Source: The African Realist
On Dec 26th, Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state, ending the self-declared republic’s 34-year quest for international legitimacy. The move carries significant implications for Horn of Africa geopolitics, maritime security in the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea corridor, and the broader regional order, increasingly shaped by strategic competition.
Somaliland’s path to recognition reflects its distinct historical trajectory. Formerly the British Somaliland Protectorate, it gained internationally recognized independence in June 1960, before uniting with Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic just five days later. That union collapsed in 1991, and Somaliland has since maintained de facto statehood without formal international recognition, even as several countries maintained liaison offices in Hargeisa.
Israel’s recognition marks a turning point in Somaliland’s external engagement. It also reflects Tel Aviv’s effort to consolidate partnerships at a time when its international standing faces strain. Diplomatic challenges – including the humanitarian toll of the Gaza conflict, criticism in multilateral forums, and declining public opinion in many states – have intensified Israel’s search for new alignments that advance both security and trade objectives. In this context, Somaliland emerges as a strategically valuable partner: its coastline along the Gulf of Aden, anchored by the UAE-operated port of Berbera and facing Yemen, offers potential access for maritime surveillance and counter-threat operations along sea lanes increasingly affected by Houthi activity. Netanyahu also framed the recognition within the Abraham Accords as part of Israel’s broader effort to normalize relations with Arab and other Muslim-majority countries, giving Israel a modest but symbolically significant foothold in a corridor where Iranian influence through Houthi proxies has grown.
For Somaliland, the recognition provides a rare diplomatic boost and strengthens its external profile, though practical benefits remain limited, as it is still outside the UN and major financial institutions, and regional opposition could reinforce its isolation. Local and regional dynamics will ultimately determine whether this symbolic recognition translates into tangible gains.
A Symbolic Boost for Somaliland
Last week’s recognition comes at a particularly challenging moment for Somaliland. Its territorial boundaries, defined by the former British Protectorate, have been sharply contested since the 2023 conflict in Las Anod, the capital of the Sool region. Sustained armed resistance by the Dhulbahante and Warsangali clans, who reject separation from Somalia, drove Somaliland’s forces out after months of fighting, marking the decisive loss of Sool, a region claimed by Hargeisa since 1991. This setback disrupted a three-decade status quo, exposing the limits of Somaliland’s authority beyond the Isaaq heartland and intensifying fragmentation amid a more assertive Somali federal government. It also crystallized Somaliland’s underlying vulnerabilities, as it increasingly functions as a one-clan, Isaaq-dominated enclave centered on Hargeisa, Berbera, and Burco, struggling to maintain inclusive governance beyond these core areas.
Somalia’s federal government moved quickly to consolidate these shifts. In July 2025, it recognized the North Eastern State, formerly SSC-Khaatumo, as its sixth federal member state, incorporating Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn into Somalia’s framework and directly overlapping Somaliland’s historical territorial claims. This institutionalized Hargeisa’s loss of authority in the east, expanded Mogadishu’s political leverage, and undermined Somaliland’s claim to represent these populations, weakening a core pillar of its independence argument.
Domestically, these territorial pressures have reinforced political uncertainty. The transition from President Muse Bihi to President Abdirahman Irro in late 2024 did little to restore stability. Irro has struggled to assert control in the east, where Dhulbahante and Warsangali communities remain beyond Hargeisa’s reach, while renewed inter-clan clashes in the west, including in Boroma this month, have further strained his administration.
Somaliland’s earlier diplomatic maneuvers help explain the significance of Israel’s recognition. In January 2024, outgoing President Muse Bihi signed a memorandum with Ethiopia granting a 50-year lease on a coastal stretch and expanded access to Berbera port in exchange for possible recognition. While hailed as historic in Hargeisa, the deal backfired as Somalia mobilized regional opposition, and under Turkish mediation, Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration, prioritizing relations with Mogadishu over Somaliland’s recognition claim.
Israel’s recognition is therefore a rare political win for Somaliland, providing international validation at a moment when its territorial and diplomatic position is weakened. While the symbolic value is high, practical benefits remain limited: Somaliland remains outside the UN and international financial institutions, and regional opposition combined with association with controversial Israeli policies could further isolate Hargeisa.
Mogadishu’s Response and Possible Outcomes
Mogadishu faces a challenging and unavoidable situation, unable to reverse Israel’s recognition, yet tasked with carefully managing its consequences. Though its options are limited, the federal government can rally allies, reinforce territorial claims, and work to ensure that Israel’s move remains an isolated case rather than triggering a broader domino effect.
Somalia has intensified and is expected to continue intensifying its diplomatic efforts through the African Union, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the United Nations. Regional opposition, particularly from the African Union and Arab League, as well as influential states such as Egypt and Turkey, seeks to contain recognition and uphold Somalia’s territorial integrity.
Mogadishu is also likely to rely on close regional partners, particularly Egypt and Turkey, whose coordinated pressure on Ethiopia in 2024, culminating in the Ankara Declaration, successfully contained earlier challenges to Somali sovereignty. A similar approach could now help limit further recognition efforts by signaling that the political and economic costs of recognizing Somaliland outweigh symbolic gains.
Domestically, the newly recognized Somali federal state, North Eastern State, provides the federal government with a tangible means to contest both Somaliland’s territorial claim and its narrative of self-determination. By channeling resources, integrating security forces, and embedding federal institutions in Sool and Sanaag regions, the government can demonstrate a viable governance alternative within Somalia’s constitutional framework. This could erode one of Somaliland’s independence arguments – that Hargeisa represents the entirety of the former British Protectorate. – if it replaces it with visible, functional federal authority. The strategy, however, carries risks. It could reignite local conflict, its success depends heavily on repairing relations with Puntland given overlapping claims in Sool and Sanaag, and may invite external involvement that undermines Mogadishu’s sovereignty.
Tel Aviv’s recognition also adds new pressures to Somalia’s broader federal calculus. If state–federal tensions persist, regional leaders in Puntland and Jubaland are likely to monitor whether Somaliland secures tangible gains, including diplomatic support, investment, or security cooperation. Should these gains materialize, other federal member states, particularly Puntland, which has shown receptivity to Somaliland’s recognition, could follow suit, heightening strain on the federal framework and testing its cohesion.
What happens next hinges on whether Mogadishu can mobilize its diplomatic strategy and how major external actors respond. While a broader wave of international recognition for Somaliland remains unlikely, two scenarios are plausible in the coming year.
The first, and most likely, scenario is isolated recognition, in which Israel remains the sole country recognizing Somaliland while the AU, Arab League, and key regional powers press Washington to reaffirm Somalia’s territorial integrity. In this scenario, Somaliland gains greater visibility and a single bilateral recognition, but it remains in limbo – neither fully part of Somalia nor fully independent.
The second plausible scenario is a limited cascade. Pressure from Israel and segments of the U.S. conservative establishment could prompt the U.S. to follow Israel’s lead, framing recognition as part of a broader pro-Israel, anti-Iran, and anti-China strategy in the Red Sea. This would lend Somaliland diplomatic weight, attract economic engagement, and draw support from states such as Ethiopia. Yet it would still fall short of UN or international financial institution membership and could complicate U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Somalia or strain relations with regional partners. Should such a cascade occur, there is a risk that internal fragmentation could intensify, as other federal member states observe Somaliland’s external partnerships and consider pursuing similar diplomatic or economic arrangements. In this scenario, Israel’s recognition shifts from a symbolic gesture to a consequential event, generating new internal pressures within Somalia and reshaping the wider regional order.
Whichever trajectory unfolds, the implications are significant. For Somaliland, Israel’s recognition provides historic validation but carries substantial political and regional risks, effectively tying its fortunes to Tel Aviv at a moment of growing international scrutiny. Regional and international opposition—including the European Union, Arab League, African Union, East African Community—could strain Somaliland’s ties, while an Israeli presence may draw attention from the Houthis, influencing security dynamics in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. Additionally, while the UAE, which operates Berbera port and holds extensive commercial and strategic interests in Somaliland, is broadly aligned with Israel on countering Houthi influence, its broader priorities may differ, creating both opportunities for cooperation and potential sources of tension in regional influence.
At the same time, Ethiopia faces a delicate balancing act, weighing whether to reactivate its memorandum of understanding with Somaliland to secure long-sought access to a naval base or maintain contentious relations with Mogadishu and other regional partners.
All in all, while Israel’s recognition offers Somaliland a rare political victory, its broader impact depends on Washington’s stance, Ethiopia’s balancing between access and cooperation with Mogadishu, and Somalia’s ability to convert external support into coordinated local and federal action. The move reshapes incentives across Ethiopia, Egypt, Turkey, and other Red Sea actors, introducing new strategic calculations. In the short term, Somaliland’s status and federal dynamics remain largely unchanged, but the recognition elevates the stakes in a fragile region, showing how even a single state’s decision can shift the political and strategic calculus in the Horn of Africa.
