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Retrospectives, Changes, Comparative Outlook, and Future Trajectory
Desta Kahsay Negussie
Alumni Note
Yemen, the Horn of Africa and beyond form a single, interdependent security complex. What has changed since 2022 is not the existence of fragility, but its scale of internationalisation.
Geneva Centre for Security Policy
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About the author
Mr Desta Kahsay Negussie is a former diplomat and was stationed at the
Embassy of Ethiopia in Yemen. He dedicated his career to researching and lecturing on the complex political landscapes of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. His expertise and experiences led him to write the book “The Conflict in Yemen and Its Shadow on the Horn of Africa”. He is a part-time lecturer at Addis Ababa University and an active member of the GCSP Alumni network in Ethiopia. His academic foundation includes a degree in Political Science and International Relations, followed by a Master of Arts on the Geopolitics of the Middle East and Northern Africa.
Purchase his book The Conflict in Yemen and its Shadow on the Horn of
Africa: on Amazon here
Introduction: The 2022 Shift
The ongoing conflict in Yemen, represents one of the most severe political and humanitarian crises in the contemporary Middle East and Red Sea region, which is rooted in historical and political grievances, fragmentation, and social division.
Having served for nine years as a diplomat at the Embassy of Ethiopia to Yemen, Mr Desta Kahsay Negussie gained firsthand insight into the country’s complex political landscape and humanitarian challenges. Drawing on this experience, he published a book titled “The Conflict in Yemen and its Shadow on the Horn of Africa” in 2022, in which he argued that Yemen and the Horn of Africa were already experiencing profound fragility shaped by civil war, insurgency, state fragmentation, and intense regional rivalries. The book outlines the volatile strategic environment of the Bab al-Mandab, Red Sea region and Gulf of Aden, identifying it as an area defined by intense competition among regional, international, and non-state actors, including the Ansar Allah (commonly called Houthis) movement, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the South Transitional Council (STC), and the internationally recognised government of the Presidential Leadership Council. However, these crises were often analysed separately – Yemen as a Middle Eastern civil war and the Horn as a set of African security challenges.1
His previous work suggested that this separation was analytically misleading. The Red Sea basin had evolved into a single strategic security theatre, where local conflicts were increasingly embedded within regional and global geopolitical competition. In recent years, the conflict has intersected with broader regional tensions, especially the escalating confrontation between Iran and Israel: the Houthis have launched missile and drones towards Israel and attacked Red Sea shipping in solidarity with Palestinian groups and in alignment
with Tehran, prompting retaliatory strikes on Houthi targets. Thus, 2022 marked a shift from localised crises to an interlinked regional security threat with global geoeconomic consequences.
The Red Sea is one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors, linking Europe, Asia, and Africa. Instability in Yemen was not confined to its borders – it was radiating outward into the Horn of Africa through military cooperation, port agreements, arms flows, migration routes, and proxy engagement. Since 2022, this interconnectedness has intensified, particularly with the escalation of maritime insecurity and expanding regional rivalries.
Retrospective: Yemen and the Horn of Africa (2022 and Prior)
Prior to 2022, the Yemeni conflict evolved from a domestic civil war – rooted in political fragmentation and weak state institutions – into a regional proxy battlefield involving external actors like Saudi Arabia and Iran. This conflict was never isolated; its effects created a shadow over the Horn of Africa, where states like Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia navigated a complex environment of on land and/or maritime insecurity.
As predicted, this region has become a central zone of contestation where Yemen’s fragmentation exacerbates broader instabilities, such as the insurgency in Somalia, a conflict of interest between Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates and political fragility in Sudan and Ethiopia. What remained latent, at the time of writing, was that maritime insecurity had not yet escalated into the direct global shipping disruptions of the scale we have seen recently. The intensity of security and economic spillover effects were less visible in 2022 than they are today.
The internationalisation of Yemen’s conflict has transformed the maritime domain into a permanent arena for geopolitical rivalry. Framed as Gaza solidarity, the Houthi strategy utilises a three-phase2 plan to achieve regional hegemony. Phase 1 disrupts Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping lanes to assert maritime control near Yemen. Phase 2 projects military power through direct engagement with Israel via Syria and Jordan, forcing defensive resource diversion. Phase 3 establishes regional power status through strategic alliances and military posturing extending from the east across Iraq and Syria3.
Ultimately, this progressive escalation integrates maritime disruption and direct conflict as strategy for regional influence and disruption, centre on the activities of the Houthis, Iran and their regional partners. Then, the phases move from localised maritime disruption to broader geopolitical dominance. Within this context, the Houthis have transitioned from a local militia into a formidable regional power. By employing a multifaceted strategy of maritime disruption and military projection, they have sustained operations against
international intervention, delivering a persistent and profound shock to the global security architecture.
Major Changes Since 2022
Since 2022, Yemen’s conflict has further fragmented the country. The Houthis control most of the north, while the UAE-backed STC has expanded its influence in the south, at times clashing with the internationally recognised government. While Saudi Arabia’s direct combat role has declined – shifting toward airstrikes and diplomacy – regional tensions persist, particularly regarding Red Sea security, which is a crucial trade route, carrying 15% of global shipping and 33% of container traffic; consequently, any regional disruptions severely impact the global economy4. Humanitarian conditions continue to worsen, with millions facing food insecurity and displacement amid widespread
human rights abuses.
This fragmentation has driven three critical trends:
Maritime Insecurity: The Red Sea is no longer just a transit corridor but an active security flashpoint. Attacks on commercial vessels and global shipping reruns underscore the economic vulnerability created by Yemen’s unresolved conflict. Red Sea attacks have forced vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, causing significant delays and surging fuel and insurance costs. These disruptions have ultimately destabilised global supply chains and increased the price of goods5.
Regional Rivalries: Gulf states, Egypt, and Türkiye are competing for influence across the Horn of Africa. This focus on strategic ports and
security arrangements has added layers of complexity to the region’s fragile state structures. Currently, the escalating Saudi-Emirati rivalry is spilling beyond Yemen, realigning regional alliances and heightening geopolitical instability across the Red Sea6.
Transnational Armed Networks: Highly adaptive networks now facilitate smuggling and arms transfers across the Red Sea. These informal systems have blurred the lines between maritime and territorial boundaries, turning the region into a major conduit for irregular networks. Maritime security is deteriorating as Al-Shabaab and Houthi cooperation bolsters their disruptive capabilities across the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Despite their ideological divide, a February 2025 UN report confirms that the Houthis and Al-Shabaab have begun trading weapons and training for piracy and smuggling services7.
A surge in Houthi missile and drone attacks since late 2023, coupled with a sudden resurgence in regional piracy, has forced a 50-60% decline in Suez Canal transit. This instability directly threatens the global economy by obstructing a corridor that handles nearly a third of the world’s container traffic8.
Persistent Structural Challenges
Despite shifting political dynamics, Yemen and the broader region face persistent structural challenges that perpetuate a cycle of instability. Authority remains fragmented among the Houthis, the STC, and the internationally recognised government – a pattern mirrored in the fragile governance structures of Somalia, Sudan, and to some extent in Ethiopia. These incomplete political settlements allow non-state actors like the Houthis and Al-Shabaab to exploit social marginalisation. Notably, the Houthis’ success in acquiring advanced weaponry and disrupting maritime trade now serves as a dangerous blueprint for other regional groups, threatening global navigation.
This institutional breakdown is compounded by a deepening humanitarian and economic crisis. Collapsing currencies, high unemployment, and destroyed infrastructure have left millions dependent on foreign aid, turning human insecurity into a permanent reality. Furthermore, external interventions remain a central, often destabilising, force. Without a coordinated regional security framework, these interventions entrench proxy dynamics – such as the rivalries between Saudi Arabia/UAE and Iran/Israel, or Egypt and Ethiopia – transforming weak states into geopolitical battlegrounds. This structural continuity confirms the book’s central thesis: that without systemic reform, the region will remain a zone of contested sovereignty and external influence.
Comparative Outlook and Future Trajectory
Yemen’s conflict resembles other protracted civil wars marked by fragmented authority and external intervention, such as those in Syria and Libya. Yemen’s multiple power centres – the Houthis in the north, the STC in the south, and the weakened Presidential Leadership Council – mirror the patterns of decentralised control and contested legitimacy seen in other regional conflicts. Looking ahead, the trajectory remains uncertain; without meaningful political recognition, Yemen risks continued fragmentation and humanitarian deterioration. While grassroots initiatives may temporarily stabilise certain areas, they cannot replace national governance.
A comparative perspective reveals that while the visibility of insecurity has increased – particularly in the maritime space – the underlying drivers remain unchanged. The region risks moving toward chronic, interconnected instability that produces global geopolitical consequences. Currently, uncontrolled competition and militarisation outweigh managed economic partnerships. This competition has become a defining feature of the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea, shaping future strategic dynamics.
In his 2022 publication, Negussie provides a comparative analysis of the security landscapes of Yemen and the Horn of Africa, illustrating that their relationship transcends mere geographic proximity to encompass deep-seated economic, social, and political interdependencies. His research suggests a critical distinction between the perceived and actual drivers of the Yemeni conflict; while often framed as a religious struggle, he argues that sectarianism is merely a tool manipulated by actors to consolidate political power; however, if the civil war continues to escalate as it is now, it is inevitable that sectarianism will grow over time. This mirrors broader regional struggles where inegalitarian political systems, widespread corruption, and the systematic exclusion of marginalised groups serve as the primary catalysts for instability.
Furthermore, the publication compares the internal grievances of the Yemeni state with the external pressures of regional proxy wars, notably those involving Saudi Arabia and Iran, and United Arab Emirates included. Desta Kahsay Negussie highlights how Yemen’s domestic instability inevitably casts a “shadow” over the Horn of Africa, creating a shared security crisis. The comparative evidence demonstrates that the instability affecting Yemen directly manifests in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia through a synchronised rise in piracy, refugee crises, human trafficking, terrorism, and arms smuggling. This interconnectedness has shifted geopolitical alliances and
intensified rivalries over strategic ports, fundamentally altering the balance of power across the Red Sea.
The gravity of maritime disruption could incentivise the creation of a more structured Red Sea security framework. However, the future will likely be determined by the Western and Gulf states’ approaches to Iran and the Houthis, as well as the resolution of crises in Yemen, Gaza, Sudan and Somalia. If these issues are not met with due attention, the convergence of advanced non-state military capabilities and regional rivalries will maintain the region as a high-risk zone, threatening global trade corridors, migration flows, and energy markets.
The future trajectory of the region, as outlined in his study, remains contingent upon addressing the fundamental hurdles of national identity and institutional maturity. He emphasises that the nascent state of democratic institutions and the absence of a cohesive, overarching national identity are the primary obstacles to long-term stability. The central variable in Yemen’s future remains
the ongoing competition among various actors to monopolise political, economic, and military power.
Moving forward, Negussie’s research concludes that a positive trajectory can only be achieved through a comprehensive and inclusive dialogue that brings together external stakeholders and all internal protagonists, Houthi included. If a brokered peace is not realised, the region is projected to face a worsening humanitarian catastrophe and a permanent state of regional insecurity. The spillover effects of a failed Yemeni state will likely continue to jeopardise the stability of the Horn Africa, the Red Sea, the Arab Gulf, and beyond as of now.
Closing Reflection
The conflict in Yemen is a multifaceted interplay of intrastate and interstate actor influences, which has left the country fragmented and its people enduring severe humanitarian suffering. This state of affairs has created a reinforced cycle of violence and instability. While localised ceasefires offer limited respite, sustainable peace requires inclusive political dialogue, the rebuilding of national state institutions, and long-term economic recovery.
Ultimately, the central argument of the 2022 publication remains valid: Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the surrounding regions form a single, interdependent security complex. What has evolved since 2022 is not the presence of fragility, but the scale of its internationalisation. The Red Sea has transitioned into a focal point of global strategic concern. Achieving sustainable stability will
require moving beyond fragmented, reactive crisis management and toward a model of integrated global and regional security governance.
