiopian diasporas in other countries happened after a change of regime in 1974 (Zewde, Yntiso, and Berhanu (2014). That is, the bursting of Ethiopian diasporas started after the military government of Dergue that replaced the ancient regime (Haile Selassie’s government) unleashed the “Red Terror” against the very forces and groups who brought revolution that toppled Haile Selassie’s government. Sadly, following the Dergue’s Red Terror campaign, the streets of Addis Ababa and other cities and towns were littered with the dead bodies of young workers and intellectuals.

Many who managed to escape execution or prolonged incarceration challenged the oppressive military junta by joining the forces that espoused pan-Ethiopian ideology, or they teamed up with the ethno-nationalist insurgent groups that were fighting to bring about ethnic self-determination in Ethiopia. The remainder opted to pursue asylum in Europe or North America. For example, more than 2 million nationals of Ethiopian origin were issued special identity cards to settle as Ethiopian diaspora in the United States of America (See Desta, 2014).

Using case studies, the upcoming section discusses the vision, objectives, and strategies of the Tigrayan diasporas in North America that have established various forms of associations to uplift awareness among Tigrayan diasporas, raise funds, involve other professional Tigrayan diasporas to share their experiences and skills with the local Tigrayans in Tigray, and facilitate networking with other development-oriented NGOs.

It needs to be noted that recently the various Tigrayans in North America are regrouping and rallying to strategically challenge Abiy’s Ethiopian National Federal Defence Force that has collaborated with the hideous human rights violator, Isaias Afework, the Amhara region’s special forces, the genocidal Fano youth squad, Somalia’s troops, and the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Chinese drones to wipe out the Tigrayans and their cultural heritage.

It needs to be underlined that the case-studies operating in North America are not only very actively raising funds for the war victims in Tigray and refugees in Sudan but are also very agile at advocacy and lobbying their host county’s politicians and international organisations to repudiate the genocidal war that Ethiopia’s Federal Government and its allied forces have inflicted on the civilian Tigray population.

Below is a brief discussion of the six Tigrayan Diasporas associations. They are 1) The Tigray Development Association, 2) Security and Justice for Tigrayans, 3) Tigray Communities Forum, 4) Global Society of Tigray Scholars, 5) Asmelash Grant Foundation, and 6) Omna Tigray.

a) The Tigray Development Association of North America

The major mobilisation processes undertaken by the Tigrayans in North America were initially carried out by the Tigray Development Association. As a pioneer organisation, the Tigray Development Association (TDA) was founded in Washington, D.C., in August 1989 by the Tigrayan diaspora living in North America. As a non-profit, non-political, and charitable organisation, the TDA has ever dedicated itself to recruiting and effectively mobilising the Tigrayan diasporas in North America to play active roles to reconstruct the physical infrastructure (roads, electricity, water, and telecommunication), re-establish social services (schools and healthcare facilities), and facilitate the settlement of internally displaced Tigrayans. More specifically, the vision, mission, objectives, and strategies of the case-studies selected for study are given below.

Vision statements: The vision of TDA is to making Tigray prosperous, free from poverty, and backwardness (Medhanie, 14 October 2021). to set it on the road to prosperity by strengthening infrastructure, providing aid, and building and supporting schools and health care facilities (Amanuel, 28 July 2016).

Mission Statements: TDA ventures to be a strong developmental organisation by actively engaging in need-based projects/programs that relate to education, health, and skill development training by soliciting funds from members, supporters, and donors and by enhancing community participation (TDA in North America, 1989).

Objectives: To achieve the future vision for Tigray, TDA has initiated the following objectives:

• Improve education, health services, and infrastructure.
• Enable target groups and communities to secure a sustainable livelihood free of poverty.
• Encourage and enhance the availability of gainful employment opportunities.
• Facilitate the ways and means of creating access to credit services and gainful employment opportunities for the poor and the needy.
• Familiarize target groups with new information, production techniques, and appropriate technology (Zewde, Yntiso, and Berhanu, 2014).

Strategies: To realise the above stated objectives, TDA designed the following strategies:

• Intensify mobilisation through the vigorous enlistment of members and supporters.
• Embark on the identification of potential donors while maintaining links with existing donors.
• Organise special fund-raising events.
• Undertake information exchange of activities by using different media outlets such as radio broadcasts, quarterly newsletters, and brochures. The TDA has tailored its activities to enable the poverty ridden Tigrayans to lead productive lives.

To summarise, the activities pursued by the TDA to line up Tigray’s developmental goals can be categorized into four phases: 1) Recruiting members (1989-92); 2) rehabilitation and reconstruction (1993-1995); 3) collaboration with NGOs, local communities, and donor organisations to undertake various types of development-related activities; and 4) embarking on a three year strategic plan (2019-2021) to enhance coverage and attain quality education and health care facilities (See, Zewde, Yntiso, and Berhanu, 2014 ; and TDA in North America, 14 October 2021).

Starting 4 November 2020, Tigray was faced with catastrophic war that was purposely initiated by the federal government of Ethiopia and its allied forces to wipe out the Tigrayan people and their cultural heritage. Thereby, the TDA-NA completely changed its strategy. TDA-NA to a large extent focused on leading the effort of mobilising a global fundraising activity and made each Tigrayan diaspora pledge to have their members contribute part of their monthly income to support the displaced Tigrayans in Tigray and the Tigrayan refugees in Sudan (Medhanie, 14 October 2021).

b) Security and Justice for Tigrayans (SJT)

A non-partisan, non-religious global movement, was initiated in May 2020 by concerned Tigrayan Ethiopian diasporas in North America. The establishment of this initiative was triggered by the dreadful situation that Prime Minister Abiy and his allies had “…waged against all aspects of being Tigrayans – be it physical, social, psychological and emotional – has left the people in the state of Tigray beleaguered on all sides. The survival of the people of Tigray depends on our own collective will and action and that of the greater human family” (Alemayehu, K. 3 May 2020).

Vision: The vision of the Security and Justice for Tigrayans, is to make meaningful contributions towards realising a just, peaceful, prosperous, and civilized Tigray that plays a pivotal role in augmenting the democratization process of Ethiopia.

Mission: Security and Justice for Tigrayans denounces and stands against any form of coercion and subversion of the rights, interests, and aspirations of the Tigray people. They stand against any acts that compromise their right to justice, economic freedom, self-determination, as well as territorial integrity.

Core Values: (a) integrity and honesty, (b) transparency and accountability, (c) public service, (d) inclusiveness, collaboration, and empowerment, (e) excellence, innovation, and dedication, (f) justice, fairness, and equality, and (g) peace and security

Goals/objectives:

• Advocate for the interest and well-being of the people of Tigray in Ethiopia.
• Defend the rights of Tigrayan political prisoners in Ethiopia detained by the federal government as well as those terminated from their civil service employment and morally humiliated due to ethnicity and political affiliation.
• Alarm the international community of the potential for ethic conflict and civil war in Ethiopia and seek partnership.
• Campaign against the socio-economic, political, and psychological injustice and violation of human rights committed against the people of Tigray by the Ethiopian federal government and its allies.
• Advocate justice for those of Tigrayan origin whose existence is threatened by the forced border demarcation and seek the immediate release of Tigrayans abducted by the Eritrean forces.

c) Tigray Communities Forum (TCF)

The forum was established in 2017 by leaders of 10 Tigray community organisations with “a vision to create and sustain the Tigrayan community in North America.” The objectives of TCF are tailored to unite Tegaru in North America, promote growth and education, and preserve identity. Among other things, the TCF focuses on empowering Tigrayan women in the diaspora to ensure sustainable development and security of women in Tigray. However, the war against the people of Tigray was waged on 4 November 2020, by the Ethiopian government and its allies to eradicate the Tigray people. Thereby, in addition to its regular business, the TCF “…started to engage in many ways to defend the people of Tigray.” (http://Tegaru FormNA.org).

Vision: To create and sustain the Tigrayan community in North America, to make it proud of its identity with harmonized and cooperative social life, and to make it educationally and economically viable.

The following briefly describe the activities have been taking place since the start of the war on 4 November 2020:

• The Tigray Communities Forum initiated an establishment of a task force which includes all Tigray organisations in North America to lead the fight against the war.
• The Tigray Communities Forum organised a global candlelight vigil, on 31 December2020, to honour all Tigrayans who were killed, raped, or injured by the invading forces.
• The Tigray Communities Forum, through its Tegaru Professional Network, has engaged in public diplomacy. As a result, the Tegaru Professional Network has been calling the US representatives on a weekly basis to discuss the situation and to help stop the war. This has brought a deep understanding of the war of Tigray Genocide.
• TPN, as a network of the first generation of Tigray-Americans, connected with their peers across the Atlantic and created a Crisis Control Network which attracted many diplomats and journalists to respond to the humanitarian crisis.
• TPN has been playing a major role in creating awareness of the Tigray Genocide using social media. In addition to that, TPN members continue to play a leading role in leading protests and conveying messages to the international community.
• The Forum has participated in raising funds for the people of Tigray at this trying time. All Tigray Community members are active in organising fundraising, protests, and social media campaigns.
• The Forum’s TPN, through its innovative fundraising program called “Double Good Gourmet Popcorn” raised US$24,249.00 to support the people of Tigray. This was a four-day program that took place on August 2 – 6, 2021.
• As a community organisation, the Forum remains committed to empowering Tigrayans in North America while contributing to the struggle against Tigrayan Genocide.

d) Global Society of Tigray Scholars and Professionals (GSTS)

The Global Society of Tigray Scholars and Professionals was established in 2010 as a non-partisan, autonomous and not-for-profit global knowledge network of over 3,000 Tigray academics and wide-ranging professionals. GSTS seeks to develop a knowledge-based economy in Tigray and works to develop diplomacy and advocacy through humanitarian works. (https://www.scholars4tigrai.org).

Vision: GSTS aims to build a robust and knowledge-based economy and society in Tigray and beyond through a series of knowledge-induced initiatives, centered on research, sounding policy and strategy, effective human capital development., technology and knowledge transfer endeavors, diplomacy/advocacy, humanitarian works and so forth.

Mission:

• Serve as leading and enabling hub of world-class scholarly and scientific minds in a wide array of multi-disciplinary fields of study and highly dynamic working environments aiming at playing a significant role towards the development of Tigray.
• Provide a platform for Tigray scholars and professionals residing both in Ethiopia and in the wider diaspora to work as a greater unit to accelerate the development of the Tigray region.
• Provide advisory and think tank functions for shaping Tigray development and prosperity.
• Promote educated and tailored advocacy, diplomatic and humanitarian activities.
• Serve as a primary center and thus liaison for various government and non-government organisations, academic, research institutions and industries.
• Facilitate and strengthen the interaction among members and other stakeholders.
• Work, promote and brand Tigray and its people’s interest and aspire at all levels.
  Core Values:
• Intellectual integrity, excellence, merit, evidence-based decisions, recommendations, and policy making
• Innovation, originality, up-to-datedness
• High level ethical standards, impartiality, inclusiveness, unity of purpose
• Networking, cooperativeness, tolerance, respect for diversity and equality
• Transparency, openness
• Merit-based awards and rewards
• Institutional independence

e) Asmelash Grant Foundation

The Asmelash Grant Foundation was founded in September 2014 by Suzani Asmelash Grant and Gary W. Grant. The Asmelash Grant Foundation is a not for profit. Independent, international, humanitarian aid organisation. The Asmelash Grant Foundation provides medical, food, housing, and economic assistance with the intention of creating new horizons for the people of Tigray (https://thelives yousave.org/who-we-are/. The vision, mission, values of the Asmelash foundation is given below.

Vision: The Asmelash Grant Foundation supports the safety, health, and economic mobility of every Tigrayan through disaster relief, sustainable programming, and transnational organising.

Values: The Asmelash group work with; (a) Integrity – deep sense of responsibility, transparency, and accountability to drive change, (b) Respect –treat people, communities, and culture with respect and dignity; (c) Passion- believe that generational change is possible through collective effort; and (d) Accountability – take initiatives to their responsibility and to exceed expectations

f) Omna Tigray

Omna Tigray was founded by a collective of international Tigrayan professionals from various backgrounds in response to the war and genocide waged on Tigrayan people on 4 November 2020. Omna Tigray is a nonprofit nonpartisan global organisation in the US, Canada, Europe, and Australia with a purpose to effectively advocate for an end to the war, call for unrestricted humanitarian aid to the Tigrayan people, and promote the economic development of Tigray. Omna means “our large tree” in Tigrigna. Om is a tree with plentiful branches that keeps growing, and this signifies that despite adversity, Tigray will continue to grow, flourish, and reach new heights. The word Omna fully encompasses the mission and vision of our organisation.

Vision²¹³⁵: to fight injustice, advocate for peace and economic development, and amplify the voices of the people in Tigray, via our sustainable, long-lasting platform.

Mission: is to build a global community and resource center advocating for the human rights and economic development of Tigrayans and other oppressed peoples in Tigray. Omna Tigray was formed with the belief that access to educated and inclusive advocacy is key to fighting disinformation and injustice, and it is our mission to create that platform for the Tigrayan community and the wider global community. We believe that strength is in unity and collaboration. In short, Omna believes that strength is in unity and collaboration.

Goal: is to ultimately eradicate failures that have prevented the development of Tigray and believes that peace and stability in Tigray are key to fostering stability in the region.

20.3.4 Summary, Conclusions, and Policy Implications

Going beyond the prevalent approach of exploring the role of the diasporas’ financial and social remittance to support relatives (i.e., the transfer of knowledge, skills, and models of business incubators), the main thrust of the study was to explore some of the economic, social, and political mobilisation processes undertaken by Tigrayan diasporas in North America to subvert the genocidal war that the Ethiopian government and its allied forces have inflicted on the people of the Tigray. Additionally, the study endeavoured to shed light on the projects that the Tigrayan diasporas have designed for the post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction of the war-torn Tigray.

In short, the major focal points of this study were to:
➢ Investigate the diverse range of mechanisms utilised by Tigrayan diaspora actors to recruit other diasporas from their original homelands.
➢ Identify the mobilisation processes used by the Tigrayan diaspora actors to awaken, galvanise, raise awareness, and establish the collective identity of the other latent Tigrayan diasporas by letting them know of the various atrocities inflicted on the Tigray people by Ethiopia’s federal government and its allied forces.
➢ Pinpoint the glaring engagement strategies used by the Tigrayan diaspora’s activists to entice the other diasporas from their homelands to be involved in the reconstruction and capacity development of Tigray.
➢ Assess some of the strategic developmental pathways that have been designed by the Tigrayan diasporas in order to integrate the internally displaced Tigrayans to their regional homeland.

A summary of the vision, mission, and objectives of the Tigrayans in North America is portrayed in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary of the Vision, Mission, and Objectives of the Tigrayans Diasporas in North America

	TDA	Security & Justice	Tigray Communities Forum	Global Society of Tigray Scholars	Asmelash Grant Foundation	OMNA
Vision	*Make Tigray Affluent, free from poverty, and backwardness.	*Realising a just, peaceful prosperous and civilized Tigray.	*To create and Sustain Tigrayan community	*Build a robust & knowledge-based economy and society in Tigray.	*Dedicated to changing the lives of Tigrayans from refugee camps in Sudan and re-settle those displaced by the genocidal war in Tigray.	*Fight injustice *Advocate for peace and economic development Amplify the people of Tigray.
Mission	*Actively engaging in need-based projects/programs that relate to education, health, and skill development training.	*Practice the democratic process to achieve economic freedom and self-determinati on…	*Practicing harmonized & cooperative social life related to education and viable economics.	*Serve as leading and enabling hub of world-class scholarly and scientific minds and skills in multidisciplinary fields.	*Strives to improve the economic well-being of Tigrayans supporting both immediate financial needs and sustainable growth. *Protect the health and improve the well-being of Tigrayans by responding to emergency health crises and building public health capacity to prevent disease, disability, and death from communicable and non-communicable diseases.	*Build a global community *Establish resources centre advocating for human rights in Tigray.
Objectives	*Target groups and communities to secure a sustainable livelihood. *Creating access to credit services and gainful employment opportunities.	*Undergoin g through the design and implement ation of peaceful struggle.		*Practice knowledge – induced initiatives. *Promote educated l and tailored advocacy, diplomatic and humanitarian activities.	*Short term Goals: -Emergency Food during famine crisis. -Counselling and clinical management -medicine, equipment, and health care services -sanitary and famine hygiene products -psychosocial support.	*Fostering stability in Tigray.
	*Familiarize target groups with new information, production techniques.				*Long term Goals; -improve nutritional status -family support -restore healthcare facilities in Tigray -rebuild water systems -build healing centres

A major analysis of the case studies indicates that, in earlier years, the mobilisation of Tigrayan diasporas operating in North America was propelled to raise funds and assist on developmental-oriented projects in Tigray. Since the Ethio-Tigrayan war of 4 November 2020, the Tigrayan diasporas restrategised their techniques to playing active roles in order to mobilise and sustain the collective identity of Tigrayan diasporas and make them 1) be aware by using social media and grass-roots tactics about the genocide the Abiy administration and his allied forces are committing in Tigray; 2) lead demonstrations and protests against Abiy’s oppressive regime and his allied forces; 3) raise funds and vital assistance (such as food, medical necessities, and sanitary and educational kits) from members, international development partners, and NGOs to help the war victims in Tigray and the Tigrayan refugees in Sudan; 4) organise candlelight vigils on major streets and picket line in front of city halls around the globe in order to educate the public about the atrocities that the local Tigrayans are facing; 5) be advocates and lobby host county’s politicians and international organisations to be on their side and repudiate the genocidal war that Ethiopia’s federal government and its allied forces have been inflicting on the civilian Tigrayan population; 6) be engaged in public diplomacy; 7) create a Crisis Control Network to galvanise diplomates and journalists to work against the humanitarian crisis in Tigray; 8) file cases with the International Court of Justice (ICC) about the atrocities that the Abiy government has committed on the people of Tigray; and 9) solicit Ethiopian attorneys to defend pro bono the various Tigrayans without legal representation in Ethiopian prisons (see Table 2).

Table 2: Summary of the Economic, Social, and Political Mobilisation Processes of Tigrayan Diasporas

Groups Mobilisation	TDA	Security & Justice	Tigray Communities Forum	Global Society of Tigray Scholars	Asmelash Grant Foundation	OMNA
Economic	*Embark on identification of potential donors, *Organise special fundraising events, *Identification of potential donors, *Organise special-fundraising events, *Help internally displaced persons through financial donation, food, and shelter. *Access to credit services		*Participate in fund raising activities, for example from August 2-6, 2021, raised US$24,249.	*Build a robust & Knowledge-based economy	*Work with donors and philanthropic organisations Around the globe	Economic development
Social	*Enlistment of members and supporters, *Undertake information exchange of activities using different media outlets – radio broadcasts, –quarterly newsletters, Brochures etc. *Help refugees in Sudan with food, medical necessities, educating kids, *Helping raped victims	*Defend the rights of Tigrayan political prisoners in Ethiopia, *Campaign against injustice and humanitarian violations	*Organise a global candlelight vigil to honour all Tigrayans killed, raped, and injured by the invading forces, *Create awareness of the genocide in Tigray using social media	*Practice knowledge induced initiatives, human capital development, technology, and knowledge transfer endeavors	*Emergency Food during famine, *Counseling & Psychological services, *Medical equipment, *Health services, *Rebuild water systems, *Built 275 temporary housing units	*Access to educated group. *Form platform for Tigrayan community
Political	*Lobbying	*Alarm the international community of potential for ethic conflict and civil war in Ethiopia. *Advocate justice for those Tigrayan origin whose existence is threatened by forced border demarcation *Seek the immediate release of Tigrayans abducted by Eritrean forces.	*Engaged in public diplomacy, *Call weekly United States representatives to stop the war in Tigray, *Establish resistance task force *Use Crisis Control Network to get in touch with diplomats and journalists to respond to humanitarian crisis in Tigray, *Establish connection with peers across the Atlantic,	*Establish advocacy and diplomatic activities and filled cases about Genocide with the int. Court of Justice.		*Access to educated and advocacy group,

Despite undergoing sleepless nights, having ideological differences, and facing the COVID-19 pandemic, the entrepreneurial Tigrayan diaspora in North America needs to be applauded for being able to mobilise the other diasporas from their homelands to be involved in different forms of galvanizing structures.

With the assistance of the drones obtained from United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, China, and Iran, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces is intermittently bombarding Tigray. Nonetheless, thanks to the heroic efforts of Tigrayan fighters, Tigray seems be on the verge of achieving of its autonomy and eventually the people of Tigray will have the right to declare self-determination—the legal right to decide their own destiny.

As the drivers of change before and during the Ethio-Tigrayan conflict, the Tigrayan diasporas need play more than ever before as stakeholders in post-conflict reconstruction of Tigray. Thus, being the inevitable stakeholders and co-development actors, the Tigrayan diasporas need to play in the reconstruction and consolidation processes of their original regional homeland (See Suh-Nwji, 17 July 2013).

Though not planned until now, the sharp-eyed Tigrayan diasporas need to be proactive and focus on designing sustainable post-conflict reconstruction developmental plans that can be gallantly used for the invigoration of their war-torn ancestral homeland, Tigray.

References

Alemayehu, K. (3 May 3, 2020). “Security and Justice for Tigrayans in Ethiopia” https://tigray.net/2020/05/03/security-and
justice-for-tigeans-in-ethiopia/.
Amanuel, H. (28 July 2016). “The History and Impact of the Tigray Development Association.” https://www.
Hiruyamanuel.net/history-impact-tigrai-development-association/
Ambrosio, T. (2002). Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Anderson, B. (1992) The New World Disorder. New Left Review.
Biden, J. (21 September 2021). “Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly.” United Nations Headquarters, New York, New York.
Bostrom, A. Brown, D. and Cechvala, S. (May 2016). “Humanitarian Effectiveness & the Role of the Diaspora: A CDA Literature
Review.” CDA: Practical Learning for International Action. Cambridge, MA.
Braziel, J.E.(2008). Diaspora: An Introduction. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.
Cunanan-Angsioco, E. (2001). “14: Outreach and Mobilization.” The Action Guide for Advocacy and Citizen Participation.
Demmers, J. (2007). “New wars and diasporas: Suggestions for research and Policy “. Journal of Peace Conflict &
Development, 11, 1-26.
Desta, A. (2014). From Economic Dependency and Stagnation to Democratic Developmental State. Trenton, N.J.: The
Red Sea Press.
Godwin, M. (2021). “Let my people go: diaspora mobilization for human rights of political prisoners.” Globalization. Published
online. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14747731.2021.1884328
Haney, P. and Vanderbush, W. (2005). The Cuban Embargo: Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Hassan et al (23 February 2021). “Recognizing diaspora humanitarianism: what we know and what we need to know more
about.” Danish Institute for International Studies. Accessed 6 August 2021: https://www.diis.dk/en/research/recognizingdiaspora-umanitarianism
Ionescu, D. (2006)). Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for
Policymakers. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
Koinova, M. (23 August 2018). “Diaspora Mobilization for Conflict and Post-conflict Reconstruction: Contextual and
Comparative Dimensions.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol 44, 2018.
Koinova. M (23 October). “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism for Kosovo Independence in the
US and the UK.” Foreign Policy Analysis. Volume 9, Issue 4.
Medhanie, S. (14 October 2021). “Tigray Development Association in North America.” Accessed November
18.2021:https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik.
Mukunda, K.P. (2001). “Training Module on Social Mobilization.” Accessed 18 October 2021:
https://www.fao.org/3/Ad346E/ad346e07.htm.
Nagel, J. (February 1994). “Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture.” Social Problems, Vol.
41, No.1.

Nedelmann, B. (December 1987). “Individual and Parties–changes in the processes of political mobilization.” European
Sociological Review. Vol.3, Issue 3, 181-202.
Newland, K. and Plaza, S. (September 2013). “What we Know about Diasporas and Economic Development”. Policy Brief,
Migration Policy Institute. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). University of Barcelona.
Ostergaard-Nielsen, E. (2006). “Diasporas and Conflict Resolution –Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?
Prasad, S. K. and Savatic, F. (2021). “Diaspora Foreign Policy Interest Groups in the United States: Democracy, Conflict, and
Political Entrepreneurship.” London: Cambridge University Press. Accessed 8 September 2021:
https://www.cambridge.org/core.
Ragab, N. J. (2020) “Diaspora Mobilization in a Conflict Setting.” Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Maastricht University.
Rubenzer, T. and Redd, S.B. (2010). “Ethnic minority groups and US Foreign Policy: Examining congressional decision making
and economic Sanctions.” International Studies Quarterly, 54(3) 755-777, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Hazel, and Paul Stares (2007). Diasporas in Conflict. Tokyo: UNU Press.
Sokefeld, M. (2006). Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora.” Global
Networks, 6(3), 265-284.
Suh-Nwji (17 July 17 2013). “Role of diaspora in post-Arab Spring Reconstruction.” Pambazuka News. Cited from
https://www.pambazuka.org/print/85888.
Tigray Development Association in North America (August,1989). Cited from https://causes.benevity.org/causes/840-
521666534.
Tigray Development Association in North America (14 October 2021). “ TDA’s works in the past and present.”
Van Hear, Pieke, N., and Vertovec, S. (2004). The Contribution of UK-based diasporas to development and poverty reduction.
ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), Oxford: University of Oxford.
Williams, R. (1994). “The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative International Perspectives.” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 20.
Zewde , B. Yntiso, G. and Berhanu, K. (2014)). “The Ethiopian diaspora and the Tigray Development Association, in Diasporas, development, and Peacemaking in the Horn of Africa, L. Laakso and P. Hautaniemi, (eds.) London: Zed book.

21. Targeting Tigray’s Heritage and Values
By Hagos Abrha Abay²¹³⁶

It is impossible to know precisely how many thousands of Tigrayans have been killed in the war that began in November 2020. The atrocities took place without regard to age, gender, social class, health or any other factor, and justice will require careful, systematic research which cannot currently be conducted. These murders were accompanied by land grabbing, ethnic cleansing, and widespread and genocidal rape. As Ethiopian and Eritrean government forces and private militia attacked Ethiopian citizens living in the northernmost region of Ethiopia, Tigray, they also attacked religious, historical, and cultural sites of immense value including museums, archaeological sites, mosques, churches, and monasteries. Tigray heritage icons were deliberately and systematically targeted, especially those that were popularly celebrated and held historical significance.

To appreciate the full weight of these attacks, the role and influence of the Church in Ethiopia which has underpinned historical and modern claims of political and military authority, shaped community identity, and informed cultural narratives, must be understood. Bombing, terrorising, and otherwise degrading churches and monasteries strikes at traditional Ethiopian power structures, cherished multifunctional gathering places, sacred spaces, and represents a grave dishonouring of cultural values and works of great beauty.

21.1 A survey of churches, monasteries, and other historically significant sites

Tigray is a land of precious heritages with thousands of monasteries and churches, about 150 of them rock hewn. Tourists from around the world and pilgrims from across the country have travelled to visit these sacred spaces. These are the Tigray heritage icons and they; their historical objects, sacred items, priests, and congregations have been intentionally targeted. At the time of writing at least 40 churches and monasteries have had a general assessment of damages, but we assume that hundreds of monasteries and churches have been affected in one way or another by the hostilities. A detailed report from the Tigray Orthodox Church Diocese just three months into the war in February 2021, showed 326 members of the priesthood had been killed; we do not have clear data on how many members of the clergy were killed in the many months that followed. At least 112 priests and deacons of Tigray origin have been detained in Addis Ababa, many of whom were arrested during the Ethiopian Meskel festival in September 2021. The atrocities have been perpetrated by joint forces: Ethiopian National Defence Forces, Eritrean Defence Forces, and Amharan forces (Amhara Militia and Amhara Special Forces) and have been supported by drones and military personnel from various countries, most significantly the UAE, Turkey, and China.

On the eve of the popular annual celebration of St. Mary which draws crowds to the holy city of Aksum every year, a bloody massacre began. Aksum; Tsion, the holy city, is the Head of Churches and Monasteries in Ethiopia. The chapel at the Church of Our Lady Mary of Tsion in Aksum is trusted as the treasury of the biblical Ark of the Covenant. The faithful were participating in a unique monthly 7-day supplication ritual where they surround and circle the sacred church of Mary Tsion three times, reflecting how Zion in the Old Testament is described as being surrounded by protective mountains, when they were suddenly interrupted by force. Eritrean troops had arrived, many congregants stayed on the church compound hoping to protect the Ark of the Covenant and they were massacred. Over the course of two days on 28 – 29 November 2020 there are estimates 800 civilians, see also this, were killed, including priests and children. Aksum, the ultimate spiritual and historical pride of the people of Tigray, not to mention Orthodox Christian Ethiopia as a whole, was disgraced.

Maryam Dengelat is a monastery and church complex with a newer church stationed in front of and below an ancient rock hewn church. Significantly, an unvocalised Aksumite Geez inscription was recently found near here. The ancient rock hewn church was also recently reopened after being inaccessible for 200 years, revealing unique and precious heritage items. Eritrean soldiers arrived on the day of Maryam Dengelat’s most popular annual festival, Saint Mary’s Feast Day on Nov 30th 2020, looted property and conducted a ruthless execution of civilians including elders, children and priests.

The Firedashum Massacre is one of the underreported massacres in eastern Tigray; after destroying the village houses and the only millhouse nearby, Eritrean troops massacred more than sixty-one civilians, more than five of them priests. More than 32 civilians and priests were said to have been killed in the church of Medhanie’alem Gu‘tolo (a church dedicated to Jesus) during its holyday on January 4, 2021. Moreover, another church nearby, named Enda Qirkos Firedashum (source: Mahibere Deqiqe Estifanos), a church dedicated to St. Cyriacus, was burned and its heritage, both ecclesiastical materials and manuscripts, destroyed at the same event. The Firedashum villagers were horrifically killed, intimidated and there are reports of villagers being tied down for days in front of their killed relatives. Detailed identities and stories of all the individuals killed in this village are known and well documented by the locals.

These first few incidents listed indicate a pattern of targeting churches on their holy days and festival days when large numbers of congregants and priests were in attendance. Ethiopian Christmas Day 2020 for example, is known to have been one of the deadliest days for civilians in the war so far, with the- Debre Abay Massacre, and multiple churches and communities attacked at the same time. During the Ethiopian Christmas week of 2021 between the 4-8 January, Eritrean troops are believed to have executed 300 Saho speaking civilians of the Irob minority group alone, in a horrifying door-to-door campaign. 72 of the individuals are well known, however the northeastern area of Tigray where the Irob people live has been under continuous Eritrean occupation the entire course of this war and some of the atrocities have been hard to verify.

Most of the brutalities in eastern Tigray were committed by Eritrean soldiers. Qirqos Ligat in Zalambessa was one of the first reported churches to be destroyed by them (as you can see in the video). Targeting churches and sacred spaces became worse as the soldiers advanced to the centre of the state with numerous churches and monasteries in central Tigray and eastern Tigray defaced by Eritrean forces.

The renowned 6th century monastery of Debre Dammo, a compound only accessible by rope up a sheer cliff on a flat-topped mountain, is the first Christian monastery in Ethiopia (sixth century) home to a rich collection of manuscripts, and it is where various prestigious Ethiopian monks got their monkhood from. Although no fighting was taking place in its vicinity, and while the site was of no strategic advantage, it was deliberately shelled by Eritrean soldiers. While there is some variance in local reporting, it is clear that the monastery was bombed, buildings around the complex were damaged and one monk was killed. More than five Eritrean soldiers were reported to have climbed up to the monastery, vandalized the space and intimidated the monks.

The famous rock hewn Ger‘alta churches in east Tigray were damaged by shelling, including the 14th century church Abuna Abraham known for its diverse architectural features and wall paintings; members of the monastic community were threatened and beaten. Priests and civilians were intimidated in the monastery of Abuna Yematta of Guh, a place dedicated to one of the sixth century Nine Saints and known for its impressively detailed, ancient frescos. This rock hewn church and the beauty of its surrounding mountains drew many tourists to Ger’alta and made it a well-loved tourist destination. 19 civilians were killed and twp injured here on 7 May 2021.

Wuqro Qirqos is an iconic church that- sits on a very important part of the historic trade route leading to the Red Sea. Local residents filmed the historic church as it appears to be shelled by invading forces. The church of Debre Medhanit Amnuel Ma‘go, in the Wereda Kiltewla‘lo district of Negash, was Shelled twice on 24 November 2020 by the Eritrean soldiers. The church building and its ecclesiastical materials were destroyed; the image of Emanuel/Jesus, after whom the church is named, was also damaged, as can be seen in the photograph.

The rock hewn church and monastery complex of Maryam Yerefeda in Digum (eastern Tigray) is historical church with three tabots, dedicated to St. Mary, St. Gabriel, and St. Michael; the church is said to have been attacked three times, especially on 25 December 2020, and 14 January 2021. Eritrean troops are believed to be primarily responsible. According to testimony, two generators, two amplifiers, and a bell were destroyed. Maryam Yerefeda’s library is totally ruined. Throughout the length of their occupation of Tigray, Eritrean soldiers became known for looting any property they found. The full extent of private property, church materials, icons that were looted by the Eritreans forces are not yet well documented. Waldibba in northwestern Tigray is one of the biggest, and most well-established monasteries in Ethiopia. It had a strong link with Debre Bonkol of Aksum, which was a place of Bahre Negasi of the 13th century. Founded in the 14th century by a Tigrayan monk from Aksum named Abba Samuel. Waldibba was among the monasteries that historically remained untouched during conflict, even by Ahmed b. Ibrahim al-Gazi, who notoriously caused widespread destruction of sacred spaces in his 16th century invasion of Ethiopia. More than one thousand monks and a few hundred nuns are believed to live in the monastery, belonging to more than 18 distinct monastic communities. These coenobitic monastic communities hail from all over Ethiopia with a majority of them being from Tigray.

Many of the monks who live on the compound never leave it, devoting their lives to study and prayer. The Waldibba compound is sizeable and is not only a monastery. It also contains a vast hermits’ desert with a wilderness that is surrounded by rivers including the Ensiya and Zarema rivers. This compound has been used as a sanctuary for destabilised individuals; members of the Derg Regime who were believed to have hidden themselves in the monastery because monasteries are independent entities, and historically and culturally considered to be untouchable by the secular community.

That belief has been shattered during this war. Hundreds of ethnically Tigrayan monks were cast out of the monastery by Amhara forces and their Amhara ‘brethren.’ Some were actually killed inside the monastery while they were praying. Most monks of Tigrayan origin were evicted and displaced to cities and other monasteries across Tigray.

The monastery of Mer’awe Kirstos in northwestern Tigray became known as an asylum for many of these monks. However even here where Waldibba monks sought refuge, more than 50 civilians, ten of them priests, are reported to have been massacred by Amhara forces (Source: Mergeta Qetsela). Precious manuscripts and heritages from this monastery were also looted. Some of the monks of Waldibba, many of whom were elderly, did not recover from the beatings endured while being expelled from the monastery. Others, having had such limited contact with the outside world for years until their expulsion, quickly became sick and died during their exile. Seventy-one-year-old Abba Gebrewahid, is one example of a revered monk who was troubled, became sick, died, and was buried in Aksum. According to local reports and eyewitness testimony, the Amhara forces committed all these atrocities at Waldibba in collaboration with some of the non-Tigrayan origin monks from the monastery itself.

The monastery of Debre Abay, which was established by Samuel of Waldibba at the end of 14th century during the reign of Dawit II, is a famous centre of excellence for Ethiopian orthodox traditional schooling, providing education in a variety of disciplines and preeminent in the field of church liturgy mass service (Qǝddase). It was attacked by Ahmed b. Ibrahim al-Gazi in the 16th century and the church in the monetary compound was bombed by the Italians in the Second-Italian-Abyssinian War. The mid to second half of the 19th century was a very significant period for Debre Abay and for its reputation as a monastery. Throughout modern times it has remained a popular school. Any Ethiopian deacon who graduates from Debre Abay is as proud of his education as any of today’s most renowned university graduates. This icon of Tigray’s and Ethiopia’s heritage was vandalized by the Amhara and ENDF forces. Civilians, priests, and students were ferociously killed, its heritage was looted, and fabric of the monastery’s traditions was erased. Access to northwestern and western areas of Tigray is limited. Western Tigray, where ethnic cleansing and horrific brutalities like the Mai Kadra massacre and the extrajudicial executions in Humera continue, much of the territory is still under occupation by the ENDF and their allied forces. Consequently, no report about monasteries and churches from there is included in this article.

In Wejjerat in southeastern Tigray, as they were preparing one evening for the anniversary day of Ezgi’na Mam‘at Church, the faithful were interrupted. Their evening meal was purposely destroyed, and elders were taunted inside the church; this was committed a few weeks after about seven elders were massacred nearby, in Tsehafti. Ethiopian soldiers who had been camping in the surroundings of Abune Aregawi Church of Quiha for a short time, and used to smoke cigarettes inside the church, and they are said to have entered the St. Mary Church of Quiha during the service of the mass, threatening civilians and priests.

Even though the degree of damage is not yet clear, local reports show the Yeha Monastery was affected and manuscripts were looted; it may also be connected tothe Ahsi’a Massacre where more than 117 civilians, 19 of them in Addi Gitaw alone, including priests, were massacred (source: Qol’a Baray). In the church of Debre Anbessa, Kidanamihret church alone, more than 10 civilians and priests including the church administrator Abba Gebremeskel, were brutally killed by Eritrean soldiers. The guardian of the Ahsi’a secondary school whose name was Gebre’aregay, escaped the violence and he claimed asylum in Debre Anbessa, but he was still killed inside the church. A university student and one operator from Sur Construction company were among the murdered youth. Sexual abuse was also committed here. We do not yet have clear data about the church building and its heritages.

The monasteries of Endabba Tsihma (a church dedicated to one of the Nine Saints in Edaga Arbi), Tseftsef Kidanamihret (Nebelet), Maryam Wuqro (Nebelet) among the other churches in Central Tigray, in one or another way, were attacked by the Eritrean forces. Civilians were killed around the monastery of Endabba Thishma. Some monasteries in Qola Temben (central Tigray) like Endaba Noba, Endaba Yohanni, Jiwamare Mika’el were part of the target. The church of Jiwamare Mikaʾel, had precious manuscripts looted by the Amhara and ENDF forces.

Northwest, central, and eastern parts of Tigray are relatively the most attacked zones in case of heritage; this is mainly because these areas were the main gains of the Amhara and the Eritrean forces, who were described to be more brutal; many other churches and monasteries in northwestern Tigray were attacked by Amharan forces and ENDF. The targets in the Mahbere Dego Massacre, for example, were members of a local congregation traveling together to a religious feast called a Tsebel. Local reports describe the civilians as being brutally murdered by ENDF and Amhara forces and thrown off the edge of a cliff.

The Church of Maryam Medhanit in northwest Tigray (Addi Da‘ero), as you can see in the picture, has been destroyed by the Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers; Christians congregated in the church and sang the prayer “O Lord, Have mercy on us” after its destruction. The church of Enda Abune Aregawi (Addi Da‘ero) is also affected from shelling. Kidanemiḥret Amburko (Tselemti) and Abune Zerʾabruk both in the northwestern Tigray were damaged from shelling by Amhara forces. Another monastery called Abune Tadewos was damaged by bombing (by a zu-23) and heritage objects, including manuscripts, were looted. Many civilians were also killed and their heritage, including manuscripts, were looted in the monastery of Abune Thomas in northwestern Tigray. More than 12 monasteries, at least in this article, were yet reported to have been damaged in northwestern Tigray, mainly by Amhara and ENDF forces; the reports are from local sources. Enda Amanuel Samre and Qeretsa Maryam of Seharti are among the churches known to have been damaged by shelling in southwestern Tigray. Qeretsa Maryam was bombed from the air. The grounds surrounding the church of Maryam Korem were recently bombed by drones and we know that many civilians died in the attack. We do not yet have a report on the physical damage to the church. Brutalities in the south and southwestern Tigray have not yet been well reported. According to local reports and Dimtsi Weyane Tigray Television, reported recently, 175 civilians including priests were killed during the Bora Massacre on 23 November 2020; according to the report, until the first three months of 2021, another 179 civilians were injured; 438 goats and sheep, and 46 cattle were looted or slaughtered there. Moreover, 387 quintals of grain were burned; 180 houses were burned down, 17 women raped; unspecified church located in Neqsege areas was totally burned; in the church of Eguyat St. Mary, a monk named Abba Hiluf was executed. In Gedefena in the St. John Church area, a priest named Mamu and three deacons were killed, with a total of nine priests reported to have been killed around that village. All this destruction was committed by ENDF and Amhara forces. I was in southern Tigray during the first three months after the war started, I am a witness, among other things, for an unimaginable destruction of agricultural investments in southern Tigray. In Rayya, massive farmlands, dairy farming (including estimated to 500 Holstein-Friesian cows from a single farm of Haleka Moges) were made out of use; this can be covered in detail in a separate article.

Archaeological sites, museums and memorial sites were affected, in addition to the damage inflicted on religious buildings and their environments. Aksum Archaeological Museum was looted on 1 February 2021 by the Eritrean soldiers; according to the curator of the museum Layn Mawcha. Among other things, 26 Aksumite coins (10 gold, 16 silver) were looted by the Eritrean soldiers. Cars with heavy loads were said to have been in many of the restricted areas around the Aksumite stelaes; this could be one of the most frustrating issues in case of the stelaes, which were already endangered after the one returned from Italy was erected. The office of Wuqro Archaeological Museum is reported to have been damaged by Eritrean soldiers. Two other archaeological sites around Wuqro and in Aksum, Addi Gutay have also reported that their shelter, fences and related archaeological materials have been looted and vandalized by the Eritrean forces. The Emperor Yohannes IV Palace, the home of a significant Ethiopian king from the 19th century, is found in the Tigrayan capital, Mekelle. The palace was renovated and transformed into a museum with UNESCO’s assistance. Today most of the cultural artifacts in the museum have been destroyed or looted by federal Ethiopian forces.

Tigray Martyr’s Memorial Museum found in Mekelle near the Tigrayan Martyrs Monument, a symbolic and educational site commemorating Tigray’s revolutionary struggle in the 1980’s, has been completely devastated. When these two heritage sites were attacked, the city of Mekelle was totally controlled by the Ethiopian National Defence Force. There were no skirmishes, battles or shots fired anywhere near these culturally significant sites, yet they were intentionally obliterated by Ethiopian soldiers. The same is true for the statue of Qeshi Gebru, a female fighter against the Derg Regime in the 1980’s. Members of ENDF and Amhara forces applauded and knocked it over in Humera; the event is documented in video footage that has been circulated on social media. Upon the destruction of development infrastructure like textile factories, large agricultural assets, schools, health centres and the list here could on, private properties and heritages were looted. There are widespread reports of Eritrean soldiers looting private property so exhaustively that they even took cooking utensils. There are also many reports indicating that Eritrean soldiers would then burn whatever was left behind, even a family’s food items. Heritage antiquities were looted both for economic gain (with many items containing silver and gold) and for the intentional discarding of Tigrayan values. Antiquity shops in and outside the Ethiopian borders must now have received looted Tigray heritage items. A friend of mine from Kenya informed me that someone approached him to sell Tigray antiquity objects. Our vigilance in documenting online heritage selling, and general assessments of heritage loss in Tigray can be important for accountability and repatriation (if possible) after the war.

The “Policy Document for the Integration of a Sustainable Development Perspective into the Processes of the World Heritage Convention” (UNESCO, 2015) treats cultural heritage rights as being human rights. A draft policy of the International Criminal Court (ICC) published on 22 March 2021 article 8:41 says, “War crimes fall under the Court’s jurisdiction under article 8 of the Statute, and at present may offer the most straightforward means to address intentional harm to cultural heritage—not least since it is well established that these crimes not only address violence to the person but also to property.” As Tigray heritage, including the world registered heritages like Aksum, are part of our shared global heritage and history, it is incumbent upon the responsible and capable international bodies to be well concerned about the targeted destruction and theft of Tigray heritage icons, to advocacy for accountability, and for everything from restitution up to rehabilitation. The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church’s historical influence on the state

Church and State have been closely connected throughout Ethiopian history, dating back to the time of King Ezana of the Aksumite Empire who converted to Christianity c. CE325. The Church became more dominant in Ethiopian literature after the 13th century when the story of the Kǝbre Negest (lit. Glory of Kings), a textual masterpiece outlining the foundation of the Solomonic Dynasty, was produced.

While there is no current known record of Aksumite kings claiming to be direct descendants of the Biblical King Solomon, the narrative of Kǝbre Negest was instrumental in denouncing their predecessors, the Lasta/Agaw kings of the so called Zagwe Dynasty (post Aksumite era that ended in the 13th century). The texts also validated the Shewan Kings’ claims to being direct descendants of the Aksumite legacy, which according to the Kǝbre Negest, was a part of the Solomonic line. While the intended purpose of the Kǝbre Negest is not yet well understood, the idea that it documented a dynastic Solomonic royal entitlement through Aksum indicates an intention to claim historical legitimacy. The colophon of the manuscript reports that the Kǝbre Negest was composed by Nǝbure Id Yisḥaq of Aksum at the order of Ya‘bike Egzi’ then governor of Enderta, Tigray. The Aksumite church of that time (late 13th-early 14th century) and their narrative values made their own contribution to the authentication of the Aksumite claim. Most importantly, the belief that the Ark of the Covenant is housed and protected in Aksum, was significant for the kings, and their claims to divine ordination. The Kǝbre Negest provided a strong legal foundation for the Church and the governing state, especially after the 14th century.

Even when medieval and modern Tigrayan nobles were perceived as competitors and threats by the Shewan kings, the Solomonic kings of Shewa persisted in glorifying their connection to Aksumite kings and the Ark of the covenant. Emperor Zara Yaqob (1434-68) introduced strong concepts of Mariology to the church, and elements of that focus combined with the Ark of the Covenant became the anchor for the whole royal package. The 15th century was a golden age for Gǝʿǝz literature and hagiographic tradition across the whole of northern Ethiopia and Eritrea. From this crucial period onwards, the Ethiopian Judaeo-Christian (Orthodox) belief is highly packed with folklore as the medieval oral and hagiographic traditions were influenced by myth and legend, which were instrumental for identity branding, power legitimacy and religious canonization. The existing folklore intermingled with a strong tradition that followed of manuscript production, translation, and adoption mainly from Syriac and Arabic sources, and brought the discourses of eschatology and prophesy into the Ethiopian religious state. The intermingling of the near east, and its religious and diplomatic relation with the Ethiopian state was influential during the medieval time. The Egyptian influence on the church has always been present and all Ethiopian patriarchs were from Egypt until 23 April 1891 when the first Ethiopian Archbishop Abba Basilios was ordained.

When a revolutionary group of Tigrayan monks called the Stephanites (14th -15th cent.) led by their founder Estifanos, formed a movement against King Zara Yaqob’s religious reforms, they were perceived as a real threat to King Zara Yaqob’s power, and he dealt very harshly with them. The Stephanites mainly rejected King Zara Yaqob’s excessive veneration of the cross, the festivals of St. Mary and the millenarian doctrine of Debre Ṣǝyon (lit. Mount Zion, Ethiopian eschatology). When they also strictly opposed the idea of bowing down to a king, Zara Yaqob characterised them as ፀረ ማርያም which literally translates to mean “enemies of Mary” in order to detach them from the Head of Churches and Monasteries in Aksum Tsion; he then massacred hundreds of them in broad daylight. Elements of their movement existed for one hundred years but they were brutally hunted down and tortured, clearly to be made an example of. Interestingly, most of the monasteries in Tigray which are linked to the Stephanites are dedicated to St. Mary: Gunda Gundo Marya, Asira Metira Maryam, and Maryam Dibo are some of them. The monastery of Samuel Qoyetsa, a well-known monastery in northwestern Tigray, named after Abba Samuel, the spiritual father of Estifanos, was attacked by the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and the Amhara Forces (AF). Priests were massacred and its heritage looted. The nunnery and church of Asira Metira St. Mary in eastern Tigray, one of the places where the Stephanites established their sect, was also targeted and the church’s heritage was looted. Monasteries with monks from the Stephanite tradition are renowned for their habit of doing good work. Asira Metira St. Mary is known to produce fruit, like oranges and apples. According to local reports, Eritrean soldiers destroyed some of their property.

Modern Ethiopian kings and their chroniclers were often preoccupied with prophesy and myth. Emperor Tewodros II (1855- 1868) for example, who was known as a modern Ethiopian reformist, was also known to consider himself as the prophesied “King Tewodros”, a king written about in the Ge’ez prophetic literature as Fikare Iyesus and talked about in oral prophecies. The prophesied King Tewodros was expected to be a king who would peacefully rule all of Ethiopia for 40 years and would be known as the “Lord of Peace”. Emperor Tewodros II was far from peaceful, destroying and burning many Christian churches because of the clergy’s reluctance to approve of his reformation; and his 13-year reign was riddled with battles and conflict.

The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church’s current political influence

Today, complex and conservative oral traditions and beliefs of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church are intermingled with the religion and politics that is still alive in Ethiopia. It seems that Ethiopia has encountered a miscarriage of social revolution and sidelined a real moderniaation process in the 20th century. There are many ordinary Ethiopians who are still waiting to see “The Lord of Peace” who will rule them for 40 years. Of course, it is easy to understand why a society fed up with a long history of civil wars would be eager to see a “Lord of Peace” and hence create a literary displacement foreshadowing stability. Even in the last decade there have been elders, mostly monks and hermits, in different Ethiopian monasteries and deserts, who claim themselves to be, or use oracles to prophesy about, the coming of “Emperor Tewodros.” 40 years is a significant number associated with any narrative about the “Lord of Peace” in Ethiopia.

This is a good moment to recapitulate some of the speeches of Ethiopia’s current Nobel Peace Prize winning Prime Minister, who is drenched in blood. The day Abiy Ahmed came to power, he said that his mother had told him a prophecy that he would be the seventh King of Ethiopia. Of course, he would be the seventh Ethiopian king/leader after Emperor Tewodros, but we are not sure what he meant by that. The Prime Minister’s political speeches frequently allude to Ethiopian Kings, he even commissioned a new statue of Emperor Menelik II in his palace. From the very beginning Abiy Ahmed seemed intent on manipulating Amhara activists desiring to be perceived as a king. In Abiy Ahmed’s recently released ten years’ strategic plan he said they had “Not only a ten-year plan, but also we have outlined a 30 years plan and in 2050 Ethiopian Calendar (2057) Ethiopia will be one of the most famous countries in the world. There is also a plan that says, ‘there will be two super-powers [in the world], one of them will be Ethiopia’. [Now] if we agree on the ten years’ plan, we will discuss the thirty years’ [another time];” and here we see that the idea of “forty years” is present.

After Abiy came to power, there have been various fresh and complex stories of prophecy that should not be overlooked when seeking to understand Ethiopian politics. Among many other mysticisms, a book has been written in Amharic about a monk from eastern Tigray called Abba Zewengel [Zäwängel] who is said to have lived for more than 610 years. He died on 21 October , 2019, just after he finished overseeing the building of his beautiful new church called Mesqele Kirstos (Cross of Christ) on the 30th of September 2019. Many Ethiopians had visited Abba Zewengel and consulted with him, relying on his wisdom and advice during the course of his lifetime. The Ethiopian Patriarch himself visited Abba Zewengel during the inauguration of the church, when it was named Debre Sina (lit. Mount Sinai). According to the book and related fragmented oral stories, after three years of hostility and brutality in Ethiopia, Abba Zewengel said: “The Lord of Peace” called Tewodros will come to power by 2015 EC (a year from now in 2023) and will rule Ethiopia peacefully from that church for the next forty years. The prophecy says there will be war and a plague in the whole world, and Ethiopia will become a global destination for displaced people. There are plenty of social media narratives circulating today that relate to this. Even the reluctance of some people to be vaccinated against Covid-19 has been twisted into this narrative. I myself for a moment wondered about the prophecy when at the beginning of 2021 I met an American living at the same hotel as was I in Addis Ababa. He informed me that he came to Ethiopia, which he called a “world destination,” to escape the Covid vaccinations in the US. I am not sure whether he evacuated from Addis Ababa when many diplomats recently left the city, because of the war.

According to the popular, oral stories of Abba Zewengel (we are not yet sure if he is the source of his own stories after all), 2056 EC will be the end of the peaceful life, the “False Messiah”, and two super beasts who will come to fight each other in the world. Is it not ironic then that Abba Zewengel’s own church Mesqele Kirstos was shelled many times, and destroyed by Eritrean soldiers at the beginning of January 2021, for Prime Minister Abiy does not want his ‘monarchy’ challenged by the prophesied “Lord of Peace?” It is a paradox that Ethiopia is currently one of the most destabilized countries in the world. Like many other churches, Mesqele Kǝrstos Ma‘abino was damaged on Ethiopia’s Christmas Day; Mahibere Deqiqe Estifanos, source of the data, made documentary film of it; almost all its ancient artefacts, including manuscripts were damaged. This is a good example of how prophecies, apocalyptic stories and mysticism can be instrumental in deceiving the community. The Ethiopian Prime Minister and his associates have been obsessed with Ethiopian public opinion, which is strongly associated with religious apocalyptic narratives. This is a manipulative and deceptive approach to gain legitimacy in the eyes of both the Ethiopian church elites and feudal politicians. Together, the Prime Minister, his associates, the Ethiopian church elite, and the feudal politicians are influential in constructing and orchestrating messaging and propaganda in the Ethiopian media. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s advisor, Daniel Kibret, for example, is amongst the church deacons known to narrate deceptive stories, while lacing them with bigotry. His ambitious claims, which rely on the Aksumite legacy, with its powerful religious, historical and mystical heritage, continues to this day.

21.2 Al Nejashi: Targeting a symbol of Tigray’s religious symbiosis (or coexistence/freedom)

While the Muslim population in Tigray remains a minority, they have a very significant historical mosque located in Negash. Some of Muhammad’s first followers found refuge with the Christian Aksumite Empire when they were facing persecution in Mecca. The King at the time welcomed the Muslims with open arms, provided them with protection and freedom to worship, and refused to expel the refugees even when rulers in Mecca sent lavish gifts and delegations to persuade him.15 tombs of the first immigrants from the First Hegira in Islam are located on the grounds of the Al Nejashi Mosque in eastern Tigray. It is considered to be an important symbol of the first Islamic settlement in Africa; today the oldest known Arabic inscription in Ethiopia and Eritrea is actually found in Quiha, Enderta in eastern Tigray and dates back to 972; studies tell us that some of the Arabic inscriptions discovered in Enderta were brought to the Archaeological Museum in Addis Ababa during the second half of the 20th century. During this war, the minaret of Al Nejashi Mosque was intentionally severely damaged; its dome partially collapsed and its façade was ruined. Civilians near the mosque were also killed.

21.3 Fracture of church authority

In the traditional sense of Christianity in Ethiopia, most believers rely on the practical deeds of their religious leaders and their confession fathers rather than on the scriptures. A priest in Tigray is multifunctional: a farmer, church servant, manuscript producer, traditional schoolteacher, etc. Not only were they massacred; the farmlands they plough are soaked with blood; the churches they serve are damaged, the manuscripts they produce have been looted or burned, the religious students they teach have been hunted down and murdered.

Many religious preachers, priests, and monks of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church participated in the brutalities in one or another way. Hence, the tradition of fearing God, respecting elders, kissing the hands/crosses of the clergy, and trusting religious leaders has been challenged in Ethiopia and especially in Tigray. It has resulted in cultural shock and may undermine or damage societal values. Hence, proactive rehabilitation is called for before the people of Tigray descend into a social and cultural collapse.

Already there are stories of women who were raped in front of their parents, who have committed suicide. Women who have become pregnant after being sexually abused have suffered deep, life changing, psychological trauma. Many interethnic marriages (mainly Tigray and Amhra, who had good mutual co-existence) have been so badly damaged the couples have divorced. Families have suffered from serious social crises.

Tigrayan society is now immersed in depression and frustration. They feel betrayed by both the state and the church. They have been denied recognition and justice from church leaders, federal representatives and from the global community.

As stated earlier, Aksum Tsion is the head of the church; it is the source of church’s law in Ethiopia, a holy city which is home to the Ark of the Covenant. More than 45 thousand arks in Ethiopia (one in the sanctuary of each church) are believed to be its replicas. The Ethiopian Patriarch is as the title of the Pope of Aksum. Yet the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church (EOTC) was silent when Aksum was disgraced; while Christian churches were destroyed, priests murdered, and ecclesiastical materials and manuscripts burned and/or looted. Except for the Patriarch, Abune Mathias, who is originally from Tigray, none of the members of the church council (synod) have officially condemned the brutalities. The Ethiopian Patriarch remains censored and under house arrest by the Ethiopian government, which collaborates with some members of the EOTC.

Subsequently, the Tigray Orthodox Tewahido Church became discontented after the EOTC position was found to be well below expectations. The Tigray Orthodox Tewahido Church Diocese stated its concerns and issued press releases to complain to the EOTC many times. Finally, on 7 January 2021, the International Orthodox Tewahido Church Association of Tigray Clergies sent an official letter to the EOTC in Addis Ababa announcing that the Tigray Church was severing its ties with the Ethiopian Church.

21.4 Destruction and theft of Tigrayan intangible heritage

In modern Ethiopia, there have always been disputes over the values ascribed to the cultural and historical objects and beliefs of different identities and political groups. This is especially true between Tigray in the north and the Amhara in the centre of the country. Throughout the country, there is also strong competition. Each group claims to have the best, the first, the oldest of everything. This sometimes becomes xenophobic, not only amongst Ethiopia’s nations states, but also for many
Ethiopian’s perceptions of their superiority in global esteem and importance.

It is important to understand that there is a tradition of moving both tangible and intangible objects of cultural significance into the centre of the country. This has been a common phenomenon which long predates the current war. There are various royal artifacts and ecclesiastical material which have been removed from Tigray and rehoused in areas of the Amhara Region or Addis Ababa. The Museum of Entoto St. Mary Church is a good example of this. Several ancient royal objects were taken from Aksum. There is a growing tendency to call this church the “Head of Churches and Monasteries” and demonstrates the trend of shifting Aksum Tsion’s position away from its historical home and to central Ethiopia. Irrespective of the displacement of cultural artifacts and the distortion of oral narratives of Aksumite values, the Aksumite Empire and its historical significance in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church is a well-established concept. It has, furthermore, remained popularly unchallenged because of the existent physical existence of buildings and statues, the written evidence, both in manuscripts and inscriptions, which has made it difficult to alter the historical narrative, despite media manipulation. The Ethiopian government’s objective appears to be the physical destruction of this heritage and the material documentation that supports it. Every effort is being made to eradicate the vital historical record that makes Tigray central to Ethiopia’s spiritual and emotional life.

Ashenda (Tigray women’s festival) is a long-celebrated folkloric and religious tradition in Tigray, in some parts of Eritrea, and some Agaw areas. It is one of the most colourful events of social performing folk arts that lasts for two weeks starting every 22 August. It is a beautiful, multigenerational celebration with dancing and singing and it is considered to be the ‘Day of Freedom’ for Tigrayan women. Almost a decade ago, the Ethiopian government took the initiative to register Ashenda as one of UNESCO’s world cultural heritages. As soon as this began, officials of Tigray and Amhara Culture and Tourism Bureaus, under intense pressure from political activists, engaged in a complicated conspiracy to try to take ownership of the festival. This festival had never been celebrated in a central Amhara in the past. Despite this, Ashenda was celebrated in August 2018 in Amhara’s capital city, Bahir Dar. This was the very first time it happened, and apparently the last; it was mostly believed to aimed at foregrounding Ashenda in Amhara for the registration only. There was, furthermore, a movement cultivated and strengthened by the Federal Government and Amhara politicians to call this festival the “Ethiopian Women’s Festival,” rather than “Ashenda” its authentic, historically correct name, during the registration process. This was intentional; an attempt to disassociate the festival from Tigray. While the application for registration was being processed, the Ethiopian government officially suspended it at the end of 2021. Ashenda itself, as it is celebrated in Tigray, is part of the intangible heritages of Tigray, which has been damaged during the war. Far from celebrating freedom, the conflict has denied Tigrayan women their freedom; has starved them and left tens of thousands sexually abused. Tigray health facilities reported 1,288 cases of gender-based violence during February to April 2021 alone: hence the Ashenda festival of 2021 was a day of lamentations.

Mahlete Gumaye, is named after the colourful folksong of the people of south and southeastern Tigray (especially in Rayya, Wejjerat and Enderta areas). It is an adventure, held most years, which involves a tour and gathering to celebrate folk-art in Awdewur. This is an area of jungle in the wilderness between Rayya and Wejjerat. It includes folksongs, oral poems, tales and legends and is accompanied by culture performances. Dibarte, is an ancient tradition involving women blessing villagers and is integral to Mahlete Gumaye. The women themselves are called after the practice:
“Dibarte”. The etymologically of this term has not been thoroughly studied but relates to driving out a spiritual power. The origins of Mahlete Gumaye comes from a desire to preserve endangered cultural values. The psycho-social problems of individuals are released in this isolated setting or “retreat”. Awdewur was attacked by drones early in the war, apparently targeting militia. I was there on 17 November 2020, a few days after the drone attack. It was also the location of one of the bitter battles for control of Tigray which occurred in the middle of November 2020, before ENDF forces took control of Mekelle. Both the place of the cult and its intangible values were vandalized; Mahilete Gumaye did not take place in 2021. Instead, it was celebrated in Frankfurt (Germany) – as a means of commemorating this important element of Tigrayan culture. But Awdewur itself is now a place of depression and desolation.

St. Yared of Aksum, a famous saint known for his role in Ethiopic musical compositions and notations with well-established oral and hagiographic tradition in Tigray, is facing a similar fate. Powerful figures now claim that he was actually not from Aksum but originally from Gondar in the Amhara region. Saint Yared is said to have lived at the end of the fifth and beginning of the sixth century when the Nine Saints, the Byzantine Roman monks, came to Aksum. Today there is a plan to construct a new church dedicated to Saint Yared in the Amhara region.

Al-Nejash is the site of the first known Islamic settlement in Africa and is a significant historical site in Tigray. One may ask why a huge mosque named after Al-Nejash is under construction in Addis Ababa, rather than in Tigray.

An intentional and systematic minimizing of Tigrayans in the annual celebration of the battle of Adwa, disregarding their extensive contributions to the anti-colonial war, which was fought in central Tigray, is part of the same agenda. There are many other examples of attempts to erode and minimize Tigray’s role in Ethiopia’s long and important heritage; to replace it with an alternative narrative based on a central Ethiopian version of events, with Aksumite values. As political tensions increased, the region’s invaders took out their frustrations on Tigray’s cultural heritage, which they have plundered or destroyed. The region, Ethiopia, and humanity as a whole, has suffered the consequences.

21.5 A culture, heritage, and people under attack

Besides the human carnage, icons of Tigray’s heritage have been intentionally targeted. The destruction of its intangible heritage and a widespread and intentional violation of values has aggravated the brutality Social norms have been transgressed without hesitation. Older women and little girls – without regard for their age – were raped in front of their relatives. So too were nuns and the wives of priests. Soldiers interrupted church services to intimidate, abuse and kill members of the clergy. Places of spiritual healing, like holy water springs and supplication settings, were demolished.

Churches and monasteries which were historically used as places of asylums and refuge during conflicts and were even believed to be endowed with a spiritual power to protect those seeking a haven, became hunting grounds where Tigrayans families could find no refuge. The sanctuaries themselves were destroyed.

This has led to doubt and confusion about the norms and beliefs of the society. It has even led many people to feel that they can no longer even pray. The aggressors have not only prevented Tigrayans from communicating with the international community, but they have also prevented many Tigrayans from seeking solace from their God, at this critical time.

22 Acknowledgements

Given the sensitivity of the subject, it is not possible to name all our contributors. However, we are immensely grateful to them for their diligence and scholarship:

• Anthony Shaw – nom de plume for a long-term consultant in Addis Ababa
• Ermias Teka is nom de plume for an Ethiopian analyst
• Felicity Mulford – Hillary Rodham Clinton scholar, Swansea University
• Habte Hagos – Fellow of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants and Chairman of Eritrea Focus
• Kjetil Tronvoll is the Director of Oslo Analytica, as well as Professor and Research Director of Peace and Conflict studies at Bjorknes Univesity College, Oslo.
• Mike Slotznick – Counsel to The America Team for Displaced Eritreans
• Martin Plaut – Senior Research Fellow Kings’ College London and former Africa Editor, BBC World Service News
• Sally Keeble – Former Labour MP for Northampton North and a Minister in the Department for International Development

23. About Eritrea Focus

Founded in 2014, Eritrea Focus is a Think Tank & Research organisation working with multiple non-governmental organisations to advance the democratisation of Eritrea. The objective of Eritrea Focus is to draw attention to the horrific abuses and suffering of Eritreans, both within the country and as refugees living abroad. We campaign for democratic accountability in Eritrea and the establishment of the rule of law, and actively engage with the international community in our efforts to achieve this.

24. Oslo-Analytica

Oslo Analytica is an independent research and consultancy company, registered in Norway. Oslo Analytica offers bespoke analysis and programming to governmental and multilateral agencies as well as the private sector. Provided services include research, teaching/training, policy analysis, and process support, within areas of conflict and peace, risk assessments, democratisation, human rights, governance, and due diligence processes.

25. Glossary

• AGOA: African Growth and Opportunity Act
• ALF: Afar Liberation Front
• AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia
• APDP: Afar People’s Democratic Party
• APPG: UK All-Party Parliamentary Group
• APP: Afar People’s Party
• ARDUF: Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front
• ASF: Afari Special Forces
• AU: African Union
• BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation
• B-GPDUF: Benishangul Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front
• BPLM: Benishangul Gumuz People’s Liberation Movement
• COI: Commission of Inquiry
• Derg: Military government that ruled Ethiopia 1974- 1987
• EDF: Eritrean Defence Force
• EDP: Ethiopian Democratic Party
• EFFORT: Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray
• EHRC: Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
• ENAMCO: Eritrean National Mining Corporation
• ENDF: Ethiopian National Defence Forces
• ERN: Eritrean Nakfa (currency)
• EOTC: Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church
• EPLF: Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
• EPDP: Eritrean People’s Democratic Party
• EPRDF: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
• EPRP: Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party’s
• ERA: Eritrean Relief Association
• ESAT: Ethiopian Satellite Television station
• EU: European Union
• EZEMA: Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice
• FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation
• FCDO: Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
• FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
• GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council
• GERD: Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
• GDP: Gross Domestic Product
• G7: Group of Seven
• HDI: Human Development Index
• HRC: Human Rights Commission
• ICC: International Criminal Court
• ICU: Islamic Courts Union
• IDP: Internally Displaced Person
• IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
• IPC: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
• IMF: International Monetary Fund
• JIT: Joint Investigation Team
• KSA: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
• LSE: London Stock Exchange
• METEC: Metals and Engineering Corporation
• MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières
• NAMA: National Movement of Amhara
• NEPAD: New Partnerships for Africa’s Development
• NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations
• NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council
• OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
• OHCHR: UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
• OFC: Oromo Federalist Congress
• OLA: Oromo Liberation Army
• OLF: Oromo Liberation Front
• ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front
• ONUB: UN Operation in Burundi
• OLA: Oromo Liberation Army
• PG7: Patriotic Gimbot 7
• PFDJ: Peoples Front for Democracy and Justice [successor to the EPLF]
• PP: Prosperity Party
• PSVI: Prevention Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative
• PSNP: Productive Safety Net Program
• REST: Relief Society of Tigray
• RRC: Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
• RSADO: Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation
• SAM: Severe Acute Malnutrition
• SGBV: Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
• SNM: Somalia National Movement
• SMEG: Somalia/Eritrea Monitoring Group
• TDF: Tigray Defence Force
• TDA: Tigray Development Associated
• TPLF: Tigray People’s Liberation Front
• TSF: Tigray Special Forces
• UAE: United Arab Emirates
• UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
• UCAV: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles
• UN: United Nations
• UNAMIR: UN Mission in Rwanda
• UNAMID: UN African Union Mission in Darfur
• UNEOE: UN Emergency Office for Ethiopia
• UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
• UNFPA: UN Population Fund
• UNHAS: UN Humanitarian Air Service
• UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees
• UNISFA: UN Interim Security Force
• UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
• UNMIL: UN Mission in Liberia
• UNMISS: United Nation Mission in South Sudan
• UNSC: United Nation Security Council
• USAID: US Agency for International Development
• US: United States of America
• WFP: World Food Programme
• WHO: World Health Organisation

26. Contact information:

Email: info@eritrea-focus.org
Website: www.eritrea-focus.org